


USFK/EUSA
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READ AHEAD PACKET
BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI
13-15 FEBRUARY 1951



Cover Photograph:

Patrol from Intelligence and Reconnaissance Company, 2ID returning to Chipyeong-ni, 10 February 1951. Note the railroad overpass in the background.

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BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI
13-15 February 1951

Significance: At Chipyong-ni, Chinese forces suffered their first tactical defeat since entering the Korean War in November 1950. An all-out Chinese offensive had been broken and their withdrawal from the crossroads village, a keystone of Eighth Army's central front, signaled an enemy pullback all along the Chinese line of advance southward. If Chipyong-ni had fallen, the entire United Nations Command front would have been severely endangered. General Ridgway regarded the defense of Chipyong-ni as the turning point in the Eighth Army's revitalization. After defeating the massive Chinese effort, the Army advanced steadily northward, recaptured Seoul by mid-March 1951, and by the first day of spring stood just below the 38th parallel.

Order of Battle: Enemy--Elements of five Chinese divisions, identified by 79 prisoners taken during the battle.

Friendly--23d Infantry Regiment (2d Infantry Division), COL Paul L. Freeman, Jr., commanding, with following attachments:

French Battalion	1st Ranger Co*
37th FA Bn (105mm)	Co B, 2d Engr Bn
Btry B, 82d AAA AW Bn	2d Plat, Clr Co, 2d Med Bn
Btry B, 503d FA Bn (155mm)*	
*Nondivisional unit	

Casualties: Enemy--estimated nearly 5,000; Friendly--52-plus killed, 259 wounded, 42 missing. (Approximate 11-to-1 ratio.)

Unit Decorations: 23d Infantry Regiment and all attached units awarded US Distinguished Unit Citation (later designated Presidential Unit Citation).

Relatively little has been published on the tactical aspects of the battle. The following material was compiled by Mr. Thomas M. Ryan, USFK/EUSA Command Historian, and includes both published and unpublished accounts of the battle:

TAB A

"Chipyong-ni," author unknown. General overview of the battle based on the regimental command report.

TAB B

FM 100-5-Operations. Extracts include Combat Fundamentals, Conduct of Operations, Fundamentals of the Defense, The Defense, Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces, and Joint Operations.

TAB C

"Twin Tunnels Patrol Ambush" taken from Combat Actions in Korea by Russell A. Gugeler. Twin Tunnels is named for a pair of railroad tunnels located approximately 4 kilometers southeast of Chipyeong-ni. On 30 January 1951 it was the scene of a fierce engagement between the 23d Regiment (-) and at least one Chinese division. This chapter describes a Chinese ambush of a US reconnaissance patrol. It is based on after-action interviews conducted by a Military History Detachment assigned to 2ID.

TAB D

"Chipyeong-ni" taken from Combat Actions in Korea by Russell A. Gugeler. This chapter describes the fighting in the sector held by G Company. On the night of 14-15 February 1951, the company was overrun by Chinese infantry, creating a serious threat to the regimental perimeter. This account, based on interviews with survivors, is taken from a manuscript prepared by a Military History Detachment shortly after the battle. It is the only detailed tactical publication on the battle.

TAB E

"The Siege of Chipyeong-ni" by COL James W. Edwards. COL Edwards commanded the 2d Battalion, 23d Regiment during the battle. After the war, he authored an as yet unpublished book-length manuscript on the battalion's actions during the war. The 2d Battalion defended the south-southeast sector of the perimeter and withstood repeated Chinese Communist attacks. COL Edward's account is the most detailed tactical description of the battle available. It is reproduced with the permission of his son, James B. Edwards, a West Point graduate.

TAB F

"Chipyeong-ni" by LT Robert Curtis. LT Curtis served with F Company, 2d Battalion, 23d Regiment during the battle. Following the Chinese breakthrough of the G Company positions, LT Curtis was directed by the 2d Battalion commander to help organize the counterattack to regain the lost positions. This unpublished manuscript was prepared in 1988. Curtis retired from the Army as a lieutenant colonel.

TAB G

"Allied Cooperation in a Combined Arms Battle: The French Battalion at Chipyeong-ni, Korea, February, 1951." A research paper prepared by CPT Donald T. Murphy, May 1976. This paper discusses the French UN battalion attached to the 23d Regimental Combat Team at Chipyeong-ni.

TAB H

"Task Force Crombez" taken from Combat Actions in Korea by Russell A. Gugeler. This account describes an armored-infantry force from the 1st Cavalry Division sent to relieve the 23d Regiment at Chipyeong-ni. This account is also based on a series of interviews conducted shortly after the action.

TAB I

"Critique of Tactics Employed in the First Encounter with the Enemy at Chipyeong-ni." Extract translated from a captured Chinese Communist booklet entitled "A Collection of Combat Experiences." This Chinese "after action report" is difficult to follow in places but the lessons learned by the Chinese are unmistakable.

TAB J Oral History Transcripts

TAB K After Action Review Format

TAB L 1:50,000 scale map showing Chipyeong-ni and vicinity

TAB A

CHIPYONG-NI

A United Nation counter-offensive, north from the 37th parallel on a line running through WonJu, started on 5 February 1951.

At this time the U.S. 23rd Infantry Regimental Combat Team, then under the command of Col(now Gen) Paul Freeman had been ordered to the vital cross roads at Chipyong-ni, roughly on the boundary of IX Corps and X Corps twenty miles beyond friendly lines.

On 11 February, the Chinese struck X Corps with two main columns pointed toward Hoengsong and WonJu. The heavy attack slashed through two division, forcing withdrawals and leaving the 23rd Infantry in an even more exposed and isolated position. General Ridgway ordered the Regiment to stand fast.

During the night of 13 Feb the Chinese offensive switched west to the heart of the 23rd Infantry, its strength aimed at Chipyong-ni. The village's fall and the loss of the road junction would threaten the entire west-central front.

The village of Chipyong-ni is situated in an oval shaped valley three miles wide and six miles long. Gently sloping, the barren hills which surround the village range in elevation from four hundred to one hundred meters in height. The enemy seized the dominating hills surrounding the town and cut all routes of supply and evacuation. Because of this, the defense perimeter was drawn tightly around the town, using the gentle slopes which afforded the best fields of fire. In setting-up a perimeter defense for Chipyong-ni a ring of low-lying hills surrounding the town was used rather than more easily defensible hills which were available further out but which would have required more forces than were available. The circular clock-like defense, when established, situated the First Battalion consisting of A & C Company on the perimeter from the 1200 O'clock position to the 1:00 O'clock position. The Third Battalion was occupying the hills from 2:00 O'clock to 5:00 O'clock and was composed of I L & K Companies. E F & G Companies composed the 2nd Bn, which was located from 5:00 O'clock to 7:00 O'clock. And in the west were the French, situated from 7:00 O'clock to 11:00 O'clock.

In regimental reserve was "B" Company and, subsequently, the 1st Ranger Comapny, both placed within the perimeter behind "A" and "C" Companies.

Heavy flare activity marked the late afternoon and evening around the 23rd's perimeter on 13 February. Small arms and mortar fire began to fall into the area between 22:00 and 23:00 hours from the northwest, north and southeast. Shortly before midnight an intense mortar and artillery barrage crashed into the northern sector of the perimeter held by the First Battalion and immediately after it lifted, the long expected attack materialized. Bugles, whistles, and yells sounded over the cold, night air; dull red and green flares burst and hung in the sky and the arcs of tracers flashed and ricocheted through the dark. By midnight, the frenzied attacks had spread with only the Third Battalion on the east not engaged. Mortar and artillery rained in upon the regimental command post and the artillery positions. The command post of the First Battalion was set on fire by the flying tracers.

Shortly after midnight, the fighting eased, but a fresh attack was launched from out of the north and northwest at 0100 hours. The rushing, yelling enemy was repulsed but as the firing died down, troops on the perimeter could hear the click of shovels as the Chinese dug-in to stay.

The force of the attack was shifted at 0215 hours when the Chinese launched a bloody frontal assault from the southwest and east, particularly against "K" Company. The perimeter held strong so with continued pressure in the south the masses of Chinese hurled themselves at the French in the north in yet another effort to pierce the circle of defenders. As the waves of attackers struck the French Battalion, intense pressure on "C" Company of the First Battalion forced a slight withdrawal, but an immediate counter-attack regained the lost ground. The entire perimeter blazed with fire as the artillery poured round after round into the determined, frenzied attackers and defenders slammed all the firepower they could muster into the hordes, by 0530 hours, the pressure had eased once again except in front of the French Battalion and "K" Company, both of whom were repulsing attack after attack.

At first light of 14 February, the Chinese attempted to slice their way into Chipyeong-ni through "K" and "I" Companies. The ring of steel held-elsewhere, the battered assault troops of the five Chinese Divisions surrounding Chipyeong-ni made stabs at the perimeter then fell back under withering mortar, artillery and small arms fire. And with the coming of daylight came a break in the action. The Chinese, fearing the devastating effect of observed artillery fire and air strikes broke physical contact, withdrew and contented themselves with intermittent mortar fire into the besieged garrison.

Reports of increased enemy activity were received by the 23rd late in the afternoon of the 14th. Then at 2030 hours, the Chinese unloaded a mortar barrage on "K" Company an hour later "C" Company was receiving fire and could hear the enemy digging-in its positions. In spite of the air-dropped ammo, there was a critical shortage of 8-round clips of M-1 ammunition with the entire supply already in the hands of the companies. Shortly after darkness had blotted out all observation, the first enemy onslaught of the night fell on the Second Battalion sector. Simultaneously the regimental command post came under a blasting barrage of mortar, artillery and small arms fire which, in an hour, had spread to cover the position of the mortar company and the trains of the French Battalion. The fighting on the perimeter mounted in intensity with both the Second and Third Battalions engaged in fierce, close combat as the enemy sought to drive a wedge into the perimeter. Bugles signaled new and more fanatical attacks.

"K" Company was struck at 0130 hours but repulsed two assaults as the pressure again mounted in the south and southwest. Ammunition shortage threatened to become critical and a radio message for relief went through Division to Japan where the supply services of the Japan Logistical Command loaded waiting planes throughout the night so air drops could be made at first light.

The first penetration of the perimeter was made at 2030 hours when savage blows by hordes of Chinese drove in to the positions of "I" Company. An immediate counterattack by "I" and "L" Companies slashed forward and cut the penetration out, restoring the positions in bitter hand-to-hand battle. It seemed impossible that the perimeter could continue to withstand the mounting pressure by the vastly numerically superior foe.

At 0315 hours, "C" Company reported a second penetration and all efforts to stem it had failed. It was withdrawing with heavy casualties. The Regimental commander, Lt Col John H. Chiles who had been flown into perimeter to replace the badly wounded Col Paul Freeman, ordered a composite force assembled to counterattack. The 1st Ranger Company, a platoon from "F" Company and the remnants of "G" Company gathered to attack while in the north "A" Company and "C" Company beat-off several attacks.

The composite counterattack force struck at the enemy penetration at 0615 hours. Hand-to-hand fighting raged fiercely as the Chinese attempted to hold their gains. The counterattack force suffered mounting casualties

and each attempt to move forward was repulsed. "B" Company, the only remaining reserve, was ordered to join the attack against the penetration at 0800 but was pinned down under murderous fire. The situation was desperate. At 1230, the relief column was 9,000 yards southwest of its goal but progress toward the seriously threatened garrison was slow against the fire from every side.

At 1400 hours, with "B" Company still pinned down, air strikes were called in upon the enemy entrenched in the gap in the perimeter. Napalm splashed and seared over the grimly holding enemy troops. It was too much. Burned and screaming they withdrew and "B" Company rose up, firing into the retreating forces, then advancing and regaining the lost position.

Amid the frantic battle, planeload after planeload of ammunition was dropped to the garrison which was holding on by its fingernails. Enemy mortar, falling into the deep zone, inflicted heavy casualties as the troops exposed themselves to regain the precious ammunition and supplies.

"B" Company had secured the lost positions by 1630 hours and jubilantly reported it could see the head of the tank column pushing forward to the relief of the perimeter. The enemy was abandoning its attack and fleeing in the face of the steel barrage from the clanking armor column. With reinforcement in sight, the artillery of the garrison poured out its lethal rain on the exposed and fleeing enemy, inflicting tremendous casualties.

Twenty heavy tanks and a handful of infantrymen from the 5th Cavalry Regiment rolled into the perimeter at 1725. The victorious but exhausted defenders realized the crisis had passed. A blessed relief from combat and a strange quiet descended over on the area. The seize at Chipyeong-ni, one of the greatest regimental defensive actions in military history, HAD ENDED.

TAB B



OPERATIONS

FM 100-5

CHAPTER 2

Combat Fundamentals

AN ARMY'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT is the core of its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training. The concept must be broad enough to describe operations in all anticipated circumstances. Yet it must allow sufficient freedom for tactical variations in any situation. It must also be uniformly known and understood.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

The object of all operations is to destroy the opposing force. At the foundation of the US Army's operations are the principles of war and their application to classical and modern theories. The Army's basic operational concept is called AirLand Battle doctrine. This doctrine is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. Destruction of the opposing force is achieved by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful initial blows from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery. The best results are obtained when initial blows are struck against critical units and areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations, rather than merely against the enemy's leading formations.

Army units will fight in all types of operations to preserve and to exploit the initiative. They will attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective. They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the points of enemy weakness. Our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the enemy. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions. Operational planning must be precise enough to preserve combined arms cooperation throughout the

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battle. It must also be sufficiently flexible to respond to changes or to capitalize on fleeting opportunities to damage the enemy.

This requires that the entire force thoroughly understand the commander's intent. Subordinate leaders must align their operations with the overall mission. They must develop opportunities that the force as a whole can exploit. Large unit commanders must encourage initiative in their subordinates. They must also be able to shift their main effort quickly to take advantage of enemy weaknesses that their subordinates discover or create. Success on the modern battlefield will depend on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine: *initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.*

"Rapidity is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots."

Sun Tzu
5.

INITIATIVE

Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or to retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance.

To preserve the initiative, subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan. They must exploit successes boldly and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. They must deviate from the expected course of battle without hesitation when opportunities arise to expedite the overall mission of the higher force. They will take risks, and the command must support them. Improvisation, initiative, and aggressiveness—the traits that have historically distinguished the American soldier—must be particularly strong in our leaders.

DEPTH

Depth, important to all US Army operations, refers to time, distance, and resources. Momentum in the attack and elasticity in the defense derive from depth. Knowing the time required to move forces—enemy and friendly—is essential to knowing how to employ fire and maneuver to destroy, to disrupt, or to delay the enemy.

Commanders need to use the entire depth of the battlefield to strike the enemy and to prevent him from concentrating his firepower or maneuvering his forces to a point of his choice. Commanders also need adequate space for disposition of their forces, for maneuver, and for dispersion.

Depth of resources refers to the number of men, weapon systems, and materiel that provide the commander with flexibility and extend his influence over great areas. Commanders need depth of time, space, and resources to execute appropriate counter-moves, to battle the forces in contact, and to attack enemy rear forces.

The battle in depth should delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's uncommitted forces and

isolate his committed forces so that they may be destroyed. The deep battle is closely linked with the close-in fight. All involved weapons, units, and surveillance assets must contribute to the commander's overall objective. When we fight an echeloned enemy, such operations may be vital to success.

Reserves play a key role in achieving depth and flexibility. Important in any battle is the commander's decision on the size, composition, and positioning of his reserves. They are best used to strike a decisive blow once the enemy has committed himself to a course of action or revealed a vulnerability.

Finally, commanders must be prepared to engage enemy airborne or airmobile forces that attack our rear areas. They must insure that combat service support units can survive nuclear and chemical strikes and still support the fast-paced battle. These are other aspects of the in-depth battle.

AGILITY

Agility requires flexible organizations and quick-minded, flexible leaders *who can act faster than the enemy*. They must know of critical events as they occur and act to avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy vulnerabilities. This must be done repeatedly, so that every time the enemy begins to counter one action, another immediately upsets his plan. This will lead to ineffective, uncoordinated, and piecemeal enemy responses and eventually to his defeat.

An organization's flexibility is determined by its basic structure, equipment, and systems. Units should have an appropriate mix of soldiers and equipment to complete their tasks. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) should control any permanent or temporary reorganization.

The mental flexibility necessary to fight on a dynamic battlefield is more difficult to describe but easier to achieve. Our Army has traditionally taken pride in our soldiers' ability to "think on their feet"—to see and to react rapidly to changing circumstances. Mental flexibility must be developed during

6.

the soldier's military education and maintained through individual and unit training.

SYNCHRONIZATION

Synchronized operations achieve maximum combat power. However, synchronization means more than coordinated action. It results from an all-prevailing unity of effort throughout the force. There can be no waste. Every action of every element must flow from understanding the higher commander's concept.

Synchronized, violent execution is the essence of decisive combat. Synchronized

combined arms complement and reinforce each other, greatly magnifying their individual effects. In AirLand Battle doctrine, synchronization applies both to our conventional forces and, when authorized, to nuclear and chemical weapons. It also characterizes our operations with other services and allies.

Forceful and rapid operations achieve at least local surprise and shock effect. Commanders must look beyond these immediate effects when they plan operations. They must make specific provisions in advance to exploit the opportunities that tactical success will create.

LEVELS OF WAR

War is a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic levels of execution. Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are the broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war. While the principles of war are appropriate to all levels, applying them involves a different perspective for each.

STRATEGIC

Military strategy employs the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force. Military strategy sets the fundamental conditions for operations. Its formulation is beyond the scope of this manual.

OPERATIONAL

The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. The disposition of forces, selection of objectives,

and actions taken to weaken or to outmaneuver the enemy all set the terms of the next battle and exploit tactical gains. They are all part of the operational level of war. In AirLand Battle doctrine, this level includes the marshalling of forces and logistical support, providing direction to ground and air maneuver, applying conventional and nuclear fires in depth, and employing unconventional and psychological warfare.

TACTICAL

Tactics are the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives. Tactics employ all available combat, combat support, and combat service support. Tactics involve the movement and positioning of forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, the provision of fire support, and the logistical support of forces prior to, during, and following engagements with the enemy.

At corps and division, operational and tactical levels are not clearly separable. They are guided by the same principles, and this manual applies to both. An operation designed to defeat an enemy force in an extended area does so through operational maneuver and a series of tactical actions.

DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

Dynamics of battle refers to *the interaction of factors that decide battle*. Force ratios and the effects of fire and maneuver are significant in deciding battles; however, a number of intangible factors often predominate. Among these intangible factors are state of training, troop motivation, leader skill, firmness of purpose, and boldness—the abilities to perceive opportunities, to think rapidly, to communicate clearly, and to act decisively. The effects of these factors create tangible and reversible relationships. To understand the dynamics of battle, it is important to understand combat power and the role of its component elements—maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is relative, never an absolute, and has meaning only as it compares to that of the enemy. The appropriate combination of maneuver, firepower, and protection by a skillful leader within a sound operational plan will turn combat potential into actual combat power. Superior combat power applied at the decisive place and time decides the battle.

Maneuver. Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain and to use the advantages of surprise, psychological shock, position, and momentum which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. More specifically, it is the employment of forces through movement supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or to threaten destruction of the enemy. The object of maneuver at the operational level is to focus maximum strength against the enemy's weakest point, thereby gaining strategic advantage. At this level, successful maneuver is achieved through skillful coordination of fire in depth with movement of large units. At the tactical level, maneuver contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and

to reducing vulnerability. Successful maneuver at this level depends upon skillful movement along indirect approaches supported by direct and indirect fires.

The *effect* created by maneuver is the first element of combat power. Effective maneuver demands battlefield mobility; knowledge of the enemy and terrain generated by reconnaissance and other intelligence activities; effective command and control; flexible operational practices; sound organization; and reliable logistical support. It requires imaginative, bold, competent, and independent leaders; discipline, coordination, and speed; well-trained troops; and logistically ready units. Effective maneuver protects the force and keeps the enemy off balance. It continually poses new problems for him, renders his reactions ineffective, and eventually leads to his defeat.

Firepower. Firepower provides the enabling, violent, destructive force essential to successful maneuver. It is the means of suppressing the enemy's fires, neutralizing his tactical forces, and destroying his ability to fight. This is done by killing, wounding, or paralyzing the enemy's soldiers and by damaging the materiel and installations necessary for his continued combat effectiveness. Firepower is delivered by personal arms, crew-served direct fire weapons, mortars, artillery, cannons and missiles, air defense guns and missiles, attack helicopters, Air Force and Navy aircraft, and Naval gunfire bombardment.

The *effect* of firepower on the enemy and not its unapplied or misused potential makes a vital contribution to combat power. It is the accuracy and effectiveness of munitions which ultimately contribute to combat power. Therefore, efficient target-acquisition systems, viable command and control, a steady supply of ammunition, and the tactical mobility necessary to place weapons within range of critical targets are necessary ingredients of this element of combat power.

Protection. Protection is the shielding of the fighting potential of the force so that it can be

applied at the decisive time and place. Protection has two components. The first includes all actions to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and units difficult to locate, to strike, or to destroy. Among these actions are security, dispersion, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression, and mobility. These actions routinely include the reinforcement and concealment of fighting positions, command posts, and support facilities. The second component includes actions to keep soldiers healthy, to maintain their fighting morale, and to diminish the impact of severe weather. It also means keeping equipment in repair and supplies from becoming lost.

As in the other elements of combat power, the *effects* of protection contribute to combat power. These effects are measured by the fighting potential available at the moment of decisive combat. It is in this way that the activities listed above contribute to combat power.

Leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leaders function through personal interaction with their men and through command and control systems and facilities. While leadership requirements differ from squad to echelons above corps, leaders must be men of character; they must know and understand soldiers and the physical tools of battle; and they must act with courage and conviction. *The primary function of leadership is to inspire and to motivate soldiers to do difficult things in trying circumstances.* Leaders must also understand how to control and to integrate fire and maneuver and how to use terrain. They must know how to combine direct and indirect fires, how to use air and naval fires, and how to substitute massed fires for massed troops.

This is the component upon which all others depend. Again, it is the *effect* the leader creates through proper application of his potential maneuver, firepower, and protection capabilities which generates combat power. Throughout the history of war, victory

**LEADERSHIP IS
THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT
OF COMBAT POWER**

has gone to the leader who understood and used the means at his disposal to the best advantage. Therefore, leaders are the crucial element of combat power. It is up to them to turn the potential of men, weapons, and resources available into superior combat power.

Leaders must set the preconditions for winning on the battlefield; therefore, superior combat power has its roots in proper preparation. Preparation includes many matters of long-term concern to the Army at the highest levels—force design, equipment design, and procurement, to name only a few. The tactical commander has a more immediate perspective. To him, preparation involves logistic readiness and motivation. It means continuous planning and training to the moment of, and even during, battle. It means training throughout campaigns because every endeavor causes the unit to learn either good or bad habits. Continuous training under all conditions insures positive skills that will contribute to success in battle. Commanders must demand excellence under all conditions and must strive to make it habitual.

In the final analysis and once the force is engaged, *superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership.*

COMBAT IMPERATIVES

Success in battle—achieving superior combat power—also depends on using tactics appropriate to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available. The effectiveness of maneuver, firepower, and protection depends on how the commander combines operational procedures, battle drills, or other measures from an established repertoire to solve a particular problem. Doctrine establishes common techniques of fighting throughout the force. The successful tactician depends on proven techniques and on troops who are well-versed in employing them. Standardized practices actually enhance flexibility; but they must be more than just a

series of routine approaches to solving types of operational problems. As he plans and fights the battle, the tactician must understand the seven imperatives of combat:

1. Insure unity of effort.
2. Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.
3. Designate and sustain the main effort.
4. Sustain the fight.
5. Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.
6. Use terrain and weather.
7. Protect the force.

1. Insure Unity of Effort

The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are *objective, unity of command, and simplicity*. Its fundamental requirements are effective leadership and an effective command and control system through which the commander—

- Learns what is going on.
- Decides what to do about it.
- Issues the necessary orders.
- Keeps track of how the battle is going.

This process is dynamic. Its primary measure of effectiveness is whether it functions efficiently and more quickly than the enemy's. At its heart are the commander and his system for command and control. The commander must insure a unified, aggressive, quick, precise, agile, and synchronized effort throughout the force.

Unity of effort *depends on motivation*—getting all involved to work quickly and well. Important to motivation in a high-risk environment are mutual trust, confidence, loyalty, and pride—the notions that describe relationships between leader and led. Leaders must convince subordinates that objectives are possible and thus deserve total dedication.

Unity of effort requires that the commander and his staff see the battlefield realistically. To do this, they must continuously study their resources, the enemy,

and the terrain from a perspective that extends from the unit's rear boundary to the forward edge of its area of interest. Because he can never know everything, the commander will make decisions based on imperfect information. He must, therefore, make realistic demands for intelligence in a clear order of priority. Commanders *must avoid the temptation to gather more detail than they need* and thus clog the flow of timely, vital information.

Unity of effort also requires continuous sensing of the battle conditions, both enemy and friendly, as the basis for sound decisions and firm directions for the force as a whole. Modern forces have decentralized and institutionalized much of the decision process, especially that involved with supporting arms and services. As decision making decentralizes, the need for unity of effort grows. Commanders who are *flexible rather than mechanical* will win decisive victories.

A plan which promotes unity of effort must have a well-defined, comprehensive mission statement. The commander identifies his goals through mission orders that leave his subordinates the greatest possible freedom. Because plans must be implemented by units under stress, simple plans are best. If a plan is necessarily complex, it must incorporate simple control measures and insure that subordinates' individual tasks remain simple. Since commanders cannot foresee, plan, or communicate instructions for every potential event, they should not attempt to control every action of their subordinates. The chaos of battle will not allow absolute control. *As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become more decentralized.* Thus, all echelons of command will have to issue mission orders. Doing so will require leaders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—and to take risks.

Risk-taking in combat has two dimensions. One has to do with the danger to men and materiel involved in the mission; the other with accomplishing the mission. All leaders

must take risks of both types independently, based on a prudent assessment of the situation. An informed risk, however, should not be confused with a gamble. A gamble is a resort to chance in the absence of either information or control. Although a gamble may be necessary in a desperate situation, a subordinate should have his commander's approval.

Mission orders require commanders to determine *intent*—what they want to happen to the enemy. Their intent must be consistent with their superiors' and must be communicated clearly to their subordinates. During battle, commanders must support and develop the local successes of their subordinates. They must commit reserves where there is the greatest chance of success. They must concentrate fires wherever the enemy is vulnerable. While detailed orders may be necessary at times, commanders must trust their subordinates to make correct on-the-spot decisions within the mission framework. Such decentralization converts initiative into agility, allowing rapid reaction to capture fleeting opportunities. Mission orders need to cover only three important points:

- They should clearly state the commander's objective, what he wants done, and why he wants it done.
- They should establish limits or controls necessary for coordination.
- They should delineate the available resources and support from outside sources.

The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander's *intent* and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform his commander and propose appropriate alternatives. If this is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon as possible.

To insure that his concept is driving the operation to completion, the commander must follow up. He must have an overall view

of the battle based on reports from subordinates, information from surveillance systems, and his own personal observations. He must compare enemy and friendly situations, assess progress, and if necessary, issue fragmentary orders (FRAGO) to adjust assigned tasks. This process of follow-up and reassessment is one of the commander's critical responsibilities.

2. Direct Friendly Strengths Against Enemy Weaknesses

The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are *maneuver* and *surprise*. To determine what tactics to use, commanders must study the enemy. They must know enemy organization, equipment, and tactics—how the enemy fights. More specifically, they must understand the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy force they are about to fight. Techniques that work in one instance against one enemy may not work against another enemy or even the same enemy at a different time and place. Commanders should determine and take into account the capabilities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies of particular enemy units.

The good tactician looks for an approach that focuses his own strengths against the enemy's weaknesses. Weaknesses may result from gaps in the enemy's dispositions, his predictability, or the character of his soldiers or units. Commanders must strive to attack the enemy where his operational, technical, or human weaknesses make him most vulnerable.

Meeting the enemy where he is strongest is sometimes unavoidable, but doing so *deliberately* is extremely hazardous. However, it may be necessary to support an indirect effort elsewhere with a direct approach. Sometimes an immediate, violent, quickly executed, direct frontal assault can capitalize on enemy unreadiness.

Our tactics must appear formless to the enemy until the last possible moment. They must deceive him about our true intentions. They must confuse him by threatening

multiple objectives, each of which he must be prepared to defend. They must surprise him whenever possible, simply by doing what he least expects. All such efforts must be fully integrated into operational plans.

3. Designate and Sustain the Main Effort

The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are *mass* and *economy of force*. The commander identifies the main effort when he states his intent. Designating the main effort links each subordinate commander's actions to those around him. Such a link maintains cohesion and insures synchronization. Yet it also permits initiative.

Whether in an attack, a defense, or any other operation, *the main effort is assigned to only one unit*. All other elements support and sustain the effort of that unit. If that unit encounters unexpected difficulties, or if a secondary effort meets with unexpected success, the commander may shift his focus by designating a new unit to make the main effort. In this way he can shift the concentration of forces, fires, and required logistics in the direction required to best achieve his aim.

To succeed against superior numbers, the commander must not limit his attack or defense to the vicinity of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). He supports the main effort by fire or maneuver that reaches deeply into the enemy's zone of action. He strikes the enemy's vulnerable high-value targets or engages his still undeployed follow-on forces. Thus, the commander seeks to set the terms of battle throughout the depth of the battlefield.

The purpose of concentrating effort is to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy at the chosen time and place. To achieve this effect, the tactician designates the objective and plans the employment of combat, combat support, and logistics means, using each to the greatest advantage in the overall scheme. By proper integration he achieves an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts.

The increased need for dispersion on the nuclear-chemical-conventional battlefield compounds the problem of concentration. To move units rapidly and efficiently over pre-selected and coordinated routes, tacticians must plan and prepare extensively. They must also select and coordinate alternate routes in case primary ones are blocked.

4. Sustain the Fight

Battles or campaigns have often gone to the side that has been most successful in pressing the main effort to conclusion. To sustain the momentum that early successes generate, leaders must do two things. First, they must deploy forces in adequate depth and arrange for timely and continuous combat and combat service support at the outset of operations. Then, they must take risks and tenaciously press soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance for as long as necessary.

Commanders deploy forces and logistic resources in depth to insure continuous, flexible operations and to protect the force. In the attack, they echelon forces and logistic resources in depth to maintain momentum and to exploit success. In the defense, depth insures continuity and flexibility for maneuver. It provides options for the defender if forward positions are penetrated. In both attack and defense, deploying in depth increases dispersion and decreases the vulnerability of the total force to nuclear and chemical fires.

To gauge the risks involved in pressing soldiers to the limits of their endurance, commanders must understand the human dimension. Ardant Du Picq, a nineteenth-century student of the human dimension of battle, appropriately stated that we can "reach into the well of courage only so many times before the well runs dry." The confusion, extreme stress, and lethality of the modern battlefield place a heavy burden on courage and endurance. Commanders must assess human abilities and limitations as they plan and fight their battles. They must accurately gauge which units should lead,

which should be replaced, and which should be reinforced. They must also be aware of the traditional concerns of weather, training, and leadership.

5. Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish Rapidly

The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are *maneuver* and *mass*. Speed has also always been important, but it will be even more important on the next battlefield because of sophisticated sensors and the possibility of conventional, nuclear, or chemical counterstrikes. To avoid detection, our concentrations must be disguised. To avoid effective counterstrikes, they must be short.

Speed allows the commander to seize and to hold the initiative, and thereby to maintain freedom of action. Quick, decisive action also makes the enemy react and deprives him of the initiative. When this happens, units should have well-conceived plans for exploiting their successes.

6. Use Terrain and Weather

Terrain and weather affect combat more significantly than any other physical factors. The ground has an immense influence on how the battle will be fought. It provides opportunities and imposes limitations, giving a decisive edge to the commander who uses it best. Most battles have been won or lost by the way in which combatants used the terrain to protect their own forces and to destroy those of the enemy. One of the best investments of the commander's time before battle is an intensive personal reconnaissance of the terrain.

Weather affects equipment and terrain, but its greatest impact is on the men. The commander must understand how weather and visibility affect his operations as well as the enemy's. He anticipates changes in the weather, capitalizing on them when possible, and uses smoke to alter visibility when it suits his purposes. The impact of terrain, weather, and visibility is developed in chapter 3.

7. Protect the Force

Successful commanders preserve the strength of the force. They do so by assuring security, keeping troops healthy and equipment ready, and sustaining discipline and morale.

Tacticians assure security by taking precautions against surprise. They must use aggressive reconnaissance, set out security forces, maintain operational security, avoid operational patterns, and practice deception. When time permits, they must build protective field fortifications. They must also disperse troops, especially on the nuclear battlefield. The degree of dispersion depends on the value of their force as a target, on whether it is mobile or static, and on the probability of its being detected.

Leaders must habitually think about troop health and equipment readiness. In the past, disease and the elements have weakened entire formations. Likewise, equipment that is not properly maintained can fail, leaving forces at a serious disadvantage. Commanders must insist on proper maintenance

both before and during battle. They must anticipate needs, conserve resources, and be ready for emergencies.

In battle, unit cohesion is important to protection. Poor morale can weaken any unit. Enemy psychological warfare, an unsuccessful operation, or a surprising and violent display of enemy strength can degrade morale. Peacetime preparation, however, will contribute directly to a unit's strength and durability in combat. *Soldiers who are always required to do it right in training will instinctively do so in combat.*

Marshall de Saxe wrote that "the soldier's courage must be reborn daily." A leader, he said, will insure this "by his dispositions, his positions, and those traits of genius that characterize great captains. . . . It is of all the elements of war the one that is most necessary to study." Leaders create cohesion and maintain discipline. Soldiers who serve in disciplined, cohesive units will be on hand with functioning equipment when the decisive moment arrives.

CHAPTER 7

Conduct of Operations

FUTURE BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS have the potential for extending over greater distances and continuing longer than any military operations of the past. Victory in such battles will demand complete unity of effort and thoroughly synchronized air and ground action. To win, our forces must use every element of combat power and keep each in operation. They must also coordinate combined arms effectively. Applying AirLand Battle doctrine, a fully synchronized small force can defeat a much larger enemy force that is poorly coordinated.

AIRLAND BATTLE FUNDAMENTALS

AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area, stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. It distinguishes the operational level of war—the conduct of campaigns and large-unit actions—from the tactical level. It recognizes the nonquantifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver which is as important as firepower. It acknowledges the importance of nuclear and chemical weapons and of electronic warfare, and it details their effects on operations. Most important, it emphasizes the human element: *courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders.*

In execution, the AirLand Battle may mean using every element of combat power from psychological operations to nuclear weapons. The battlefield includes every area and enemy unit that can affect the outcome of the immediate fight, and it extends into the area of interest where future operations will take place. An innovative approach to fighting at both the tactical and operational levels,

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all arms, all services, and all means of support.

To insure success, AirLand Battle doctrine concentrates on—

- Indirect approaches.
- Speed and violence.
- Flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior leaders.
- Rapid decision-making.
- Clearly defined objectives and operational concepts.
- A clearly designated main effort.
- Deep attack.

AirLand Battle offensives are rapid, violent operations that seek enemy soft spots, remain flexible in shifting the main effort, and exploit successes promptly. The attacker creates a fluid situation, maintains the initiative, and destroys the coherence of the enemy defense. Using supporting and reserve units flexibly, the attack must continue for as long as it takes to assure victory.

AirLand Battle defenses combine static and dynamic elements. Static strongpoints and battle positions and dynamic delays and counterattacks are supported by effective deep attack. This allows the defender to defeat the attacker's momentum, to present him with the unexpected, to defeat his combined arms cooperation, and to gain the initiative.

Whether attacking or defending, any US force operating anywhere in the world must secure the initiative as early as possible and exercise it aggressively. It will use every weapon, asset, and combat multiplier to gain the initiative and to throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction. *It will follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery.* At the operational level, the force will defeat the enemy by destroying his critical units or facilities. At the tactical level, both attrition and massed fires, substituting for massed troops, will occasionally facilitate decisive maneuver at the operational level. At both the tactical and

operational levels and for all levels of command, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization are the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine.

Initiative, the ability to set the terms of battle by action, *is the greatest advantage in war.* Whether US forces are attacking or defending, they must seize and preserve the initiative to hasten the enemy's defeat and to prevent his recovery. Subordinate commanders must understand the well-defined objectives thoroughly and be aggressive. They must be able to act independently when electronic warfare, the destruction of friendly forces and headquarters, or the confusion of war disrupt command and control communications.

Depth refers to time, space, and resources. Deep attack is neither a sideshow nor an unimportant optional activity; it is an inseparable part of a unified plan of operation. Plans for the deep battle must be realistic, complete, and firmly linked to the commander's central concept for an operation.

Combat will extend throughout the operational area, and deep actions will influence the outcome of the battle between committed forces. Improved sensors, long-range weapons, and a responsive intelligence distribution system can be used to great advantage in the deep battle. Using all available assets, the commander must protect his own rear area and attack the enemy's uncommitted forces and support facilities. He must be ready to carry the battle into new areas, to fight and support for extended periods, to operate without interruption even if the enemy resorts to nuclear weapons, and to convert battlefield successes into campaign advantages.

Agility means acting faster than the enemy to exploit his weaknesses and to frustrate his plans. It implies a constant effort to pit friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Agility involves maneuver which concentrates friendly strength in vulnerable areas and tactics which exploit friendly

technical, human, or geographical advantages, while avoiding enemy strengths. Good intelligence, imaginative planning, flexible operational techniques, and responsive tactical units are indispensable in achieving superior agility. Mission orders, initiative, maneuver, and the readiness to exploit fleeting advantages rapidly all foster agility.

Synchronization combines economy of force and unity of effort so that *no effort is wasted* either initially or as operations develop. The commander's concept of operation determines the design of all supporting plans. Attaining the commander's goal usually depends on whether his maneuver plan succeeds and on whether the combat and combat support units accomplish their critical tasks. The designated main effort must be supported by every means necessary and maintained or shifted as the battle

progresses or the campaign matures. In non-linear combat, maneuver units from company to corps must support their main efforts continuously and modify them quickly if the situation changes.

The actual or potential use of nuclear weapons will significantly affect the battle. Depending on deception, surprise, target acquisition, and user boldness, nuclear strikes can change the course of a battle suddenly and decisively. Nuclear weapons give the commanders the ability to hold the enemy at risk throughout their areas of influence. When facing a nuclear-capable enemy, commanders plan and conduct their operations so they can continue synchronized operations without interruption if nuclear weapons are used. When nuclear or chemical weapons are being used, fire support may be more important than maneuver or combat support.

BATTLE COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of command, the means of planning and directing campaigns and battles. Its essence lies in applying leadership, making decisions, issuing orders, and supervising operations. At the operational level it concerns the organizations, procedures, facilities, equipment, and techniques which facilitate the exercise of command. A comprehensive discussion of all command and control elements is contained in FM 101-5.

Staffing, equipment, and organizational concerns vary among levels of command. In every case, however, the only purpose of command and control is to implement the commander's will in pursuit of the unit's objective. The system must be reliable, secure, fast, and durable. It must collect, analyze, and present information rapidly. It must communicate orders, coordinate support, and provide direction to the force in spite of enemy interference, destruction of command posts, or loss and replacement of commanders. The key measure of command and control effectiveness is whether it func-

tions more efficiently and more quickly than the enemy's. Effective operations depend on its superiority.

Communications on the contemporary battlefield will be uncertain. Opportunities to inflict damage on the enemy and to accomplish the mission will arise and pass quickly. Command and control doctrine assumes that subordinate commanders exercise initiative within the context of the higher commander's concept. Staff assistance and coordination are indispensable to conducting sustained operations, but the mutual understanding which enables commanders to act rapidly and confidently in the crisis of battle is equally important.

COMBINED ARMS

Victory on the battlefield will hinge on fully synchronizing combat forces. Weapons and units are more effective when they operate jointly than when they function separately.

The term *combined arms* refers to two or more arms in mutual support to produce complementary and reinforcing effects that neither can obtain separately. Technically, combined arms refers to coordinating weapons of differing characteristics. For example, guns and missiles can combine in the air defense of a key installation; or mines, mortars, or grenade launchers can cover the dead space of a machine gun's field of fire. Tactically, combined arms refers to coordinating units of different arms or capabilities. For example, armor and mechanized infantry should operate together routinely. Artillery and mortars must support their maneuver, and engineers must assist it. Air defense must cover vulnerable forces and facilities. *Complementary combined arms should pose a dilemma for the enemy.* As he evades the effects of one weapon or arm, he places himself in jeopardy of attack by the other.

Combined arms also reinforce each other. The effects of one supplement the effects of another to create a cumulative effect. This massing of effects is also discernible at both technical and tactical levels. Technically, it may involve engineer preparation of fighting positions, the teamwork of observation and attack helicopters, or the massing of all anti-tank fires against an armored threat. Tactically, it may involve concentrating all types of maneuver forces or fires to create mass.

At the tactical level, forces maneuver to attack the enemy's flanks, rear, or supporting formations. Doing so sustains the initiative, exploits success, and reduces vulnerability. Normally supported by direct and indirect fires, tactical maneuver attempts to obtain a local position of advantage. Often part of the maneuvering force provides fire to support movements of other parts. Once it comes into contact with the enemy, the maneuvering force advances using the fire and movement technique. One element of an engaged force adds its suppressive direct fires to the supporting indirect fires of mortars, artillery, naval guns, or close air. This firepower makes

movement by another element possible. A force may close with the enemy by alternating its elements between fire and movement.

At the operational level, corps and divisions maneuver to envelop, to turn, to penetrate, or to block enemy forces. Although it may not be directly tied to fire, such movement is also maneuver.

Effective use of maneuver and firepower depends on good intelligence throughout a unit's areas of interest and influence. It also requires sound staff and operational procedures that permit rapid and coordinated reaction to opportunity. Through battle drill, battalions and smaller units attain the speed and flexibility so necessary to effective operations. In larger units, contingency plans are the basis of this flexibility.

The basic combined arms maneuver element is the battalion task force. Battalion task forces are organized from infantry battalions, tank battalions, and cavalry squadrons. Field and air defense artillery, engineers, and Air Force and Army air elements provide support. Battalion task forces can be infantry-heavy, tank-heavy, or balanced. They can also be pure, depending on the brigade commander's plan. Armor and infantry, the nucleus of the combined arms team, provide flexibility during operations over varied terrain. Infantry assists the advance of tanks in difficult terrain, while armor provides protection in open terrain. They can develop both complementary and reinforcing effects. A similar synergy exists in defense or delay.

UNITS

Infantry. Light infantry can operate effectively in most terrain and weather. In mounted operations, infantry units can—

- Occupy strongpoints as pivots for maneuver.
- Make initial penetrations for exploitation by armor and mechanized infantry.
- Attack over approaches that are not feasible for heavy forces.

- Capture or defend built-up areas.
- Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.
- Follow and support exploiting heavy forces.

In dismounted operations, airborne, air-mobile, or other light infantry leads the combined arms attack, and all other arms support the infantry attack.

Mechanized Infantry. Mechanized infantry complements armor in its ability to hold ground. It provides overwatching anti-tank fires and suppresses enemy infantry and antitank guided missile elements. Infantrymen can dismount—

- To patrol difficult terrain.
- To clear or to emplace obstacles and minefields.
- To infiltrate and to attack enemy positions.
- To protect tanks in urban and wooded areas and in limited-visibility conditions.

Mechanized infantrymen have the same mobility as tankers but less firepower and protection. Armor and mechanized infantry must perform as a team to defeat enemy armored forces on the modern battlefield.

When equipped with infantry fighting vehicles, the mechanized infantry is significantly more capable. So equipped, it can accompany tanks in mounted assault. In the attack, such infantrymen can act as fixing forces. In the defense, they act as pivot points for maneuvering tank-heavy forces.

Armor. In mounted warfare, the tank is the primary offensive weapon. Its firepower, protection from enemy fire, and speed create the shock effect necessary to disrupt the enemy's operations and to defeat him. Tanks can destroy enemy armored vehicles and suppress enemy infantry and antitank guided missile elements. Tanks can break through suppressed defenses, exploit the success of an attack by striking into the enemy's rear areas, and boldly pursue enemy

forces. Armored units can also blunt enemy attacks and rapidly counterattack in force.

Armored units also have limitations. They are vulnerable in close terrain, such as forests and cities, and under limited-visibility conditions. They cannot cross most rivers and swamps without bridging, and they cannot climb steep grades.

Armored Cavalry. The basic tasks of armored cavalry units are *reconnaissance and security*. The ability of armored cavalry units to find the enemy, to develop the situation, and to provide the commander with reaction time and security also make them ideal for economy-of-force missions. Armored cavalry forces can delay an attacking enemy as well as assist in a withdrawal. They are also capable of attacking and defending, although these are not their normal missions.

Field Artillery. The principal fire support element in fire and maneuver is the field artillery. It not only provides conventional, nuclear, or chemical fires with cannon, rocket, and missile systems; but it also integrates all means of fire support available to the commander. Field artillery is capable of suppressing enemy direct fire forces, attacking enemy artillery and mortars, and delivering scatterable mines to isolate and to interdict enemy forces or to protect friendly operations. It contributes to the deep battle by delaying or disrupting enemy forces in depth and by suppressing enemy air defense systems to facilitate Army and Air Force air operations. The artillery can also screen operations with smoke or illuminate the battlefield. Normally as mobile as the maneuver forces it supports, field artillery can provide continuous fire in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver.

Air Defense Artillery. Air defense units provide the commander with security from enemy air attack by destroying or driving off enemy close air support aircraft and helicopters. Their fires can degrade the effectiveness of enemy strike and reconnaissance aircraft by forcing them to evade friendly air

defenses. Short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems normally provide forward air defense protection for maneuver units whether they are attacking, delaying, withdrawing, or repositioning in the defense. Air defense secures critical facilities, such as command posts, logistic installations, and special ammunition supply points. It also protects convoys and lines of communication. In conjunction with US Air-Force elements, Army air defense plays a significant role in protecting friendly air maneuver and in attacking enemy air maneuver units.

Combat Engineers. Combat engineers contribute to the combined arms team by performing mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions. *Mobility missions* include breaching enemy minefields and obstacles, improving existing routes or building new ones, and providing bridge and raft support for crossing major water obstacles. *Countermobility* efforts limit the maneuver of enemy forces and enhance the effectiveness of our fires. Engineers improve the *survivability* of the friendly force by hardening command and control facilities and key logistic installations and by fortifying battle positions in the defense. In addition, combat engineers are organized, equipped, and trained to fight as infantry in tactical emergencies.

Army Aviation. Three types of Army aviation units participate in combined arms operations: attack helicopter, air cavalry, and combat support aviation.

Attack Helicopter Units

These provide highly maneuverable anti-armor firepower. They use natural cover and speed to compensate for their vulnerabilities. They are ideally suited for situations in which rapid reaction time is important or terrain restricts ground forces. Attack helicopters are best suited for attacking moving enemy armor formations. Attack helicopter units—

- Overwatch ground maneuver forces with antitank fires.

- Attack the flanks and rear of attacking or withdrawing enemy formations.
- Counterattack enemy penetrations.
- Conduct raids in enemy-held territory.
- Dominate key terrain by fires for ground maneuver forces.

Employed alone or working with close air support aircraft and using tactics of a joint air attack team (JAAT), attack helicopters can defeat enemy armored formations. To be most effective, however, such missions require other elements of the combined arms to suppress enemy air defense.

Air Cavalry Units

These perform the same missions of reconnaissance and security as ground cavalry and are therefore complementary parts of the cavalry system. Because of its greater mobility, air cavalry can reconnoiter and maintain surveillance over a much larger area in a shorter period of time than its ground counterpart. During security operations, air cavalry reconnoiters, screens forward and to the flanks of moving ground forces, and acts as a rapid reaction force.

Combat Support Aviation

These units give dismounted infantry and ground antitank units great tactical mobility, moving them rapidly to the enemy's flanks or rear or repositioning them rapidly in the defense. Combat support aviation can quickly move towed field artillery units and other lighter elements of the combined arms team as the commander dictates. It can also provide critical supplies to forward areas in the defense and to attacking formations when ground lines of communication have been interdicted or overloaded.

Air Support. The Air Force is an equal partner in the air-land battle. It supports the battle with counterair and air interdiction operations, offensive air support (OAS), and tactical airlift operations. *Counterair* operations achieve necessary air superiority and insure that enemy air forces cannot interfere with the operations of friendly air or

ground forces. *Air interdiction* operations destroy, isolate, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can influence friendly operations. OAS is that portion of offensive airpower in direct support of ground operations and consists of tactical air reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and close air support (CAS).

Electronic Warfare Units. The military intelligence battalion (combat electronic

warfare intelligence [CEWI]) detects important enemy communications nets and intercepts their traffic to provide the commander with intelligence. It also directs electronic countermeasures, primarily jamming, against enemy fire direction and command and control communications, air defense radar, and electronic guidance systems. This capability to locate the enemy, to intercept his messages, and to hamper his operations at critical periods contributes directly and indirectly to the effectiveness of combined arms operations.

BATTLE PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Assets available for an operation vary with the level of command and the type of unit, but in almost every case commanders must coordinate—

- Maneuver.
- Fire support.
- Deep battle.
- Electronic warfare.
- Engineer support.
- Air defense.
- Signal and command control.
- Logistics (*see chapter 5*).
- Other operations (*deception, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, ranger operations, and civil-military operations*).

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the dynamic element of battle, the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain the advantages of surprise, position, and momentum which enable small forces to defeat larger ones. Effective maneuver maintains or restores initiative. Using indirect approaches to avoid the enemy's greatest strength, friendly forces maneuver to positions on enemy flanks and rear. The attack strikes him where he is least prepared and exposes his critical forces to destruction. Maneuver maximizes the effectiveness of firepower by restricting the

enemy's freedom to act and forcing him to react, to concentrate his force, and thus to expose himself.

US Army doctrine balances maneuver with firepower. *Maneuver and firepower are inseparable and complementary elements of combat.* Although one might dominate a phase of the battle, the coordinated use of both characterizes all operations. Their joint use makes the destruction of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of a friendly force.

Conversely, fire support helps to create opportunities for maneuver. It destroys or suppresses enemy forces and isolates areas of immediate concern through deep attack. It accomplishes the physical destruction which maneuver makes possible and adds to the shock effect of all operations. When nuclear weapons are used, maneuver may mainly exploit the effects of fire.

In most cases the plan for maneuver is the central expression of the commander's concept of operations. The maneuver plan—

- Outlines the movements of the force.
- Identifies objectives or areas to be retained.
- Assigns responsibilities for zones, sectors, or areas.
- Identifies maneuver options which may develop during an operation.

The commander's plan for maneuver determines the subsequent allocation of forces and the design of supporting plans. Fires, barriers, air defense priorities, electronic warfare, deception efforts, combat support, and combat service support arrangements are normally subordinate to and coordinated with the maneuver plan.

Commanders normally design the maneuver plan to avoid the enemy's strength and to strike at his weaknesses. Maneuver units can inflict the greatest damage on the enemy by avoiding head-on encounters with his deployed forces. Instead they should operate on his flanks and rear, where direct fire is most effective, psychological shock is greatest, and the enemy is least prepared to fight. By coordinating attacks on the enemy in depth with attacks on his forward units, the commander—

- Preserves or secures the initiative.
- Upsets the enemy's plan.
- Disrupts his coordination.
- Destroys his most sensitive forces—reserves, artillery, command and control, and logistic support.

Maneuver in defensive counterattacks on the enemy side of the FLOT in the defended sector is particularly important and must be planned in detail.

The maneuver plan should gain surprise. It should use indirect approaches and flank positions which do not attract immediate attention. As a rule, a maneuver plan should contain only the minimum necessary control measures. Subordinate commanders should have the greatest possible freedom to maneuver.

The maneuver plan should disseminate supplementary control measures. These include on-order routes, axes, objectives, and battle positions for implementation on order. They will provide the necessary flexibility for responding to changes in the situation.

The plan should designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of reserves or for the forward or rearward

passage of one unit through another. It should also identify air axes for the maneuver of attack helicopter and air cavalry units or for the helicopter movement of light infantry and other assets.

Movement of supporting units is also critical to the success of the maneuver plan. Commanders must assure the uninterrupted support of field artillery, air defense, engineer, military intelligence, and logistic units. To do so they must plan multiple routes throughout the area of operations and closely control their use. Military police must be prepared to facilitate these movements, to prevent congestion, and to respond to changes in the maneuver plan.

When planning operations, the commanders must take account of the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons. Commanders must consider the troop risk area (emergency risk to unwarned exposed personnel), the sure kill area, and countermobility areas (tree blowdown and urban rubble). Vulnerability analysis templates for specific weapons, such as the one shown on the following page, display these areas.

Commanders must not create lucrative targets. They should also avoid positions which can be isolated by obstacles that nuclear weapons create.


Commanders must constantly seek to minimize the overall risk by dispersing their commands into small units that are not worthwhile targets. Yet, they must maintain sufficient concentration to accomplish the mission. The size of the unit depends on its function. The distance between units varies in accordance with their size, mobility, firepower, and the terrain.

The dilemma is dynamic; the degree of risk changes as the distance between opposing forces changes. Initially, maneuver forces will disperse to avoid presenting a battalion-size target. As the distance from the enemy decreases, maneuver units will concentrate over multiple routes at the decisive place and time and will disperse again after defeating the enemy.


USING A VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

Using nuclear and chemical weapons may reduce the required size of maneuver elements. Such weapons will sometimes allow smaller units to accomplish missions that would normally require large massed forces. The commander must determine what size force to use and when it should concentrate. If he masses too late, he risks defeat in detail. If he masses too soon, he risks nuclear destruction. This dilemma is graphed below.

In purely conventional operations, concentration increases the chance of success. In nuclear operations, on the other hand, dispersal will decrease risk of destruction. The graph does not depict one key dimension—duration. Speed in achieving the necessary concentration and rapid dispersal after the mission are essential.



RISK ANALYSIS



The maneuver plan must also control the airspace over a unit's area of responsibility. Air movements and maneuver in support of the commander's maneuver plan, including specific routes and times, must coordinate with air defense and ground maneuver units whose areas will be overflown.

FIRE SUPPORT

The fire support plan includes mortars, field artillery, naval gunfire, and air-delivered weapons. The long range and great flexibility of the fire support system make it especially effective. The commander can use it to support his maneuver plan, to mass firepower rapidly without shifting maneuver forces, and to delay, to disrupt, or to destroy enemy forces in depth.

Fire support must be integrated with the unit's maneuver plan and its surveillance and target-acquisition efforts. It must be flexible enough to supply conventional support without interruption as the tactical situation changes. It must be capable of shifting from conventional to nuclear or chemical support during the course of an operation.

The fire support system destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses surface targets, including enemy weapons, formations or facilities, and fires from the enemy's rear. It also suppresses enemy air defense and executes nuclear packages.

When nuclear weapons are available, the fire support may become the principal means of destroying enemy forces. The maneuver may then be designed specifically to exploit the effects of the fire support.

The weapons of the system are mortars, guns, cannons, rockets, guided missiles, and tactical fighter aircraft. These weapons are coordinated by a network of fire support teams, liaison parties, fire direction centers, and fire support elements that work closely with an appropriate ASIC and an artillery headquarters. This network masses fires against area targets or directs fires against

point targets. The force commander exercises central control of the system.

Commanders at all levels are responsible for integrating fire support into their plans. Corps and division commanders who command their own artillery employ their artillery commanders as fire support coordinators. Air Force and Navy liaison teams at all levels down to battalion will normally coordinate fires that are available from their respective services. Supporting artillery units provide commanders below division level with fire support elements (FSE). Each cell is capable of coordinating all the fire support necessary for its commander's plans.

In integrating fire support into operations, the most important considerations are adequacy, flexibility, and continuity. In offensive operations, the main attack gets priority fire support while long-range systems strike defenses in depth, enemy reserves, or targets such as command posts, brigades, and defiles. In defense, a greater balance of fire support is necessary, but anticipated areas of the enemy's main effort are allocated stronger fire support.

When maneuver forces have missions such as advance guard, flank guard, or covering force, which take them beyond supporting distance of the main body, commanders must make special provision for their fire support. This may be provided by CAS allocation, direct support field artillery battalions, dedicated batteries, or mortar support, depending on the size of the force and its mission.

Commanders must make special provisions for foreseeable contingencies or phases of a maneuver operation. These may include—

- Time-on-target attacks of ambush areas in coordination with direct fires and a particular obstacle.
- Obscuration of an open area with smoke to facilitate ground maneuver.
- SEAD fires in conjunction with attack helicopter, close air support, or joint air attack team operations.

- Final protective fires around a defensive position.
- Interdiction of a specific follow-on unit to complete an attack in progress.

Commanders must also insure flexibility by—

- Holding some of the artillery in general support.
- Giving artillery units on-order missions which orient them on likely contingencies.
- Reserving some of the allocated CAS missions for the force commander's use.

They must also distribute liaison teams properly and plan possible road or air movements before they become necessary. Planners must recognize that long road movements, for example, are time-consuming and reduce support capability. Commanders insure continuous support by designating routes for artillery units and by planning air movement of weapons and ammunition. When rapid offensive progress occurs or defensive counterstrokes are planned beyond the FLOT, commanders must insure that artillery units are in position to support the maneuver.

The large number of targets acquired during combat may generate demands for fire support that exceeds the system's capacity. To deal with such overloads and yet satisfy the most important demands, commanders must establish priorities. They can express these priorities in allocating assets, in positioning fire support units, in constraining ammunition expenditure, or in guiding the attack to specified types of targets.

The commander will also control fires by using standard control measures such as the fire support coordination line (FSCL), the coordinated fire line (CFL), and the restrictive fire line (RFL). *Specific details of fire planning and direction are in FM 6-20.*

Offensive Air Support. OAS is an integral element of fire support in offensive and defensive operations. Corps commanders will

be supported with CAS sorties, BAI, and tactical air reconnaissance missions.

Tactical air reconnaissance supplies intelligence gathered by observers and/or sensors. Reconnaissance tasks include identifying hostile forces and facilities and collecting terrain and weather information. Information acquired by tactical air reconnaissance is of special value in the conduct of the deep battle and must be disseminated rapidly.

BAI is air action against hostile surface targets nominated by the ground commander and in direct support of ground operations. It is the primary means of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. BAI isolates enemy forces by preventing their reinforcement and resupply and by restricting their freedom of maneuver. It also destroys, delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy units before they can enter the close battle. BAI missions may be planned against targets on either side of the FSCL in the ground commander's area of influence. Missions short of the FSCL require close coordination with ground units. Although all BAI missions require joint planning and coordination, they may not require continuous coordination in the execution stage.

CAS is air action against hostile targets near friendly forces. CAS complements and reinforces ground fire. Each air mission must be integrated with the ground commander's fire and maneuver scheme. This means that aircraft are under either positive or procedural control. Inherent in the ground commander's responsibility is the need to suppress enemy air defenses. CAS can offset shortages of surface firepower during critical initial phases of airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations.

Because each offensive air support sortie is a critical asset, its use must be planned and employed carefully. Corps and division commanders normally distribute CAS to lower levels; however, they should retain some CAS missions at their own levels to influence the conduct of operations. If BAI will be more

useful than CAS in a projected operation, corps commanders should request BAI emphasis early in the planning process.

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) increases the overall effectiveness of friendly air-land operations. The two types of J-SEAD are campaign and localized.

The Air Force component commander conducts the theaterwide J-SEAD operation against specific surface-to-air defense systems. The locations of most campaign targets will dictate this. However, Army surface-to-surface weapons will complement these efforts. More than one J-SEAD campaign may be necessary during a conflict.

Localized J-SEAD operations attack specific ground targets or support airborne, airmobile, or other air operations. Battalions and larger Army units plan localized J-SEAD operations to protect friendly aircraft and to maximize the effect of offensive air support. Such operations normally involve jammers, suppressive fires, and passive measures such as camouflage or deception to degrade the effects of enemy air defenses. Localized J-SEAD operations can use field artillery, attack helicopters, direct fire weapons, and electronic warfare.

Nuclear Weapons. When nuclear weapons are in use, the fire support plan becomes more potent and is subject to unique considerations. The authority to use nuclear weapons will be conveyed from the NCA through the operational chain of command.

Using nuclear weapons requires advanced planning, training, and logistic support. One technique is to develop preplanned *packages*. A package is a group of nuclear weapons of specific yields for use in a specific area and within a limited time to support a specific tactical goal. Each package must contain nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tactical situation decisively and to accomplish the mission. For effective employ-

ment, it is essential to update and to refine packages continuously.

Planning must reflect the constraints and directives of higher authority, procedures for warning friendly units, and responsibilities for post-strike analysis. Careful selection of targets, yields, aimpoints, and delivery systems can limit collateral damage. *Special care must be taken not to create obstacles to friendly maneuver through the use of nuclear fire.* Aircraft may deliver some weapons. Other services must warn friendly aircraft to avoid areas scheduled for nuclear strikes. Thus, joint planning and coordination is mandatory. The echelon which controls the requested package is responsible for disseminating the warning.

In general, preferred targets are—

- Enemy nuclear delivery systems.
- Key command and control elements.
- Support forces in the rear of committed elements.
- Follow-on or deep-echeloned forces.
- Reserves.

This selective targeting allows friendly units in contact to defeat engaged enemy forces by conventional means.

Brigade and division commanders will develop groups of targets in their areas of influence on the basis of the above criteria or their special operational needs. They will limit collateral damage to the levels specified in their planning guidance. The corps will review its divisions' nuclear fire plans and will integrate them into its plans.

Chemical Weapons. US policy prohibits the *first use* of lethal or incapacitating chemical munitions. It also prohibits *any use* of biological weapons. However, because the United States has reserved the right to retaliate if enemies use chemical weapons, Army units must be prepared to conduct chemical operations. *Only the NCA can grant authority to employ chemical munitions.* When it does, it will also provide specific guidance governing their use.

Commanders must be prepared to integrate chemical weapons into nuclear and conventional fire plans on receipt of chemical release. Chemical weapons are individually more lethal than conventional munitions. However, the chemical expenditure rates necessary to produce a significant effect on a well-trained and well-equipped enemy may approach those of conventional fires. Thus, when they plan, commanders must carefully consider how chemical weapons will affect operations and logistics.

Modern chemical agents produce three types of toxic effect that range from mild incapacitation to high lethality depending on concentration, degree of protection, and length of exposure. Nerve agents usually cause suffocation: breathing ceases. Blister agents attack the respiratory tract, the eyes, and the skin. Skin blistering is usually delayed, but damage to the eyes and lungs occurs rapidly. Deaths from blister agent poisoning are not common. Blood agents interfere with the ability of body tissue, especially the brain, to absorb oxygen from the blood.

Chemical agents are either persistent or nonpersistent. They normally enter the body through inhalation or through the skin. Persistent agents may present hazards from both inhalation and skin contact. Chemical munitions can also have substantial blast and fragmentation effects, producing additional casualties or materiel damage.

When properly employed in mass and without warning, chemical fires can—

- Cause high casualties among poorly trained or poorly equipped troops.
- Degrade the effectiveness of weapons, vehicles, and command posts by causing their operators to wear protective equipment.
- Restrict the use of weapons, supplies, and equipment by contamination.
- Disrupt rear area operations and troop movement.
- Enhance the effects of other fire support by slowing enemy movement.

- Reduce the speed, cohesion, and freedom of movement of enemy formations.
- Restrict or deny the use of key terrain.
- Force the enemy to undertake decontamination operations, thereby producing fresh targets for chemical or other fire support means.

DEEP BATTLE

The deep battle component of the AirLand Battle doctrine supports the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. In either attack or defense, timely and well-executed deep actions against enemy forces not yet in contact are necessary for effective operations. This is not a new discovery. US, German, and Israeli campaign plans have historically made use of long-range interdiction to gain local battlefield advantages. Deep battle prevents the enemy from massing and creates windows of opportunity for offensive actions that allow us to defeat him in detail.


The deep battle is based on a thorough IPB and timely intelligence from organic and higher sources. High-value targets must be identified, and organic and support means must be synchronized in the attack.

The corps is the focal point for intelligence collection and distribution in the deep battle. However, deep battle planning and execution are just as important at division and lower levels.

Our primary strike assets for deep attack are air and artillery interdiction. Conventional and unconventional military forces can also interdict enemy movement in depth; and while tactical electronic warfare systems do not have the range to hit deep targets, they can free artillery units for the deep battle. Deception also plays a part in delaying, disrupting, and diverting an enemy and in frustrating his plans for committing follow-on forces.

"Deep battle opens opportunities for decisive action by reducing the enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority in order to gain or to retain the initiative. If the enemy is prevented from reinforcing his committed forces, even temporarily, he may be defeated piecemeal."

DEEP ATTACK



When deep attack assets are limited, it is impossible to destroy such follow-on forces. However, it is possible to delay, to disrupt, or to divert selected enemy forces by attacking targets in those forces or blocking choke-points in the terrain. To obtain an actual tactical or operational advantage, these efforts must be directed towards a specific goal.

In the offense, the deep battle initially isolates, immobilizes, and weakens defenders in depth. As the attack continues, it sustains momentum by preventing the reorganization of coherent defenses, by blocking the movement of enemy reserves, and by preventing the escape of defending units. In the defense, the deep battle prevents the enemy from concentrating overwhelming combat power. Its major objectives are to separate and to

disrupt attacking echelons, to protect the defender's maneuver, and to degrade the enemy's fire support, command and control, communications, combat support, and combat service support.

Deep battle opens opportunities for decisive action by reducing the enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority in order to gain or to retain the initiative. If the enemy is prevented from reinforcing his committed forces, even temporarily, he may be defeated piecemeal.

Long-range weapons will be relatively scarce, but the choice of targets is apt to be large. Therefore, the commander must select targets of the highest possible mission value, whose loss will substantially degrade enemy capability.

Nuclear weapons are particularly effective in engaging follow-on formations or forces in depth because of their inherent power and because of reduced concerns about troop safety and collateral damage. Air maneuver units, airborne or airmobile troops, mechanized formations, and artillery can also take part in the deep battle. Battlefield air interdiction, however, is the most common means of striking at extended ranges.


To conduct a deep attack successfully, the fire support coordinator, the G3, and the G2 must cooperate fully. They must maintain proper emphasis on the deep battle during all phases of the operation.

Commanders will fight the enemy in an *area of influence* designated by the next higher level of command. This area normally contains enemy forces whose actions can affect the unit's close battle. Commanders simultaneously monitor activity beyond and adjacent to their areas of influence in what is called the *area of interest*. The area of interest contains enemy units capable of affecting future operations.

The exact dimensions of a unit's areas of interest and influence will vary with the terrain, weather, and capabilities of friendly and enemy forces. Corps will strive to maintain surveillance of an area of interest large enough to give 96 hours' notice of the approach of enemy divisions and armies. The ASIC, using all assets of the corps and obtaining support of higher echelons of command, collects this information under the direction of the G2.

The corps area of influence should extend far enough beyond the FLOT to permit a corps to engage enemy forces which can *join or support the main battle within 72 hours*. Divisions must collect intelligence on enemy forces up to 72 hours before they can reach the defended area. Further, divisions should be able to fight enemy forces up to 24 hours before they reach the FLOT.

An area of interest may be irregular in shape and may overlap the areas of adjacent and subordinate units. The area will change with the forward or rearward movement of the FLOT as new avenues uncover and as commanders assess mission, enemy, terrain,






and troops (METT). Higher headquarters should provide intelligence on overlapping areas of interest to all concerned commanders through the ASIC system.

Named areas of interest (NAI), routes or avenues of approach, direction of enemy movement, and specific enemy units may combine to define an area of interest. They also focus intelligence collection or fires during the battle. Corps or divisions may restrict the fires of adjacent or subordinate units and Air Force operations by designating no-fire areas. Close coordination between corps and their divisions assures that their deep battle plans complement and do not duplicate each other.

The corps area of influence includes divisional areas of influence just as the division's area of influence overlaps those of its brigades. Each level of command fights its

deep battle simultaneously. In many instances, enemy units will concern both superior and subordinate commanders. For example, both corps and divisions may follow the second echelon divisions of an enemy army. But divisions will fight enemy second echelon regiments. Corps commanders usually will fight the second echelon divisions. Commanders may restrict the engagement of particular forces or physical targets in a subordinate's area of influence. They do so if the overall plan of defense calls for unimpeded advance of the enemy on certain approaches. They do so if it is in their interest to defer destruction of an enemy force or facility. In some cases the corps may choose to limit its divisions' deep battle responsibilities and engage deep regiments itself. Normally, however, the corps will expect divisions to fight the defense in depth and will allocate enabling resources.



DELAY OF FORCES TO ALLOW MANEUVER COMPLETION**DECISIVE DEEP ATTACK**

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW is an effective tool of battle in a combined arms context. It can support operations by—

- Deceiving the enemy.
- Locating his electronic emitters.
- Intercepting his transmissions.
- Complicating his command and control and his target-acquisition systems at decisive junctures in the battle.

Planners should understand the relative scarcity of EW weapons, their limitations, and the transient nature of their effects.

The commander is the key to successfully integrating electronic warfare into the operational scheme. He must understand its potential impact on the battlefield and provide the continuous guidance necessary to its proper use.

When developing his concept of operation, the commander should treat EW assets much as he treats artillery assets. He should deploy EW assets to committed units in the light of their missions, the capabilities of available systems, and potential enemy actions.

The commander and staff members must understand the enemy's electronic systems. Commanders and staffs at corps and division levels must sort out thousands of enemy emitters and hundreds of communications nets by function. Then they must determine the ones that can disrupt the friendly combat plan. Each enemy net or weapon system that uses electronic emitters has a relative target value. Commanders should identify nets which have high tactical value to the enemy but little or no intelligence value. Enemy fire direction nets usually meet these criteria and should be jammed and/or destroyed per SOP.

Enemy nets may routinely pass information of intelligence value. SOP requires their identification and monitoring. Jammers and enemy radars cannot normally be jammed by ground resources, and they pass virtually no intelligence. SOP requires their destruction. Such SOPs allow the commander and his staff to focus on key emitters and nets that require decisive action. Decisions to jam, to

destroy, or to exploit for intelligence require routine reevaluation.

The G2 or the S2 is responsible to the commander for intelligence, counterintelligence, and target development. Working with the G3 or the S3, he will develop the intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare support measures, and target development requirements for planning and executing an operation.

For EW, the G2 or the S2 will task his collection ground and airborne systems to develop targets for interception, jamming, or destruction. His direction-finding equipment determines the approximate location of enemy emitters. These locations provide valuable information for targeting command posts, key control points, and, in the case of radars, the enemy weapon systems. Airborne direction finders available to a corps and its divisions provide the most accurate locations and do so at greater ranges than the ground vehicular systems. Ground equipment, however, provides the nucleus of locating assets. Direction finders will assist in determining enemy intentions by providing a picture of the battlefield.

The communications-electronics officer manages the defensive electronic warfare battle. Defensive EW is discussed in chapter 4.

The G3 or the S3 has the overall responsibility for EW, but his primary focus will be offensive EW or electronic combat. He must fully implement the commander's guidance by developing plans and orders. The G3 or the S3 is responsible for jamming missions, fire missions, and deception operations.

The supporting military intelligence unit provides an electronic warfare support element (EWSE) to assist the G3 or the S3 in coordinating EW activities. The EWSE will collocate with the fire support element (FSE) to facilitate target acquisition, fire planning, and coordination.

The G3 or the S3 has staff responsibility for attacking enemy electronic emitters by

electronic means (jamming). The FSE coordinates both lethal and nonlethal means of attack for the G3. Jamming should interrupt or disrupt the enemy's command and control at the decisive moment on the battlefield. When jamming is timed to coincide with other combat actions, it can produce decisive results. Like any other combat capability, it is a scarce resource with specific applicability. Jamming may be effective only for the short periods of time the enemy needs to take evasive action or to execute countermeasures.

Jammers support other combat actions—

- To disrupt key command and control nets, thus slowing or disorganizing the enemy in critical sections.
- To deny the enemy the ability to react to changes on the battlefield, for example, by committing reserves or changing direction.
- To reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire support and air control nets.
- To deny the enemy the use of his air defense fire control nets.
- To disrupt the enemy's flow of critical supplies, such as ammunition and POL.

Jammers are vulnerable to direction finding and destruction by fire. They should be used judiciously and moved often enough to avoid destruction. The G3 or the S3 coordinates the initial positioning of jammers and other electronic warfare assets in the sectors or zones of action of subordinate units. Their subsequent movement must be coordinated with the units in whose areas they are located. Such units may best control any relocation of ground mobile equipment. The electronic warfare assets must be positioned on favorable terrain away from command posts and fighting positions. They must remain close enough to the FLOT to be effective, but they cannot hinder the movement of combat units.

The G3 or the S3 is also responsible for electronic deception activities. These should tie to and enhance the overall deception effort of the corps, and they should include imitative communication deception (ICD)

and MED. ICD enters an enemy net, posing as a member. It can simply harass or, by passing changes in orders, disrupt the operations of the enemy unit. ICD is strictly controlled. *Applicable rules are in AR 105-86.*

MED is an effective means of deceiving the enemy that must also be carefully planned to create the desired effect. It passes a false picture of friendly unit dispositions and intentions to the enemy. It can portray a phantom unit by using the proper numbers of radios and radars normally assigned to the real unit. It can also portray a false image of a unit's intentions. Changing the number or kind of radio messages passed during a given period creates the illusion of a buildup of personnel and supplies. Eliminating normal radio traffic creates the illusion of radio silence, typical practice prior to an attack.

The enemy is well-versed in both ICD and MED and is likely to be wary of them. Our efforts must be well-planned and based on accurate data, or they will deceive no one. Furthermore, if poorly done, they will only deprive us of critical assets which could be better employed elsewhere.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

Maneuver and fires must be coordinated with a *supporting engineer plan*. The commander's decision and guidance for using engineers should control the plan. At maneuver brigade and battalion levels, the maneuver unit S3 prepares the engineer plan. At division and above, the engineer is responsible for preparing the engineer plan under the direction of the G3.

The engineer system has three basic purposes: It preserves the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces; it obstructs the maneuver of the enemy in areas where fire and maneuver can be used to destroy him; it enhances the survivability of friendly forces with protective construction. Engineer plans must be fully coordinated with the scheme of maneuver and fire support plans. They must allocate units and furnish a clear list of mission priorities.

Time, equipment, and materials may restrict the amount of engineer work accomplished before and during battle. Engineer plans must reflect these limitations realistically. They must assess the necessary trade-offs between survivability, mobility, and countermobility tasks and assign priorities. Normally, they must concentrate in vital areas in support of the main effort rather than throughout the force.

In offensive operations, engineers normally concentrate their efforts in supporting maneuver by—

- Improving and maintaining routes.
- Laying bridges.
- Breaching and removing obstacles to movement.
- Installing protective obstacles to the flanks of the attacking forces.

Some corps engineer units may be attached to, or placed under operational control of, divisions. Others will operate in direct or general support.

In the defense, engineers reinforce the terrain to anchor the defense in critical areas, to maximize the effects of the defender's fires, and to facilitate the movement of counter-attack forces. They also prepare positions and roads or trails for moving reserve, artillery, logistic, and other units. Doing so enhances the survivability of forces and vital facilities.

Corps engineer units are responsible for employing atomic demolition munitions against accessible hard targets. Maneuver units will provide the required mission support.

Engineer units *must coordinate obstacle plans in detail*. They must destroy or emplace bridges at the proper time, accurately place and report gaps and flank obstacles, and close routes left open for friendly maneuver or withdrawal on time. All engineer, artillery, and aviation units are responsible for emplacing scatterable mines. Plans must provide for the timely recording of in-place

obstacles, and key information must be promptly disseminated to all affected units.

Engineer operations are time and labor intensive. They must begin as early as possible in the defense. They must also be flexible enough to change as the battle develops. They must include detailed plans for emplacing scatterable mines rapidly, installing bridging on short notice, and placing or clearing obstacles in combat.

Denial plans will prevent or hinder the enemy from occupying or using areas or objects of tactical or strategic value. To the maximum extent possible, all materials of military value to the enemy will be removed or destroyed prior to retrograde movements. International agreements and national policy restrict denial operations to military objects. They prohibit destroying certain materials and facilities for humanitarian concerns. Each local commander must strictly follow the theater policy on denial.

INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE

US forces can no longer count on unchallenged air superiority. Enemy air forces will contest control of the air, and our operations are likely to be conducted under temporary or local air superiority, air parity, or even enemy domination. Enemy air capability will require us to coordinate air defenses.

Corps and divisions will often possess organic SHORAD units. High-to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) units may also be assigned or attached to corps when higher echelons are not providing them.

All air defense systems must be integrated to preclude the attack of friendly aircraft and to engage hostile aircraft. The Air Force component commander in a theater is normally the area air defense commander. He is responsible for integrating all air defense elements. He also establishes air defense rules of engagement and procedures for all air defense systems within the theater. HIMAD systems are integrated by automated data

link to an Air Force control and reporting center (CRC). Air defense rules and procedures pass from the CRC through the corps and division to SHORAD systems by voice communication.

The commander locates air defense battalions of corps and divisions to protect his highest priority assets. These will vary with each operation. When air attack is likely, he should be concerned about—

- Command posts.
- Logistic facilities.
- Artillery units.
- Bridges or defiles.
- Reserves.
- Forward arming and refueling points.
- Massed maneuver forces.

The unit air defense officer recommends air defenses based on the commander's guidance for each operation. Passive defensive measures will remain important since there will rarely be enough air defense artillery (ADA) weapons to provide complete protection.

Like field artillery, ADA must provide continuous coverage of protected units during mobile operations. Movements must be carefully planned, firing positions must be cleared with sector or zone commanders, and plans must be flexible enough to accommodate sudden changes. *FM 44-1 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 8 contain detailed discussions of air defense operation.*

AIRSPACE COORDINATION

Airspace coordination maximizes joint force effectiveness in the air-land battle without hindering the combat power of either service. Friendly aircraft must be able to enter, to depart, and to move within the area of operations free of undue restrictions, while artillery fires in support of the ground force continue uninterrupted. The tempo and complexity of modern combat rule out a system that requires complicated or time-consuming coordination. Also, the likelihood of poor or

enemy-jammed communications dictates maximum reliance on procedural arrangement. To be simple and flexible, our airspace coordination system operates under a concept of management by exception.

Each service is free to operate its aircraft within the theater airspace. Army aircraft at low altitudes operate under the control of Army commanders. Air Force aircraft at medium and high altitudes operate under control of the tactical air control system. The boundary between low- and medium-altitude regimes is flexible and situation-dependent. Only when aircraft pass from one regime to another is traffic coordination required. Generally, Army aircraft operate without restriction below coordinating altitudes forward of the division rear boundary. Passing information about major movements or high concentrations of fire helps to avoid conflicts.

The operations officer is responsible for the airspace coordination of Army aviation. He coordinates air routes and movements with the aviation officer, the air defense officer, the fire support coordinators, and aviation unit commanders. Doing so insures the safe movement of aircraft within his area of responsibility. Routes, times of flight, and other procedures must be precisely defined and stringently observed to engage enemy aircraft effectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

Signal support plans deliberately meet the requirements of the operation. Means for transmitting information and orders range from the time-tested radio, wire, and messenger systems to high-speed data links and man-packed satellite communication terminals. Commanders and staffs at all echelons must understand the capabilities and limitations of their systems. They must be actively involved in insuring adequacy. Atmospheric conditions, terrain, enemy EW efforts, and nuclear EMP may hinder electronic signal equipment. The key to survivability is establishing command and

control procedures that—

- Provide redundancy of communications.
- Eliminate unnecessary reports.
- Insure that subordinates know what to do during communications interruption.
- Do not overload communications and use them only when absolutely necessary.
- Minimize use of the most vulnerable means.
- Practice good operations security and good communications security.

Each means of communication has its strengths and weaknesses. Carefully integrated means should give the most flexible and reliable system possible.

DECEPTION

Deception misleads the enemy regarding friendly intentions, capabilities, objectives, and locations of vulnerable units and facilities. The G3 assembles the deception plan, making use of every unit and asset available to project a plausible deception story designed to elicit a specific enemy reaction. He may use combat units; CEWI units; elements of the signal, support, command, and aviation units, as well as civil affairs staff and other forces. The deception effort may include demonstrations and ruses as part of offensive or defensive maneuver plans.

Demonstrations deceive the enemy by a show of force in an area where no battle is sought. Although forces may move as part of a demonstration, they do not intend to contact the enemy. For example, maneuver or fire support forces might be positioned to indicate an attack at a location other than that actually intended.

Ruses are single actions that *deliberately* place false information in enemy hands. They may cause the enemy to disclose his intentions, state of morale, or combat readiness. One ruse is to use a few vehicles towing chains to produce the dust clouds of a large

movement. Another is to move a few tanks throughout an area at night to simulate repositioning of forces. Manipulative communications deception is a common means of placing false or misleading information in the enemy's hands. *FM 90-2 provides additional details on deception operations.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are an important component of the political, military, economic, and ideological actions that support both long-term and immediate objectives. Propaganda and other PSYOP techniques for changing the attitudes and behavior of target groups provide the commander with his primary means of communication with opposing military forces and civilian groups. When effectively integrated with other operations, PSYOP add to the relative combat power of the force. They manipulate the psychological dimension of the battlefield—

- To reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces.
- To promote support for friendly forces by foreign populations and groups.
- To reduce the effectiveness of enemy PSYOP directed toward friendly forces and supporting civilian groups.

PSYOP must be effectively employed from the theater to the division level. Based on levels of employment, objectives, and targeted groups, each of the following categories is part of an integrated theater PSYOP effort:

- Strategic PSYOP, conducted to advance broad or long-term objectives and to create a psychological environment favorable to military operations.
- Tactical PSYOP, conducted to achieve relatively immediate and short-term objectives in support of tactical commanders.
- Consolidated PSYOP, conducted to facilitate military operations, to reduce interference by noncombatants, and to

obtain the cooperation of the civilian population in the area of operations.

The G3 is responsible for integrating psychological and combat operations. The supporting PSYOP unit commander plans and executes PSYOP. He normally provides a small PSYOP staff element to the supported G3.

Effective integration of PSYOP is based on the following fundamental principles:

- Planning should begin early, concurrently with operational planning.
- PSYOP must occur early in an operation.
- Scarce resources for conducting PSYOP should be targeted against groups most critical to success.
- Campaigns of strategic, tactical, and consolidation PSYOP must be thoroughly coordinated and mutually supportive.
- All PSYOP units are part of a PSYOP command to insure integration and consistency of campaigns.
- PSYOP must respond to changing requirements of the battlefield.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional warfare (UW), normally conducted by US Army Special Forces, operates deep in the enemy's rear area. Special Forces can disrupt the enemy's ability to prosecute the main battle by conducting either unconventional warfare or unilateral operations deep in his rear areas. Normally, the unified commander assigns missions through his Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC). Special Forces will provide support by responding to requirements from the tactical corps commander when their elements are located in the corps area of interest.

The US Army Special Forces conduct unconventional warfare in a theater. These operations concentrate on strategic goals and have long-range and immediate effects on the battle. They include interdicting enemy lines of communications and destroying military

and industrial facilities. Special Forces conduct PSYOP to demoralize the enemy and to collect information in the enemy's rear areas. Special Forces organize, train, equip, and advise resistance forces in guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape (E&E), subversion, and sabotage. Their greatest value to commanders of conventional forces is in fighting the deep battle and forcing the enemy to deploy significant numbers of combat forces to counter these activities.

Guerrilla warfare combines military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Guerrilla operations are brief, violent offensive actions conducted to complement, to support, or to extend conventional military operations. Guerrilla operations in support of a corps' deep battle can assist the commander by maintaining surveillance of a critical area, by distracting enemy attention from objective areas, by attacking enemy fire support units, and by interdicting key approaches.

E&E, subversion, and sabotage activities are aspects of UW which contribute to the strategic effort of conventional forces. E&E moves military and selected civilian personnel out of enemy-held territory. Subversion undermines the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a government. Sabotage injures or obstructs the defense of a country by destroying war materiel and human or natural resources.

If the United States retains control of the guerrilla forces after linkup with the conventional forces, the guerrillas may augment conventional forces. They may participate in conventional combat operations or conduct reconnaissance in support of conventional forces. They may also relieve or replace conventional units in the main battle area, for example, to contain or to destroy bypassed enemy units and enemy guerrilla elements.

Special Forces elements can deploy unilaterally into the enemy's rear area to locate, to identify, and to destroy vital

targets. Special Forces detachments may have the following missions:

- Intelligence collection.
- Target acquisition.
- Terminal guidance for Air Force strike aircraft and Army missile systems.
- Interdiction of critical transportation targets.
- Destruction of nuclear storage sites and command and control facilities.
- Personnel recovery.

RANGER OPERATIONS

Ranger companies and battalions are specially organized, trained, and equipped to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, ground interdiction, and raids in the enemy rear. Ranger battalions can deploy rapidly to any location in the world where an immediate US military presence is required. They can infiltrate the hostile area by air, land, or sea. When adequately supported, they are capable of independent operations. Ranger missions should integrate into a plan designed to destroy, to delay, and to disorganize the enemy. As an additional benefit, they cause him to divert a significant portion of his combat forces to rear area security.

Ranger operations normally take two forms: quick response and deliberate. In quick response, Ranger units accomplish missions before the enemy can react to their presence. Deliberate operations rely on—

- Meticulous planning for every phase.
- Detailed reconnaissance or surveillance of a target area.
- Deceptive countermeasures and absolute secrecy, thorough preparation, and rehearsals.
- Decisive execution characterized by surprise, speed, precision, and boldness.

In either kind, the mission should be completed and the unit extracted before the enemy can react in strength.

Command and control of the ranger battalion will normally be at a level where the

unit's unique capabilities can be fully employed on a worldwide or a theaterwide basis. The command echelon to which the Ranger battalion is attached must be able to provide all resources necessary to employ it properly.

Ranger units require access to real-time, all-source tactical and strategic intelligence. The controlling headquarters must have interface with national-, theater-, and corps-level intelligence collection and production elements. It must provide timely, detailed, processed intelligence to the Ranger planning staff.

Insertion and extraction operations are crucial to Ranger employment. Ranger battalions must be provided mission-dedicated assets when air insertion and extraction are involved. Ranger units must also have effective and secure long-range communications with controlling headquarters.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Commanders must expect to fight in or near populated areas. Centers of civilian population have the potential of providing supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources that US commanders can use to support military operations. Conversely, uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians about the battlefield, hostile actions by the population, or failure to cooperate with US forces can significantly disrupt military operations. International law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949, requires all commanders to maintain a humane standard of treatment of civilians in the battle area, to preserve law and order, and to protect private property.

Civil-military operations (CMO) affect the relationship between a military command and the civilian populace. They include activities conducted to assist civil authorities and to control the population in the operational area. To obtain the cooperation of the civilian population, CMO integrate psychological operations and civil affairs operations.

The G3 supervises PYSOP, but the G5 coordinates those PYSOP directed against civilian populations. PYSOP support CMO through political, military, and economic actions planned and conducted to mold the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of foreign groups to support US national objectives. They also counter enemy PYSOP. The target audience need not be under US control.

The G5 or the S5 staff supervises civilian affairs activities. Civil affairs are those activities which involve US military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or those in a country or area occupied by US military forces. This relationship may be established prior to, during, or after military action in time of hostilities or other emergencies. In a friendly country or area, US forces coordinate activities with

local agencies or persons, when possible. Normally these relationships are covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied. In occupied territory, a military government may have to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority. Civil-military activities—

- Identify the local resources, facilities, and support available for US operations.
- Coordinate the use of local resources, facilities, and support such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
- Minimize interference by the local populace with US military operations.
- Assist the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local populace.

PART THREE
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 10
Fundamentals of the Defense

THE DEFENSE denies success to an attacking enemy. For this reason some theorists have labeled defense the less decisive form of war. To win, one must attack. However, the distinctions between defensive and offensive operations of large formations are made primarily on their intended purposes rather than on the types of combat actions they under take. Offensive combat is as much a part of defensive operations as strongpoint defenses or delaying actions.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A successful defense consists of reactive and offensive elements working together to rob the enemy of the initiative. It is never purely reactive. The defender resists and contains the enemy where he must but seeks every opportunity to turn the tables. Early in the battle, such opportunities will be local and limited. As the battle develops, they will become more numerous. This is especially true when the defender uses reactive elements to uncover enemy vulnerabilities and to confuse or to disorganize his force. When the attacker exposes himself, the defender's reserves or uncommitted forces counter-attack. The defense that successfully attacks the enemy's plan can ultimately destroy his uncoordinated force.

While reactive measures halt the enemy, early counterattacks improve the chances for total victory. The reactive phase of the battle should end with a general counteroffensive. Gettysburg, for example, was an entirely reactive battle. The outcome depended on the attacker's errors, not on the defender's exploitation of them. At the Battle of Kursk in


1943, the defense was better balanced. Early counterattacks strengthened the reactive phase, and the entire defending army ultimately went on the offensive to exploit its gains.

A closer parallel to the fluid conditions, rapid maneuver, and calculated risks of future operations occurred in the Battle of Tannenberg fought in East Prussia in August 1914. While the majority of the German army attacked France, General Max von Prittwitz, commander of the German Eighth Army, defended the province against two Russian armies—Rennenkampf's First Army and Samsonov's Second. After failing to halt the two forces with a series of counter-strokes, Prittwitz notified the high command that he would evacuate the province to set up a defense on the Vistula River. As a result, he was promptly relieved and replaced by General Paul von Hindenburg.

Upon their arrival in East Prussia, Hindenburg and Chief of Staff, General Erich von Ludendorff, adopted a plan conceived by

Chief of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffman, to entrap and destroy Samsonov's Second Army. Leaving only a screen of cavalry to confront Rennenkampf's army, Hindenburg began to concentrate his forces in the south. Five days later he halted, then encircled and destroyed the Second Army near Tannenberg. Samsonov's army broke up in panic, losing 125,000 men and 500 guns from 26 to 31 August.

Turning back to the north, the Germans then concentrated against the Russian First Army, defeating and driving it out of East Prussia. In this defensive campaign, the Germans lost about 10,000 men while imposing losses of 250,000 and effectively ended the Russian threat to their eastern provinces.



PURPOSES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Defensive operations achieve one or more of the following:

- Cause an enemy attack to fail.
- Gain time.
- Concentrate forces elsewhere.
- Control essential terrain.
- Wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations.
- Retain tactical, strategic, or political objectives.

The immediate purpose of any defense is to cause an enemy attack to fail. The other listed reasons contribute to purposes beyond the immediate defense.

It may be necessary to gain time for reinforcements to arrive or to economize forces in one sector while concentrating forces for attack in another. In either case, a

defense or a delay may achieve these purposes.

In some cases a force may be defending because it cannot attack. The defender then uses his advantages of position and superior knowledge of the terrain to cause the enemy to extend himself. Once the enemy has been weakened and adopts a defensive posture, the defender maneuvers to destroy him with fires or counterattacks.

In other cases, portions of a force may be required to retain key terrain or essential tactical, strategic, or political objectives. In some instances, airmobile or airborne forces must first seize and hold such objectives until a larger force can link with the defender. An underlying purpose of all defensive operations is to create the opportunity to change to the offensive. All activities of the defense must contribute to that aim.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE DEFENSE

Some military theorists think defense is the stronger form of war because denying success is easier than achieving it. Indeed, the defender does have significant advantages over the attacker. In most cases he not only knows the ground better, but having occupied it first, he has strengthened his position and massed his forces. He is under the cover of his own field artillery and air defense. Once the battle begins, the defender fights from cover against an exposed enemy. He uses the terrain to mask his movements as he gathers forces to block and to attack the enemy. The defender can hold his major forces in reserve until the attack has developed and then strike the extended enemy over carefully selected and prepared terrain within the defensive area. The effects of obstacles, airpower, and conventional weapons on exposed troops and certain aspects of nuclear, chemical, and electronic warfare also favor the defender.

Balanced against these advantages, however, is the attacker's single greatest asset—the initiative. The attacker chooses the time and place of battle. He can concen-

trate first and surprise the defender by his choice of ground, direction of approach, and time of attack. He can also mislead the defender to slow his recognition of the main attack or distract him to delay his countermeasures.

The attacker tries to shatter the defense quickly and to maintain a fast pace to prevent its reconstitution. The defender must slow the tempo, giving himself time to react before he ultimately isolates and destroys the attacking forces.

The defender prevents the attacker from focusing his full strength at one time and place on the battlefield. Using deception, operations security, and maneuver to appear ambiguous and to confuse the enemy, the defender must divert the attacker's efforts into unproductive ventures and into strikes at nonexistent targets. These dissipate his strength, use his resources, and throw him off balance. Using terrain skillfully and interdicting follow-on forces through deep attack, the defender breaks the attacker's ability to

sustain the momentum. The defender makes it difficult for him to employ fire support assets, to reinforce, to resupply, and to direct attacking echelons. In essence, he destroys the synchronization among the elements of the attacking force.

Initially outnumbered, the defender must take advantage of fighting from stationary, protected positions. Deep attack, the actions of security forces, and detailed fire and barrier plans help contain and control the attack. However, once the defender has controlled the attacker and concentrated forces in the area of the main attack, he gains equally important advantages. He can operate against exposed, precisely located segments of the attacking force. He can attack the overextended enemy with fires from all sides and launch surprise counterattacks on his flanks and rear to destroy the attacking force.

The defender's ultimate task is to overcome the attacker's advantages and to gain the initiative quickly. Napoleon's *Memoirs* contain his principles for conducting defensive campaigns. They can be succinctly summarized: The entire art of war consists of a well-planned and exceptionally circumspect defense followed by rapid, audacious attack.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Types of defensive operations include the defense, the delay, the defense of an encircled force, and rear area protection operations. Other combat activities normally associated with defensive operations include counterattacks, passage of lines, withdrawals, and reliefs to continue the defense. In defensive operations, portions of large corps-or division-size forces may be conducting any of these operations or activities:

- **DEFENSE.** The defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and to prevent him from achieving his objectives. The manner in which this is done is developed in chapter 11.
- **DELAY.** A delaying operation is usually conducted when the commander needs

The key terms of AirLand Battle doctrine—initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization—also apply to any successful defense.

Defensive operations—

- **Seize the tactical initiative locally and then generally as the entire force shifts from defense to attack.**
- **Fight the enemy throughout the depth of his formations to delay and to disorganize him and to create opportunities for offensive action.** The defender must organize forces and resources in depth to gain time and space for flexibility and responsive maneuver.
- **Maintain agility and flexibility in using fire, maneuver, and electronic warfare to set the terms of battle.** Just as the attacker commits himself, the defender should change the situation and thereby force a countermove. This overloads the enemy's command and control system and renders his reaction uncoordinated and indecisive. Effective agility can lead to the enemy's piecemeal destruction.
- **Synchronize all available combat capability in well-coordinated combat actions.** Violent execution of flexible plans and aggressive exploitation of enemy weaknesses can halt the attacking force.

time to concentrate or to withdraw forces, to establish defenses in greater depth, to economize in an area, or to complete offensive actions elsewhere. In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing his advance. Counterattacks and defenses by elements of a delaying force may be necessary in such operations. Delay operations are discussed in chapter 12.

- **DEFENSE OF ENCIRCLED FORCES.** Those defending units intentionally and unintentionally bypassed on a nonlinear battlefield must continue to contribute to the overall defense. This is the subject of chapter 13.
- **REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATIONS.** The rear areas must be defended during any operation. The threats may vary

from individual acts of sabotage to major regimental attacks and even to division-size airborne or airmobile attacks. Chapter 14 addresses the particulars of rear area protection operations.

- **COUNTERATTACKS AND SPOILING ATTACKS.** Counterattacks and spoiling attacks may enhance both the defense and the delay. They may occur forward of or within the main battle area. Counterattacks by fire involve maneuvering to engage an enemy's flank or rear. A well-executed counterattack to the flanks or rear of an enemy just as he meets a resolute defense to his front can entirely upset his plan. Companies and larger forces may launch counterattacks to retake critical terrain or to destroy an enemy. They may also assist a friendly unit to disengage. Launched as the enemy gathers his offensive force, a spoiling attack can prevent him from attacking or give the defender additional time to prepare.
- **WITHDRAWALS.** In a withdrawal, all or part of a force disengages from the enemy for another mission in another area. A partial withdrawal may be necessary in either the defense or a

delay. Withdrawals are discussed in chapter 12.

- **RELIEFS TO CONTINUE THE DEFENSE.** There are two kinds of relief. The relief-in-place is common when units have similar organizations or when occupied terrain must be retained. The area relief is practical when units are dissimilar or when improved defensive terrain is located away from the line of contact.

All coordination, reconnaissance, planning, and control for relief should be simple and efficient. Control, speed, and secrecy can insure simplicity and efficiency. Control, the most important principle, should receive the most command involvement. All relief decisions must consider the time available and allow for advance reconnaissance. The larger the units involved in the relief, the more time will be required for planning and coordination. Both hasty and deliberate reliefs must be concealed from the enemy. Reliefs should be conducted during periods of reduced visibility and when the enemy is least likely to attack. Any change in the defensive plan should normally wait until the relief is complete.

CHAPTER 11

The Defense

KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ characterized the ideal defense as a "shield of blows." At the onset of the attack the defender yields the initiative. However, he uses his prepared positions and knowledge of the ground to slow its momentum and to strike the enemy with repeated, unexpected blows. He defeats the attacker's combined arms, degrades his strength and ability to concentrate, and destroys his force with effective maneuver supported by flexible firepower. He does not have to kill each enemy tank, squad, or combat system; he has only to destroy the ability of the attacking force to continue fighting.

SCOPE

US Army defensive doctrine is applicable anywhere in the world. The commander chooses a defense to fit his mission, the nature of the enemy, the terrain, and the capabilities of available units. He may elect to defend well forward by striking the enemy as he approaches. He may fight the decisive battle within the main battle area (MBA). If he does not have to hold a specified area or position, he may draw the enemy deep into the area of operations and then strike his flanks and rear. He may even choose to preempt the enemy with spoiling attacks if conditions favor such tactics. In the past, all four methods have proved decisive.

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
DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK

Corps and divisions fight a unified air-land defense organized into five complementary elements:

- A continuous deep battle operation in the area of influence forward of the FLOT.
- A covering force operation to support the main effort.
- A main effort in the main battle area.
- Rear area protection (RAP) operations.
- Reserve operations in support of the main effort.

These elements perform different but complementary functions in the defense. The deep battle robs the attacker of the initiative early and continues to limit his options throughout the battle. Normally established

by corps, the covering force serves as the forward security echelon and begins the fight against the attacker's leading echelons in the covering force area (CFA). Covering force actions are designed to facilitate the defeat of the attack in the MBA where the main defensive effort occurs, either at the FEBA or further to the rear. Rear area protection maintains the viability of command and control and support for the overall effort. The primary purpose of the reserve in the defense is to maintain the commander's flexibility. It is best used to strike a decisive blow against the attacker. The commander organizes his defense around these functional elements based on the factors of METT-T. He allocates forces and other resources to these tasks and shifts them as appropriate during the battle.



CONSIDERATIONS

To plan effective defenses, commanders must consider the five factors discussed below.

Mission. The first consideration in planning the defense is the mission. It defines the area to be defended, and it must be analyzed in terms of the higher commander's overall scheme. Defending broad frontages forces the commander to accept gaps. Defending shallow sectors in which there is little ground to yield reduces flexibility and requires the commander to fight well forward. Narrow frontages and deep sectors increase the elasticity of the defense and simplify concentration of effort, which create a stronger defense. In planning his defensive posture, the commander also considers subsequent missions.

Enemy. The second consideration in planning the defense is the enemy—his procedures, equipment, capabilities, and probable courses of action. Defending commanders must look at themselves and their sectors for weaknesses that the enemy will seek to exploit and then act to counter them. They may also be able to identify probable enemy objectives and approaches to them. In a defense against an echeloned enemy, they must know how soon follow-on forces can attack. If the defenders can delay such forces, they can defeat a strong, echeloned enemy piecemeal—one echelon at a time. If the defenders can force the enemy to commit follow-on echelons sooner than planned, they upset his attack timetable, creating exploitable gaps between the committed and subsequent echelons.

Terrain. The third consideration in organizing the defense is terrain. The defending force must exploit any feature of the terrain that impairs enemy momentum or makes it difficult for him to mass or to maneuver. Defenders must engage the attacker at those points along his avenue of approach where the terrain puts him at greatest disadvantage. Controlling key terrain is vital to a successful defense. Some

terrain may be so significant to the defense that its loss would prove decisive. Decisive terrain is usually more prevalent at brigade and lower levels. Terrain itself is seldom decisive in division or corps defense. However, when it is, commanders must make it a focal point of the defensive plan.

Troops. The fourth consideration is the mobility and protection of the defending force relative to the opposing forces. Armor and mechanized forces can move on the battlefield with minimum losses even under artillery fire, while infantry cannot. Once engaged, infantry elements must remain where they are initially positioned and dug in. They disengage when the attack is defeated or when counterattacking forces relieve the pressure on them. However, infantry defenses against enemy infantry attacks in close terrain can be fluid battles of ambush and maneuver.

Time. The fifth consideration in organizing the defense is time. The defense needs time for reconnaissance; for preparing initial, supplementary, and subsequent positions; for fire planning; and for coordinating maneuver, fires, terrain reinforcement, and logistic support. To give MBA forces additional preparation time, the commander may order a high-risk delay by a covering force. Lack of time may also cause a commander to maintain a larger-than-normal reserve force.

OPTIONS

Based on his analysis, the commander assigns missions, allocates forces, and apportions combat support and CSS resources within the framework of the overall defense. He decides where to concentrate his effort and where to take risks. This analysis also establishes the advantages of defending forward or defending in depth.

When he defends in the forward part of the sector, the commander commits most of his combat power and the main defensive effort early. He may do so by deploying forces

forward or by planning counterattacks well forward in the MBA or even forward of it. He may select a defense in depth when the mission is less restrictive, when defensive sectors are deep, and when advantageous terrain extends deep into the sector. Normally, divisions and corps defend a wide sector in depth. Elements in the CFA and forward elements in the MBA identify, define, and control the depth of the enemy's main effort while holding off secondary thrusts. Then counterattacks on the flanks of the main effort seal off, isolate, and destroy penetrating enemy forces.

While METT-T may require forward defense, it is the most difficult to execute because it is inherently less flexible and more dependent on synchronization than defense in depth. The commander's options are not limited to a defense in depth or to a forward defense. The conditions may favor an intermediate form of defense.

DEEP BATTLE OPERATIONS

Deep battle operations in the defense turn the table on the attacker by limiting his options, destroying his plan, and robbing him of the initiative. They can delay the arrival of follow-on forces or cause them to be committed where and when it is most advantageous to the defense. They can also disrupt enemy operations by attacking command posts at critical stages in the battle or by striking and eliminating key elements of an enemy's capability.

Areas of interest and influence extend far enough forward of the FLOT to give the commander time to react to approaching enemy forces, to assess his options, and to execute operations accordingly. The deep battle begins before the enemy closes with the maneuver forces. It goes on during combat in the CFA and the MBA, and it usually continues after the direct contact between forces has ended.

In fighting the deep battle, the commander will maintain a current intelligence picture of

enemy forces throughout his area of interest. Yet, he must focus his collection effort on areas and units of particular concern. To conduct a deep attack successfully, the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), G3, and G2 must cooperate to insure that deep battle actions support the overall concept of the defense.

As enemy formations approach the FLOT, the commander will monitor them, seek high-value targets, and disrupt and delay them. Air-delivered weapons, field artillery fires, tactical nuclear weapons, air maneuver units, and unconventional warfare forces are the chief means of the deep battle. Because they are usually limited in number and effect, commanders must use them wisely and efficiently. Generally, more sensors and weapons become available as the enemy nears the FLOT. Effective employment of maneuver units in deep attack requires careful planning, IPB, and responsive surveillance once operations are underway. For a detailed discussion of the deep battle, see chapter 7.

COVERING FORCE OPERATIONS

In any form of defense, the covering force serves as the forward security echelon. It occupies a sector far enough forward of the FEBA to protect MBA units from surprise, allowing MBA commanders to reposition forces to meet the enemy attack and preventing enemy medium-range artillery fire on the FEBA. The covering force gains and maintains contact, develops the situation, and delays or defeats the enemy's leading fighting forces.

Corps and division commanders may establish a strong covering force as the first echelon of a two-echelon defense. It may battle leading enemy formations, causing the enemy to commit follow-on battalions or regiments and disclose his main effort. During the action, the corps or next higher level of command conducts the deep battle

against follow-on forces and prepares for battle in the MBA.

The size and composition of the covering force depends on METT-T and also on the time that the MBA force needs to organize or to occupy its positions. Normally the covering force is organized around tank-heavy task forces and divisional and regimental cavalry. Ideally, a corps will employ one or more armored cavalry regiments because they are specially organized, trained, and equipped for security missions. A corps may use divisions or separate brigade units instead of cavalry or with cavalry. A light corps may have to use air cavalry, light armor, or airmobile infantry in the CFA. Light covering forces will be able only to harass the enemy and to report his movement as he approaches the MBA. In any case, the covering force will require appropriate additional artillery, engineer, CEWI, ADA, and Army aviation units to perform its mission successfully.

The corps or MBA divisions may control the covering force as a separate force in their own sectors. Brigades should control the covering force only where terrain makes other solutions impractical. Corps or division control depends on the overall plan for defense, the size of the CFA, the number of battalion-size units to be employed, and the time that MBA units have for preparing.

Corps and division operations officers must monitor the covering force battle and maintain coordination between it and the deep battle. Above all, the covering force battle must complement the overall defensive plan. It must damage and mislead the enemy, channel his attacks into desired areas, and cover either the positioning or the relocation of MBA forces.


Covering force battalions and squadrons fight from a series of mutually supporting battle positions that make maximum use of the terrain and the force's long-range fires. Carefully planned indirect fires and obstacles protect these positions. They also help the covering force avoid an inappro-

**THE COVERING FORCE DEFEATS
OR DELAYS THE ENEMY,
FORCING HIM TO
REVEAL HIS MAIN THRUST
AND DENYING HIM ACCESS
TO THE MAIN BATTLE AREA**

priate decisive engagement. Normally, the covering force will defend, delay, and attack with its maneuver units. Delay by itself will rarely provide enough protection.

The entire covering force should not withdraw automatically when the first enemy units reach the FEBA. It should adjust to the enemy advance and continue to fight or to screen far forward. Doing so can increase the chances for success even though the attack has penetrated in some parts. Those parts

that remain forward can maintain surveillance. They resist the enemy's supporting attacks and reconnaissance effort, upsetting his coordination and allowing the MBA commander to fight one battle at a time. Finally, the covering force can stage a staggered withdrawal. In observing and providing access to enemy flanks, it facilitates counter-attack forward of the FEBA. In some cases the covering force can attack first-echelon forces from the rear or drive between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.



HANDOFF

Handoff must occur quickly and efficiently to minimize vulnerability. It also requires close coordination between the covering force and MBA forces. The covering force commander must retain freedom to maneuver until he initiates the passage of lines. The overall commander must establish contact points, passage points, passage lanes, routes to positions, resupply, and fire support coordination prior to the withdrawal of the covering force. Normally battalion-size units of the covering force hand off the battle to the brigades through which they pass. After passage, the covering forces normally move to designated areas in the rear or MBA to prepare for subsequent operations. Those areas must be far enough away to keep the withdrawn units from interfering with operations.

Control of the deep battle passes to MBA divisions as the covering force hands off the battle. This usually occurs in one sector at a time until the covering force has been completely withdrawn. A corps will continue to fight its deep battle after the commander commits MBA divisions to the defense.

MAIN EFFORT

Whatever the concept of operation, forces fight the decisive defensive battle either at the FEBA or within the MBA. The commander positions forces in the MBA to control or to repel enemy penetrations.

The commander assigns MBA sectors on the basis of the defending unit's capability, the terrain within the sector, and the larger unit's mission. The assigned sector usually coincides with a major avenue of approach. The force responsible for the most dangerous sector in the MBA normally receives priority in the initial allocation of artillery, engineer, and close air support. It is the main effort. The commander strengthens the effort at the most dangerous avenue of approach by narrowing the sector of the unit astride it. He may use armored cavalry units or other maneuver forces to economize in rough sectors and to concentrate the major units on

the most dangerous approaches, but he must do so without splitting secondary avenues of approach. The defensive plan must be flexible enough to allow changes in the main effort during the course of the battle.

A significant obstacle along the FEBA, such as a river, favors a defense trying to retain terrain. It adds to the relative combat power of the defender. Reserves at all levels destroy forces which have penetrated such obstacles or established bridgeheads. Such attacking forces must be destroyed while they are small. If they are not, they can assist following elements to cross, build rapidly in strength, and rupture the coherence of the defense.

Corps and division commanders—

- Follow developments in the MBA.
- Support important fights with additional nuclear or conventional firepower.
- Adjust sectors.
- Control movement of committed forces as necessary.
- Reinforce MBA units with fresh maneuver forces.
- Intervene at decisive junctures in the battle with reserves.

As the close battle progresses, corps and division commanders continue to fight the deep battle. They monitor events beyond the FLOT and fight follow-on enemy forces to prevent them from outflanking defensive positions or overwhelming committed forces.

The commander may also structure a deep defense with elements deployed within the MBA. He may enhance it by holding out a large mobile reserve and by committing fewer elements to the initial MBA defense. Committed elements in such a defense control the penetration until counterattack can eliminate it.

Large mobile forces may penetrate sections of the MBA. Penetration and separation of adjacent units is likely with nuclear and chemical operations. Nonetheless, MBA forces continue to fight while protecting their

own flanks, striking at the enemy's, and driving across penetrations when possible. Division or corps reserves can defeat some penetrations, but others will pass into the corps rear area.

REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATIONS

In contemporary battle, protection of rear areas will be very important. Because RAP may divert forces from the main effort, commanders should carefully balance their assets against requirements and prepare to take risks somewhere. For example, they may have to decide between competing needs if the rear area and the main effort both need reserves simultaneously. To make such decisions, commanders require accurate information and nerve.

Rear area command and control and support facilities must be dispersed and redundant. Artillery and obstacles must protect such facilities. Air defense forces should be detailed to protect especially sensitive areas and facilities in the rear if the enemy succeeds in opening flight corridors over the MBA. Reserves must be ready for fluid counteroffensive operations in the rear area—in essence, movement to contact. Airmobile forces, attack helicopter and air cavalry units, Air Force close air support missions, and mechanized forces will be of special value, as will be chemical fires and low-yield nuclear weapons. For a detailed discussion of RAP, see chapter 14.

RESERVE OPERATIONS

The primary purpose of reserves in the defense is to counterattack to exploit enemy weaknesses, such as exposed flanks or support units, unprotected forces in depth, and congestion. They also reinforce forward defensive operations, containing enemy penetrations or reacting to rear area threats.

Commanders should decide on the size, composition, and mission of the reserve as early as possible. Commanders down to

brigade will normally try to retain about one third of their maneuver strength in reserve.

Timing is critical to counterattacks, but the commander and his subordinates have little latitude. They must anticipate the lead times for committing reserves. Committed too soon, the reserves may not be available for a more dangerous contingency. Committed too late, they may be ineffectual. Once he has committed the reserves, the commander should form other reserves from uncommitted forces or from forces in less threatened sectors.

In planning a counterattack, the commander must carefully estimate the time and distance for follow-on enemy echelons. Then he must determine which of his units can attack, where they will take positions after the counterattack, and what interdiction or deep attack will isolate the enemy. Counter-attacking units seek to avoid enemy strength. The most effective counterattacks seize strong positions from which to fire on the enemy's exposed flanks and rear. If the force is to stay and to defend after counterattack, it must regain good defensive positions before overwatching enemy units can interfere.

Reserves may be air or ground maneuver units. Nuclear weapons may also be reserves if the theater policy permits the commander to use them freely. Reserves may exist at battalion and task force levels, but designated reserves are not usually available at these or lower levels. At these levels counterattacks are conducted by least committed elements, by elements positioned in depth, or by reinforcing elements that a higher headquarters has attached for the purpose. In any case, the commanders must designate artillery units to support the reserves on short notice.

Reserve airmobile forces can respond rapidly. In suitable terrain they may reinforce positions to the front or on a flank. In a threatened sector they may be positioned in depth. Airmobile forces are also suitable for swift attack against enemy airborne units landing in the rear area. Once committed, however, they have limited mobility.

Because of the unique capabilities of attack helicopter units, commanders hold them in depth initially and commit them when needed. They respond so quickly that commanders have a long decision window. The mobility and firepower of attack helicopters often make them the quickest and most effective means for stopping surprise tank attacks and for destroying enemy tanks which have broken through.

In addition to designating reserve forces, commanders may choose to shift uncommitted subordinate elements to reconstitute a reserve or to concentrate forces elsewhere.

The most easily shifted forces are the reserves of subordinate units. Commanders should shift committed MBA forces laterally only as a last resort because of three great risks. First, the attacker can inhibit or prevent such lateral movement with air or artillery interdiction and with nuclear or chemical munitions. Second, when a force is engaged even by small probing or reconnaissance actions, it is neither physically nor psychologically prepared to make lateral movements. Third, vacating a sector, even temporarily, invites penetration and exploitation by alert follow-on forces.


DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES

Defensive techniques apply to brigades, battalions, and companies. *Army doctrine does not prescribe a single technique for defense.*

The defensive options form a continuum. At one end is the absolutely static defense designed exclusively to retain terrain. It depends primarily on firepower from fixed positions. At the other end is the wholly dynamic defense that focuses only on the enemy. It depends primarily on maneuver to disrupt and to destroy the attacking force. Typically, large-unit operations combine

elements of both forms: the static which controls, stops, or canalizes the attacker; and the dynamic which strikes and defeats the enemy's committed forces. Defenses are predominantly static or dynamic depending on the unit's mission, composition, relative strength, mobility and operational environment.

Whatever the plans, commanders must match available defending forces to the terrain. For example, infantry can form static pivots for maneuver and defensive strong-points in rugged terrain, forests, and urban





areas. Heavily armored units form the dynamic elements of a defense. They can best defend by moving between islands of resistance and by using them to cover their maneuver or to entrap the enemy.

In a dynamic defensive battle, commanders generally use tanks and overwatching long-range antitank weapons. They use short-range antitank and other infantry weapons in urban, wooded, or rugged areas to defend static positions. Each commander decides on whether and how to cross-reinforce, depending on his battle plans. On some occasions, the brigade commander may decide to use tank and mechanized infantry battalions without cross-reinforcing to make special use of the capabilities of each. For example, he may

position a mechanized battalion in a cluster of small villages all within supporting distance of each other across an avenue of approach. The tank battalion forms the dynamic element, counterattacking the flank or rear of the enemy force as it encounters the dug-in mechanized infantry.

Strongpoints are the most static elements of a defense. The strongpoint is essentially a heavily fortified battle position—an antitank nest which enemy forces cannot quickly overrun or easily by-pass. Strongpoints locate on terrain features critical to the defense or at a bottleneck formed by terrain obstacles. Strongpoints astride or along avenues of approach in small urban areas may make it possible to halt a vastly superior force for a considerable time. When nuclear or chemical





weapons are in use, strongpoints must be well camouflaged and protected, or forces must occupy them just before the enemy's arrival.

To be effective, the strongpoint must surprise the enemy. It must congest and limit his maneuver. It can set up a counterattack. Commanders can extricate the force in the strongpoint after it has accomplished its mission and before enemy follow-on forces arrive.

In organizing their defenses, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions will all combine the static and dynamic forms. However, they will probably vary the details of their operations even in executing the same plan.

Once the division commander decides where he intends to employ his brigades, brigade commanders organize tank, mechanized, and infantry battalions for combat on the basis of METT-T. Brigade commanders organize for defense by assigning sectors or battle positions to subordinate battalions or task forces. Sectors give battalion task forces freedom to maneuver and to decentralize force planning. Assigning

sectors to battalion task forces on the FEBA in the MBA has four additional advantages. It helps commanders plan fires and terrain-reinforcing barriers. It allows commanders to match teams to terrain. It permits the forward task force to plan a battle in depth, and it improves integration of direct and indirect fires.

To retain control over maneuver and task force positioning, the brigade commander establishes initial battle positions. He does so to concentrate task forces rapidly and to manage them in open terrain with good fields of fire. He controls maneuver outside those battle positions and prescribes the position's primary directions of fire. He assumes responsibility for fire and maneuver planning among several battalions in mutually supporting positions.

Whatever the defensive techniques, the overall scheme should maximize maneuver and offensive tactics. When the enemy has committed his forces, the defender should seize the initiative and counterattack over familiar ground protected by his own positions. He can destroy a halted, disorganized enemy.

DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS

PLANS AND ORDERS

To coordinate combined and supporting actions, soldiers and leaders of all arms must prepare in detail. As soon as possible, the commander describes his concept of operation in enough detail for his staff and subordinate commanders to understand precisely how he intends to fight the battle.

Time is of the essence in getting the force prepared. Warning orders and subsequent verbal instructions can alert forces. Commanders cannot wait for the complete plan to begin preparations. Maximum preparation time increases defensive effectiveness. If time allows, commanders should receive briefbacks from their subordinates. These insure that orders are understood and that implementing plans match the overall concept and are coordinated among adjacent units.

Deception plans and OPSEC guidance must be a part of the defensive plan. The OPSEC effort should conceal the location of the main defense and the disposition of forces from the enemy. If the attacker finds under-strength sectors, he will attack them. Dummy battle positions can deceive the enemy. Preparing and camouflaging positions can, too. Commanders should avoid predictable defensive preparation.

As he plans, the commander must evaluate his vulnerability to nuclear or chemical attack. He must specify the degree of risk he is willing to accept and establish priorities for his NBC defense units. He positions forces and installations to avoid congestion, but he must not disperse to the extent that he risks defeat with conventional weapons. He plans to mass forces at the last moment to avoid a nuclear strike and an enemy exploitation of it. He positions forces and plans and prepares multiple routes so that nuclear or chemical strikes do not hamper maneuver.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

To anticipate CSS needs, the logisticians must understand how the battle will be fought. Therefore, they must be involved early in defensive planning. This will allow them to plan the support of the defense and to anticipate changing priorities.

Combat service support should—

- Consider stockpiling limited amounts of ammunition and POL in centrally located battle positions in the forward MBA that are likely to be occupied. Plans should be made to destroy those stocks if necessary.
- Send push packages of critically needed supplies on a scheduled basis. Regular shipments of ammunition, POL, and repair parts should be sent forward to eliminate the need to call for supplies repeatedly and to reduce the chance that a lapse in communications will interrupt supply. The receiving unit should be resupplied until it issues instructions to the contrary.
- Resupply during periods of limited visibility to reduce the chances of enemy interference; infiltrate resupply vehicles to reduce the chances of detection.
- Plan to reconstitute the CSS capability lost to enemy fires. Potential replacements from DISCOM CSS units should be identified as early as possible to reestablish lost capability.
- Echelon CSS units in depth throughout the defensive area. When a forward unit displaces to the rear, another should be designated to pick up the work load until the displacing unit is again operational.
- Use maintenance contact teams and dispatch them as far forward as possible to reduce the need to evacuate equipment.
- Consolidate different types of maintenance contact teams (vehicle, armament, missile) to maximize the use of available vehicles and make sure such teams have adequate communications.

CHAPTER 13

Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces

TO DENY THE ENEMY PASSAGE through a vital choke point following breakthrough, a commander may intentionally order a force to remain in a strong position on key terrain. He may assign it to hold the shoulder of a penetration. He might also leave a unit in position behind the enemy or give it a mission with a high risk of being entrapped. During defense or delay operations, units or adjacent elements of different units may be unintentionally cut off from friendly forces. Whenever such an encirclement occurs, the encircled commander must understand the mission and the higher commander's plan clearly so that he can continue to contribute.

OPTIONS

An encircled force must act rapidly to preserve itself. The senior commander must assume control of all encircled elements and assess the all-around defensive posture of the force. He must determine whether the next higher commander wants his force to break out or to defend the position. He must reorganize and consolidate expeditiously. If the force is free to break out, it should do so before the enemy has time to block escape routes. If it cannot break out, the senior commander must continue to defend while planning for and assisting in linkup with the relieving force.


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DEFENDING

In assuring an effective defense and contributing to the combat effort, the commander of the encircled force has many simultaneous responsibilities:

- **REESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.** The commander must assure unity of command. He must reorganize fragmented units and place troops separated from their units under another unit's supervision. He must establish a clear chain of command throughout the force.
- **ESTABLISH A VIABLE DEFENSE.** The commander must quickly establish an all-around defense on defensible terrain. The force may have to attack to seize that ground. It must improve its fighting positions rapidly and continuously (see graphic on next page).
- **ESTABLISH A RESERVE.** If armor-heavy units are available, the commander should use them as a reserve and position them centrally to take advantage of interior lines. If only infantry forces are present, then the commander should designate small local reserves to react to potential penetrations.
- **REORGANIZE FIRE SUPPORT.** The commander must reorganize all artillery in the encirclement and bring it under centralized control. He must reestablish fire nets and coordination measures rapidly. If mortars are available, he must make provisions to mass their fires in dangerous areas. He must distribute artillery and mortars throughout the enclave to limit their vulnerability to counterfires. He must assess the availability of fire support from outside the encirclement.
- **REORGANIZE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.** The commander must assess his logistical posture quickly. He must centralize control of all supplies. The force must ration strictly and practice supply economy. If possible, parachute drop or helicopter lift will resupply the encircled force. The force should establish a centrally located medical facility and evacuate wounded troops if an air supply line is open. If the force must break out without taking all of its wounded, the commander must leave behind adequate supplies and medical personnel to care for them. The force should evacuate those wounded who can move with it without hindering its chances for success.
- **ESTABLISH SECURITY.** The commander should position security elements as far forward as possible to provide early warning. He should initiate vigorous patrolling immediately. He must establish local security throughout the force and insist on passive security measures.
- **REESTABLISH COMMUNICATION.** The commander must rapidly reestablish communications with higher headquarters and lateral communications with adjacent units. He must receive instructions and remain informed about the battle outside the encirclement. Encircled units can supply information on the enemy's rear area and deliver important counterstrokes. When relief and linkup are imminent, good communications are essential.
- **LIMIT NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL DAMAGE.** Encircled forces are particularly vulnerable to enemy nuclear weapons and chemical agents. If the enemy gives positive indications of employing these weapons, the encircled force should establish increased nuclear and chemical defense readiness. A decision to break out earlier than anticipated can be crucial to the survival of the force.
- **CONTINUE THE DEFENSE.** Enemy forces may attempt to split an encircled force by penetrating its perimeter with armor-heavy units. An energetic defense, rapid reaction by reserves, and antitank weapons in depth within the encirclement can defeat such attempts. As the defensive force weakens in the battle, it may have to reduce the size of the perimeter. The defense must maintain coherence at all costs.
- **MAINTAIN MORALE.** Soldiers in the encirclement must not regard their situation as being desperate or hopeless. Commanders and leaders at all levels must maintain the confidence of soldiers by resolute action and positive attitudes. To suppress rumors, they must keep soldiers informed.

DEFENDING WHILE ENCIRCLED




BREAKING OUT

The attack to break out of an encirclement differs from other attacks only in that the force must maintain a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter. The commander of the encircled force must recognize the essentials of breakout discussed below:

- **DECEIVE THE ENEMY.** If it is not possible to break out immediately, the commander must attempt to deceive the enemy by concealing his preparations and redispersions. He must also make it appear that the force will make a resolute stand and await relief. Dummy radio traffic that may be monitored or landlines that might be tapped are good means of conveying false information to the enemy. The breakout should not take the obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no other alternative.
- **EXPLOIT GAPS OR WEAKNESSES.** Early in the encirclement there will be gaps or weaknesses in the encircling force. Patrolling or probing actions will reveal them. The attack should capitalize on them. The resulting attack over a less direct route or over less favorable terrain may be the best course of action if it avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise.
- **EXPLOIT DARKNESS AND LIMITED VISIBILITY.** Darkness, fog, or severe weather favors the breakout. Encircling force weapons are less effective in these conditions, and the enemy will have difficulty following the movements of the breakout force.
- **ORGANIZE THE BREAKOUT FORCE.** The commander must reorganize the force so that tank-heavy units, if available, lead the attack. The remainder of the force must fight a delaying action or defend the perimeter during the initial stage of the breakout. After penetrating the encirclement, the main body moves out of the area, preceded by the attacking force and covered by a rear guard. The commander must integrate CSS elements into the formations for the breakout. If the commander has sufficient forces, he may organize a diversionary attack just prior to the real

breakout attempt to draw off enemy forces.

- **CONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER AT THE BREAKOUT POINT.** The commander must make every effort to produce overwhelming combat power and to generate momentum at the breakout point. Perimeter forces must integrate smoothly into the breakout column. The encircled force must take risks on other parts of the perimeter to insure the success of the breakout. Forces left in contact must fight a vigorous delaying action on the perimeter so that no portion of the force is cut off. The perimeter force must be unified under one commander. Supporting fires must concentrate at the breakout point. Once the breakout occurs, the rear guard action may get priority for fires. However, above all else, the force must maintain the momentum of the attack, or it will be more vulnerable to destruction than it was prior to the breakout attempt (see graphic on next page).
- **COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING ATTACKS.** A nearby friendly force can assist the breakout by launching a supporting attack to divert enemy attention and assets from the breakout effort. The breakout attempt should occur just after the enemy reacts to the supporting attack.
- **CONSIDER EXFILTRATION.** If the breakout attack appears too risky and a relief operation is not planned, the only other way to preserve a portion of the force might be through organized exfiltration. An exfiltration effort is preferable to capture. It can distract the enemy from his main effort and produce intelligence for the main force. This tactic organizes the encircled force into small groups under small-unit leaders and exfiltrates them during periods of limited visibility through gaps in the encircling forces. Equipment that cannot be taken is left behind and incapacitated in an inconspicuous way. The wounded are left with supplies and medical attendants. Some portion of the force may have to remain to create a diversion.




LINKING UP

If a breakout is not possible or desirable, another force may attack the encircling enemy forces to effect linkup. During such attacks the encircled force may act as a blocking force. The commander of the encircled force must understand the requisites for linkup discussed below:

- **COORDINATE PLANS FOR LINKUP.** Relief attacks require thorough preparation because they must be coordinated with the actions of the encircled force. At a minimum, coordination must be established for command relationships between forces and responsibilities of each force during the operation, command and staff liaison, schemes of maneuver, fire control measures, communications plans, actions following linkup, and logistics support required by the encircled force.

- **ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT THE RELIEF ATTACK.** The size, composition, and mission of the relieving force will depend in part on the enemy situation and the distance to the encircled force. It will also depend on whether the relief attack is intended to achieve an additional purpose such as restoration of a previous defensive line. Assault forces with enough combat power to achieve quick success make the relief attack. The attempt will often occur at night. Normally the encircled unit will support the attempt with fire.

- **COORDINATE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS.** The headquarters directing the linkup operation establishes the command relationships and responsibilities of the two forces. After linkup, the two forces can combine under the control of either commander, or both forces can continue to operate separately under a single higher commander.



PART FOUR

JOINT, CONTINGENCY, AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 15

Joint Operations

THE ARMY WILL SELDOM FIGHT ALONE. Because US military operations normally involve more than one service, joint operations will be the rule rather than the exception. Command and control of joint forces will conform to the provisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2. Each service's doctrine and applicable joint doctrine will prescribe tactical employment.

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ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL


Joint forces include unified and specified commands and joint task forces. Each military service is responsible for providing its contingent (composed of various types of units) to unified and specified commands. These contingents are called service components but may have other titles such as theater Army, naval fleet, fleet marine force, or theater Air Force. Joint task forces (JTF) normally draw units from the components. For command and control, forces are normally assigned to unified and specified commands, but are attached to a JTF.

There are two distinct chains of command involving joint forces—one for operations, another for administrative and logistic matters. For operations, orders to joint command commanders are issued from the President or the Secretary of Defense or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by direction of the Secretary of Defense. The JCS prepare plans and provide strategic and operational direction for the armed forces, including operations by commanders of unified and specified commands. These commanders are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for accomplishing their assigned tasks.

The administrative chain of command encompasses those functions of the military services not included in strategic and operational direction. The military departments are responsible for administrative and logistic support of their forces wherever employed. Service components of unified and specified commands deal directly with their respective departments on single service matters.

Joint commanders are granted the authority necessary to accomplish their mission. Operational command and operational control in joint force terminology both refer to the authority exercised by joint commanders over subordinate service components. These terms are not interchangeable in joint operations. *Operational command* uniquely applies to the authority exercised by commanders of unified and specified commands and subordinate unified commands. *Operational control* is the authority that subordinate joint task force commanders exercise in the conduct of specific operations. The authority that military departments exercise over their respective components is commonly referred to as *command less operational command*.

TYPES OF JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATIONS



Operational command and operational control include four specific elements of authority for joint commanders:

- Composition of subordinate forces.
- Assignment of tasks.
- Designation of objectives.
- Authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

The critical factors that determine the structure of a joint organization formed to conduct a contingency operation are—

- Missions and tasks assigned to the commander.
- Nature and scope of the operation.
- Forces available.
- Duration of the operation.

The organization should provide for centralized direction, decentralized execution, and common doctrine, while at the same time maintaining the identity of the separate service components.

The commander in chief (CINC) of the unified command develops operation plans (OPLAN), operation plans in concept format (CONPLAN), and operation orders (OPORD). As the supported commander (supported CINC), he has responsibility for a specific geographical area.

UNIFIED COMMAND

A unified command is established and designated by direction of the President. The command is organized under a single unified CINC and has a broad continuing mission. The CINC is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing his broad and continuing mission and operates under the strategic and operational direction of the JCS.

A unified command is composed of assigned forces of two or more services. These forces, as service components, are under the operational command of the unified commander. The CINC exercises operational command authority through service component commanders. When tasked by

higher authority, he may establish a subordinate JTF to conduct specific missions. Under emergency conditions, the CINC has the authority to use all facilities and supplies of assigned forces to accomplish his mission.

SPECIFIED COMMAND

A specified command is similar to the unified command. It is also established and designated by direction of the President. The commander is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing a broad, continuing mission. One of the major differences between the unified and specified command lies in composition. A specified command is primarily a single service command, but may have elements of other services assigned. The specified command, as a joint command, receives strategic and operational direction from the JCS.

JOINT TASK FORCE

A JTF may be constituted and designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, specified command, or an existing JTF. Normally it performs missions having specific, limited objectives or missions of short duration. It dissolves when it has achieved its purpose. The joint task force commander is responsible to the commander, known as the establishing authority, who created the JTF. The JTF is composed of elements of two or more services operating under a single JTF commander. The JTF commander has operational control over the entire force and may have direct command of his own service component. He will usually augment his own staff with representatives from the other services. He exercises logistic coordination or control only as necessary to meet his subordinate commanders' logistic needs.

SERVICE COMPONENT

Each service component commander is responsible for recommending the proper employment of his forces and for accom-

plishing operational tasks assigned by the joint commander. He is also responsible for his service in matters of—

- Internal administration and discipline.
- Training in own service doctrine, techniques, and tactics.

- Designation of specific units to meet joint requirements.
 - Logistics functions normal to the component.
 - Tactical employment of service component forces.
 - Service intelligence matters.
-

TAB C

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

RUSSELL A. GUGELER



The event corresponds less to expectations in war than in any other case whatever.

LIVY: HISTORY OF ROME. XXX. 10.

7

Twin Tunnels Patrol Ambush

★ During the withdrawal from northern Korea in December of 1950, U.S. Eighth Army outdistanced the pursuing Chinese and North Koreans and broke contact with the enemy. By the end of January 1951, as a result of firm orders from its commander (Lt.Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway) the army turned and took up defensive positions near the 37th parallel, and from there sent feeler patrols northward to locate the enemy again and reestablish contact.

The 24th and 2d Infantry Divisions occupied adjoining positions near the center of Eighth Army's line. Late on the 27th of January, the commanding general of U.S. X Corps directed the 2d Division to send a reconnaissance patrol northward to the vicinity of two railroad tunnels a few miles south of Chipyeong-ni. It was to join forces at Iho-ri with a group from the 24th Division, after which the composite patrol would proceed to the objective.¹

Because the order reached the divisions so late, the 24th Division was unable to make arrangements for crossing the unbridged Han River in time to effect the meeting. A patrol from the 23d Infantry (2d Division) reconnoitered the Twin Tunnels area, however, and returned to its base without incident.²

At 2240 on the night of the 28th, X Corps directed the 2d Division to run the same patrol on the following day, again in conjunction with a patrol from the adjoining division. This time the 2d Division was to furnish five additional jeeps to carry the men from the 24th Division, which was still unable to get its vehicles across the river.³

First orders concerning the patrol reached the 23d Infantry at 2300. They were passed on down to the 1st Battalion which, in turn, called Company C and gave preliminary instructions to Lt. James P. Mitchell (one of its platoon leaders), asking him to report to battalion headquarters the following morning at 0600 to get complete orders.⁴

It was still dark, the sky was clear, and the temperature was a few degrees above zero when Lieutenant Mitchell reached the S3 tent on the morning of 29 January. Here he was given the mission of making another reconnaissance of the Twin Tunnels area—by road, about thirty miles north of Company C's location—and told to make contact with the enemy, if he could, but to avoid combat with any large enemy force. He was ordered to move out as soon as possible since he was scheduled to meet the 24th Division's patrol at 1030. By 0630 Lieutenant Mitchell had returned to his company to organize his group.

Plans for the patrol were being made and changed while the members assembled. Battalion headquarters called three times between 0630 and 0800, each time adding men and weapons to the patrol. There were also difficulties and delays in securing enough vehicles and radios, both of which were acutely scarce as a result of heavy equipment losses which the 2d Division had sustained during its withdrawal from northern Korea. The 1st Battalion finally arranged to borrow three jeeps, with drivers, from another battalion of the same regiment, and extra radios from an artillery battalion. Lieutenant Mitchell had two SCR-300 radios, neither of which worked well, for communications within the patrol. To help maintain communications between the patrol and its headquarters, the regiment had arranged for an L-5 liaison plane to circle above the patrol and act as a radio relay station. It was therefore necessary to have an SCR-619 radio to communicate with the plane. To be safe, the 1st Battalion borrowed two. On the morning of 29 January, however, the artillery battalion complained because two of its radios had been damaged when loaned to the infantry the previous day, and insisted on furnishing its own operators with the radios. It was 0900 before the artillerymen reported, and the patrol was ready to get under way.⁵

Lieutenant Mitchell was in command of the patrol. As finally organized, it consisted of forty-four officers and men, most of whom were members of his Company C rifle platoon. Nine members of the patrol, including an officer, were from Company D; the others were the artillery radio operators and the drivers from the 3d Battalion. These men were mounted on two $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton weapons carriers and nine jeeps, five of which were for the 24th Division men. Mitchell's men carried two BARs and either rifles or carbines, plus a 75mm and a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 3.5-inch bazooka, a 60mm mortar, and two caliber .50 and three caliber .30 machine guns mounted on the vehicles, and two light machine guns with tripod mounts.

For 20 of the 44 members of the patrol, this was their first combat action since they had joined Company C only four days before. They were

from specialist schools—listed as draftsmen, mechanics, and technicians—and had received little training as infantrymen.

Another officer joined the patrol just before it left. Capt. Melvin R. Stai (battalion assistant S₃) went along only to be certain that Lieutenant Mitchell's patrol met the men from the 24th Division as planned. He was told to return to battalion headquarters after the composite patrol departed for the tunnels.⁶

Lieutenant Mitchell, with four men in a jeep mounting a caliber .50 machine gun, made up the advance party and led the patrol by about fifteen hundred yards. The main body, under the control of Lt. William C. Penrod (a Company D platoon leader), followed, with intervals of at least a hundred yards between vehicles. For Korea, the road was good but movement was slow because of heavy snow in shaded spots and patches of ice that covered some sections of the narrow road.


The liaison plane circled above the vehicular column as far as Iho-ri where it lost visual contact because of the haze that frequently filled the narrow Korean valleys during the morning hours.

At 1115 the column reached Iho-ri, a small village on the east bank of the Han River, where the patrol from the 24th Division was waiting. The group from the 24th consisted of Lt. Harold P. Mueller and fourteen men whom he had selected from his platoon of Company F, 21st Infantry. In addition to rifles, the men had six BARs and a light machine gun. They had reversible parkas which they wore with the white side out, including white hoods over their helmets, whereas the men from the 2d Division were dressed in fatigue clothing and field jackets. The combined patrol now numbered 4 officers and 56 men, including Captain Stai, who decided at Iho-ri to accompany the patrol instead of returning to battalion headquarters. It proceeded at once toward the objective, which was still approximately fifteen miles away.

The Twin Tunnels were located about three miles southeast of Chipyeong-ni and less than a mile northwest of a little village named Sinchon. As Lieutenant Mitchell in the lead vehicle neared the objective, he passed a large hill that rose steeply on the left (west) side of the road, dominating the entire area. This was Hill 453. Skirting the base of the hill, the road crossed a ford in a shallow stream and then split at the base of another, smaller hill. One fork of the road turned right to Sinchon; the other fork went west for several hundred yards, then turned north for another two thousand yards where it crossed the railroad track between the two tunnels.

At the ford Lieutenant Mitchell stopped to wait for Lieutenant Mueller and Captain Stai, who were riding in the two jeeps immediately behind. Since the patrol was already behind schedule, Captain Stai offered to go alone into Sinchon while the rest of the patrol went on to investigate the tunnels, after which they would be ready to return. Accordingly, the two lieutenants and the men with them proceeded to the railroad track, turned

their vehicles around in position to go back, and then waited near a farm house. The tunnels were not side by side, but were, instead, end to end, cutting under two steep ridges, one on each side of the road and narrow valley. On the west side the ridge rose toward the south to the hill mass of




which Hill 453 was a part; the ridge on the east side of the road sloped north to Hill 333. Between these two ridges were a stream, terraced rice paddies, and scattered Lombardy poplars, all typical of the Korean landscape.

Captain Stai left his driver and vehicle by the road, walked alone toward the cluster of drab houses in Sinchon and disappeared. The time was about 1215.⁷

Trouble started within a minute or two after the two jeeps stopped by

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the railroad tracks. Men from the 21st Infantry patrol spotted 15 or 20 Chinese soldiers running from a small hill just north of the railroad crossing, and opened fire on them. The others of the patrol ran up to see what was happening. Soon after the first shots, ten or twelve scattered mortar rounds



fell near the road, landing just south of the two parked jeeps and in front of the other vehicles which were now closing into the tunnels area.

At about this time the liaison plane appeared overhead again. The battalion executive officer (Major Millard O. Engen) was in the plane which, after it had turned back at Iho-ri because of ground haze, was now returning since visibility had increased. Major Engen saw the same enemy troops whom Lieutenant Mueller's men had taken under fire, as well as another company-sized group on Hill 453. He immediately reported this over the SCR-619 radio together with instructions for Lieutenant Mitchell to turn

his patrol around and get out of the area at once.⁸ Lieutenant Mitchell did not receive this message because of faulty radio reception.

By the time the last vehicle in the column crossed the ford near Sinchon, Mitchell also saw enemy movement to the south and suspected that his patrol had been caught in a well-planned ambush. He realized that from the fingers of Hill 453, which dominated the road and even the ditches along the road, the Chinese could see when the last vehicle of the patrol closed into the tunnels area. Hill 453 also blocked the route of retreat. Further advance of the column was stopped by enemy positions on Hill 333 northeast of the railroad crossing. Lacking radio communication with the liaison plane and also within the column, and since the ridge tips crowded so close against the road that the men in the trailing vehicles could not see ahead, the vehicles and the entire patrol bunched up in the area just south of the railroad crossing.

Lieutenant Mitchell had decided to make a run for it before the last vehicles in the column had come to a stop.

"Let's get out of here!" he shouted to the men, most of whom had dispersed to seek cover when the first mortar rounds fell. "Let's get out of here!"

Before the last vehicles to arrive could be turned around, however, the men could see Chinese soldiers running from Hill 453 down toward the ford.

In the plane overhead, Major Engen also watched the Chinese moving to cut off the patrol. He radioed new instructions, this time directing Mitchell to head for the high ground east of the road. He then left the area since it was necessary to refuel the plane. No one received this message either.

Men in the get-away jeep, which having turned around was now in the lead, opened fire with their caliber .50 machine gun, but the gun was cold and had so much oil on it that it took two men to operate it, one to jack it back and another man to fire it. It had little effect. Lieutenant Penrod tried to get the 75mm recoilless rifle in position to fire, but gave that up when he saw that the Chinese had already cut the road and that they were racing for the high ground on the east side of the road. He called back to Mitchell to say they couldn't get through.

After Captain Stai had walked off toward Sinchon, his driver followed him in the jeep for a hundred or two hundred yards and had then stopped in the single-lane road to wait. When the enemy force began running from Hill 453 toward the east side of the road, the driver left, apparently trying to join the main body of the patrol. He was shot and killed before he had gone far, the jeep overturning by the road.

When the firing commenced, Lieutenant Mueller looked at the hill on the east side of the road. Realizing they had no chance of breaking out of the ambush by following the road and, wanting to get on defensible high ground, he started up the hill, calling for his men to follow.⁹

A single, narrow ridge rose abruptly at the east edge of the road, and then extended east for nine hundred yards to the high part of the ridge. The ridge was only about four hundred feet higher than the road, and both it and the ridge leading to it were covered with low brush and, on the northern slopes, a foot of wet snow. After climbing a short distance, Lieutenant Mueller stopped to study the area through his binoculars. To the south he saw the Chinese running toward the same hill for which he was heading.

"We're going to have to get to the top of that hill," he called back to Lieutenant Mitchell. "The Chinese are coming up from the other side! This is our only chance!"

From this time on it was a race for the high ground, with the Chinese climbing the south slope of the hill from which the snow had melted.

The patrol, well equipped when mounted, was forced to abandon most of its heavy and crew-served weapons now that it was on foot. Penrod and Mitchell loaded their men with as much ammunition as each man could carry, and with the tripod-mounted caliber .30 machine gun and the 3.5-inch bazooka. Mueller's men had another light machine gun with them. The two recoilless rifles, the 60mm mortar, the five machine guns mounted on the vehicles, and the ammunition that could not be carried, were all left on the vehicles which were abandoned on the road, their engines still running.¹⁰

Seven of Lieutenant Mitchell's men, all from the group of replacements, stayed in the ditch by the road. They had become frightened at the outbreak of the enemy fire, had taken cover in the ditch, and refused to leave when the other men started for the high ground. All seven were killed in the same ditch later that afternoon. With Captain Stai and his driver, nine of the original sixty men were out of action. It was after 1300. The remaining fifty-one men were climbing the steep northern side of the ridge.

The climb was agonizingly slow. Since enemy soldiers were climbing the hill on the south side of the same ridge, Mitchell's men had to stay on the north, steep, snowy side. Even so, they were under fire from several enemy riflemen and an enemy machine gun located to the north. Men from the 23d Infantry were conspicuous targets since their dark clothing made them prominent against the bright snow. Much of the way they moved on their hands and knees, pulling themselves from one scrub brush to another. Enemy fire was so accurate they would often pretend that they had been hit, deliberately roll a short distance down the hill and lie quietly until the enemy rifleman shifted his fire to someone else. They did this in spite of the extreme difficulties of carrying their heavy loads up the steep, slippery ridge.

Within a short time all of the men were wet, either from the snow or from perspiration, and several of them were injured on the way up. PFC Bobby G. Hensley, who was carrying the light machine gun and tripod on

his back, stumbled and fell forward over a pointed stump, breaking several ribs. Sgt. Alfred Buchanan, who was with him, carrying four boxes of ammunition, rubbed snow in Hensley's face to revive him, and had him on his feet a few minutes later when Lieutenant Penrod came along and told Hensley to throw away the bolt and leave the machine gun. Hensley said he didn't think he could make it any farther.

"You've got to make it, son," said Penrod. "Just keep climbing."

Sergeant Buchanan left the ammunition and helped Hensley part way up the hill.

Lieutenant Mitchell also became a casualty before reaching the hill. During World War II he had received an injury to his spine, which left his back and legs weakened. Three fourths of the way up the hill one of his legs became weak and numb. Mitchell slid himself along the ground for a while but finally sat down in the snow to rest. While he was sitting by the trail a jeep driver (PFC William W. Stratton) stopped and urged Mitchell to go on. Stratton was one of the recent replacements and this was his first day in combat. When Lieutenant Mitchell explained that he couldn't move for a while, Stratton offered to stay with him. Just about this time, three Chinese riflemen appeared on top of the ridge and stopped about fifteen feet from where the two men were sitting. Mitchell was hidden partially by brush. Stratton saw them first and fired seven rounds from his rifle, missing each time. Mitchell fired one round and missed. His carbine jammed then and he had to take out his bayonet and pry the cartridge from the chamber. Meanwhile, a bullet from one of the Chinese guns hit the stock of Stratton's rifle and then his hand, tearing it badly. Then the enemy gun jammed. The other two Chinese had turned their backs and appeared to be listening to someone who was shouting to them from the opposite side of the hill. Lieutenant Mitchell finally got his carbine in operation and killed all three of the enemy. The two men slid down the hill a short distance to a small gully that offered more cover from enemy fire. Hensley (the machine gunner with the broken ribs) was already sitting in this gully, having been left there by Sergeant Buchanan. The three men sat there for about a half hour.

Except for one man, the remaining forty-eight men left in the patrol reached the crest of the hill. Sgt. John C. Gardella, loaded with machine-gun ammunition, slipped in the snow and fell down a steep part of the ridge. Since he was unable to climb back at that point, he circled to the north looking for an easier route. As it happened, he went too far north and suddenly came upon several enemy riflemen and a crew operating a machine gun. He was within twenty feet of the group before he noticed it and, although he was in heavy brush at the time and had not been seen, he was afraid to move back. He lay there for the rest of the day and throughout the night.

Lieutenant Mueller and his fourteen men were the first to reach the top of the hill. Once there, they learned that it afforded little protection

from the enemy guns, which both to the north and to the south were located on higher ground. The ridge, which extended south from Hill 333, was made up of several pointed peaks connected by narrow saddles. The hill Mueller's men now occupied was approximately sixty feet lower than the top of Hill 333, nine hundred yards to the north, and a little lower than another hill not more than one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards to the south. The Chinese reached the hill to the south about the same time Lieutenant Mueller occupied the center high ground. In addition to the two narrow saddles that connected Mueller's position with the enemy-held ground both to the north and to the south, there was another narrow saddle between his hill and a smaller mound of earth to the west, on the ridge that the patrol followed toward the high ground. This mound of earth was within grenade-throwing distance. All three of these saddles were under enemy fire.

The useable area on top of the hill was so small it could have been covered by a squad tent and was tilted so that it sloped toward the east side of the hill, which was so steep that there was no danger of enemy attack from that direction. However, the hilltop was too small to accommodate all of the men, so Mueller and Penrod put some of the men along the saddle toward the north. Even then, it was crowded. There were no holes and the ground was frozen too deep to allow digging.

Enemy activity commenced almost at once, with machine-gun and rifle fire coming from both the Chinese north and south positions. The activity from the south was the more serious threat for two reasons. The enemy machine gun on the southern hill, being only slightly higher than the hilltop occupied by the American patrol, fired from a flat angle. Its beaten zone, therefore, was long and almost exactly covered the hilltop. In addition, the saddle connecting the two hills was so deep that the Chinese would be able to move under the machine-gun or other supporting fire until they were within a few yards of the patrol before they would mask their own fire. This would place them within easy grenade range. Fortunately, this same path was so narrow that the Chinese would be limited to small groups for each assault. Lieutenant Mueller, realizing that this was the critical part of his perimeter, placed his machine gun to guard this approach. (The machine gun was the only one left to the patrol by this time. There were eight BARs and the 3.5-inch bazooka.) The first enemy assault was prepared by mortar fire while the Chinese moved under the machine-gun fire until they were within easy grenade range. Mueller's men stopped it just below the rim of the perimeter with the machine gun and a concentration of BAR fire. The Chinese backed away and the enemy was comparatively inactive for about twenty minutes.

Meanwhile, the three injured men—Lieutenant Mitchell and Privates Hensley and Stratton—worked their way up on the hill to join the rest of the men in the perimeter. Stratton, pleased because he thought his shat-

tered hand would be sufficient cause for returning home, crawled around the perimeter and showed it to some of the men.

"Give me your telephone number," he said to several of them, "and I'll call your wife when I get back to California."

Soon after the initial thrust from the south, the enemy gun to the north opened fire, wounding seven men at that end of the perimeter. The men lay as still as possible to avoid this fire, except for an eighteen-year-old squad leader (Cpl. LeRoy Gibbons) who already had been wounded six times during the Korean war. Gibbons wanted to talk with Lieutenant Mitchell, who, by this time, had reached the small, flat part of the perimeter. He stood up and walked erect through a string of tracers that went past him. Several of the men yelled at him to get down.

"Aw, hell," he said, "they couldn't hit the broad side of a barn," and continued walking.

After this demonstration, Sgt. Everett Lee decided to take the enemy gun under fire. He crawled about fifteen feet farther north, saying to the other men nearby, "I'm going to get that son of a bitch." He fired two rounds to zero in his rifle, then killed two of the men operating the machine gun. Other men near him joined in the firing and the enemy gun went quiet and did not again fire. Sergeant Lee stood up and walked back to his position on the line. This relieved much of the pressure on the north end of the line and, from then on, the main enemy efforts came from the south and from the west.

Lieutenant Mueller's machine gun, the only one to reach the top of the hill, was the main strength of the defense. Five or six separate assaults were directed against the south side of the perimeter during the afternoon. Each time the men held their fire until the enemy soldiers were within close range and then directed all available fire at the narrow enemy approach route. The machine gun was effective and Mueller's chief concern was keeping it and several BARs operating at the south end of the line. Seven men firing these weapons were either killed or wounded during the afternoon, all hit in the head. When one man was hit others would pull him back by his feet and another man would crawl forward to man the machine gun.

One of the machine gunners (Cpl. Billy B. Blizzard) raised his head not more than six inches from the ground and was struck by a bullet that went through his helmet, cutting into the top of his head.

Lieutenant Mitchell noticed Blizzard's head jerk and saw the hole suddenly appear in his helmet. He yelled to him, "You aren't hurt, son. That was a ricochet."

Corporal Blizzard turned so that his platoon leader could see the blood running across his forehead. "Like hell it's a ricochet," he said.

Mueller put another man in Blizzard's place. "For God's sake," he kept saying, "we've got to keep this gun going."

During one of the attacks, a Chinese crawled close to the perimeter,

stood up and fired a continuous burst from his burp gun. He hit five men, including Mueller, before one of the Americans killed the enemy soldier.¹¹

When Major Engen (executive officer of the 1st Battalion) and the liaison pilot left the Twin Tunnels area to refuel their plane, they immediately reported to the 23d Infantry that the Chinese had ambushed and surrounded Mitchell's patrol. The regimental commander (Col. Paul Freeman) immediately requested an air strike, ordered the 2d Battalion to send relief to the patrol, and directed that a liaison pilot make a drop of ammunition to the patrol.

The 2d Battalion occupied a patrol base forward of the regimental line and was already about ten miles (road distance) nearer than the remainder of the regiment. The order reached the 2d Battalion commander (Lt. Col. James W. Edwards) at 1300.¹² Colonel Edwards immediately called Capt. Stanley C. Tyrrell, whose Company F had performed a similar rescue mission the day before. Even though Company F was available at once, it required a little more than two hours to assemble the vehicles, weapons, and necessary supplies for the company, which consisted of 3 other officers and 142 enlisted men. Colonel Edwards added a section of 81mm mortars, a section of heavy machine guns from Company H, and included an artillery forward observation party because its radio was necessary for communications with the liaison plane. Thus reinforced, the total strength of the force amounted to 167 officers and men.¹³

Captain Tyrrell's mission was to rescue the ambushed patrol and to recover the bodies and the vehicles. Since darkness was not far off, Colonel Edwards instructed Tyrrell to form a defensive perimeter and proceed with the mission the following morning, if he could not gain contact with the ambushed patrol that night.¹⁴ Company F started north at 1515.

Back at the perimeter, the afternoon wore on with occasional lulls between enemy assaults. Toward late afternoon ammunition was getting scarce and the officers kept cautioning their men to use it sparingly. Medical supplies were exhausted three and a half hours after the fighting had begun.¹⁵ More than a third of the men had become casualties, although many of the wounded men remained in the perimeter fighting.

Private Stratton (the jeep driver with the shattered hand) had taken over a BAR from another wounded man. He fired it with his left hand. During quiet periods he crawled around the perimeter telling the other men not to worry about their situation. "We'll get out of this all right," he kept saying. However, by evening few of the men there expected to get out alive.

Lieutenant Mitchell pulled his men back several feet to the rim of the hilltop. There were advantages to this move. There, the Chinese could not spot American weapons so easily, and from the new position the Americans could not see an enemy soldier until his head appeared a few feet away. This saved ammunition since the men could not fire until they could see a Chinese head. As a frozen crust formed over the snow, the men braced themselves

for the heavy blow they expected as soon as the darkness was complete. Said one of the men, "I'll see you fellows down below."

The first help for the surrounded patrol members came late in the afternoon. A Mosquito plane appeared above the patrol about 1730, just before sunset. The men watched as it circled above them and then screamed with delight when the first fighter planes appeared. Altogether they were two flights of four planes each. The first planes were jets, and they came in so low the men thought they could have touched them with the tips of their bayonets. Enemy activity stopped abruptly and, for the first time that afternoon, the men could raise their heads from the ground and move around freely in their crowded perimeter. The first planes fired machine guns and rockets. The second flight carried napalm bombs that burst into orange blossoms of flame among the enemy positions. It was excellent close support, and Lieutenant Mitchell and the members of his patrol grinned with appreciation during the half hour that it lasted.

Immediately following the air strike a liaison plane came over to drop supplies to the patrol. It made four runs over the group of men, each time flying no higher than fifteen feet above their heads, so low the men could see that the pilot had pink cheeks. And because the enemy hills were so close, the plane had to cross the enemy positions at the same height. The pilot dropped thirty bandoleers of rifle ammunition, two cases of machine-gun ammunition and several belts of carbine cartridges and then, on the last run, an envelope to which was fastened a long, yellow streamer. Except for one box of machine-gun ammunition, all of this fell beyond the tiny perimeter and, now that the air strike was over, in an area that was under enemy fire. Nevertheless, several men dashed out to retrieve everything that was close.

A young soldier raced after the message, which fell well down on the eastern slope, and took it back to Lieutenant Mitchell. The message said, "Friendly column approaching from the south. Will be with you shortly." Mitchell read it and then crawled around the perimeter to show it to the rest of the men.¹⁶

About the same time, there was the sound of firing to the south. A few minutes later mortar rounds exploded on the top of Hill 453. Hopes of survival soared suddenly and the men shouted for joy. This, they decided, was the friendly relief column.

The airplanes left just as darkness began to set in, and Mitchell and Mueller warned their men to expect an enemy assault just as soon as it got dark. They also told the men not to yell out if they were hit because they did not dare let the Chinese know how many of the group were wounded.

Several mortar shells fell in the area, and one exploded in the center of the crowded perimeter, wounding one man seriously. The Chinese added automatic-weapons and rifle fire, building up the volume fast. There was the sound of bugles and of enemy voices and, between bursts of enemy fire,

the sound of enemy soldiers walking over the crusted snow. Four men crawled forward until they could see the enemy approaching across the narrow saddle from the south. One of them, Sgt. Donald H. Larson, began yelling: "Here they come! Here they come!" They opened fire but within a few seconds all four of the men were hit. They crawled back.

Sergeant Larson pointed to his head wound—his fifth for the day—as he crawled past Lieutenant Mitchell. "That's enough for me," he said.

The situation was grim. The fire fight that had flared up in the vicinity of Hill 453 had stopped, and there was now no evidence of friendly troops nearby. Gradually, the men who had been looking anxiously toward the area from which Captain Tyrrell's men had been firing lost their hope of getting out of their perimeter. It was colder now. Their wet clothing was freezing to the ground. Several men were suffering from frostbite. More than half were casualties. Those with serious wounds had been dragged to the rear (east) part of the hilltop where they were laid on the frozen earth. The hill was so steep there that if grenades were dropped they would roll on down the hill away from the wounded men.

Those men who were less seriously wounded kept firing on the line or loading magazines for automatic rifles and carbines. One man with a large hole in his stomach loaded ammunition for an hour and a half before he died.¹⁷ Lieutenant Mueller, who had been wounded earlier when a bullet struck his leg, was hit a second time—this time in the head—injuring his left eye. He began to see flashes of light and occasionally lost consciousness.¹⁸

Instead of the expected help, a second night attack hit Mitchell's patrol. It began with the usual mortar and machine-gun fire, worked up to grenade range, but again stopped a few feet from the edge of the perimeter when faced by the concentrated fire at the south end—fire from the machine gun and from several BARs. Private Stratton fired one of the automatic rifles with his left hand. When the Chinese were close, he stood on the rim of the perimeter, leveled his BAR at them and emptied the magazine. He was hit a second time, this time through the chest. Someone pulled him back toward the center of the perimeter. Soon afterwards a grenade exploded between his legs. Stratton screamed.

"For God's sake," said Mitchell, "shut up!"

"My legs have just been shot off," Stratton complained.

"I know it," the Lieutenant answered, "but shut up anyway."

Soon after this Stratton was wounded a fourth time, and died.¹⁹

While all of these events were taking place on the hill, Captain Tyrrell's rescue mission was progressing even though Mitchell's men could see no action. Company F had arrived in the Twin Tunnels area between 1720 and 1730—as the air strike was in progress and a few minutes before darkness. The vehicular column of eight $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks and thirteen jeeps, with all of the trucks and some of the jeeps pulling trailers loaded with extra mortar

and recoilless rifle ammunition, followed the same road used by the patrol. While the column was en route, an observer in a liaison plane dropped a message giving the exact location of the ambushed patrol, its vehicles, and also several positions where he had observed groups of enemy soldiers in that vicinity.

Nothing important happened until the two jeeps that formed the point of the column were within one hundred or two hundred yards of the ford near which Captain Stai had disappeared earlier in the day. Two machine guns on Hill 453 opened fire on the jeeps, bringing them to a quick halt. The occupants scrambled into the ditch for protection.

Captain Tyrrell, in the third jeep, soon appeared. He dismounted and walked back toward the rest of the column while his driver, already in the ditch, called after him, "You'd better get in the ditch, Captain. The Chinks will get you."

Tyrrell walked on back toward the 2d Platoon, which was next in column. "To hell with the Chinks," he said.²⁰

Deciding he could not proceed to the patrol with enemy machine gunners in his rear and riflemen on the highest hill in the area, Tyrrell hurriedly prepared to attack Hill 453. He ordered his 2d Platoon to dismount and lay down a base of fire to support an attack by the other two platoons. The 2d Platoon was firing rifles at Hill 453 within three to five minutes after the Chinese began firing. In the haze of dusk, Tyrrell sent his other two platoons toward the top of the hill, attacking up two of three spur ridges which extended generally east from Hill 453 and ended abruptly at the road. The heavy-machine-gun section was in action by the time the infantrymen started up the steep ridgeline, and before they had gone far the 81mm mortar section began firing. Captain Tyrrell told the mortar crew to plaster the hill during the attack, moving the shell bursts up the ridgeline just in front of the advancing platoons. All of this had taken place in no more than twenty minutes, and in the midst of brisk enemy fire.²¹

The first sergeant of Company F, in the meantime, had all vehicles turned around and parked in a closed column near the mortar section so that the drivers and other men not actively engaged at the time could guard both the mortar section and the vehicles.

There was no fight for the top of Hill 453; the Chinese abandoned it and fell back in front of the mortar and machine-gun fire. In fact, enemy fire fell off sharply after the first half hour, and thereafter there was negligible opposition. Darkness, however, retarded the advance, which was already difficult and tedious because of the snow and the steepness of the ridge. It took two hours or longer for the 1st Platoon—the one that attacked straight west—to gain the top of Hill 453. Once there, Captain Tyrrell told it to form a hasty perimeter for the defense of the hilltop and then send one squad south to contact the other platoon, which was coming up along the southern of the three spur ridges, thus making certain that the top of the

hill was free of enemy soldiers. At 2030 these two platoons made contact.²²

From the hill to the north came the sounds of grenade explosions and heavy firing as another enemy attack fell against Lieutenant Mitchell's patrol.

Having secured Hill 453 and eliminated the threat from his rear, Tyrrell was ready to go ahead with his original mission. His 2d Platoon, which had been in support so far, was on the road and ready to head straight north toward the surrounded patrol just as soon as the rest of the company could be maneuvered into place to support the attack. By radio Captain Tyrrell ordered one of the platoons on Hill 453 to return to the road by the most direct route, and told the other one to move northeast to a point approximately two thirds of the way down the northernmost of the three spur ridges from that hill mass. When this platoon reached a position from which it could support the 2d Platoon by fire, it was to hold in place. He also sent the heavy-machine-gun section up the northern ridgeline to join the platoon that was to form the base of fire.²³

This re-positioning of his force required time, and in the meanwhile Tyrrell went to the area of his 2d Platoon to work out the complete plans for its advance and to make certain that all men of the platoon knew of the movements of the other platoons so that units of his company would not get into a fire fight among themselves. Having done this, he walked off to choose new positions east of the road for the heavy mortars, which he intended to displace forward. It was, by this time, 2100 or later.

While Tyrrell was thus engaged, he heard a voice coming from the direction of Sinchon: "Hey, are you GIs?" It sounded like an American voice.

Captain Tyrrell called back, "Who are you?" and received an answer that they were three wounded Americans.

Returning to the road, he alerted the platoon there to the possibility of some incident occurring on its right flank, moved a squad into position about a hundred yards east of the road and then, with his runner and radio operator, walked forward toward the direction from which the sound of the voice had come. They stopped at a ditch and Tyrrell called for one man to come forward to be recognized. Someone answered, claiming they could not come forward separately since two of them were wounded—one seriously—and could not walk alone. Tyrrell, by this time reasonably certain that they were Americans, told them to come forward together. It was so dark that Tyrrell could distinguish objects only a few yards away and although he could see nothing, he could hear the three men stumbling through the crusted snow. He saw them first when they were only a few yards away, halted them, and asked who they were.

The three men explained that they were members of Mitchell's patrol. They had escaped from the perimeter and had made their way down the steep east side of the hill to the railroad tracks, which they had followed

south. All of them appeared to be excited and suffering from exhaustion. One was bleeding badly. Tyrrell told them to get into the ditch with him and remain quiet while he listened for the sound of any enemy soldiers who, he thought, might have followed them. The six men sat quietly. There was no sound anywhere in the area, only darkness and stillness. After several minutes of waiting, they returned to the road and the area of the 2d Platoon.²⁴

Everyone else in the patrol, according to the three men who reached Company F, was dead. They described the last attack which ended with Chinese swarming over their perimeter, shooting and throwing grenades. Only the three of them had escaped and there was nothing on the hill now, they claimed, but "hundreds of Chinese." Although Captain Tyrrell questioned them in detail, they were emphatic in stating that the entire patrol had been overrun and all members had been killed.²⁵

The last fire fight on the hill had ended abruptly after what seemed to Tyrrell like a half hour of heavy fighting. He now decided to wait until morning before continuing, since his battalion commander had told him that if he could not make contact with the patrol before dark, to form a defensive perimeter until morning to prevent falling into an enemy trap or getting into a fire fight with friendly troops. He advised his platoon leaders of the change in plan.²⁶

Ten or fifteen minutes later the leader of the 1st Platoon (Lt. Leonard Napier), which was moving down the northern ridge from Hill 453 with the mission of establishing the base of fire for the next attack, called his company commander by radio.

"If you had talked with a man who just came into my position," he told Tyrrell, "you wouldn't believe the patrol was wiped out."

This was Lieutenant Mueller's aid man who had run out of medical supplies during the afternoon and had left the perimeter after dark to try to get back to the vehicles where he hoped to find more supplies. For some unaccountable reason, he had gone too far south and there encountered Napier's platoon. Captain Tyrrell, questioning the medic over the radio, learned that the patrol was still holding at the time he left, even though three fourths of the men were casualties.²⁷

At once, Tyrrell issued new orders for his 2d Platoon (Lt. Albert E. Jones) to head north up the end of the long ridge toward the ambushed patrol. In the path of this platoon were three high points on the same ridge-line. Moving as quietly as possible, without preparatory or supporting fires, Lieutenant Jones and his platoon started forward, experiencing only the difficulties of moving and maintaining contact over steep terrain. They could hear another fire fight starting at the perimeter. They reached the first knob an hour later. The next knob ahead was the one from which most of the Chinese attacks had originated. Beyond that was the slightly lower knob where the patrol itself was located. There was no firing going on at the

time Jones's 2d Platoon arrived at the southernmost knoll. Afraid that he might be walking into an ambush with his own platoon, he halted and then decided to go forward with one squad while the rest of his men formed a defensive perimeter.²⁸

Several hours had passed since Company F had done any firing. To the surviving members of Mitchell's patrol there was no evidence of the promised rescue. Enemy attacks, however, continued. Between first darkness and about 2100, the enemy made four separate assaults, all of them against the south end of the perimeter. It was the last of these that Captain Tyrrell had heard end abruptly while he was waiting for two of his platoons to get into position. Like the others, this attempt was preceded by heavy machine-gun and rifle fire with a few men making the final assault. It was broken up by Cpl. Jesus A. Sanchez, one of Lieutenant Mueller's men from 21st Infantry. Sanchez loaded two BAR magazines, waited until the Chinese were almost upon them, then jumped up and forward a few feet, and emptied both magazines at the Chinese. He ran back and lay down again.

There was respite for an hour before the enemy struck again, this time as Lieutenant Jones's platoon began moving north. For this assault the Chinese shifted to the small mound just west of Mitchell's hill, and attacked from that direction. Ten or fifteen enemy soldiers crawled up under the mortar and machine-gun fire and attempted to overrun the American position. Since Lieutenant Mueller's machine gun was still guarding the south end of the line, five men with rifles and automatic carbines waited until the Chinese were at the rim of their perimeter, then fired at full rate for a minute or less. There was another brief lull before the Chinese made one more assault. This time three enemy soldiers succeeded in getting into the perimeter where they caused considerable confusion in the darkness. One Chinese soldier stood erect among Lieutenant Mitchell's men.

"Get the son of a bitch!" one of them yelled.

Several men fired at once, killing him. They killed another one who appeared immediately afterwards. A third Chinese walked up to within a few feet of SFC Odvin A. Martinson (Mueller's platoon sergeant) and fired at him with a burp gun. Sergeant Martinson, who already had been wounded five times that day, fired back with a pistol. Neither of them hit the other. PFC Thomas J. Mortimer, who was lying on the ground immediately behind the Chinese soldier, raised up and stuck a bayonet into his back as someone else shot him from the front. Sergeant Martinson picked up the body and threw it out of the perimeter.

"I don't want them in here," he said, "dead or alive."

The time was now 2230. There were between 27 and 30 wounded men in the perimeter, including those who were unable to fight, and several others, like Martinson, who had been wounded but were able to keep fighting. Lieutenant Mueller, having become conscious again, kept experiencing flashes of light in front of one eye. Ammunition was nearly gone, the effec-

tive strength of the patrol was low, and several doubted if they could hold off another attack. A few of the men wanted to surrender.

"Surrender hell!" said Sergeant Martinson who was, by this time, thoroughly angry.

Two red flares appeared toward the west and thereafter it was quiet. The patrol members waited for a half hour or longer while nothing happened. Then they heard footsteps again, the same sound of men approaching over frozen snow. This time the sound came from the south again. When the footsteps sounded close, Lieutenant Mitchell's men opened fire.

"GIs!" someone below yelled. "Don't shoot! GIs!"

For several seconds no one spoke or moved. Finally Corporal Sanchez called down, "Who won the Rose Bowl game?"

There was silence again for a few seconds until someone below called, "Fox Company, 23d Infantry, by God!"

Lieutenant Jones and his squad from Company F moved on up, following the same snow-beaten path over which the Chinese attacked during the afternoon and evening. Sanchez, the BAR man, stood up.

"We're relieved, fellows!" he yelled. "We're relieved!"

The others who could also stood up and, from then on, they disregarded the Chinese who had, apparently, moved back for the night.

A thin moon came up and furnished a little light, which made the evacuation of the wounded men easier. Nevertheless, it required more than three hours to move everyone off of the hill. Corporal Sanchez took charge of the top of the hill and supervised the evacuation from that end, searching the hill to be certain no living men were left behind, and emptying the pockets of the dead.²⁹

Some of the men whose wounds were not serious complained about the cold and the hardships of walking over the difficult terrain in the dark, but those men who were wounded seriously expressed only their gratitude, and tried to help themselves. Sergeant Martinson, with five bullet wounds, left the litters for the other men and hobbled out with two other men. Private Hensley, who broke several ribs while climbing the hill at the beginning of the action and had received help himself at that time, now helped carry another man down the hill. It was 0330, 30 January, before Company F men had carried down all surviving members of the patrol. Captain Tyrrell gave the word to move out and the column started south with one platoon of Company F marching ahead of the column and another following on foot behind the trucks.³⁰

The sun came up as the column reached Iho-ri.

★ DISCUSSION

An army is a team. It is composed of many subordinate teams, called organizations or units, which make up the whole. An army operates by teamwork.

Only under extreme circumstances should subordinate units be broken up and teamwork jeopardized.

The patrol to the Twin Tunnels area was not a team. It had a rifle platoon, three drivers from another battalion, radio operators from an artillery battalion, attached heavy-weapons men, fourteen men from a platoon of another division, and an extra captain. Eleven All Stars do not make a football team until they have worked together. Fifty-six men and four officers do not make a patrol.

Security for a motorized patrol may be provided by speed, by regulated movement, by reconnaissance and observation to the front and flanks, and by the use of a proper formation. Either this account lacks detail or the patrol commander depended almost entirely on speed. No mention is made of movement by bounds from one position of observation to another. No patrols or individuals were sent out from the column to reconnoiter. No system of observation from within the column is described. The patrol leader—more courageously than wisely—is a part of the sole security element—four men in a jeep a hundred yards ahead of the main body.

It is doubtful, although the patrol followed the same route as a patrol on the preceding day, that the Chinese had prepared an ambush. A more probable explanation is that the patrol blundered into Chinese forces moving into or through the area. By any standards an organized ambush when sprung should have placed more immediate and more destructive fire on any inclosed patrol. If the enemy is to be credited with skillfully executing an ambush he must be criticized for permitting his prey to escape. If the enemy had not prepared an ambush, then he must be commended for his prompt and vigorous reaction.

In spite of the organizational handicap facing the patrol leader, he had almost unanimous support in his obviously good plan to break out of an awkward position. Only unity of effort and courageous leadership saved the patrol until a well-coordinated and skillfully executed attack by the Company C *team* relieved it.

★ NOTES

1. 23d Infantry Regiment: S2 journal, entry 22, 27 January 1951; 23d Infantry Regiment: special report, Patrol Ambush and Rescue Action, 29 January 1951 (hereafter cited as 23d Infantry: Patrol Ambush).
2. 23d Infantry: Patrol Ambush.
3. 2d Infantry Division: G3 journal and file, entry 107, 28 January 1951.
4. Unless otherwise mentioned, the account of the Twin Tunnels patrol action is based upon interviews by the author with the following officers and men who participated in the action: Lt. James P. Mitchell, Lt. William G. Penrod, PFC Bobby G. Hensley, Cpl. Billy B. Blizzard, PFC Thomas J. Mortimer, PFC Bernard L. Dunlap, and Sgt. John C. Gardella.

5. Major Millard O. Engen: comments and notes. Major Engen was executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, at the time of the patrol action.
6. Engen, *op. cit.*
7. An enemy radio broadcast made in March or April 1951 mentioned a Capt. Melvin R. Stai, claiming he was a prisoner of the Chinese Communists.
8. Engen, *op. cit.*
9. Statement of Lt. Harold P. Mueller. Lieutenant Mueller and his men reached the top of this hill some time before the men from the 23d Infantry.
10. Although several reports indicate these vehicles were destroyed before they were abandoned, Lieutenants Mitchell and Penrod, in Twin Tunnels interviews, say they were not destroyed then, and that the engines were left running since they thought there was a possibility that they might later escape and need the vehicles. The next day (30 January) the 2d Division requested and got an air strike to destroy the vehicles. See Capt. William G. Penrod, letter to the author, 6 May 1953; also 2d Division: G3 journal and file, entry 36, 30 January 1951.
11. Lt. Harold P. Mueller, letter to the author, 30 January 1952.
12. The narrative of the action of Company F, 23d Infantry, is based on an account by Lt.Col. James W. Edwards, CO, 2d Battalion, "Patrolling at Twin Tunnels," and upon two letters from Major Stanley C. Tyrrell to Major Leonard O. Friesz, dated 5 March and 9 September 1952. These letters were written in answer to questions submitted by OCMH.
13. Statement of Lt.Col. James W. Edwards.
14. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, 5 March 1952.
15. Mueller, *op. cit.*
16. Statement of Lt. Harold P. Mueller.
17. Mueller, *op. cit.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. In order that his family may not suffer unnecessary anguish, "Stratton" has been substituted for the real name of this brave soldier.
20. Edwards, *op. cit.*
21. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, 9 September 1952.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, 5 March and 9 September 1952.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
29. Mueller, *op. cit.*
30. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, 9 September 1952.

TAB D

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

RUSSELL A. GUGELER



It appears that it is as necessary to provide soldiers with defensive arms of every kind as to instruct them in the use of offensive ones. For it is certain a man will fight with greater courage and confidence when he finds himself properly armed for defense.

VEGETIUS: MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE ROMANS

8

Chipyong-ni

★ Chipyong-ni was defended because the commanding general of Eighth Army (Lt.Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway) decided to make a stand there against the Chinese Communists. In the chronology of Korean battles, the fighting for Chipyong-ni followed the withdrawal from northern Korea at the end of 1950, a brief Eighth Army offensive that began on 5 February 1951, and a full-scale Chinese counteroffensive that struck a week later.

The 23d Regimental Combat Team made the decisive defense of Chipyong-ni on 13 and 14 February 1951. This action followed the patrol ambush and the subsequent battle for the Twin Tunnels area—some high ground three miles southeast of Chipyong-ni. After the Twin Tunnels operation, the 23d Infantry Regiment (2d Infantry Division) proceeded on the afternoon of 3 February to the town of Chipyong-ni and set up a perimeter defense. Chipyong-ni was a small crossroads town half a mile long and several blocks wide, situated on a single-track railroad. Besides the railway station there were several other brick or frame buildings in the center of the town, but most of the buildings were constructed of the usual mud, sticks, and straw. At least half of the buildings were already reduced to rubble as the result of previous fighting in the town.

Encircling Chipyong-ni were eight prominent hills that rose to an average height of 850 feet above the rice paddies and buildings in the valley. These hills provided excellent defensive positions, but to have occupied them would have stretched the front-line defensive positions along 12 miles of ridgelines and formed a perimeter with a 3- to 4-mile diameter. Instead,

the regimental commander (Col. Paul L. Freeman) stationed his infantrymen on lower ground around a tight perimeter about a mile in diameter. On three sides of the town the line followed small hills; on the northwest section the infantrymen dug their holes across a half-mile strip of rice paddies.

During the ten days after going into position at Chipyong-ni, Colonel Freeman's regiment dug in and strengthened its positions. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion (attached to the regiment) arrived on 5 February. Battery B, 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, joined the regiment, adding six M16 and four M19 flakwagons to the defense of the town. Several days later Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion (a 155mm howitzer unit), was attached to reinforce the fires of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion.¹


The infantry companies dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars, sowed antipersonnel mines, and operated daily patrols to the encompassing high ground. The regimental Heavy-Mortar Company divided the fires of its platoons and sections among the sectors of the perimeter, the artillery registered on all probable avenues of enemy approach, and all units established good communications lines. There was time to coordinate the infantry, artillery, and air support into an effective combat team.²

This narrative describes the fighting for Chipyong-ni that occurred in that sector of the 2d Battalion's perimeter defended by Company G, 23d Infantry. As it happened, the howitzers of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, were in position at the bottom of Company G's hill so that the artillerymen were drawn into the same battle. The commander of the 2d Battalion (Lt.Col. James W. Edwards) placed all three of his rifle companies on the front line to cover the sector assigned to his battalion. This was the south rim of the perimeter. Within the companies, two company commanders committed their three rifle platoons. The other company (F), to which Colonel Edwards assigned the center and smallest sector, manned its part of the line with only two platoons, leaving its support platoon as the battalion reserve.³

The narrow supply road leading southwest from Chipyong-ni went under the railroad on the south edge of the town and then, within a third of a mile, passed two embankments of red clay where the road cut through the two ends of a U-shaped hill. Company G started at the second of these two road cuts and extended left (east) along the southern side of the U. It was not much of a hill—only a couple of contour lines on the map. Infantrymen could climb the smooth hump of earth in a few minutes. The 1st Platoon of Company G held the right end of the hill next to the road cut. The 3d Platoon had the center position (the highest part of the hill) and extended its line left to the bend of the U. The 2d Platoon was down in the rice paddies between the 3d Platoon and Company F.⁴

Men from the two platoons on the hill dug their holes just over the top

of the forward slope. The positions restricted the fields of fire somewhat but provided good observation, especially for the 3d Platoon, which could see all areas to the south except for a dead spot in a dry creek bed just in front of its right flank.



There were two other significant features near the 3d Platoon's area. At the foot of the hill and just beyond the dry creek bed was a cluster of 15 or 20 buildings that made up the village of Masan. The second feature was a narrow spur of ground that formed a link between the 3d Platoon's hill and a large hill mass to the south. The 2d Platoon in the rice paddies lacked satisfactory observation but had good fields of fire across the flat land to its immediate front.

In addition to its own Weapons Platoon, Company G's supporting

weapons included a section of 75mm recoilless rifles, a section of heavy machine guns from Company H, and a platoon of 81mm mortars which was dug in near the edge of the town and had a forward observer stationed with Company G. There were also forward observers from the regimental Heavy-Mortar Company and from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion with Company G. During the daytime men from the 75mm recoilless rifle section manned their weapons, but at night they replaced them with two caliber .50 machine guns to prevent having their positions disclosed at night by the back-blasts of the recoilless rifles.⁵

The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon set up two fougasses (drums of napalm), the first on the road just south of the road cut, and the second in the rice paddies in front of the 2d Platoon. The 1st Platoon, which was next to the road, also strung barbed-wire entanglements across the road and in front of its position. There was not enough wire available to reach across the company front.⁶ Colonel Edwards supervised the siting of all weapons, and the digging of the holes which he insisted be of the standing type and deep enough for good cover.

When Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, arrived, its 155mm howitzers went into position in the small bowl formed by the U-shaped ridge of which Company G occupied one side. The howitzers were laid by platoon to support the east, north, and west sectors of the regimental perimeter. To the rear of the howitzers, the artillerymen set up a tent for the fire direction center (FDC) personnel. Behind that, near the bottom of Company G's hill, were several other tents for the mess and supply sections. A liaison officer from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion to Battery B (Capt. John A. Elledge), and the commander of Company G (Lt. Thomas Heath) worked out a plan for joint defense of the sector. This plan provided for the use of the artillery's machine guns on the front line and, if necessary, the use of some artillerymen as riflemen while skeleton crews manned the howitzers. The two officers also set up an infantry-artillery machine-gun post in the road cut with a six-man crew to operate two machine guns—one caliber .50 and one caliber .30. This road cut was also the dividing line between Colonel Edwards's 2d Battalion sector and that of the French Battalion (a regular battalion of the 23d Infantry).

In the meantime, while the 23d RCT built up its defenses, an Eighth Army general offensive got under way on 5 February with X Corps, in the center of the line, attacking to make a double envelopment of the town of Hongchon, an important enemy build-up area. The attack moved slowly until the night of 11 February, when the Chinese launched a full-scale counteroffensive with two columns driving south aimed at the towns of Hoengsong and Wonju in X Corps' sector.⁷ The vigorous enemy attack drove through two ROK divisions and turned the United Nations' attack into a withdrawal that rolled the front lines south between 5 and 20 miles.⁸ Before the Chinese attack, the front lines of X Corps were well ahead of

Colonel Freeman's Chipyong-ni perimeter, but as the units went south, sometimes fighting through enemy roadblocks, Chipyong-ni became a conspicuous bulge on the left of the corps' line.

At the 23d Infantry's perimeter, the usual patrols for the daylight hours of 13 February reported increased enemy activity crowding close to Chipyong-ni on three sides—north, east, and west. The Air Force observation plane operating with the RCT reported enemy groups moving toward the perimeter from the north and east. Observers called for artillery fire against those enemy columns within reach, while the tactical air control party directed forty flights of aircraft against other enemy groups beyond artillery range.⁹

Another indication of enemy strength and dispositions came from the 2d Division's Reconnaissance Company. Reinforced by a rifle company, it was ordered on the morning of 13 February to patrol the road from Iho-ri straight north to Chipyong-ni—a distance of 15 to 18 miles. Even on this road there were Chinese in sufficient strength to halt this force and turn it back.¹⁰

Faced with this growing threat of encirclement, Colonel Freeman wanted to give up his positions and go back to Yaju, fifteen miles south. The commander of X Corps (Maj.Gen. Edward M. Almond) flew into Chipyong-ni by helicopter at noon on 13 February and discussed with Colonel Freeman the advisability of such a withdrawal—a move that had the approval of the corps and division commanders. At noon Colonel Freeman recommended that his regiment go south on the following morning (14 February). However, within an hour and a half after General Almond returned to his command post to relay this recommendation to General Ridgway, Colonel Freeman changed his mind and his recommendation. The report from the 2d Division's Reconnaissance Company describing enemy opposition to movement on the main supply road south convinced Freeman that it would be better to leave as soon as possible, and he presented his request to division headquarters. In the meantime, however, General Almond had submitted the original recommendation and request—to leave Chipyong-ni on the following morning—to General Ridgway. General Ridgway adamantly refused permission to abandon Chipyong-ni.¹¹

Colonel Freeman immediately started to strengthen his position. He asked for air strikes and airdrops for the next day, set up a secondary perimeter to be manned at night by a company of engineers, positioned his tanks near the outer perimeter, and ordered all gaps mined or blocked by lanes of machine-gun fire.¹² During the early part of the evening of 13 February, Colonel Freeman called his unit commanders together to warn them that the movement of enemy troops probably meant that they would soon be surrounded and attacked by the Chinese.

"We'll stay here and fight it out," he said.¹³

The early part of the evening was quiet. At Battery B's position Lt. Robert L. Peters was sitting in a tent writing a letter. The battery executive (Lt. Randolph McKinney) went to bed after having decided to remove his shoes but to sleep in his clothes in case trouble started. Most of the men of Battery B were inexperienced replacements who had joined the battery after the action at Kunu-ri, where more than half of the men and all equipment had been lost. Before Lieutenant Peters finished his letter he heard a burst of fire from what seemed like several thousand yards away. He stepped outside to look. To the southwest he could see what appeared to be six torches along a trail leading from a large hill. In a short time the machine-guns in the road cut opened fire at figures they could distinguish moving across the rice paddies to the south. Peters called back to Lieutenant McKinney: "Get up, McKinney; this is it!"

On the east end of Company G's sector, PFC Donald E. Nelson and Pvt. Jack Ward (members of the 2d Platoon) were sitting in their foxhole in the rice paddy arguing over which one of them had to stay awake during the first part of the night. The company was required to be on a fifty per cent alert at all times, which meant that one man in each foxhole had to be awake while the other slept. Suddenly they heard the sound of digging. It sounded as if it were several hundred yards away.

Soon after this, two squads of Chinese soldiers attacked the center of Company G's line, hitting its 3d Platoon (Lt. Paul J. McGee). One of these enemy squads crawled along the spur of ground that led to the center of the 3d Platoon's position. The enemy threw three grenades at a machine gun manned by Cpl. Eugene L. Ottesen, and then opened with rifles. Corporal Ottesen began firing his machine gun. The other enemy squad, two hundred yards to the west, taking advantage of the dead spot in the dry creek bed, climbed the hill and attacked the 3d Platoon at the point where it joined the 1st Platoon. It was about 2200 when the first firing broke out.

Hearing the firing, PFC Herbert G. Ziebell awakened his foxhole buddy (PFC Roy F. Benoit) and said: "There's some firing going on. Get up and get ready."

Ziebell did not fire immediately because he could see nothing to shoot, and he was afraid the flash of his rifle would draw enemy fire. Along the line other men heard the firing and sat in the darkness waiting for the attack.

When Lieutenant McGee heard Corporal Ottesen's machine gun open fire he immediately telephoned his company commander (Lieutenant Heath). He then called his squad leaders by sound-powered telephone and informed them of the attack. In order to conserve ammunition, he ordered his men to fire only when they could see the enemy. Apparently making only a probing attack, the enemy withdrew after a few minutes. Except for some firing by the 2d Platoon, there was a lull for about an hour.

Around 2300 a Chinese squad worked up close to the center of the 3d Platoon. An enemy tossed a grenade in the hole of one of Lieutenant McGee's squad leaders (Cpl. James C. Mougeat), wounding him.

Corporal Mougeat crawled out of his hole and, shouting, "Lieutenant McGee, I'm hit!" started west along the hilltop toward the platoon's command post, twenty yards away.

The enemy threw several grenades at him, one of which knocked his rifle from his hand and tore off the stock. Fortunately for Mougeat, two men from his squad shot the Chinese. Recovering his damaged rifle, Corporal Mougeat ran on to the command post. There Lieutenant McGee calmed him down, and Mougeat decided to return to his squad.

"I'm not hit bad," he said.

Lieutenant McGee was watching several men about twenty yards below the platoon's position. One of them called his name.

"Who is that?" he asked a BAR man beside him.

"It's a Chink," the BAR man said.

McGee tossed a grenade down the hill. The explosion apparently wounded the enemy soldier who rolled down the slope. Lieutenant McGee borrowed the BAR and killed him.

Main activity near Battery B's position centered around the machine guns at the road cut. As soon as these began firing, one of the artillery officers (Lt. John E. Travis) and his machine-gun sergeant (Cpl. William H. Pope) grabbed several boxes of ammunition and went to the road cut. The rice paddies in front of these machine guns were completely covered with snow. On previous nights when Travis had gone there to check the position, that area had been smooth and white, but now there were lines of dark forms moving across the fields. They were barely visible in the dark but appeared plainly when illuminating flares hung over the area.

Lieutenant Travis and Corporal Pope had been at the outpost position only a short time when a mortar shell exploded in the cut, killing the two men closest to them, and wounding six, including Travis and Pope. Travis headed for the fire direction center tent and began yelling for some men to help—six to man the machine guns and another six to carry back the wounded.

Captain Elledge (the liaison officer) gathered up ten men and told them to follow. Enemy mortar shells were also falling in the battery's area at this time so that the artillerymen, most of whom were in action for the first time, were reluctant to leave their holes. Five of the men followed Captain Elledge; the others dropped off on the way and went back to their fox-holes. When they reached the outpost position, the caliber .50 machine gun was jamming, so Captain Elledge and PFC Leslie Alston returned for another gun, carrying one of the wounded men back as they went. They then made several trips between the battery's position and the outpost, carrying ammunition out and wounded men back.

These two machine guns fired steadily for several hours, although no close action developed until about 0200 on 14 February when a platoon-sized group of Chinese made an attack against the French Battalion just to the right of the machine-gun outpost. The enemy soldiers formed one hundred or two hundred yards in front of the small hill which the French occupied, then launched their attack, blowing whistles and bugles, and running with bayonets fixed. When this noise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and one squad started running toward the Chinese, yelling and throwing grenades far to the front and to the side. When the two forces were within twenty yards of each other the Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was all over within a minute. After this incident it was relatively quiet in the rice paddies near the road cut.

The firing battery, meanwhile, kept up a normal volume of harassing and interdiction fire, and also fired an illuminating round every five minutes for the sector on the opposite side of the regimental perimeter. The gun sections had L-shaped trenches near their howitzers where the men stayed until Lieutenant Peters or Lieutenant McKinney called out a fire mission.

During the night the enemy, signalling with whistles and horns, launched four separate attacks against Lieutenant Heath's company. Most of the action fell against the 3d Platoon. Toward morning the artillery battery commander (Lt. Arthur Rochnowski) sent twenty men up to help on Company G's line.

At first light on the morning of 14 February, there were Chinese near the front line in front of the 3d and the 1st Platoons, although only three enemy soldiers actually reached it. One of these was killed and the other two captured soon afterward. Five or six Chinese remained near the road cut machine-gun outpost until daylight, then tried to crawl back across the rice paddies. At the limiting point between the 1st and the 3d Platoons, which had been under enemy pressure for several hours, a small group withdrew, leaving 12 or 15 bodies on the south slope of the hill. The platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon (Sgt. Bill C. Kluttz), in a foxhole next to the one occupied by Lieutenant McGee, spotted several Chinese in the creek bed just in front. He fired several times at them. Suspecting the presence of other Chinese, Lieutenant McGee ordered him to have the rocket launcher fired into the creek bed. Sergeant Kluttz fired the launcher himself. The rocket hit a tree, making an air burst over the creek bed. About forty Chinese came out of the creek bed and began running across the rice paddies in front of the 1st Platoon, which opened fire on them. By the time it was completely light, all enemy activity had stopped.

During the day of 14 February, the artillerymen and infantrymen rebuilt their defenses in preparation for another attack. At 0900 Lieutenant McGee took out a patrol which captured 5 Chinese hiding in a culvert and 7 others who were wounded and lying in the rice paddies south of the com-

pany's position. McGee counted 18 enemy bodies. Near Masan, he walked up to a small haystack. Near it was an abandoned enemy machine gun. As a wounded Chinese raised up in the haystack to shoot the platoon leader, Sergeant Kluttz shot and killed the enemy soldier. Another Chinese, although handicapped by a badly wounded leg, was still trying to operate a Soviet burp gun when Cpl. Boleslaw M. Sander killed him.

Captain Elledge and several other artillerymen set out to examine the area around the battery's position. Eight hundred yards west of the machine guns in the road cut, there was a house that Captain Elledge decided should be destroyed before the Chinese could occupy it if they attacked that night. Since the house was visible from the howitzer position, the 5th Section (Sgt. James Webb) took it under direct fire, using white phosphorus shells. After the third round the house began burning, and about fifteen enemy soldiers ran from it across the flat ground. The two machine-gunners and men from the French Battalion killed eight of them; the other Chinese escaped.

During the day the artillerymen dug new and deeper holes and personnel trenches around the howitzers, since they found many of the holes they had dug unsatisfactory during the first night's attack. The battery commander also relaid his howitzers so that, instead of the usual two platoons of three howitzers each, they were laid in pairs. The two howitzers on the left were laid on an azimuth of 5,600 mils, the center laid on 6,400 mils, and those on the right were laid on 800 mils. The normal volume of harassing fires was scheduled for the night of 14 February, about 250 rounds for the battery.

During the afternoon the commander of Company G (Lieutenant Heath) went over to Battery B's fire direction tent to work out plans with Lieutenant Rochnowski and Captain Elledge for the defense of the company and battery position. After the experience of the night before, all were confident of being able to hold if the enemy renewed his attacks. They decided the Chinese were most apt to attack the center of the company's front—the highest part of the perimeter where Lieutenant McGee's 3d Platoon was situated—and to reinforce that area as much as possible. Lieutenant Rochnowski agreed to set up three outpost positions and two BAR teams on the 3d Platoon's right flank near the saddle directly behind his battery. This was in addition to the two machine guns the artillerymen manned on the front line. If it became necessary, he offered to send some of his artillerymen up to fight with Heath's men. Rochnowski planned to send half of the men from one platoon up on the hill first; if more were needed he would then split up the other platoon and thereby contribute a total of about forty men. Skeleton crews would continue to fire the howitzers.

During the day the 23d RCT received twenty-four airdrops of ammunition. There were also several air strikes, including three south of the

Chipyong-ni perimeter where there appeared to be increased enemy activity. Inside the perimeter enemy mortar rounds fell intermittently.

Company G had a quiet day. Hot meals were served. Some of the men thought that perhaps the Chinese had withdrawn. That hope disappeared soon after dark. First, flares appeared in the southern sky; then followed the sound of bugles. After about half an hour or longer, while the men of Company G waited tensely in their holes, a small enemy group opened fire on the machine gun in the center of Lieutenant McGee's platoon, wounding the gunner. The previous night the enemy had opened the fighting by firing on the machine gun. A squad-sized group of Chinese was trying to reach Corporal Ottesen's gun by working along the spur connecting the 3d Platoon's hill with the enemy-held Hill 397 to the south. An enemy machine gun fired overhead cover for the small force. Enemy flares popped in front of the company, and the firing built up rapidly into a furious and noisy fight with the strongest enemy thrusts apparently aimed at the center of the 3d Platoon and at the saddle between it and the 1st Platoon. Tracers arched over the artillery's gun position.

Down at Company G's kitchen tent members of the mess crew heard the firing. They had neglected to dig foxholes and now the closest and best protection was the garbage pit. Eight men crowded into it. None of them made any funny remarks about the odor. An artilleryman with no protection of his own set out looking for any unoccupied foxhole. He finally found one with a man stretched out in the bottom, and jumped in.

"There ain't no room in this hole," the first man said; "not for nobody."

"No room hell!" said the second man. "We'll make room!"

Up on the hill two squads succeeded in penetrating the front line at the left end of the 1st Platoon, occupying several foxholes next to the saddle. The line was further weakened when these Chinese, having gained a foothold on the hill, planted pole charges in two of the 1st Platoon's holes; the resulting explosions killed four men. The enemy, now in control of the left side of the 1st Platoon's sector, set up a machine gun and started firing across the area of Lieutenant McGee's 3d Platoon. The leader of the 1st Platoon had his command post in a hut a short distance from another hut being used by the company commander. Without informing Lieutenant Heath, the leader of the 1st Platoon remained in his hut after the fighting started and did not join his platoon on the hill. He did maintain wire communication with his platoon sergeant (Sgt. Donald R. Schmitt) on the hill.

Because of the fire coming from the 1st Platoon's area, Lieutenant McGee began to suspect that platoon had lost some foxholes in its sector. He called the company commander on the telephone.

"Heath," he asked, "is the 1st Platoon still in position?"

Heath at once called the leader of the 1st Platoon, who in turn called Sergeant Schmitt on the hill. Schmitt was on the right end of the 1st Platoon's position, next to the road cut, still holding and unaware that the

enemy had taken the opposite end of the platoon position. He claimed the line was still solid. Lieutenant Heath relayed the information to McGee.

Lieutenant McGee, however, still had his doubts. He and his platoon sergeant (Sergeant Kluttz) shouted over to the 1st Platoon area, "Anyone from the 1st Platoon?"

There was no answer.

Activities in his own area now took up Lieutenant McGee's interest as enemy soldiers overran one of his own foxholes. On the right flank of his platoon's sector, next to the saddle, he could see four Chinese soldiers with shovels strapped on their backs crawling on their hands and knees. They were about fifteen feet above and behind a hole occupied by the squad leader on the platoon's right flank.

By this time the sound-powered telephone line to the squad leader was out, so McGee shouted across to him: "There are four of them at the rear of your hole. Toss a grenade up and over."

A burst from a machine gun in the 1st Platoon's area—one now manned by the enemy—prevented the squad leader from standing up to lob the grenade. Lieutenant McGee and the other occupant of his foxhole (Pvt. Cletis Inmon, a runner), firing a BAR and rifle, respectively, killed the four enemy soldiers. The time was now about 2200.

The right-flank squad leader's troubles were not yet over. Lieutenant McGee looked down the slope and saw a group of Chinese crawl out of the dry creek bed and start up the hill toward the squad leader's hole.

McGee called to him, "About fifteen or twenty of them are coming up to your right front."

With the enemy-manned machine gun firing frequent short bursts over his hole, the squad leader did not want to stand up high enough to see and fire at the enemy. Although Lieutenant McGee and Inmon kept firing at the Chinese, they could not stop them, and the enemy continued to crawl up toward the squad leader's hole, which was on the 3d Platoon's right flank next to the saddle. The Chinese began throwing potato-masher grenades toward the hole, which the squad leader shared with two other men. The squad leader and one of the other men—a sergeant—climbed out, ran to McGee's hole, and jumped in on top of him and Inmon. The sergeant was hit on the way over. The enemy then threw a satchel charge into the hole they had just left and killed the man who had remained there.

With these men on top of him, Lieutenant McGee could neither see nor fire. "Get the hell out of here, and get back with your squad!" he yelled.

The squad leader did not budge, and McGee repeated the order. The squad leader then jumped out and was immediately shot through the shoulder. Lieutenant McGee called for a litter team, and the two men—the sergeant and the squad leader—were evacuated under fire.

By this time other enemy soldiers had started crawling up the slope

toward Lieutenant McGee's position. One of them threw three grenades at McGee before the lieutenant killed the Chinese with a BAR he had taken from one of his men who had just been hit. The BAR was jamming on every tenth round. Lieutenant McGee used his pocket knife to extract the case. Finally he dropped the knife and was unable to find it in the dark. Quickly, he abandoned the automatic rifle and tried to fire his carbine at a Chinese who had crawled up to within ten feet of his hole. As the enemy soldier raised up on his knees, McGee pulled back the bolt to load the carbine, but at this critical moment the cold oil on the mechanism stopped the bolt from going home, and the weapon would not fire. McGee grabbed the operating handle and slammed the bolt in, fired four rounds at the Chinese, killing him. Men in nearby holes killed three other enemy soldiers who got close to Company G's front line.

It was now close to 2300. Lieutenant McGee needed help. Since wire communications were out, he ordered his platoon runner (PFC John N. Martin) to return to the company's command post and inform Lieutenant Heath that the platoon urgently needed men, ammunition, and litter teams.

After receiving this request, Lieutenant Heath stepped outside and shouted over to the artillery fire direction center asking Lieutenant Rochowski for help up on the hill. The battery commander, in turn, called to his sections. In a few minutes fifteen artillerymen assembled. The runner (Martin) led them up toward the 3d Platoon's hill. As they crossed the crest of the hill the enemy opened fire on them. Lieutenant McGee watched with a sinking sensation as a mortar round killed one and wounded another, and the rest of the reinforcing group turned and ran back down the hill. Martin then returned to the rear area to guide the company's wire team, which was carrying ammunition up to the platoon.

Lieutenant Heath stopped the artillerymen at the bottom of the hill, re-formed them, and led them back up the hill himself. By this time, fighting on the hill had erupted into a frenzy of firing, with the enemy in full possession of that sector of Company G's line near the saddle. Near the top of the hill Lieutenant Heath's group fell apart again, the men running hard toward the bottom. With his men all gone, Heath started back after them. He was angry, and was yelling so loudly the men in the fire direction center tent could hear him. Halfway down the hill he stopped and stood there yelling for more help, ordering the men to return and re-form their line. When they didn't, he ran on to the bottom.

Heath grabbed a couple of the men by their clothing, yelling: "God-dammit, get back up on that hill! You'll die down here anyway. You might as well go up on the hill and die there."

Tracers from the enemy machine gun stretched along the hilltop like red beads. Flares popped overhead. The area was alternately dimly lighted and dark—as if someone were turning street lights on and off. When the artillerymen tried to find cover, Lieutenant Heath ran back and forth yell-

ing and pulling at the men to persuade them to stand up and move. It was now between midnight and 0100 on 15 February.

Captain Elledge heard Lieutenant Heath calling for help. He went out in the gun park and yelled for men to help fight. The inexperienced artillerymen responded slowly. Captain Elledge went around the howitzers, pulled several men from their holes and, with a force of about ten men, set out for the left flank of the area still held by the 1st Platoon. Reaching the forward slope of the hill he found the caliber .30 machine gun there was silent; its three-man crew had been killed. Elledge stationed three men in the machine-gun pit and spread the others along the hill, then examined the machine gun. It was binding, apparently having been hit. There was no ammunition. Captain Elledge put the machine gun on his shoulders and ran down the hill with it, after telling his men there that he would bring another one back immediately. He exchanged the damaged gun for an extra caliber .50 machine gun of Battery B. With it and a box of ammunition, he returned to the hill. He set up the weapon, turned it over to the three men, and then continued along the ridge, moving to the right toward the road cut. He wanted to see what the situation was.

Positions still manned by the 1st Platoon were a few yards down the forward slope of the hill, below Captain Elledge. Toward the west end of the hill he heard some odd noises, and stopped beside a three-foot-high grave mound near the top of the hill. Nearby were several men whom he suspected were Chinese. He could not see them, but he could hear them making low whistling sounds, like an owl, probably as a signal to other enemy soldiers. He waited there on his hands and knees, listening. In a few moments he could hear someone crawling over the crusted snow. Raising to look over the mound, he came face to face with an enemy soldier who was also peering over the mound. Captain Elledge was holding his carbine in his right hand. It was set to operate on automatic and was pointed in the general direction of the Chinese. He pulled the trigger and hit the man in the chest. Right behind this Chinese was another whom Captain Elledge shot through the head. A third enemy soldier threw a small "ink bottle" grenade which exploded and hit Elledge in the shoulder. With his arm numb, and figuring he was badly hit, Elledge slid on down the hill and went back to the battery's mess tent.¹⁴

Soon after 2200, Lieutenant Heath's main line of resistance began to break up when the enemy seized and held part of the 1st Platoon's sector. The three hours that followed were filled with fighting as intense and as frantic as any in which the infantrymen had participated. Although the entire regimental perimeter was under attack, it appeared then that the main effort was directed against Company G. And within that company, the 1st and 3d Platoons were standing athwart the two routes by which the enemy tried to reach the top of Company G's hill. One of these routes followed the spur that led from Hill 397 into the center of the 3d Platoon;

the other route ran from the dead space in the creek bed to the saddle at the boundary between the 3d and 1st Platoons. Loss of this saddle early in the night seriously weakened the company's defenses, especially when the leader of the 1st Platoon, not knowing that the enemy had wrested these foxholes from his men, claimed to be in possession of the area for an hour or two after the enemy had been firing the American machine gun from there. This gave the enemy ample time to organize the saddle before the Americans counterattacked.

Lieutenant Heath used all the supporting fire he could get. He had mortar fire from his own light mortars, the 81mm weapons from Company H, and some help from the regimental Heavy-Mortar Company. The explosions from these shells, most of which fell in the area immediately south of Company G, sounded almost humdrum. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion shelled the slope of Hill 397 1,500 yards south of Company G. Enemy mortar shells fell on the north side of the hill, among Battery B's 155mm howitzers, and on the French Battalion across the road. At frequent intervals illuminating flares appeared in the sky, and one time a plane dropped three large parachute flares which hovered in the sky above Battery B. They burned for thirty seconds or longer, turning the natural bowl from which the battery was firing into a large room flooded with bluish light. By this time the Chinese had a machine gun operating in the saddle and swung it toward the howitzers, raking the area.

Up on the hill the main weapons were small arms, grenades and explosive charges. The Chinese were fighting for each foxhole, receiving heavy casualties, but also taking some of the holes on Lieutenant Heath's front line and killing and wounding men from Company G and Battery B. The walking wounded slid down the hill and gathered at the building used as the company's command post or at one of the tents set up by the artillerymen, or walked toward the medical clearing station in Chipyong-ni.

Lieutenant Heath, realizing that the enemy now held the saddle and the flank of both the 1st and the 3d Platoons, tried unsuccessfully to form a counterattack force from the artillerymen. Several groups of artillerymen were fighting determinedly, including a caliber .50 machine-gun crew and individuals along the line. But those men Heath tried to build into a counterattacking force were the artillerymen who had been on the front line and left when heavy fighting commenced, or others who had avoided getting into combat in the first place.

After the first three attempts to reach the top of the hill failed, Lieutenant Heath went to the artillery commander for more men, and then organized his line for another counterattack.

"We're going up that goddam hill or bust," he kept yelling.

While Heath struggled to hold his men together and counterattack, McGee's 3d Platoon gradually lost more men and foxholes. The enemy machine gun, firing from a position in the former sector of the 1st Platoon,

sent a bullet through the left eye of Private Inmon (the platoon runner in McGee's foxhole). He started shouting: "I'm hit in the face! I'm hit in the face! Get me back off this hill!"

Blood spurted from his eye as the platoon leader tried to calm him down. Lieutenant McGee told him to lie down. "I can't take you out now," he said. He shouted across to his platoon sergeant for the medic. "Inmon's been hit."

Within a few minutes the aid man came over and bandaged Inmon's head. Lieutenant McGee wanted Inmon to keep on firing his rifle but the wounded man said he could not see well enough, so McGee asked him to load clips for his carbine while he fired.

The 3d Platoon's strongest weapon was Corporal Ottesen's machine gun located in the center of its sector. It fired along the spur over which the enemy crawled toward Company G's line, and enemy soldiers had tried repeatedly to silence it. Some time after midnight two enemy soldiers managed to flank Ottesen's hole and tossed in two grenades, knocking out the gun. Corporal Ottesen became missing in action.

No longer hearing the machine gun, Lieutenant McGee called to his platoon sergeant (Sergeant Kluttz) who was between him and the gun.

"What's happened to the machine gun?" he asked. "It's quit firing."

Sergeant Kluttz told him the position had been overrun and that Chinese were coming through between Corporal Ottesen's squad and Cpl. Raymond Bennett's squad. Bennett's squad, holding the left flank of the platoon, had not been attacked. McGee called him on the sound-powered telephone and ordered him to shift several men over to fill the gap left by the knocked-out machine gun. He also sent his other runner (PFC John Martin) to find Lieutenant Heath and ask for ammunition and for replacements to fill the empty holes along his defensive line. Heath, in turn, called Colonel Edwards, who immediately sent a squad from Company F's uncommitted platoon to bolster Company G's line.¹⁵

While this squad was on the way, Corporal Bennett succeeded in closing the gap where Corporal Ottesen's machine gun had been. A group of Chinese was still trying hard to seize that part of the hill. There was a bugler in the group whom Bennett shot as he tooted his second note. In the melee, however, Corporal Bennett was hit by a hand grenade which blew off part of his hand. Then a bullet hit him in the shoulder, and shortly thereafter a shell fragment struck him in the head. The sound-powered telephone went out, and Lieutenant McGee lost contact with Bennett's squad.

It was nearly 0200 when Sgt. Kenneth G. Kelly arrived with a squad from Company F's support platoon. This squad had the mission of recovering the part of Company G's line that had fallen to the enemy, especially the saddle between the two platoons. Sergeant Kluttz guided the men west toward the enemy-occupied foxholes and immediately started a fire fight that wounded or killed the entire squad from Company F within ten min-

ures.¹⁶ After killing two Chinese who fired burp guns at him but missed, Sergeant Kluttz returned to tell Lieutenant McGee what had happened.

"Lieutenant," he said, "we've got to stop them!"

The enemy attack continued without let-up. It was not one calculated to overrun the entire hill but a persistent, gnawing assault that progressed from one hole to the next. The Chinese held most of the holes on that part of the hill between the road cut and the saddle, and those on the right flank of the weakened 3d Platoon. Then, between 0200 and 0300, the 2d Platoon, which was not under heavy fire, pulled back its right flank from its position in the rice paddies, thus breaking contact with Lieutenant McGee's platoon and taking away a machine gun that had been supporting the 3d Platoon. Only a few men from the 3d Platoon were left.

Lieutenant McGee shouted over to Sergeant Kluttz to ask how Corporal Bennett's squad was making out.

"I think three or four of them are still left," the Sergeant answered.

McGee's platoon was low on ammunition and Sergeant Kluttz was having trouble with the machine gun he was firing.

Growing discouraged, Lieutenant McGee called to his platoon sergeant, "It looks like they've got us, Kluttz."

"Well," Sergeant Kluttz called back, "let's kill as many of these sons of bitches as we can before they get us."

Once in possession of part of Company G's hill, the Chinese fired into the bowl-shaped area among the artillery and mortarmen, causing several casualties. The leader of the 4th Platoon (Lt. Carl F. Haberman) moved his mortars to a ditch a hundred yards or more to the rear. He then set out to find men to help retake the hill and eliminate the enemy fire. He walked into a squad tent filled with artillerymen.

"Hell," he said, "a squad tent won't stop bullets."

Haberman persuaded five or six men to accompany him. They went outside with him but none would climb the hill.

Some time between 0230 and 0300 Company G lost the rest of its hill. Sergeant Schmitt and the remainder of the 1st Platoon came down from the west end of the company's sector. In the center of the company's front, Sergeant Kluttz's machine gun jammed. He and Lieutenant McGee decided to try to get out. They called to the other men, threw what grenades they had left, and climbed over the crest of the hill. Lieutenant McGee and five other men, all who were left from the 3d Platoon, walked on down the hill.

Lieutenant Heath called his battalion commander (Colonel Edwards) to report the loss of his company's position. Since a break occurring anywhere around the small regimental perimeter was serious, Colonel Edwards ordered a counterattack and promised to send help. His battalion reserve now consisted of the support platoon of Company F less the squad that had

been lost while attacking the saddle. After ordering this platoon to move to Company G's area, Edwards appealed to Colonel Freeman (CO, 23d Infantry) for more help. Colonel Freeman was fixed no better for reserve strength. An attached Ranger company constituted his reserve, but because of another severe enemy thrust at his 3d Battalion, Colonel Freeman was reluctant to commit his entire reserve in Company G's area. He agreed to furnish one platoon from the Ranger company and a tank.¹⁷

Since so few of Company G's men were left, Colonel Edwards decided to put one of his battalion staff officers (Lt. Robert Curtis) in command of the two platoons. Curtis set out to meet the Ranger platoon and guide it into position.

While these two platoons were on the way, Lieutenant Heath attempted to form a defensive line along a four- or five-foot rib of ground that crossed the center of the bowl-shaped area just behind the artillery position. At the fire direction center several artillerymen were firing an illuminating mission when they heard Heath's voice outside. Heath was now speaking in a normal voice as he stationed one of his men on the new defensive line.

"We'll form our line right along here," he explained to the man, "just back of this tent."

The artillerymen looked at one another for a few seconds.

"I guess it's time to get out of here," one of them said.

They pulled a blanket over two wounded men who lay on the ground, and prepared to leave. Just then the telephone rang. It was the S₃ of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion inquiring about the illuminating mission he had requested.

"Where the hell are my flares?" he asked.

"Excuse me, sir," answered the artilleryman, "but our position is being overrun."

He dropped the telephone, followed the others outside, and crossed to the opposite side of the road in front of the howitzers. A three-foot-high embankment there afforded good protection. Other artillerymen were already behind it. The artillerymen did not abandon their howitzers; they could still cover the battery's position by fire.

Lieutenant Curtis, with the platoon from Company F and the Ranger platoon, reached Company G about 0330.¹⁸ Lieutenant Curtis took command of the two platoons but immediately encountered trouble from the commander of the Ranger company. The latter officer had come with the platoon from his company. He claimed that the platoon, being a part of regimental reserve, was to take orders only from the regimental commander. Curtis immediately called his battalion headquarters to explain the situation to Colonel Edwards, who solved the problem by putting another staff officer—this time a captain—in command of the composite force.

It was between 0345 and 0400, 15 February, when Capt. John H. Rams-

burg left the long, tin-roofed building that housed the battalion's command post and set out for Company G's area. Except for Company G's sector where there was brisk firing, the regimental perimeter was relatively quiet at the time. A quarter of a mile beyond the railroad tracks Ramsburg turned left, following a trail that led from the road to the house where Lieutenant Heath had established his command post.

Along the trail there was a quad caliber .50 halftrack. An hour or two before the crew with the vehicle had accidentally run into a ditch, nearly tipping the halftrack over. Unable to get it into firing position, the crew had abandoned the weapon and vehicle. Lieutenant Curtis was standing near the halftrack. There was enough light in the area for Captain Ramsburg to recognize him at a distance of ten or fifteen feet.

"Christ, John," Lieutenant Curtis said, "but I'm glad to see you here! I can't do anything with these Rangers."

He went on to explain that the commander of the Ranger company objected to having a platoon from his company attached to another unit, to having it participate in a counterattack, and that he refused to take orders from anyone but the regimental commander.

Captain Ramsburg went first to Lieutenant Heath's command post where he called Colonel Edwards in order to report that he and both platoons were at the position. He then talked with the commander of the Ranger company to establish his position as commander of the infantry units in that sector.

At the time the few men left from Company G and those from the platoons from Company F and the Ranger company were all mixed together—just a line of bodies on the ground firing against the hill to discourage the enemy from attempting a further advance. Captain Ramsburg had the platoon leaders separate their units and sort out the artillerymen whom he sent across the road where most men from the battery had assembled. Since none of Company G's communications facilities was working at the time, Captain Ramsburg asked Lieutenant Curtis to send men to Chipyong-ni for more radios. He then asked Lieutenant McGee to have the mortars moved closer to the line of departure so that he could call out orders to the crew.

In the meantime, the two platoon leaders re-formed their men. There were 36 men in the platoon from the Ranger company, 28 in the platoon from Company F. In addition, there were 6 or 7 mortarmen, 2 machine-gun crews, and 4 or 5 men left from Company G. To the two platoon leaders he outlined his plan: following a short mortar concentration, the two machine guns would commence firing at the top of the ridge and over the heads of the attacking men who were to move on Captain Ramsburg's signal. The Ranger platoon, on the right, was to attack the hill formerly held by the 1st Platoon of Company G, while the platoon from Company F was to assault Lieutenant McGee's former position.

It was still dark when a man returned with three SCR-536 radios—one each for Captain Ramsburg and his two platoon leaders. The enemy was fairly quiet at the time and had not interfered with organizing the attack. After testing the radios and getting all men in position on the line of departure, Captain Ramsburg called for mortar fire. The first round, fired from a range of not more than 150 yards, landed squarely on the crest of the ridge.

"That where you want 'em?" one of the mortarmen asked.

"That's exactly right," Captain Ramsburg yelled back. "Now go ahead and sweep the hill in both directions."

He asked for a five-minute concentration. The mortarmen doubted that their ammunition would last that long. After two or three minutes, Captain Ramsburg signalled for machine-gun fire. The two guns went into action, but after a few bursts enemy mortar rounds landed nearby, and both the friendly mortars and the machine guns had to cease firing. Eight or ten rounds landed between the line of departure and the mortar crews about twenty yards behind it. The explosions wounded at least six men, including the leader of the platoon from Company F.

The commander of the Ranger company, thinking that friendly rounds were falling short, called for the mortar crews to cease firing. The shouting interfered with efforts to get the attack under way. Captain Ramsburg became angry. He ordered the Ranger commander to gather up and evacuate his wounded men, hoping thereby to get rid of the commander as well as the wounded men.

The platoon sergeant took command of the platoon from Company F, the machine guns opened fire again, and Captain Ramsburg signalled for the jumpoff.

"OK, let's go!" he shouted.

The men stood up, commenced firing, and walked forward through crusted snow which, in the low ground in front of the hill, was knee-deep in places. In a minute or two the advancing line, with Captain Ramsburg moving in the center, started up the hillside, the Rangers in the lead since men from that platoon, all yelling loudly, pushed their attack fast.

Several enemy mortar rounds and a few grenades exploded on the slope of the hill. In the middle of the attack, two guns located near the French Battalion's hill fired into the Ranger platoon. The guns appeared to be either automatic rifles or light machine guns, but Captain Ramsburg could not tell if the French were firing by mistake, or if Chinese soldiers had set up guns in that area. Nor did he later learn who was firing. The first burst was a long, steady one—a solid string of light from the gun to the Ranger platoon. After that there were short bursts for a minute or longer while Captain Ramsburg and several other men, believing this to be friendly fire, screamed to have it stopped. Several Rangers were wounded by this fire.

Just before the attack jumped off, Lieutenant Curtis had gone to each of the three tanks in that area to tell the tankers of the counterattack plans, and to warn them not to fire without orders. He had just returned when the machine gun fired into the Ranger platoon. One of the tank crews, having apparently decided the machine gun firing from the French Battalion's hill was friendly and the Rangers were enemy, disregarded orders and also opened fire, aiming the tank's caliber .50 machine gun at the Ranger platoon. While Captain Ramsburg yelled at the tankers, Lieutenant Curtis raced back and halted the machine gun, which had fired for 20 or 30 seconds, only long enough to sweep across the hill once. Besides creating more confusion, this caused additional casualties among the Rangers, the remaining ones of whom, by this time, were near the top of their hill still yelling among themselves.

Another gun—this one definitely manned by the Chinese—had meanwhile opened fire into the left flank of the platoon from Company F, causing serious damage in that area. The gun was in the rice paddies near the place where the 2d Platoon of Company G had been, and gave the attacking force its first indication that friendly troops had vacated that position. The commander of Company F spotted the tracers from this enemy gun and directed mortar fire at it but was unable to knock it out. As he afterward learned, the Chinese crew had been there long enough to dig in and provide overhead protection for the gun.

Captain Ramsburg, occupied with the machine-gun fire hitting the right flank of his line, did not know of the trouble the platoon from Company F was experiencing on the opposite end. Lieutenant Curtis succeeded in silencing the tank's fire. Several men from the Ranger platoon were already on top of their objective shouting for help.

"We're on top!" they yelled. "Come on up! Get some men up here!"

Other members of that platoon were still climbing the hill, but a third or more were casualties by this time, the result of either friendly or enemy fire.

A grenade exploded beside Captain Ramsburg just as the tank's fire ended and he turned to go on up the hill. A fragment struck him in the foot. At the moment he was holding a caliber .45 submachine gun in his right hand and at first he thought that, in his anger and excitement over the machine-gun fire from his own tanks, he had squeezed too hard on the trigger and shot himself through the foot. He wondered how he would explain the accident to Colonel Edwards. He then realized his gun was on full automatic and, had he pulled the trigger, it would have fired several times. He also recalled seeing a flash and decided he had been hit by a grenade fragment. He removed his glove and sat down to examine his foot. The two machine-gun crews came by on their way to the top of the hill where they were to relocate their guns. A little later Lieutenant Heath came up the hill and stopped where Ramsburg was sitting.

"What happened to you?" Heath asked. He was supposed to stay at the bottom of the hill and collect any stragglers who might congregate in that area. He was to go up on the hill later, after it was secured.

Captain Ramsburg explained that he was not seriously wounded, that he had only one or two broken bones in his ankle. Lieutenant Heath offered to take charge of the attack for the time being. Slinging Ramsburg's radio over his shoulder, Heath proceeded up the hill.

After resting for several minutes, Captain Ramsburg started on up the hill. He had hobbled a few yards when a soldier came down, dragging another man by a leg. Captain Ramsburg stopped the soldier because he did not want an able-bodied man to evacuate a wounded man, thereby losing two men because of one casualty. The soldier explained that he was wounded also and, to prove it, turned around to show one arm which was badly shot up and appeared to be hanging only by a piece of flesh. Captain Ramsburg waved him on.

"Who's the man you're dragging?" he asked as the soldier moved on.

"It's the Lieutenant," the soldier answered; "Lieutenant Heath. He got it in the chest."

After talking with Captain Ramsburg, Heath had gone on to the crest of the hill, and there had come face to face with a Chinese soldier. Heath reached for the carbine slung on his shoulder but it was entangled in the strap on the radio which he had just taken from Captain Ramsburg. Before he could get his carbine, the enemy soldier had shot him through the chest, causing a serious, but not fatal, wound. About the same time the Ranger platoon leader was killed.

The American counterattack did not force the enemy from the top of the ridge but, instead, for a brief time the opposing forces occupied the same ground, fighting in the darkness. Casualties were heavy.

Several other wounded men slid down the hill. Within a few seconds, four or five more appeared and, when Captain Ramsburg stopped them, they explained the Chinese had recaptured the hill, that no soldiers from Company F or the Rangers were left there, and that they could hold out no longer. Ramsburg followed them to the foot of the hill. The counter-attack was ended.

At the mortar position Captain Ramsburg met Lieutenant Curtis. "Get as many men as you can possibly gather up," he told Lieutenant Curtis, "and get them on this hump to hold off the damned Chinese if they come over the hill."

Of the 28 men in the platoon from Company F, 22 were wounded during the brief attack; 1 became missing in action; only 5 were unhurt.¹⁹ The Ranger platoon suffered casualties equally as heavy. Many of the walking wounded had already gone down the road into Chipyeong-ni; there were 18 or 20 wounded men congregated near the farm house used as the command post, and others at the artillery supply tent. There were

few effective men left, but Lieutenant Curtis stationed those he could find near the command post to guard it.

Although men from both platoons claimed no friendly troops remained on the hill, Lieutenant Curtis decided to make a search for survivors and with another man started up the slope, heading toward an area where he heard the sound of men digging. It was still dark, although in the sky there was the first indication of approaching daylight. As the two men reached the top of the ridge an enemy soldier suddenly jumped up in front of them and sounded a bugle call. A dozen or more enemy soldiers ran toward the bugler. Lieutenant Curtis and his companion thought the Chinese had heard them, but no firing followed the alarm. They backed away. On the way down they came across three wounded soldiers who said they were the last men on the hill from the platoon from Company F. Nevertheless, after helping them back to the command post shacks, Lieutenant Curtis returned—this time alone—to search the remainder of the area where the attacking platoons had been. He found only Chinese.²⁰

When Curtis got back to the cluster of command post buildings, he discovered that what was left of the friendly defensive organization in that area was falling apart. The commander of the Ranger company, having returned from evacuating the men wounded at the outset of the counter-attack, kept yelling, "We can't hold here; let's get out of here!"

Captain Ramsburg had reported the failure of the counterattack to Colonel Edwards who had, meanwhile, secured the remainder of the Ranger company to help regain the lost section of the perimeter. He told Captain Ramsburg to hang on, that help was on the way.²¹ However, by this time no able-bodied riflemen were left. Even the men Lieutenant Curtis had left to guard the command post had gone. Up on the hill, Chinese began firing rifles into the bowl-shaped area. With only wounded men left, Captain Ramsburg finally gave the order for everyone to move back to the hill that formed the other end of the horseshoe, to a ridge just south of the railroad tracks.²²

While these events were taking place, the artillery liaison officer (Captain Elledge) had undertaken to get the quad .50 halftrack back in operation. Abandoned earlier in the night by its crew, it was in a ditch near the trail leading from the road to the command post. About the same time that Captain Ramsburg's counterattack got under way, Captain Elledge had persuaded a tank crew to help pull the halftrack onto the road again. In the first place, Elledge wanted to get the halftrack turned around so that he could fire the machine guns; in addition, it blocked the trail leading to the command post buildings and thereby interfered with the evacuation of some of the wounded men. Half an hour later—after Captain Ramsburg's counterattack had fallen back—Elledge had the halftrack operating under its own power and had tested the small engine that drove the traversing mechanism for the quadruple-mounted machine guns. He went off to get

permission to fire from the infantrymen. At the command post, Captain Ramsburg had just given the order to pull out.

"Go ahead and fire," he told Captain Elledge. "No one's left up there."²³

Captain Elledge returned to the quad .50 and swept the length of the enemy-held hill. The tank commander (MSgt. Andrew Reyna) appeared at that time to ask for help in recovering sixteen wounded men—artillerymen and infantrymen—who had been left at Battery B's supply tent near the foot of the hill and directly under the enemy's guns. While Captain Elledge kept pounding the enemy hilltop with fire from his four machine guns, Sergeant Reyna and his crew drove the tank under the fire to the base of the hill, carried the wounded men from the tent, piled them on the tank, and returned.

Captain Elledge had been firing so steadily that, in the first gray light of the morning, artillerymen across the road could see heat waves shimmering above the four guns.²⁴ Elledge scanned the area, looking for targets. He noticed several enemy soldiers standing on the hill between the saddle and the road cut, and suddenly realized they were preparing to fire a 75mm recoilless rifle that the 1st Platoon of Company G had left there. It was aimed directly at him. Captain Elledge could see daylight through the tube. He watched as the Chinese shoved a round into the breech, then he quickly turned his machine guns in that direction and destroyed the enemy crew.²⁵

Two wounded men had been left under a blanket in the fire direction center tent. While one tank, firing from the road, covered the rescue, PFC Thomas S. Allison and PFC Isaiah W. Williams (both members of the artillery wire section) drove a $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck to the tent, loaded the two wounded men onto it, and backed out again.

Lieutenant Curtis urged the remaining wounded men to start walking toward Chipyeong-ni, then ran to the road to tell the artillerymen that the infantrymen were pulling back.

"You're the front line now," he told them.

The artillerymen, concerned about the safety of their howitzers, decided to stay behind the road embankment where, by fire, they could keep the Chinese out of their battery's position. Two tanks on the road separating the artillerymen from their howitzers regularly fired short machine-gun bursts into the blackened, chewed-up top of the hill.

At the command post only nine wounded men were left—not counting Captain Ramsburg, who stayed behind to supervise the withdrawal. All nine were seriously wounded and waiting for litters and a vehicle to carry them to the battalion's aid station. They were lying on the ground near the straw-roofed buildings. As Lieutenant Curtis returned to the command post, a bugle sounded and he saw 10 or 12 Chinese soldiers coming down the highest hill—the one originally defended by Lieutenant McGee's platoon. Curtis pointed out the enemy to the wounded men.

"If you fellows don't leave now," he told them, "you'll never leave. There aren't enough men left to protect you."

All nine men left, somehow or other moving with only the help they could give one another or get from Lieutenant Curtis, who followed them, heading back to the new defensive position.²⁶

Only two men—both sergeants—remained at the command post with Captain Ramsburg. The sergeants pulled out the telephones and the three men started toward Chipyong-ni, moving across the frozen rice paddies. Before they had gone far, however, an enemy machine-gunner fired at them. They broke into a run. Captain Ramsburg, disregarding his broken ankle which was now stiff and sore, sprinted the entire distance to the new hilltop.

The quad .50—still manned by Captain Elledge—and the three tanks pounded the enemy hill with machine-gun fire. One of the artillery officers yelled for a gun crew to man a howitzer, and half a dozen men scrambled over the road embankment and dashed to one of the 155mm howitzers. Turning it around, they fired six white phosphorus shells that blossomed into white streamers of smoke and fire along the hillside. At such close range, the sound of the propelling charge and the sound of the shell burst were barely separated.²⁷

At the new position, Captain Ramsburg joined the survivors of the ten-hour enemy attack, as well as the remaining two platoons of the Ranger company attached to Colonel Edwards's battalion. All of the men experienced a feeling of relief when daylight came on 15 February, because the enemy soldiers usually withdrew then. This time, however, the Chinese did not withdraw. They conducted a determined defense against an attack made by the Ranger company and Company B, supported by air strikes, artillery, and tanks, and directed by Colonel Edwards. It was evening before the enemy was defeated and withdrew.

Several inches of snow fell during the night of 15-16 February, covering several hundred Chinese bodies on the hill originally defended by Lieutenant Heath's Company G. At Chipyong-ni, the Chinese suffered their first defeat since entering the Korean war.

★ DISCUSSION

If the commander of an attacking force disregards casualties, he will usually be able to attain at least local successes. The commander of defending troops faced with such an opponent must be prepared to limit any such successes. He holds the shoulders of any penetration. He uses supporting fires and positions in depth to blunt, slow down, and finally to stop the spearhead of the attack. Once the penetration has been contained, the defending commander then counterattacks to eliminate it.

A counterattack plan is based on the answers to these questions: When?

Where? How many? Prematurely launched counterattacks meet the enemy head on, before the enemy attack has lost its impetus, and before the enemy has been softened by fire. Tardy counterattacks meet the enemy intrenched and reinforced. Thus, ill-timed counterattacks—no matter how gallantly executed—often fail. Terrain and the disposition of the enemy within the penetration probably will dictate where the counterattack should strike. But a knowledge of all the many factors that go to make up both the enemy and friendly situation is necessary to determine the strength of the counterattack. The entire reserve should not be committed to action unless necessary. Nor should “a boy be sent to do a man’s job.”

Some highlights of the action at Chipyeong-ni bear emphasizing by repetition.

Note that Company G was first alerted to an attack by the sound of digging. Note also the use of the machine gun to replace the recoilless rifle at night—a move that not only kept the rifle blast from disclosing the position but also used the available personnel to the maximum with a weapon much better suited to the requirements of close-in night fighting.

The reprehensible actions of some of the men of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, cannot be attributed to inexperience alone. Few men will perform well when they are formed into an impromptu group of individuals to do an unfamiliar job. The infantry squad needs teamwork and an interdependence within itself—attributes that must reach the maximum in assault combat. An infantry squad will fight its best only when each member has confidence in all other members and in the commanders and leaders over it. Twenty artillerymen who have not demonstrated to one another their individual abilities as infantrymen and who are placed under the leadership of a stranger cannot be expected to behave with distinction. Captain Elledge, who obviously enjoyed the fight, is of a type that occurs not very often. If artillerymen are to be used as infantry, they must be so trained and so organized.

★ NOTES

1. 2d Division Artillery: S3 journal, entry J6, 110910, February 1951.
2. 2d Division, command report: 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951, appendix 1, section D.
3. Lt.Col. James W. Edwards, “The Siege of Chipyeong-ni” (unpublished manuscript on file in OCMH), p. 1.
4. Edwards, *op. cit.* (sketch maps of these positions prepared by Colonel Edwards, battalion commander at the time of the action, on file in OCMH). Unless otherwise noted, that part of this account describing the actions of Company G, 23d Infantry, is based upon a manuscript by Major Edward C. Williamson (“Chipyeong-ni: Defense of South Sector of 23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by Company G, 13–15 February 1951”), prepared in Korea from

interviews with personnel of the battalion. That part describing the activities of Battery B, 503d FA Battalion, is based upon interviews by the author with key personnel of the battery, and upon several with Capt. John A. Elledge, 37th FA Battalion.

5. Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.
6. Edwards, *loc. cit.*
7. X Corps: command report, February 1951 (narrative section). See also map 2 in that report.
8. *Ibid.* See also map 4 in that report.
9. 2d Division, command report: 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951.
10. X Corps: command report, February 1951 (Inclosure 1, "Battle of Chipyong-ni"); hereafter cited as X Corps: Chipyong-ni.
11. For details on the question of holding Chipyong-ni, see X Corps: Chipyong-ni; 2d Division: G3 journal, entry J79, 131422 February, entry J80, 131428 February, and entry J56, 131055 February 1951.
12. X Corps: Chipyong-ni.
13. Statement by Capt. John A. Elledge.
14. Capt. John A. Elledge, in an interview by the author upon which this account is based.
15. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
16. Edwards, *loc. cit.*
17. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
18. Capt. John H. Ramsburg, in an interview by the author. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the second counterattack to retake Company G's sector is based upon that interview. For more details on the difficulties created by the commander of the Ranger company, see Edwards, *op. cit.*, and Lt. Robert Curtis, letter to the author, 22 July 1952.
19. Lt. Donald O. Miller, letter to Major Roy E. Appleman, 18 October 1951.
20. Curtis, *op. cit.*
21. Ramsburg, *op. cit.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. Ramsburg, *op. cit.*, Elledge, *op. cit.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Elledge, *op. cit.*
26. Curtis, *op. cit.*
27. Ramsburg, *op. cit.*

TAB E

"Siege of Chipyeong-Ni"
by

Col. James W. Edwards

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THE SIEGE OF CHIPYONG-NI
© 1964 by Colonel James W. Edwards

The Siege of CHIPYONG-NI, if not the outstanding battle of the Korean War, was at least the outstanding defensive battle of the war. One Infantry Regimental Combat Team, totalling slightly over 4,000, decisively defeated a group of Chinese Divisions, totalling well over 60,000. Newsmen have classed the Siege of CHIPYONG-NI with Custer's Last Stand, the Battle of Bunker Hill, and the Siege of Fort Sumtner. However, unlike the three defensive battles mentioned above, the Siege of CHIPYONG-NI ended in a brilliant victory.

GENERAL SITUATION
(see Sketch 1)

On 3 February 1951, after having practically wiped out a Chinese Division in the Battle of Twin Tunnels on 1 February 1951, the tired but victory-flushed infantrymen of the 23d Infantry Regiment pursued the fleeing Chinese to the North on foot. The Division Reconnaissance Company and Ranger Company were attached to the 23d Infantry. The 1st Battalion was the Advance Guard and was followed by the French, 3d and 2d Battalions in that order. The mission of the 23d Infantry was to seize the highway hub at CHIPYONG-NI. The 1st Battalion seized the town on the afternoon of 3 February 1951 encountering only light, sporadic resistance from a few small enemy groups on HILL 506 (see Sketch 1). By darkness the entire regiment had closed into the town and occupied a defensive perimeter around the low hills inclosing the town on the North, East and South. While it would have been desirable to occupy the following large surrounding hills: HILL 345 to the NW; HILL 348 to the N; HILL 506 to the E; HILLS 159 and 319 to the SE; HILL 397 to the S; and HILLS 129 and 248 to the W, it would have taken at least a division to properly garrison them. Therefore, these dominant terrain features had to be surrendered to the enemy. The Regimental Commanding Officer kept a daily check on these hills by having the Battalions send patrols to them.

The 2d Battalion occupied the Southern part of the perimeter with the French Battalion on its right (West) and the 3d Battalion on its left (East). The 2d Battalion had all three of its companies on the MLR; Company E being on the left (East) and Company G being on the right (West). Company F was given the smallest sector in the center. Company F could man this sector with 2 rifle platoons. Therefore, the support platoon of Company F was "ear-marked" for Battalion Reserve in case of emergency. Company E had to use all three platoons on line, but had a small group, formed from the Company Headquarters personnel and drivers, which could be used as a support in emergencies. Company G initially used two platoons on the MLR and had one platoon in support.

The other Battalions occupied sectors as shown in Sketch 1. Company B and the attached Ranger Company were initially in Regimental Reserve. During the period 3 February to 14 February 1951, all units improved their positions whenever they were not engaged in combat or on patrols. The 2d Battalion Commanding Officer insisted that all foxholes and weapons emplacements be of the standing type with overhead cover. He personally checked the siting of each automatic weapon. This extra labor saved many lives in the savage fighting that followed. For once the frontage assigned to the 2d Battalion was not too excessive and the MLR could be heavily manned. The standard defensive tactical principles taught at the Infantry School at Fort Benning were applied to the ground. It

was a school solution as nearly as the time and the materials permitted.

PRELIMINARY ACTIONS
(see Sketches 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)

The companies of the Regiment were disposed around the perimeter as follows: Company C at 1200; Company A at 0200; Company L at 0230; Company I at 0300; Company K at 0400; Company E at 0500; Company F at 0600; Company G at 0700; 1st French Company at 0800; 3d French Company at 0900; French ROK Company at 1000; and 2d French Company at 1100. Company B was occupying HILL 210 behind Company A and the Ranger Company was behind Company C.

Throughout this narrative the actions of the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, are covered in great detail while the actions of the other Battalions are mentioned briefly and only in enough detail to preserve the continuity of the narrative. This is done for the following two reasons: 1. This is a story about the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry; 2. The writer is only able to furnish the details of the actions of the 2d Battalion because he has in his possession the detailed After Action Reports of the companies of that Battalion and he does not know the detailed actions of the other Battalions. He is not intentionally slighting the gallant actions of the other Battalions.

On 4 February 1951, Company G sent a reinforced rifle platoon patrol to HILL 129 and Company F sent a reinforced rifle platoon patrol to HILL 397. Both patrols proceeded on foot, reached their objectives and returned by dark without encountering any enemy.

A reinforced squad patrol from the 1st Battalion to the crest of HILL 345, KALOHISAN, was fired upon by an estimated enemy company and was forced to withdraw. Artillery and mortar concentrations were placed on HILL 345 for the remainder of the day.

A platoon patrol from the 3d Battalion to HILL 506 ran into a strong enemy force on the northern noses of that hill and also was forced to retire. Artillery and mortar concentrations were also placed on these noses for the remainder of the day. The night of 4-5 February 1951 passed quietly without contact.

5 FEBRUARY 1951


On 5 February 1951 a reinforced rifle platoon from the 1st Battalion, preceded by Artillery and mortar barrages and supported by tank and flak wagon fire from the road, reached the crest of HILL 345 without opposition; the enemy had abandoned it during the night. The platoon remained in observation during the remainder of the day. A French rifle platoon patrol to HILL 248 reached its objective and returned late in the afternoon without enemy contact.

On the morning of 5 February 1951, Company B was dispatched to clear out the enemy on the northern noses of HILL 506. They contacted the enemy about 1100 and, after an all day battle, succeeded in driving the enemy from the northern noses at about 1645 hour. Company B suffered several casualties and did not pursue the enemy as darkness was falling. Company B returned to the Regimental perimeter at dark.

The Reconnaissance Company was sent on a motorized patrol to SANGGOSONG but after traveling about one and one-half miles they ran into several craters blown in the road, and could proceed no farther. Artillery Liaison planes of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion reported observing several enemy groups in

Sketch #1

The chipyang-ni Twin-Tunnels Area



in SANGGOSONG and artillery fire was placed on them.

Company G and Company F on 5 February again sent reinforced, rifle platoons on foot to HILLS 129 and 397, respectively, with negative results.

6 FEBRUARY 1951

On the evening of 5 February, the Regimental Commanding Officer, because of the enemy observed in SANGGOSONG, decided to send a rifle company, reinforced with 3 tanks, to this village and alerted the 2d Battalion to send out the company. The 2d Battalion Commanding Officer alerted Company E and reinforced them with a section of heavy machineguns from Company H. As per Battalion SOP, the Company H machine-gunners carried light machineguns on this mission; the heavy machineguns were too heavy when moving across country. A squad of the Battalion Panda Platoon was also attached to Company E to assist the tanks in negotiating the craters in the road.

Company E departed at 0900, 6 February 1951. The 3 tanks moved down the road with the Panda squad as their closein protection. Company E moved on foot down a trail which ran parallel to the road and was visible from the road. The Company Commander had estimated that the enemy would probably be astride the road and that if the foot troops used the trail they could flank any enemy positions astride the road from the South, while the enemy was busy firing on the tanks. The support platoon of Company F occupied key points in Company E's sector of the perimeter during the absence of Company E.

Company E advanced in column of platoons; 3d, 2d, Company H heavy machinegun section, 1st and Weapons Platoons in that order. PASS A was reached at about 1030 hour without opposition (see Sketch 2). The Company Commander sent the 3d and 2d Platoons, accompanied by the Company H heavy machinegun section, forward to seize HILL 363. The remainder of the Company and the 3 tanks, located at the pass, covered their advance.


When the 3d and 2d Platoons reached POINT X (see Sketch 2), an estimated company of enemy, hidden in the trees on HILL 363, opened fire on them with mortars, machineguns and small-arms. This cut Company E into two parts. The two platoons immediately deployed fully and returned the fire. The attached section of heavy machineguns went into position on HILL A and began firing. The Company Commander had his 60mm mortars go into position on the Northwest slope of HILL 319, and the 2 57mm Recoilless Rifles (because of a shortage of personnel, Company E could only man two instead of the three specified in T/O) went into positions on the Northeast slope of the same hill. The Artillery Forward Observer with Company E brought down artillery fire on HILL 363.

After 30 minutes of this supporting fire, at about 1200, the enemy fire from HILL 363 ceased. The Company Commander ordered the 1st Platoon to move to the Southeast and then East against the Southern slopes of HILL 363. When the 1st Platoon came abreast of POINT X (see Sketch 2), he planned to continue the attack against HILL 363 with the 1st and 3d Platoons in the assault. His plan of maneuver was to have the 3d Platoon seize the northern nose of HILL 363 and then turn South and to have the 1st Platoon seize the Southern nose and then turn North.

The 3d Platoon advanced without opposition and seized the northernmost nose of HILL 363. It then turned South but at 1330 hour ran into a deluge of machinegun, grenade and small-arms fire from the enemy. At about the same time the 1st Platoon, working its way up the heavily wooded Southeastern slope, was also stopped cold by the same type of enemy fire. The enemy had evidently been reinforced from SANGGOSONG and now had about two companies on HILL 363.

Sketch # 2

Hill 363 Area - 6 Feb. 51



There were at least two enemy machineguns firing into each of the platoons. The 1st Platoon could not move. The 3d Platoon was inching forward slowly. The Company Commander ordered the 1st Platoon and the attached heavy machineguns to assist the advance of the 3d Platoon as much as possible by fire. The 3d Platoon then sprang up and tried a bayonet assault but it was stopped with the platoon suffering several casualties. Then minutes later, at about 1400 hour, the 3d Platoon tried a second bayonet assault with the same results.

The Company Commander had been ordered by the Battalion Commander not to become too heavily engaged, so he ordered both platoons to withdraw 100 yards. The 3 tanks, which had moved up the road to the craters, were now ordered to fire on HILL 363. They continued to fire for 30 minutes until about 1540 hour. The 60mm mortars also fired on the same target, expending 65 rounds, and the 57mm Recoilless Rifles fired 22 rounds.

At about 1530 hour, 6 February 1951, some 40 to 50 enemy soldiers were observed approaching PASS B from the direction of the crest of HILL 506. The 2d Platoon, in support, had followed the 3d Platoon at about 150 yards. The 2d Platoon now deployed, facing North, and, assisted by the heavy machinegun section on HILL A, it took this enemy group under fire, surprising them and killing most of them. However, a few did manage to escape and they set up a machinegun. At about 1600 hour, other groups of enemy could be seen approaching from SANGGOSONG and the crest of HILL 506. The Commanding Officer of Company E informed the Battalion Commander by radio that he was receiving fire from the North, South and East, and the Battalion Commander, at 1615 hour, ordered Company E to withdraw to PASS A. The 3d Platoon, assisted by the fire of the 3 tanks, covered the withdrawal. The withdrawal was smoothly executed in the following order: 1st, 2d, Company H Heavy Machinegun Section and 3d Platoons. Upon arrival at PASS A Company E received some long range machinegun fire from HILL 401. The Battalion Commander then ordered Company E to withdraw to the perimeter. Company E had 3 killed and 11 wounded in the action. The patrol disclosed that the enemy was present in some strength to the East of the perimeter. Company E returned to the perimeter without incident.

A 1st Battalion rifle platoon, reinforced with tanks, ran into a strong enemy position North of KOSAN (see Sketch 1). After placing tank and artillery fire on the enemy the 1st Battalion patrol withdrew. HILL 345 was unoccupied by the enemy and a squad from the 1st Battalion remained in observation on the crest during the day of 6 February 1951. A French reinforced, rifle platoon patrol to CHANGDAE (see Sketch 1) encountered no enemy.

7 FEBRUARY 1951

Late in the evening of 6 February 1951, the Regimental Commander, after hearing the results of Company E's patrol to HILL 363, decided to send a Battalion (-), reinforced with 4 tanks to clear out the enemy around SANGGOSONG. He ordered the 2d Battalion, less one of its companies which was to occupy key points in the Battalion's sector during the Battalion's absence, to perform the mission. The Battalion was ordered to return to the perimeter by dark. The Battalion Commander decided to leave Company E to guard the Battalion's sector during the absence of the Battalion.

At 0800, 7 February 1951, the 2d Battalion (less Company E), with 4 tanks attached, left the 23d Infantry perimeter on foot. Company F, with 2 tanks attached, was the Advance Guard, and was followed in column on the road by Company G (less one rifle platoon), the other 2 tanks, Battalion Headquarters

Company, Company H and a rifle platoon of Company G as Rear Guard. PASS A (see Sketch 2) was secured by Company F without opposition by 0930 hour, 7 February 1951. Before any further advance was made the Battalion Commander brought up Company G (less a platoon), the 2 remaining tanks and Company H. Company G went into position astride the road at PASS A prepared to support Company F's next advance by fire. Company H's heavy weapons and the 4 tanks all went into positions prepared to do the same; the 4 tanks remained near the road. The Battalion Commander then ordered Company F to seize PASS B (see Sketches 2 and 3). The Company F commander, leap-frogging his three rifle platoons through each other astride the trail, reached HILL 363 and secured PASS B by 1030 hour without any opposition. The enemy had abandoned the positions which they had defended so tenaciously against Company E on the previous day.

The tanks were now stopped by the craters. The Panda Platoon Leader estimated that it would take two hours to fill the craters and in some of the places revett the road in order to make it passable for the tanks. To continue the advance would mean the separating of the Battalion from its tanks and weapons carriers. The Battalion Commander decided to take the calculated risk and continue the advance without his tanks and without the bulk of his ammunition supply which was on the weapons carriers. Ordering Company H to completely dismount and hand carry as much ammunition as possible, the Battalion Commander moved his Battalion forward along the road in the initial formation, i. e., Company F, Company G (less one platoon), Battalion Headquarters Company (less Panda Platoon with the tanks) and Company H. Company F secured PASS C (see Sketch 3) at about 1120 hour without opposition. The Battalion Commander with the leading elements of Company F at PASS C (see Sketch 3) could now see the entire SANGGOSONG valley stretching before him like a panoramic sketch. While no enemy were visible, the Battalion Commander was still reluctant to advance further without the fire support of his tanks and a full basic load of ammunition for his Battalion weapons. So he ordered the advance to halt. Company G was brought up and the two rifle companies were deployed astride the road with Company G on the left (North) of the road. Company H's heavy weapons went into positions preparatory to supporting a continuation of the advance. The Battalion ate a noon meal of C-Rations and waited for the tanks and the weapons carriers to come up. Sharp eyed infantrymen detected some movement near HILLS 218 and 320, but could not tell whether they were enemy or civilians.

At 1245 hour the craters were filled by the P and A Platoon. All 4 tanks arrived at PASS C at about 1300 hour. The Battalion plan for the continuation of the advance was to have Company F advance astride the road in the valley to seize and clear SANGGOSONG. They would be covered by the remainder of the Battalion from PASS C. When the leading elements of Company F had reached SANGGOSONG, Company G would sweep to the North up the ridge line of HILL 506 to the nose above (West of) HAGOSONG. Company F on Battalion order would advance towards HILLS 218 and 320 and then send a platoon to hit HAGOSONG from the Southeast when Company G attacked it from the West. Further advance from HAGOSONG would depend on the situation.

At 1310 hour, Company F advanced towards SANGGOSONG in column of platoons with the 1st Platoon leading and followed in column by the 3d Platoon, Weapons Platoon and 2d Platoon in that order. As Company F started out the Battalion Commander ordered Company G to send a squad patrol to HILL 539. Company F advancing cautiously reached SANGGOSONG at about 1340 without opposition. The 1st Platoon searched the few remaining mud huts left standing in the village. No enemy were found but evidence that the village had recently been occupied by a large body of enemy troops was everywhere.

As the leading elements of Company F reached SANGGOSONG, Company G moved out. Company G was also in column of platoons, which was a favorite formation with Company Commanders when the situation was obscure. At about 1415 hour the leading platoon of Company G, approaching one of the many crests of HILL 506, saw a lone enemy soldier sitting under a scrub tree. Almost everyone in the platoon fired at him but the enemy soldier, running like a scared deer, miraculously escaped all of the bullets and disappeared over the crest. Several bodies of dead Chinese soldiers were found and searched for documents. This was the first concrete evidence that the enemy opposing the 23d Infantry were still Chinese. A dead U. S. soldier's body was also found and evacuated. He was from Company B and evidently had been killed in the battle that Company B had on HILL 506 on 5 February 1951 (see above). Company G was making very slow progress due to the rugged nature of the many crests of HILL 506.

At 1430 hour the Battalion Commander ordered Company F to advance cautiously towards HILLS 218 and 320. Company F sent the 1st and 3d Platoons forward, leap-frogging through each other. The remainder of Company F in SANGGOSONG now began to receive enemy 60mm mortar fire on them. Two men were wounded. The soldiers in the village took shelter behind rice paddy dykes just Southwest of the village. As soon as they evacuated the village the mortar fire ceased. It appeared that the enemy mortar observers could only see into the village or possibly the village was at the maximum range of the enemy mortars. No mortar fire was received at PASS C although troops of the Battalion had been moving around it and all 4 tanks had moved through the pass to take up firing positions along the road just below the pass. The tanks now began to fire on suspected enemy mortar OPs on HILLS 218 and 320.

By 1500 hour, Company F's leading platoon had advanced about 400 yards Northeast of SANGGOSONG. Company G was making such slow progress that they would be unable to reach the nose directly West of HAGOSONG by dark. The Battalion Commander decided to change his plan. He ordered the Commanding Officer of Company F to stop the advance of his two leading platoons and to send his 2d Platoon directly across the open valley to the bottom of HILL 506, and seize HAGOSONG from the Southwest. The two leading platoons were to support by fire, as well as the Battalion's 81mm mortars and the 4 tanks. If the enemy were on HILLS 218 and 320 the Battalion would soon know.

The 2d Platoon Leader of Company F decided to send two of his rifle squads forward initially. Moving by rushes the two squads were half way across the valley when a storm of enemy machinegun and small-arms fire descended upon them from HILLS 218 and 320 and pinned them to the ground. Some fire also came from HAGOSONG. The Battalion Commander ordered the Commanding Officer of Company F to withdraw his 2d Platoon and then to withdraw Company F to PASS C. As usual the SCR-300 radio went out at this crucial moment and the order had to be sent through the artillery net via the Battalion Liaison Officer to the Artillery Forward Observer with Company F. It was SOP in the Battalion to always have the Artillery Forward Observers with the Company. Commanding Officers, who were usually with their leading elements, and the Battalion Liaison Officer with the Battalion Commander, who was usually with the leading Company or at least where he could observe the leading company. In this case the Battalion Commander was at PASS C. Thus the Battalion had an alternate radio net which could be used in an emergency. The Artillery, tanks and 81mm mortar Platoon started to fire HE and WP at HILLS 218 and 320, covering the withdrawal of the two squads of Company F in the open valley. The fire disrupted the aim of the enemy and the battle-hardened infantrymen crawled back individually to SANGGOSONG. Both squads withdrew successfully

without a single casualty. It was now 1600 hour.

Meanwhile Company G was still 1,200 yards from HAGOSONG. The Battalion Commander ordered Company G to discontinue its advance and to move South and descend into the SANGGOSONG valley. By skirting the edge of HILL 506, in order to keep out of the line of enemy fire, Company G could then return to PASS C much faster than if it had to retrace its steps along the craggy crests of HILL 506 (see Sketch 3).

The 1st and 3d Platoons of Company F covering each other withdrew to SANGGOSONG without difficulty, arriving at about 1630 hour simultaneously with another enemy 60mm mortar barrage which wounded three more men. Company F hastily withdrew from SANGGOSONG in the same formation that it had advanced into the village.

The squad patrol from Company G to HILL 539 had been furnished a SCR-300 radio but, as usual, this radio also failed to work and nothing was heard from the patrol all afternoon. Company G arrived at PASS C at 1700 hour and was ordered to leave one rifle platoon, with two tanks attached to cover the withdrawal of Company F. This platoon when passed through by Company F was then to become the Rear Guard of the Battalion. Regiment had sent sufficient 2½-ton trucks to a turn-around just West of PASS A to bring in the Battalion. Company G (less the Rear Guard Platoon) with the other two tanks was ordered to begin marching to PASS A (see Sketch 2). Just as Company G departed at about 1715 hour, the squad patrol to HILL 539 arrived back. The patrol had become lost among the many crests and had never reached HILL 539; no enemy had been seen by the patrol in its wanderings.

The leading elements of Company F arrived at PASS C at about 1730 hour as darkness was descending. Company H's heavy weapons then went out of action and were loaded on a few ½-ton weapons carriers which had been brought forward; the majority of Company H walked back to PASS A. The 2d Battalion Headquarters Company, less a small command group with the Battalion Commander, then followed Company H back to PASS A. Company F with its wounded closed into PASS C at 1750 hour and continued marching to PASS A. The Battalion Commander and his command group withdrew with the last elements of Company F. The Rear Guard platoon and its two attached tanks followed Company F by 200 yards.

The Battalion arrived at PASS A without interference from the enemy. In the confusion of the dark night, the Rear Guard inadvertently closed up on the main body while the main body was still loading into trucks. This could have been a costly error and it had all commanders sweating for several minutes. However, no harm was done as the enemy had not pursued. The Battalion left PASS A at about 1900 hour and arrived without incident at the perimeter at about 2015 hour, 7 February 1951.

The Battalion's action had uncovered the fact that the enemy were occupying a strong defensive position in the northern part of SANGGOSONG valley. From ground OPs and the observations of an Artillery liaison plane which flew over the Battalion late in the afternoon, it was estimated that the enemy numbered at least one infantry regiment. The total casualties suffered by the Battalion were the five men from Company F wounded by mortar fire; only one of them was wounded seriously. The mission of the Battalion, which was to seize and clear SANGGOSONG and return to the perimeter at dark, had been successfully accomplished.

On 7 February 1951, the 1st Battalion again sent a rifle platoon patrol, reinforced with tanks, Northward and again it was stopped by strong enemy positions North of KOSAN. It seemed that the enemy was determined to keep the 23d Infantry from advancing North of CHIPYONG-NI. The reason for this enemy determination was disclosed the next day. Another squad patrol from the 1st

Battalion remained in observation on the crest of HILL 345 throughout the day.

8 FEBRUARY 1951

Division was becoming concerned about the enemy buildup between CHIPYONG-NI and HOENGSONG (see Sketch 4) and particularly about the enemy around SANGGOSONG. When the results of the 2d Battalion's actions around SANGGOSONG on 7 February 1951 were relayed to Division, the Division Commanding General ordered the 23d Infantry to send another full Battalion to clear out SANGGOSONG and vicinity on 8 February 1951. At the same time the Division Commanding General ordered the 9th Infantry, then about 12 miles South and Southwest of CHIPYONG-NI in Division Reserve, to send an Infantry Battalion up the WOL-LI-YUIMOK Road (see Sketch 3) to advance abreast of the 23d Infantry Battalion. The mission of the 23d Infantry Battalion was to seize HILLS 218, 320, and 444. The Commanding Officer of the 23d Infantry sent the 3d Battalion complete, reinforced with 5 tanks, to accomplish this mission. The 2d Battalion was ordered to send a company to occupy the sectors of Company K and one half of Company I, and the 1st Battalion was ordered to send Company B to occupy the other half of Company I's sector and the sector of Company L (see Sketch 1). The 2d Battalion Commander ordered Company E to shift to the 3d Battalion's sector and had the Company F support platoon occupy the key points in Company E's two East platoon areas; the West platoon area of Company E was partially garrisoned by elements of the Company F Platoon adjacent to it. This resulted in a very thinly manned line which was sufficient during the daytime but extremely dangerous at night.

The 3d Battalion advanced to PASS C on the morning of 8 February 1951 without opposition and sent a company to seize SANGGOSONG (see Sketch 3). This company did not reach the town being pinned down by strong enemy forces on the crest of HILL 539 and the nose just Southwest of SANGGOSONG. The Battalion Commander committed a second company to attack the crest of HILL 539, against very stubborn resistance. No contact was made with the 9th Infantry Battalion but firing could be heard to the Southeast. Darkness fell and Regiment ordered the 3d Battalion to remain in place. The 3d Battalion Commander was forced to split his Battalion into two perimeters. The two rifle companies on HILL 539 formed a perimeter there and the 3d Battalion (less 2 companies) formed a second perimeter around PASS C. Neither perimeter was attacked during the night.

A 1st Battalion rifle platoon, reinforced with tanks, again ran into strong enemy resistance North of KOSAN and had to withdraw. Liaison planes reported large bodies of enemy troops, well dispersed, moving from West to East to the North of CHIPYONG-NI, just beyond the range of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion's 105mm Howitzers. The mule pack trains of these enemy units were also well dispersed. Air-strikes against such well dispersed formations were ineffective. The movement continued throughout the night and for the next five days and nights. Aerial observers estimated that from 2 to 3 infantry divisions moved past CHIPYONG-NI during each 24 hour period. The reason for the determined Chinese stand at SANGGOSONG and North of KOSAN was now apparent. The Chinese had thrown at least one division into a defensive line to screen the movement of a group of their Armies from an assembly area East of SEOUL. A Chinese Army was the equivalent of a U. S. Corps; the Chinese have no Corps. They were moving Eastward towards HOENGSONG (see Sketch 4).

On 8 February Company G sent a reinforced rifle platoon on foot to HILLS

248 and 129, and another reinforced, rifle platoon on foot to HILL 397 without encountering any enemy. One male civilian was picked up on HILL 248 and brought in for questioning. He stated that there were "many, many" Chinese assembling in the valley just Northwest of massive HILL 583 (see Sketch 1).

9 FEBRUARY 1951

During the morning, Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion arrived within the perimeter to reinforce the fires of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion. This battery of 155mm Howitzers was attached to the 37th FA Battalion. The 503d was a negro FA Battalion with mostly white officers. The Regimental Commander decided to place them in the small hollow, RAMSBURG BOWL, just South of HEATH RIDGE (see Sketch 5). This meant that Company G had to extend its original perimeter to the South and occupy CURTIS, MCGEE, and SCHMITT HILLS. This forced Company G to use all three of its rifle platoons on line. Originally Company G had the 3d Platoon in support on HITCHINGS HILL (see Sketch 5). The first shipment of barbed wire arrived in the Regimental area. The 2d Battalion was only issued enough wire to put up a double-apron fence in front of about one-half of the Battalion's MLR. Since Company G was digging its new fox-holes, because of the extension of the perimeter in its area, and since the Battalion Commander considered the Company F sector and the West two platoon areas of Company E as the most vulnerable areas, the wire was issued to Company E and Company F. More wire was ordered but never did arrive thus leaving Company G's sector without any wire except for a small section of about 100 feet on SCHMITT HILL adjacent to the road. This wire had been carried on the Panda truck and was issued to Company G.

From 4 February to 8 February 1951, the 23d Infantry was under the impression that a ROK Corps was to jump off in an attack to the North through CHIPYONG-NI. On 9 February it was learned that I Corps' plans had changed. On 5 February I Corps had launched its part of OPERATION ROUND-UP. The ROK III Corps, comprising the 3d, 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions, was to make the main attack in the I Corps' part of the operation. Instead of launching the attack from CHIPYONG-NI I Corps decided to launch the attack from HOENGSONG, which was occupied by the 38th Infantry (see Sketch 4). The plan called for a double envelopment of HONGCHON by the 3d and 5th ROK Infantry Divisions, a difficult maneuver for battle-hardened U. S. Divisions. Each ROK Division had at least a Battalion of U. S. Artillery supporting it. The 8th ROK Division was to drive North up the HOENGSONG-HONGCHON ROAD. The 38th Infantry was dispersed behind these ROK Divisions to "stiffen" them. Two Battalions of the 38th Infantry were North of HOENGSONG, one Battalion in HOENGSONG and the Netherland Battalion, permanently attached to the 38th Infantry just as the French Battalion was permanently attached to the 23d Infantry, was to the West of HOENGSONG.

The 503d Field Artillery Battery now in the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter began to fire on the Chinese divisions North of the town. These Divisions were out of the range of the 105mm Howitzers of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion but within range of the 155mm Howitzers of the 503d. This probably surprised the Chinese, but, since they were so well dispersed, they continued to move in spite of the concentrations falling among them.

The 24th Infantry Division was on the left (East) of the 2d Infantry Division. A Battalion of their right regiment, the 21st Infantry, on 5 February 1951 arrived on a line opposite KOKSU-RI (see Sketches 1 and 4).

124.

Sketch #4

Chipyang-ni - Wonju Area

11 Feb. to 15 Feb. 51

Note: All terrain Very mountainous

0 1 2 3 4 5
Approximate Scale

N
↑


➡ Approximate Location
of Chinese + N. Korean
Divisions

General Direction of Chinese Movement
Hukchon River



(Chipyang-ni Group
5 Chinese Divisions +
13 to 15 Feb


Wonju Shoot
Chinese Army
4 Chinese
Divisions
13 Feb.



38th Inf.
11 Feb 51

Route of 38th Inf.
Withdrawal
N. Korean
Corps of
3 Divs.

Chinese Divisions
30 Inf. (-)
18th RGT
on 19th Inf
13 Feb



During the next few days they made several abortive and highly costly attempts to seize HILL 583 whose Southern slopes appeared to be heavily held by the Chinese. They never succeeded in advancing any farther North than the line they held on 5 February 1951.

On 9 February Company G again sent a reinforced rifle platoon on foot to HILL 129. No enemy were encountered but two male civilians were picked up and brought in. Since the United Nations Forces had evacuated all male civilians from the area during the December 1950 and January 1951 withdrawals, all male civilians were considered as enemy and were brought in and processed as prisoners. Both of these civilians again reported "many, many" Chinese on HILL 583 and in the river valley Northwest of that hill. Company F sent a reinforced rifle platoon on foot to HILL 397 with negative results. Company F's patrol mined and booby-trapped the crest of HILL 397.

The 3d Battalion continued the attack on the morning of 9 February 1951 after a quiet night. The 23d Infantry perimeter had also spent a quiet night. The 3d Battalion attacked with all three rifle companies. One company drove on SANGGOSONG and the two companies on the crest of HILL 539 started for HILL 444. By noon SANGGOSONG had been captured and the other companies had reached the trail between SANGGOSONG and YULMOK (see Sketch 3). In the afternoon these two companies made two unsuccessful assaults on HILL 444 which was held by at least an enemy Battalion. The 9th Infantry Battalion had failed to come abreast of the 3d Battalion on the WOL-LI-YULMOK ROAD. A patrol from the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, contacted elements of this Battalion in WOL-LI, and were informed that the 9th Infantry Battalion had to clear two miles of enemy held road to reach WOL-LI, that a strong enemy force opposed them just North of WOL-LI and that they had just received orders to withdraw to the South. The patrol relayed this information by radio to the 3d Battalion Commander who relayed it to the Commanding Officer of the 23d Infantry. The Commanding Officer of the 23d Infantry ordered the 3d Battalion to disengage and return to the perimeter by dark. This the 3d Battalion was able to accomplish without interference from the enemy. One tank which had fallen from the road just North of PASS C had to be abandoned. The Machineguns and radio were dismantled from the tank and the turret locked. Unfortunately the crew forgot to take out the ammunition for the 76mm cannon in the turret of the tank.

A 1st Battalion patrol to the North brought in one sick Chinese soldier. The Regimental Commander several days previous had offered a bottle of whiskey to the enlisted man who captured a prisoner and competition between the patrols had been lively. ✓

During the entire night of 9-10 February 1951 Artillery concentrations were placed on SANGGOSONG, PASS C and HILLS 444, 539, 320, and 218. The night passed quietly without any action around the perimeter.

10 FEBRUARY 1951

Early in the morning of 10 February, one rifle company from the 3d Battalion was sent to PASS C with a tank retriever. The company reached the pass without opposition and remained there until late afternoon. In spite of all efforts the tank retriever was unable to get the tank on the road and it had to be abandoned again. The crew of the tank retriever locked the turret of the tank but also forgot to remove the ammunition for the cannon.

Reports from Liaison Planes indicated that the Chinese units were still streaming Eastward and that some of the units had turned South down the YULMOK-WOL-LI ROAD (see Sketch 3).

A French company patrol to HILL 281 had a very stiff engagement with a superior Chinese force. The leading platoon of the company was hopelessly pinned down in a rice paddy and was only extricated after additional tanks were brought up and a timely air-strike was made. The French suffered heavy casualties.

An enemy patrol appeared on the northern slopes of HILL 506 and was taken under fire by elements of the 3d Battalion and the Artillery. This was a daily occurrence from henceforward.

Company F sent a reinforced rifle platoon to HILL 397 to check the mines and booby-traps. None of them had been set off. The patrol encountered no enemy and returned to the perimeter after setting out some trip flares and adding more mines and booby-traps to the minefield.

In view of the increased Chinese activity to the West of the perimeter Company G was ordered to send a reinforced rifle platoon to HILL 129 and then West to HILL 340 to observe the crest of the massive mountain, HILL 583 (see Sketch 1). The patrol reached HILL 340 without encountering any enemy and remained in observation until late in the afternoon. What appeared to be about one squad of enemy were observed moving around on the crest of HILL 583.

Shortly after dark a flare went off on HILL 397. Regiment ordered the 2d Battalion to send a patrol to investigate. The Battalion Commander objected because, if the patrol did succeed in reaching the crest on the dark night, they were still liable to run into the mines and booby-traps that had been planted there. The Regimental Commander, a very brave man who was adored by his officers and enlisted men, saw the logic of the objection and modified his order so that the patrol would only proceed to the base of HILL 397 and establish a listening post at the village of SOKPUL (see Sketch 1). The Battalion Commander ordered Company E to send out a squad, lightly equipped, to perform this mission. The squad departed from the perimeter about 1930 hour, and proceeded to SOKPUL where they remained until 2300 hour. They then returned to the perimeter without hearing or seeing any enemy.

Because of its darkness the night of 10-11 February 1951 was picked by the Ranger Company to make a raid on the enemy to capture prisoners. The Rangers were not too well liked by the battle-hardened infantrymen of the 23d Infantry. Although they had never been in a real battle, they were very "cocky" Like the Marines they "talked a good fight", but unlike the Marines they never "produced when the chips were down". The writer and the other officers of the 23d Infantry felt that it is a grave error to form these special units. They detract from the emphasis which should be placed solely on the combat infantryman and lower the morale of the combat infantrymen because of the special privileges and equipment given these "elite" units. Furthermore they drain the line regiments of the highly intelligent soldiers that they need. Any well trained infantry unit, with a little special instruction, should be capable of performing any of the special missions assigned these "elite" units. The officers and men of the 23d Infantry felt that they could do anything the Rangers could do, only better!

To hear the Rangers talk the night raid would be very simple. One platoon would infiltrate to a position just South of CHANGDAE (see Sketch 1). Another platoon would infiltrate to the North edge of the same town; this platoon would then "shoot up" the town driving the frightened Chinese into the hands of the other platoon waiting at the South edge of town. It sounded so easy that a French newspaper correspondent, who had just arrived in the

Thanks!
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perimeter that day, requested permission to accompany the Rangers. The permission was granted. The Rangers left the perimeter about 2000 hour, 10 February 1951. At about 2140 hour a great din of machinegun and small-arms reports broke the silence of the night; the battle lasted for about thirty minutes. Both platoons had run into strong enemy positions before they reached the town. Numerous Chinese machineguns ripped into the ranks of the Rangers, killing several, among them the French newspaper correspondent, and wounding many. The Rangers were forced to beat a hasty retreat abandoning their dead and many of their wounded. The Chinese were the only ones that captured any prisoners that night! After this episode, particularly the abandonment of the wounded, the stock of the Rangers sank lower than ever among the combat infantrymen of the 23d Infantry.

11 FEBRUARY 1951

The actions and reports of the previous day had definitely shown that the Chinese were moving South to the East of the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter, and that they had also started to move South to the West of the perimeter. The 23d Infantry knew that it was only a matter of time until they would be completely surrounded. Although they could have withdrawn to the South their orders were to hold CHIPYONG-NI; so, they continued to work grimly on their defenses. To get the Chinese to mass so that our Artillery and Air could slaughter them, the Eighth Army Commander, who was well liked and respected by the officers and men of the 23d Infantry, decided to bait a trap. The trap was CHIPYONG-NI and the bait was the 23d Infantry. Would the Chinese mass to annihilate the 23d Infantry? It was also vital to hold CHIPYONG-NI as long as possible because it was a road hub.

As dawn broke on 11 February 1951, Company K observed a small enemy patrol on HILL 159. The tanks and flak wagons, stationed on this part of the perimeter, opened up and killed all but two of the enemy patrol. The daily patrol of a reinforced rifle platoon from Company F to HILL 397 again failed to encounter any enemy. The patrol found a dead cow in the minefield on the crest of HILL 397. This explained the flare of the previous night. The cow had wandered into the minefield and had set off a flare and some antipersonnel mines which had killed it.

Liaison planes continued to report enemy movements North of CHIPYONG-NI towards the East, and also movements to the South, both to the East and West of the perimeter. Because of the enemy reported on HILL 583 by the patrol on the previous day, Regiment ordered the 2d Battalion to send a rifle company, less a platoon, to this mountain to ascertain if the enemy in this area were increasing in strength. The Battalion Commander ordered Company E to make this patrol and told the Company Commander to leave one of his platoons in the perimeter to occupy key points in Company E's sector during the absence of the company. Company E, less the 2d Platoon, with 3 tanks attached, left the perimeter at the road in Company G's sector at 0800 hour on foot. The company arrived at KWANGYANG (see Sketch 1) at about 0900 hour. Using the town as a patrol base, the Company Commander dispatched the 1st Platoon to HILL 340, Objective A, and the 3d Platoon to HILL 320, Objective B. Each platoon as per Battalion SOP was reinforced by a 57mm recoilless rifle squad and in addition each platoon had attached to it one 60mm mortar squad. The tanks and the remainder of the company remained in the vicinity of the patrol base. The tanks took up positions on the West side of the road where they could "over-watch" the two rifle platoons as they climbed towards their objectives.

Both platoons reached their objectives at about 1100 hour without opposition from the enemy. Both platoons then started for HILL 360, Objective C. The 3d Platoon on the way to Objective C swept through the villages of UON and CHILSONG without finding any enemy. The 3d Platoon then continued on to Objective C, arriving there without encountering any enemy. It was now about 1245 hour. The 1st Platoon had occupied the northern nose of Objective C about 200 yards North of the 3d Platoon which was on the crest of Objective C. Both Platoons paused here to eat a lunch of C-rations.

At 1345 hour the 1st Platoon received 5 rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire and long range machinegun and small-arms fire from an enemy force, estimated at about a platoon, which had suddenly appeared on HILL 290 (see Sketch 1). The Artillery Forward Observer who was with the 1st Platoon immediately placed Artillery concentrations on this force. The 1st Platoon also placed long range machinegun and 60mm mortar fire on this group. The enemy group was dispersed by these fires.

Both platoons waited about 30 minutes for any further enemy reaction. When none occurred, the 3d Platoon at about 1445 hour, cautiously pushed two squads towards the crest of HILL 583 up its Southeast nose. Just past the saddle between HILL 360 and the Southeast nose of HILL 583, both squads were pinned down by very heavy machinegun, small-arms and 60mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy company entrenched about 300 yards East of the crest of HILL 583. The 1st Platoon and the remainder of the 3d Platoon immediately placed long range machinegun and rifle fire on the enemy company. Artillery and 60mm mortar fire was also brought down on the same enemy. Under cover of this fire the two squads were able to withdraw to HILL 360. At 1630 hour the Battalion Commander ordered Company E to break contact and return to the perimeter. Under cover of the tanks the two platoons returned to the patrol base without interference from the enemy. Company E returned to the perimeter at 1830 hour. Company E did not have any casualties and estimated that it had killed ten and wounded thirty of the enemy. This patrol showed that the Chinese now occupied the East slope of HILL 583 with at least a reinforced company. The steady build-up in this area indicated that the Chinese were slowly moving South in strength to the West of the perimeter, as well as to the East of it.

The Chinese Divisions, which had been streaming East for days, hit the ROK III Corps on the morning of 11 February 1951. How many divisions hit the three ROK Divisions will never be known. The three ROK Divisions, as usual, disintegrated like chaff before a wind. The newsmen called them the "volatile" ROKs and that is a good description. A Battalion Commander of the 38th Infantry told the writer that the 8th ROK Division, which was supposed to be one of the "better" divisions, came down the road through his Battalion like a herd of wild cattle on a stampede! Most of them were at a dead run and had thrown away their weapons. The U. S. officers of the 38th Infantry tried to stop them, but the only way that they could have been stopped would have been to use the Communist method of setting up machineguns and firing into them. The United States Army just couldn't use this method against their "allies". The general opinion of all officers of the Infantry Regiments of the 2d Division was that the ROKs were only good for running to the rear and for cluttering up the supply roads with their speeding vehicles. Operation Round-up had turned into a stampede as far as the ROKs were concerned! The ROKs in their stampede had failed to even notify their supporting U. S. Artillery Battalions that they were pulling out. The Chinese over-ran many of these Artillery Battalions and

killed most of their personnel. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion and its attached Battery A of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion, which normally supported the 9th Infantry Regimental Combat Team but which was supporting one of the ROK Divisions, was cut off and overwhelmed by waves of Chinese. About 75% of the personnel, including the Battalion Commander, were killed and many captured. The Chinese captured all of the guns of this Battalion intact and later put them to good use against the 23d Infantry at CHIPYONG-NI. It was indeed a sorry commentary on our "allies", the ROKs! The two Battalions of the 38th Infantry North of HOENGSONG were cut off. They finally fought their way South to WONJU suffering terrific casualties; 150 men were left in one of the Battalions and about 250 men in the other. A Chinese patrol sneaked into HOENGSONG and shot up the Command Post of the 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry located in that town. The Netherland Battalion was also cut off and had to fight its way out to the HOENGSONG-HONG-CHON ROAD (see Sketch 4). This Battalion was the victim of a Chinese ruse during the following night, the night of 12-13 February 1951. At dusk 12 February a group of Chinese or North Koreans dressed in South Korean (U. S.) uniforms approached the Netherland Battalion Command Post. One of the enemy soldiers, who spoke English, explained that the group were South Koreans who had run out of ammunition fighting the Chinese. He asked for and received some ammunition for the U. S. weapons that the group was carrying. The English-speaking enemy soldier then thanked the Dutch for the ammunition and the group withdrew about 50 yards from the CP. Here they calmly loaded their weapons and fired into the surprised CP group, killing the Battalion Commander and several others. As they disappeared into the dark they ignited a brush fire. The fire served as a marker for an enemy mortar barrage which then descended upon the Command Post. It was a daring and successful ruse that was very costly to the Netherland (called Dutch by the U. S. soldiers) Battalion.

The perimeter was quiet during the night of 11-12 February 1951. Again a flare went off on the crest of HILL 397 at about 2000 hour. On Regimental order, the Battalion Commander ordered Company F to send a lightly equipped squad patrol to the village of SOKPUL to establish another listening post. The squad departed South down the road in Company E's sector, reached SOKPUL, remained in position until 2400 hour, and returned safely to the perimeter without hearing or seeing any enemy.

12 FEBRUARY 1951

The 38th Infantry was fighting for its life. It had evacuated HOENGSONG and was retreating to WONJU. The 9th Infantry had a Battalion at IHO-RI. This Battalion had a Company blocking the road about one-half mile East of CHUAM-NI (see Sketch 4). The 9th Infantry Battalion, which had attempted to go North up the WOL-LI--YULMOK ROAD (see Sketches 3 and 4), had withdrawn before very heavy pressure to the vicinity of MANNANGPO. The other Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the remainder of the Regiment were to the East of this Battalion with the mission of keeping the WONJU-MANNANGPO ROAD open. Many Chinese divisions were observed moving in the area between HOENGSONG and CHIPYONG-NI and air-strikes hit them all day long. A North Korean Corps of 3 Divisions was miles to the East of HOENGSONG moving South towards CHEIHON. The big Red February offensive in Central Korea was in full swing! The Chinese were binding the arms of the U. S. prisoners of the 38th Infantry behind their backs and shooting them down in cold blood!

130.

Eighth Army realized the seriousness of the break-through in the 2d Infantry Division's sector and pulled both the 1st Cavalry Division and the 29th British Brigade out of the line South of SEOUL and sent them speeding East. The 7th Infantry Division, which had been reorganizing and resting since December 1950 after the HUNGNAM evacuation, had the 17th Infantry Regiment near CHECHON and the remainder of the Division farther to the South. The 17th Infantry was ordered to send a Battalion to WONJU and the rest of the Division was ordered North to CHECHON. The 1st Marine Division, which had also been reorganizing and resting near MASAN since December 1950 after the HUNGNAM evacuation, was also ordered North. Incidentally, the 2d Infantry Division after the KUNU-RI withdrawal, where it had suffered the heaviest casualties of any division in Korea (5,000 killed and wounded out of a total strength of 12,000), was given about twelve days from 6 December to 19 December to reorganize and rest and then was placed back into line. The 2d Infantry Division again was savagely engaged by the end of December 1950. It never received two months to reorganize and rest! The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team after a long rest had been placed in X Corps Reserve. It was now ordered up to WONJU and attached to the 2d Infantry Division; it arrived in WONJU on 12 February 1951. Four additional Battalions of Artillery from Corps Artillery and other Divisions were also ordered to WONJU, arriving late on 12 February; they went into positions in WONJU and to the West of WONJU on the WONJU-MANNANGPO ROAD.

On the morning of 12 February 1951, the 3d Battalion had their daily target practice against enemy groups on HILL 506. A patrol from the 1st Battalion again was stopped by the enemy North of KOSAN (see Sketch 1). Reinforced rifle platoons to HILLS 248 and 397 by Companies G and E, respectively, encountered no enemy. Company E's patrol failed to find any of the flares on the crest discharged; therefore, the flare fired on the previous night from the crest of this hill must have been an enemy flare.

Keeping a close check on HILL 583, the Battalion again sent out a reinforced rifle company to investigate the enemy build-up in that area. Company F, intact and reinforced by a section of 81mm mortars from Company H and three tanks, was motorized and sent on the mission. A platoon from Company G occupied key points in Company F's sector during its absence. Company F was ordered to make a reconnaissance in the direction of the crest of HILL 583 and to sweep the villages of UON, CHILSONG, and HWAJON-NI (see Sketch 1). Company F departed South down the road in Company G's sector at 1045 hour, 12 February 1951. Company F dropped off the 81mm mortar section, with one tank to protect them, at the village of KWANGYANG. The remainder of the company continued on to OKKU where they detrucked. The company moved out in column of platoons in the following order: 1st Platoon, two tanks, Command Post group, 2d Platoon, Weapons Platoon and 3d Platoon. The 1st Platoon reached and searched the village of CHURYONG without finding any enemy. Here the 60mm mortars set up; the two tanks also remained here to protect them. One 57mm recoilless squad was attached to the leading two platoons as per Battalion SOP. The 1st Platoon proceeded Northwest to the Southern nose of HILL 320. The 2d Platoon, now echeloned to the right rear of the 1st Platoon, seized the crest of HILL 320 without any opposition. The 2d Platoon captured three civilians near the crest. The 1st Platoon then started Northwest towards HILL 340 (see Sketch 1) and came under heavy 60mm mortar, machinegun and small-arms fire from HILL 360, HILL 281 and the crest of HILL 583.

The company commander decided to clear HILL 360 first, so he ordered

the 1st Platoon to attack HILL 360. The 2d Platoon learned from the three captured civilians that there were many enemy in UON and CHILSONG. The Platoon Leader moved his attached 57mm recoilless squad into a position from which it could fire into the villages. Just as it got into position a file of 30 to 50 Chinese were seen leaving the Western edge of UON. Another column of about the same size were observed moving North out of CHILSONG. Both columns were taken under fire and dispersed; the survivors fled to the West.

The 1st Platoon started its attack on HILL 360 by sending one squad forward covered by the fire of the remainder of the platoon. As this squad advanced, about 15 Chinese soldiers came towards it from the crest of HILL 360 shouting "come here" in English. The light machinegun of the 1st Platoon opened up on them killing most of them and forcing the survivors to flee over the crest of HILL 360. The leading squad now halted and the remainder of the Platoon came forward by squad rushes and built up a line on the leading squad. The Platoon continued to advance in this manner until it reached the crest of HILL 360; the enemy on the crest had fled to the West towards the crest of HILL 583. The 1st Platoon had two men wounded in this action.

Many enemy were seen on the crest of HILL 583 and bugles and horns were heard. Artillery and small-arms fire were being placed on the Southwest slopes of HILL 583 as the 21st Infantry Regiment made another attempt to take the hill. At this time, about 1330 hour, approximately 100 enemy fled from the Southwest slopes of HILL 583 to the Eastern side of the crest. Here they were joined by the remnants of the force that fled before Company F. The entire force then moved North up the draw between the crest of HILL 583 and HILL 290 (see Sketch 1). They were in sight of Company F for about 30 minutes as their progress was slow due to the fact that they were carrying many wounded. Artillery, 81mm mortar and long range machinegun fire was placed on them, killing and wounding many more. The column finally disappeared Northwest of HILL 290. An air-strike now hit the Southwest slope of HILL 583; P-51s and jet fighters used rockets, bombs and 50 calibre machineguns on the enemy. In spite of this the 21st Infantry was still unable to take the crest, as the enemy were too well dug in.

At about 1415 hour the 3d Platoon of Company F passed through the 2d Platoon and advanced on HILL 340. HILL 340 was secured by 1435 hour without opposition. The 60mm mortars displaced to a position behind the 3d Platoon on HILL 340. The two tanks which had been protecting the mortars returned to KWANGYANG with the weapons carriers. At 1500 hour, the 2d Platoon passed through the 3d Platoon and continuing slightly Northwest seized HILL 281 without opposition. At 1545 hour the 2d Platoon attacking Southwest and the 3d Platoon attacking North converged on HWAJON-NI. The 3d Platoon, reaching the village first, searched it and found no enemy but did find many civilians. Fifteen of these civilians, being males of military age, were made prisoners. The Battalion Commander now ordered Company F by radio to burn the village and return to the perimeter. The village was burned and the 3d and 2d Platoons, with the 3d Platoon leading, withdrew Southeast down the draw between HILL 129 and HILL 340; they were covered by the 1st Platoon which had moved to HILL 340 when HWAJON-NI was captured. All elements reached KWANGYANG without incident and, mounting their trucks, the infantrymen of Company F returned to the perimeter at about 1745 hour. Company F had two men wounded during the entire action and estimated that it had killed 30 enemy soldiers and wounded 90.

The Company F patrol had found out that HILL 583 was now held by an estimated Battalion of Chinese. The male civilian prisoners when questioned disclosed that there were thousands of Chinese soldiers massed Northwest of HILL 583. Artillery concentrations were placed in this area throughout the night.

The night of 12-13 February 1951 was quiet except for about ten rounds of Self-propelled fire received in the areas of Companies I, K and E (see Sketch 1). No casualties resulted. Examination of shell fragments the next morning disclosed that they were U. S. 76mm tank shells. The Chinese had broken into the turret of the tank abandoned at PASS C (see Sketch 3), had pointed the 76mm cannon in the general direction of the perimeter and had fired the ammunition left in the turret at the 23d Infantry perimeter.

13 FEBRUARY 1951

On the morning of 13 February 1951, the situation of the 2d Infantry Division was desperate. The remnants of the 38th Infantry had reached WONJU. Here together with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and a Battalion of the 17th Infantry, they braced for the hordes descending from the North. About mid-morning two Chinese divisions attacked them. At the same time a North Korean Army (our U. S. Corps) of three divisions was by-passing WONJU on the East, and a Chinese Army of four divisions was attempting to outflank WONJU from the West by moving South down the torturous SOM RIVER valley at 0400 hour, 13 February 1951.

The 2d Reconnaissance Company was detached from the 23d Infantry and sent to join the 9th Infantry Company L, just East of CHAUM-NI; air had reported at least a Chinese regiment moving West towards that company. The Chinese hit these two companies and cut them to pieces in the afternoon of 13 February 1951. The remnants were forced back to CHAUM-NI and then South. The Chinese now had cut one of the roads leading South out of CHIPYONG-NI. Within the next 24 hours a Chinese Division moved in astride this road just South of CHAUM-NI.

During the day the TACP attached to the 23d Infantry directed 40 flights of aircraft against the Chinese units moving around CHIPYONG-NI. The Chinese were still so well dispersed that the air-strikes had little effect upon them.

A reinforced rifle platoon from Company E proceeded on foot to HILL 319 in the morning without encountering any enemy resistance. The patrol could not see any enemy on HILLS 333 and 279 in the TWIN TUNNELS area. The next day air reported a Chinese Division in the TWIN TUNNELS area. Another foot patrol, consisting of a reinforced rifle platoon from Company G, went to HILL 397 in the morning without encountering any enemy. However, several enemy patrols appeared on HILL 348 throughout the day, and the enemy groups on HILL 506 were much larger than on previous days. The Chinese were closing in! They appeared to be taking the bait. The four Chinese divisions moving South down the SOM RIVER valley were spotted by Artillery Liaison planes. The Battalion of the 9th Infantry at MANWANG-PO (see Sketch 4) was the only unit near them.

However, the four extra Battalions of Field Artillery in WONJU were not occupied. The Battalions having gone into positions in a semi-arc could fire under the overhanging cliffs on each side of the narrow SOM RIVER valley. They began firing at the four Chinese divisions at dawn. Rolling barrages, directed by the liaison planes, chased the four Chinese divisions

up and down the valley and from side to side. The bewildered Chinese could find no shelter from the terrific barrages. The "WONJU SHOOT" lasted for about five hours during which the four Field Artillery Battalions fired over 7,000 rounds. The four Chinese divisions were erased from Uncle Joe Stalin's muster rolls. About 6,000 were killed and an estimated 25,000 wounded in the narrow valley. This stopped the flanking movement from the West. Meanwhile, the frontal, holding attack, by the two Chinese divisions against WONJU was stopped and the town was saved for another day. The "WONJU SHOOT" will go down in history as one of the most successful artillery actions of any war.

As darkness approached, liaison planes reported that strong Chinese forces were moving East from HILL 583 and that enemy groups were astride the road at KWANGYANG and as far South as KOKSU-RI (see Sketch 1). CHIPYONG-NI was surrounded! The Chinese had taken the bait! Could the 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team hold its perimeter? The 23d Infantry was only at about 75% T/O strength. The Battalions were even lower than that. The 2d Battalion was at 65% T/O strength.

As the 2d Battalion grimly prepared for the worst, several of the officers asked the unofficial chaplain of the Battalion, Father Frank, to "Get on that direct line to J. C.". Father Frank was a Roman Catholic Missionary priest who had been in KOREA for 15 years. He had become acquainted with the Battalion Commander when the Battalion Commander had served a previous tour in KOREA. When the Battalion had landed in PUSAN on 5 August 1950, Father Frank had been on the dock. In his thick Irish brogue he had asked the Battalion Commander if he could become the Battalion's chaplain. He had escaped the invading Reds by five minutes and his mission had been burned to the ground. Since the Regiment was short of chaplains, the Battalion Commander had quickly secured the permission of the Army authorities and Father Frank the permission of his superior. Being an Irish neutral he could receive neither pay or rank. In emergencies he conducted both Catholic and Protestant services. He was loved by all the officers and enlisted men. He was accused of having a "direct line to J. C. (Jesus Christ)", whereas the ordinary layman had to always go through too many "switchboards" to get to J. C. When the Battalion got into a "hot spot" someone invariably asked Father Frank to get on that "direct line to J. C.". His answer now, as always, was, "Don't worry. The Man Above is on our side.". (For further details on Father Frank see Chapter 8, FATHER FRANK)

The surrounded 23d Infantry had radio contact with the 2d Infantry Division. Division informed the Regiment that the 29th British Brigade, which had six English and Australian Infantry Battalions in it, was moving North up the IHO-RI--CHAUM-NI Road late in the evening of 13 February 1951 and would attempt to break the Chinese Divisional road-block just South of CHAUM-NI. The leading elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were arriving at YOJU (see Sketch 4) on the night of 13-14 February 1951 and would drive North on the IHO-RI--KOKSU-RI Road on the morning of 14 February 1951. This news cheered the surrounded fighting men of the 23d Infantry RCT.

However, the fact that they were completely surrounded did not seem to worry the Combat Infantrymen of the 23d Infantry Regiment. At last they had an opportunity to stand and "clobber the Chinks"! The attitude of these fighting men was succinctly expressed by a Sergeant of the 3d Platoon of Company G, who was later killed in action in the early morning hours of 15 February. The 2d Battalion Commander, inspecting the fox-holes and gun emplacements of Company G, walked up unobserved as the Sergeant announced

to his squad that the perimeter was now completely surrounded. He ended his announcement with this statement: "Those stupid slant-eyed, yellow bastards! They don't realize it but they have just started to dig their own graves!" Such was the esprit of the 23d Infantry Regiment! The Chinese had grabbed a tiger by the tail and wouldn't be able to let go.

The enemy opposing the 2d Infantry Division was the crack Chinese Fourth Field Army under General Lin Pao, numbering roughly 18 to 21 divisions, and the remnants of the once powerful North Korean Army, numbering 13 divisions of various strengths. The total number of this force was about 200,000. Just North of it were 100,000 more Chinese of the Third Field Army. The Fourth Field Army was the best in the entire Chinese Army. It was this Army, composed mostly of big Chinese from Manchuria, which had hit the Eighth Army in November 1950 (see "The Chinaman's Hat" and "The Kunu-ri Withdrawal"), forcing the Eighth Army to retreat. This same Army had later captured SEOUL. They were experts in the "Human sea" tactics. Would these mass tactics overwhelm the 2d Infantry Division and particularly the surrounded 23d Infantry in CHIPYONG-NI?

Definitely identified in the Fourth Field Army at this time were the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th Armies; one other unidentified Army belonged to this Field Army. A Chinese Army was usually composed of three divisions and a small amount of supporting troops and was roughly comparable to a U. S. Corps. During the siege of CHIPYONG-NI all three divisions of the 40th Army and two divisions of the 42d Army attacked the perimeter. Prisoners from three other divisions were captured but they were probably from the four Chinese divisions which were opposing the 29th British Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division. The Fourth Field Army was the "Phantom Army", which air reconnaissance and intelligence agents had failed to locate in January of 1951. They had been in a rest area about 30 miles East of SEOUL and were finally located when the 23d Infantry patrols "bumped into" their outpost line in the TWIN TUNNELS area late in January 1951. This outpost line was driven in with heavy losses to the enemy by the 23d Infantry in the Battle of the TWIN TUNNELS where one Chinese Division was just about annihilated.

The North Korean First Corps was in the SEOUL area. The North Korean Fifth and Second Corps were to the East of the Fourth Chinese Field Army and farther North, backing these two corps up, was the North Korean Third Corps. It was probably the Fifth Corps or Army of 3 divisions that was racing South to the East of WONJU towards CHECHON.

As darkness settled upon the 23d Infantry perimeter, Chinese signal flares could be seen from all directions, leaving no doubt in anyone's mind about being completely surrounded. While the standard North Korean signal flare for attack was two green flares fired in rapid succession, the Chinese evidently had a different set of signal flares. Two white flares fired consecutively seemed to be the Chinese signal for attack and one green flare the signal to withdraw.

The 2d Battalion was disposed as shown in Sketch 5. Each platoon defensive area was dug-in for all-around defense in case of a break-through. It was almost a perfect Fort Benning solution. The primary positions of the machineguns were down low so that they could fire FPL fires along the wire or, where there was no wire, along the front of the positions. Tank and Antiaircraft Vehicle machineguns covered some sections of the Battalion's MLR. Alternate positions, high up on the hills, were occupied by the machineguns during the daytime so that long-range fire could be placed on Chinese

groups on the high, distant peaks which could not be seen from the MLR. All foxholes along the MLR and most of the alternate foxholes were of the two-man, standing type foxholes. Two-man foxholes were SOP in the Battalion as men fought better when they were not alone. Two-man foxholes also permitted one of the men in the foxhole to get some rest, during lulls in the fighting, while the other man remained on guard. On the MLR all foxholes had overhead cover. The 2d Platoon of Company E and the 2d Platoon of Company G were both in rice paddies and they both struck sub-surface water after digging down about two and one-half feet. These two platoons built two-man breastworks with overhead cover behind the rice paddy dykes. Strange as it may seem it was always difficult to get grazing fields of fire in the rice paddies. This was due to the fact that each rice paddy was sub-divided into numerous little plots, each of which was terraced a few feet above or below the adjoining plots. Each of these plots was surrounded by dykes about two or two and one-half feet high. Therefore, the machinegun bullets were able to only sweep one plot of about 50 or 75 feet before hitting the dyke of the next terraced plot, that was higher, or completely going over the next plot by three feet, if it was lower. Trip-flares, antipersonnel mines and booby-traps had been sown copiously in front of all positions and in the draws leading down from HILL 397 towards the Battalion MLR. They were also placed in the double-apron, barbed wire fence that had been erected in front of Companies F and E and the extreme right (West) flank of Company G. Extensive use was made of booby-traps manufactured from C-ration cans and hand grenades (for details of the construction of this type of booby-trap see "Bloody NAKTONG Defense"). At night each company sent out 2 or 3 two-man groups about 50 to 75 yards in front of the MLR to act as listening posts. Company E had no support except a small group of 28 men recruited from Company Headquarters and the drivers. Company G now had no support at all as its support platoon was now on the MLR and all the extra Company Headquarters personnel and drivers had already been used to reinforce the depleted rifle platoons. Company F had the 3d Platoon in support but could not employ it without permission of the Battalion Commander as it was the only rifle reserve the Battalion had. The Battalion had the P and A Platoon, the Intelligence Section, Company H Headquarters Group and a few soldiers from Battalion Headquarters Company Headquarters Group, which could be used as a reserve in case of emergency; however, all of these units were at about 60% T/O strength.

The Machinegun Platoon of Company H was attached to the companies as follows: 1st Section to Company G, 2d Section to Company E and a 3d Section of light machineguns, manned by men from both of the other two sections, to Company F. In accordance with Battalion SOP the Commanding Officer of Company H was not only responsible for the coordination of all machinegun fire along the MLR, but was also responsible for placing not only his own machineguns but all the light machineguns of the rifle companies as well as any 50 calibre machineguns that might be placed on the MLR. He was also responsible for placing any ground-mounted or truck-mounted 50 calibre machineguns, that remained in the rear area, in positions and for assigning each machinegun a sector of fire for the antiaircraft protection of the Battalion area.

The 75mm recoilless rifle Platoon was also attached to the companies as follows: 1st Section to Company E; and 2d Section to Company G. Each of the sections manned two 75mm Recoilless Rifles. In addition, in accordance with Battalion SOP, each section carried two 50 calibre machineguns with it. After dark the 50 calibre machineguns were set up and manned,

as no accurate shooting could be done with the 75mm recoilless rifles at night. Furthermore, the back blasts of the RRs at night would disclose their positions to the enemy. Because of the shortage of personnel all three rifle companies could only man two of their three T/O 57mm recoilless rifles. All six of these RRs were close to the MLR. The recoilless rifles were excellent weapons for shooting at distant enemy groups. Therefore, alternate positions high up on the hills were occupied by some of these rifles during the daytime.

The 81mm Mortar Platoon was in G/S. It had dug in its weapons in the Railroad Cut on WAGGONER HILL (see Sketch 5). Although the positions were protected from observation from HILL 397, portions of the Railroad Cut could be observed from some of the distant high hills, namely, HILL 248 and HILL 583 (see Sketch 1). Normally Battalion SOP provided that this platoon man six mortars instead of the T/O four; this allowed a section of two mortars to be ready to fire in each of the three company areas. A 3d Forward Observer group was also formed. Therefore, in combat each rifle company could count on a section of at least two mortars supporting it at all times and would have a mortar Forward Observer with the Company Commander. Due to the shortage of personnel the 81mm Mortar Platoon was only able to man 5 mortars and two Forward Observer groups. One FO Group was sent to Company G and the other to Company E. Concentrations and the primary barrages were registered in front of the MLR and in the draws leading into the Battalion's position. One Forward Observer party was sent to the Battalion from the Regimental Heavy Mortar Company. This Forward Observer party was sent to Company G. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion furnished 3 FO parties to the Battalion and one of these was sent to each one of the rifle companies. The Artillery Liaison Officer and his party stayed with the Battalion Commander as per SOP.

During the night, rifle company commanders always remained at their OPs directing the defense of their sector from that spot. The First Sergeant and Administrative Warrant Officer, if the Company had one, remained at the Company Command Post and arranged for food, ammunition and supplies to be brought up to the company as needed. All of the companies were short of officers so that the Executive Officers, who normally would be taking care of the administrative details at the CP, had to command platoons on the MLR.

Battalion had laid double wire lines to all companies and each company had lines to its OP and all its rifle platoons connected to a switchboard at the Company CP. Company H had lines to all of its heavy machine-guns and recoilless rifle sections and to the 81mm Mortar Platoon. During an attack the Battalion switchboard operator would hook all companies into a conference call on the Battalion Commanders telephone. Then the orders to one company would be heard by all companies and conversely a report from one company would be immediately disseminated to all companies. This system was excellent for the immediate relaying of orders and information. It was SOP in the Battalion for all defensive engagements.

The vehicles of the Battalion Headquarters Company and Company H were in a Battalion Motor Pool which was established in the rubble between the Battalion CP and Company H's CP. (see Sketch 5) All vehicles were well dispersed. The four wheels of each vehicle were protected by sandbags or piled up rubble; this was to prevent mortar fragments from blowing out the tires. Sometimes either the front or the back wheels could be dug in where the ground suddenly sloped sharply. The Battalion CP was located in a three-room Korean mud house. The room on the East end of the house

was used as an Operations Room and was sand-bagged on the outside to a height of six feet.

THE FIRST NIGHT OF THE SIEGE

(see Sketches 5, 6 and 7)


At 2200 hour, 13 February 1951, enemy 60-, 82-, and 120mm mortar fire began to fall on all parts of the perimeter. The listening posts in front of all companies came in and reported hearing many enemy massing in front of all units. Enemy artillery began to fall into CHIPYONG-NI. This appeared to be flat trajectory, probably from 75mm pack mountain howitzers, which came from somewhere in the vicinity of the Northeast slope of HILL 345. Company E also reported receiving flat trajectory SP fire from somewhere in the vicinity of PASS C (see Sketch 3); this was probably some Chinese expending the remainder of the U. S. 76mm tank ammunition abandoned with the tank at that pass. Unfortunately, the roof of a Korean house adjacent to the 3d Battalion Command Post caught on fire; the straw roof of this type of house was very combustible. The burning house furnished an excellent aiming point for the enemy mortar and artillery observers.

Enemy bugles, horns and whistles could be heard all around the perimeter. At 2215 hour, two white flares went up in front of Company E's 1st Platoon and in front of Company G's 3d Platoon. Under a very heavy mortar barrage the Chinese attacked at 2220 hour, 13 February 1951. The night was very dark.

A Chinese assault force of about one platoon came through the Railroad tunnel in front of the right of the 1st Platoon of Company E. They were followed through the tunnel and over the tunnel hill by a reinforced rifle company. The entire force advanced down the slope toward the unnamed, four-hut village along the road in front of the 2d Platoon's area. FPL artillery, mortar and machinegun fires were brought down and illuminating flares were fired. More Chinese forces appeared on the tunnel hill and fired small-arms at the 2d Platoon and thus gave the attacking Chinese force covering fire. One machinegun was set up in the mouth of the Railroad tunnel and it swept the 2d Platoon's area. Heavy mortar fire continued to fall on all three of Company E's platoons during the attack. The Chinese first wave assaulted right through the antipersonnel mines, trip flares and booby traps, taking heavy casualties. This wave was mowed down by the U. S. smallarms and machine gun fire. The tank and the M-16 (Quad 50) laid down a curtain of 50 calibre slugs in front of the 2d Platoon. The Chinese continued to come on in waves until they were all killed or wounded. About one hour later at 2320 hour a second assault was launched. The waves of this assaulting force were cut down just as efficiently as the waves of the first assault had been. The Chinese had adopted the North Korean battle-cry of "Manzai" and they shrieked this as they charged forward. At 2240 hour, after the Chinese machinegun in the mouth of the Railroad tunnel had been in action about ten minutes, the 3.5" Rocket Launcher team of the 2d Platoon scored a direct hit on it, destroying the gun and sending its crew into eternity. The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant of the 2d Platoon, during the height of the battle, moved from foxhole to foxhole with some extra hand grenades that had been in reserve at the platoon CP. The Infantrymen always used a large amount of hand grenades in these night battles, as they preferred not to

Sketch #6

Co. E. Area - Night 13-14 Feb



fire their rifles except in extreme emergencies, as the flash immediately pinpointed their position. Both the Platoon Leader and the Platoon Sergeant were wounded by Chinese hand grenades but neither one left his post until the assault was over. The veteran Infantrymen of Company E's 2d Platoon calmly mowed down the waves of the 3d, 4th and 5th assaults during the remainder of the night. The 3d Assault took place at about 0220 hour, 14 February 1951.

The Light Machine Gun of the 3d Platoon on NANCE HILL helped the 2d Platoon to cut down the Chinese waves. One of the 75mm Recoilless Rifles of the 1st Section on NANCE HILL attempted to knock out the enemy machinegun and fired two rounds of 75mm at the entrance to the railroad tunnel in the light of illuminating flares. This brought down such a heavy concentration of enemy mortar fire upon the rifle, that its crew was forced to move down the hill into their Primary Positions on the MLR. Here they manned their 50 calibre machine gun; both 50 calibre machineguns of this section expended three boxes of ammunition helping the 2d Platoon to stop some of the Chinese assaulting waves. After the fifth assault, which began at about 0515 hour, 14 February 1951, was stopped the Chinese began to withdraw. Their "human sea" tactics had hit a stone-wall! However, small-arms and mortar fire still continued to descend on all three platoons of Company E and the Chinese were still present in the unnamed, four-hut village in front of the 2d Platoon.

Meanwhile, at 2230 hour, 13 February 1951, about a reinforced company of Chinese hit the 1st Platoon of Company E. Preceded by an intense mortar barrage and supported by a machinegun on HILL 159 and SP fire from PASS C (see Sketch 3), the shrieking waves came up the road and the creek bed. An artillery concentration seemed to silence the SP gun at the pass. However, if it was the abandoned tank, as shell fragments appeared to indicate, it is more probable that the Chinese had by now run out of ammunition. FPL artillery, mortar and machinegun fires were brought down in front of the 1st Platoon. Here, as everywhere else around the perimeter, the first waves rushed right through the AP mines, trip-flares and booby-traps, taking heavy casualties. The veteran riflemen with the tremendous fire support of the 50 calibre machineguns of the two tanks and the two antiaircraft vehicles stopped each assault without any difficulty. A few Chinese during the first assault did succeed in getting within hand grenade range before they were killed. One of these Chinese grenades landed in an antiaircraft vehicle wounding two men, one of them seriously. The enemy machinegun on HILL 159 was knocked out by U. S. machinegun fire during the first assault. After four suicidal "Manzai" assaults, spaced about one hour apart, the Chinese withdrew to the South at about 0400 hour, 14 February 1951 to "lick their wounds".

The 3d Platoon of Company E was subjected to intense mortar and small-arms fire throughout the night but was never assaulted.


At 2205 hour, 13 February 1951, Company G's listening posts came in and reported heavy enemy movements down the slopes of the massive mountain, HILL 397, and in the village of MASAN. At 2217 hour, enemy bugles were heard in front of the 3d Platoon of Company G. At 2220 hour, two white flares came up from the village of MASAN. Friendly artillery and mortar fire was brought down immediately on the village of MASAN and the slopes of HILL 397. At 2220 hour, CURTIS and McGEE HILLS started to receive enemy mortar and small-arms fire. At 2230 hour,

the first "Manzai" attack was launched by the Chinese against CURTIS HILL. The Chinese again charged right through the trip-flares, AP mines and booby-traps, callously taking their heavy casualties. The veteran Company G combat soldiers mowed down this Chinese force, estimated as a reinforced platoon. With the help of the light machinegun on McGEE HILL the attack was stopped cold before it reached anywhere near the foxholes. The 2d Platoon and the Company G 60mm Mortar Section were under a heavy enemy mortar concentration during this entire attack.

The whole perimeter was under attack. It was later learned that at least two Chinese Divisions attempted to crack the perimeter on this night. The Chinese attack was preceded by a very heavy artillery and mortar preparation. One artillery shell made a direct hit on the house in which the 1st Battalion CP was located and set it on fire. At about 2220 hour, the Chinese attacked the 1st Battalion Sector in wave after wave; the main effort was in Company C's area. Company K at the same time was under a very heavy attack (see Sketch 1). The French 1st Company could hear the Chinese forming up for an attack in front of them. Led by their officers they left their foxholes and charged down on the unsuspecting Chinese. With their red scarves tied around their heads the French hit the Chinese with a howling bayonet charge, killing and wounding most of them. Fifteen of the Chinese were seized by the scruffs of their necks and brought back as prisoners. The remainder of the Chinese attacking force, terror-stricken by the "Red Demons", fled into the darkness. The Chinese attack in this sector was disorganized for many hours. The 3d French Company also received an attack at this time but had no trouble repulsing it. The 23d Infantry had long ago discovered that both the Chinese and the North Koreans were afraid of our bayonets. As a result most of the infantrymen of the 2d Battalion had secured small carbon stones and after the rifle had been given its daily cleaning the bayonet was sharpened to a razor edge. The "Spirit of the Bayonet" thoroughly permeated the 23d Infantry and its permanently attached French Battalion. New replacements always received several hours of "refresher" training with the bayonet.

At 2300 hour, 13 February 1951, during the height of the attack in Company E's 2d Platoon area, an ambulance jeep from the 3d Battalion Medical Section, accompanied by a Quad 50 antiaircraft vehicle, in spite of warning from the 2d Platoon Leader, attempted to go South down the road to Company K's area. The jeep reached the four-hut village along the road just in front of the 2d Platoon. This village was still full of Chinese. The jeep was smothered with Chinese small-arms fire and burst into flames. The two occupants, the driver and aid-man, were both hit. The driver was captured by the Chinese but the aid-man was rescued by a Company E infantryman from a nearby foxhole. The wounded aid-man crawled into the foxhole and remained there until dawn. The hail of Chinese small-arms and grenades forced the Quad 50 to withdraw to the Company E MLR. Here it stayed for the remainder of the night and assisted in repulsing the remainder of the Chinese assaults.

At 2320 hour, 13 February 1951, Regiment called up Battalion and stated that it was imperative that another attempt be made to evacuate the wounded from Company K and from the antiaircraft vehicle that had been hit by a Chinese grenade in the Company E 1st Platoon area. Regiment dispatched an additional tank from the Regimental Reserve to assist in



Sketch # 7

Co. G Area - Night 13-14 Feb.

200 yards

Approximate Scale 0 50 100 200

14 Feb 95

Crest 397

Same as Sketch 6 Elevations in Meters

Key

Foot trail

Squad, 0100

New Landing Point 19 Feb.

Curtis Hill

McGee Hill 3623

1600

Schmitt Hill

Ramsburg Bowl

Rice Field

CO G 60 Mort

Reinforcements

Btr 503 M FA

1st French Co

Dike

2nd Assault 2300 - Company 1
3rd Assault 0230 - 600 ft 300 ft 100 ft
4th Assault 0545 - 800 ft

Mason

the attempt. The Battalion Commander ordered Company E to send a rifle squad with the tank. Since at this time there was a temporary lull between assaults in the Company E 2d Platoon area, the Company Commander of Company E ordered the 2d Platoon to furnish the rifle squad. At about 2335 hour, the squad and tank left the MLR. Upon reaching the unnamed four-hut village along the road, they were also forced to halt by a hail of Chinese small-arms fire and hand grenades. The Chinese began to shoot a 2.36 inch bazooka at the tank and it was forced to withdraw. The squad was then ordered back to its foxholes by the Battalion Commander and Regiment was informed that to attempt to run the road at night was plain suicide. Regiment rescinded its order and the tank returned to Regimental Reserve.

Meanwhile, in Company G's area, a second Chinese assault was launched. At 2255 hour, an SP gun, probably another 75mm mountain pack howitzer, started to shell SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS from somewhere in the vicinity of KANHYON (see Sketches 1 and 5). At this time the dreaded two white flares again came up from MASAN and at 2300 hour, 13 February 1951, an estimated Chinese Company came on in waves against SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. Taking heavy casualties as they came up the hills, some of the Chinese succeeded in reaching a few of the foxholes through the FPL curtain which had been brought down. They were killed with hand grenades and bayonets by the veteran infantrymen in a savage hand-to-hand battle. Again the Chinese "human sea" tactics had hit a stone wall. During this assault and the first assault Company G had lost a total of two men killed and ten wounded. A small gap caused by the above loss of manpower now existed in the 1st Platoon's MLR. The Company Commander of Company G requested the Commanding Officer of Battery B of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion to give him a few men to plug this gap. The Commanding Officer of Battery B complied with the request and sent up 5 negro artillerymen under a Sergeant and one 50 calibre machinegun. This "machinegun squad" was placed in the gap and fought heroically during the remainder of the night. They were the only negro troops observed by the writer throughout the first five campaigns in KOREA who did fight heroically, and they were artillerymen. The Chinese attack recoiled and they were so disorganized that no further assaults took place for the next hour or until about 0100 hour, 14 February 1951. Of course they did keep up the small-arms, mortar and SP fire on the Company G area. At about 0100 hour, 14 February 1951, a Chinese squad patrol attempted to come up the nose on CURTIS HILL on the left flank of the 3d Platoon but were driven back with heavy losses. They were evidently probing for weak spots.

At 0225 hour, 14 February 1951, the two white flares again came up from MASAN. MASAN seemed to be the Chinese Headquarters and assembly area and it was continually "plastered" by our artillery and mortar concentrations. At 0230 hour, the Chinese launched their third attack. About six small diversionary attacks of squad strength hit all along the MLR on SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. The main attack of at least one reinforced rifle platoon headed for the Limiting Point between the 1st and 3d Platoons. The 1st Platoon's light machinegun and the negro-manned 50 calibre machinegun, in the light of illuminating flares, calmly "clobbered" each wave as it came shrieking up the slope. Two of the Chinese did manage to get a few feet inside the MLR but both were killed before they could do any damage. The remnants of the Chinese assault

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force retreated followed by Company G's 60mm mortar fire. At 0330 hour, 14 February 1951, another attack by a force, estimated as a reinforced rifle platoon, was launched against the front and left (North) flank of CURTIS HILL. Assisted by the light machinegun of the 2d Platoon and the heavy machinegun section in the rice-paddy, the defenders of this hill repulsed the attack with heavy casualties; the heavy machinegun section expended 1,400 rounds of ammunition. The main Chinese force had attempted to hit the hill from the North but had been hit in the flank by the enfilading fire of the light machinegun of the 2d Platoon on the nose of FINN HILL and the heavy machineguns in the rice-paddy. The Chinese attacked the 1st French Company at about the same time but were also repulsed. The 75mm recoilless rifle Section, whose positions were along the road next to the French, assisted in repulsing the attack against the French by firing into the flanks of the assaulting Chinese waves with 50 calibre machineguns.

The attacks around the rest of the 23d Infantry perimeter had continued. At 0100 hour, 14 February 1951, another strong assault was launched from the North against Companies C and A, and from the Northeast against the 2d French Company. The savage nature of the combat is illustrated by the following true narrative. A Corporal from Company D was the gunner on a heavy machinegun located in Company C's sector. His gun inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking waves until it was knocked out by enemy fire. The Corporal then held off a Chinese group, only twenty yards distant, with his pistol, until another machinegun could be brought up. He, heedless of the enemy fire around him, then manned this new gun and killed 26 Chinese before his second heavy machinegun was knocked out by enemy fire. After savage hand-to-hand fighting, all assaults were repulsed. At 0215 hour, 14 February 1951, the Chinese started to make desperate frontal assaults on Company K. The 3d Battalion requested the 2d Battalion to assist by fire, and the 2d Battalion's 81mm mortars fired several concentrations in front of Company K. The enemy were heard digging and much activity was reported to the North of Company C. Several enemy mortars were located by their flashes in this same area.

The Artillery, 4.2 mortars and 81mm mortars fired continuously throughout the night. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar concentrations fell within the town of CHIPYONG-NI throughout the night. Installations in the Western part of CHIPYONG-NI, such as the Regimental CP, 1st Battalion CP, Heavy Mortar Company area and the 37th Field Artillery Battalion area, received the majority of the flat trajectory fire. However, all sections received some flat trajectory fire and all were thoroughly saturated with enemy mortar fire. This was the heaviest enemy artillery shelling that the 23d Infantry had ever been subjected to; the minimum rate of enemy fire was 3 to 4 shells per minute and most of the time it was much more than this. The Chinese appeared to have plenty of artillery and plenty of ammunition for it. The 2d Battalion Aid Station was hit twice. One shell exploded against one of the walls and wounded two of the Aid Station Squad slightly. The 2d shell, a 75mm pack howitzer round, lodged in a wall without exploding. Several artillery and mortar rounds landed very close to the Battalion and Company H's CPs and threw fragments of steel into the walls of both buildings. Fortunately, there were no direct hits, but each "close" round

would break loose pieces of mud from the ceilings and walls. One man was killed and one wounded from the mortar fire; both were from the 2d Battalion Headquarters Company. One mortar shell landed squarely in the middle of Company H's mess tent. This tent was located near and to the West of the building in which Company H had its CP. The shell, a 120mm mortar, tore the tent into ribbons and destroyed all of the field ranges. No men were injured by this shell. During the remainder of the siege the mess personnel were used as riflemen on the two small perimeters established around the Company H CP and the 81mm mortar positions. Five of the shells landed in the Battalion Motor Pool area, destroying one 2½-ton kitchen truck beyond repair and blowing out all the tires on six other vehicles. One of the Company H drivers and the Warrant Officer, Company H's Administrator, were wounded. The 81mm Mortar positions also received many rounds of counter-battery. The faulty U. S. mortar ammunition always left a red trail from the muzzle of the mortar to the apex of the maximum ordinate making it very easy for the enemy observers to spot the positions.

At 0245 hour, 14 February 1951, the Chinese launched another attack on the 2d French Company and at 0300 hour still another attack on Company C. Both units held firmly. By 0530 hour most of the pressure around the perimeter had relaxed except for the 2d French Company which was still receiving attacks from the Northwest, and for Company K which was fighting fiercely to hold its sector.

At 0530 hour, 14 February 1951, the 1st and 3d Platoons of Company G heard bugle calls to their front and ten minutes later the dreaded two white flares came up in front of them. At 0545 hour, accompanied by much blowing of whistles and the well known screams of "Manzai", a full Chinese Battalion launched the fifth assault against SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. The attack was supported by a very heavy mortar barrage that never lifted throughout the entire action. One company hit SCHMITT HILL and another company McGEE HILL. The main effort of both of these companies was directed at the limiting point between the 1st and 3d Platoons. Smaller units hit CURTIS HILL and along the flanks of the attacking companies. This was an unusual fanatical and savage attack. Some of the last waves succeeded in reaching the foxholes and very savage hand-to-hand fighting transpired. The Artillery Forward Observer with Company G succeeded in silencing three enemy mortars located just Southwest of MASAN, with Artillery concentrations. The Battalion Commander ordered Company F to send a rifle squad from the support platoon to reinforce Company G, but the attack was over when the squad arrived in the Company G area. To illustrate the savage nature of the combat the following example is cited. The BAR man and his assistant occupied a foxhole in the center of the MTR on McGEE HILL. After the BAR man had cut down several screaming waves with his BAR, the Chinese worked two squads close up to his hole. His assistant was badly wounded by a burst from a Chinese Bren gun (Czech copy). He cut down one of the squads which had sprung up and was coming at him in squad column formation; two of the Chinese in this squad feigned death. He then turned on the other squad, which was attempting to flank his foxhole from the left (East), and killed or wounded all of that squad. Meanwhile, the two Chinese, that had feigned death, crawled up to his foxhole while he was busy shooting at the second Chinese squad. They suddenly sprang on him and wrested the BAR from his hands. He immediately

grabbed up his wounded assistant's carbine, leaped out of his foxhole and hit one of the Chinese, who was attempting to fire his captured BAR at him, over the head. This broke the stock of the carbine. When the struggle ended he had beaten both Chinese to death with the steel barrel of the carbine. Recovering his BAR, he went back to his foxhole and continued firing on the next oncoming wave. Such were the fighting men of the 23d Infantry Regiment! No wonder that the Chinese always met a stone wall. The few Chinese left now crawled away into the darkness which soon started to turn into the grayish light preceding dawn. Company G had suffered 11 more casualties during this attack; three killed and eight wounded. The 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section on SCHMITT also had two men wounded.

At 0545 hour, 14 February 1951, the Chinese launched still another attack against Company G, but were repulsed. At 0630 hour, as dawn was breaking, fighting flared up again. Companies I and K were hit again. Company K was still fighting at 0730 hour as was the 2d French Company, but shortly after that the Chinese broke contact. The Chinese knew better than to attack in daylight. As the enemy broke contact and withdrew in the 2d Battalion's sector, he fired one green flare and played a bugle tune similar to our "Taps". Company E and Company G pursued fleeing groups of from 10 to 40 Chinese by fire. The 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section with Company G fired 16 rounds of HE at these groups, which could be seen on HILL 129 and on the slopes of HILL 397 retreating towards the crests of those hills; this section had expended 11 boxes of 50 calibre machinegun ammunition during the night's actions.

The 81mm Mortar Platoon had fired 220 rounds of HE light, 50 rounds of WP and 22 illuminating rounds. The company 60mm mortar sections had each fired about 150 rounds, including 10 rounds of illuminating shell per company. Company F had not been assaulted but its 60mm mortar section had fired at enemy snipers and suspected enemy mortar positions that were firing on the company. Two men in Company F were wounded by enemy mortar fire. Due to the over-head cover on all the MLR foxholes and emplacements, the casualties of the Battalion were comparatively light considering the savage nature of the hand-to-hand combat. Most of the casualties had been incurred in the hand-to-hand combat. A summary of the Battalion's casualties for the first night's actions follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>WOUNDED</u>
Hq Co 2d Bn	1	1
Company E	1	4
Company F	0	2
Company G	5	18
Company H	0	4
2d Bn Med Det	0	2
TOTALS	7	31

It was estimated that at least two Battalions, reinforced, or possibly even a Regiment had attacked Company G, and that a reinforced Battalion had attacked Company E. 137 dead bodies were counted in front of Company E and 283 dead bodies in front of Company G. However, all these bodies were close to our MLR under the fire of our machineguns. Many hundreds

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of large blood spots and evidence of bodies being dragged away were seen farther away from the MLR and the muzzles of the machineguns, indicating that there had been many more dead. The Chinese and North Koreans always attempted to carry away their dead whenever possible, so that the U. S. forces would not know how badly they had been hurt. Even if we just consider the actual dead bodies counted, i. e., the 420, the Chinese wounded must have been close to 1,260 as the normal ratio of dead to wounded is usually three wounded to one dead. Therefore the Chinese attacking the "Second to None" Battalion had suffered at least 1,680 casualties. The Chinese Divisions had orders to annihilate the 23d Infantry Regiment but it appeared that the 23d Infantry was doing the annihilating!

THE FIRST DAY OF THE SEIGE

(see Sketch 5)

The situation in the 2d Infantry Division sector had definitely improved on 14 February 1951. The defenders of WONJU had successfully repulsed several Chinese attacks during the night of 13-14 February 1951 with only a slight penetration being made by the enemy; this penetration was eliminated by a counter-attack by the Dutch and U. S. troops in the morning. The Chinese then withdrew and the threat to this sector of the 2d Division sector was over. The Air Corps harassed the withdrawing Chinese all day long. The North Korean Corps (Army) streaking South to the East of WONJU had wiped out a road-block, located just to the East of CHECHON on the CHECHON-YONGWOL ROAD and manned by a rifle platoon of the 17th Infantry Regiment. The 17th Infantry was now in CHECHON and the rest of the 7th Infantry Division was just to the South of that town. The North Korean advance had been slowed to a walk by air strikes which harassed them continually during daylight hours. This North Korean Corps eventually went too far South and was unable to withdraw with the Chinese Fourth Field Army on 15 February 1951. It was cut off and within the next thirty days cut to pieces by United Nations Forces.

Meanwhile around the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter, Chinese snipers made movement difficult during the morning. One man from Company H's 1st heavy machinegun section, attached to Company G and located in the rice paddy with the 2d Platoon of Company G, was killed by Chinese sniper fire at 0730 hour, 14 February 1951. Liaison planes reported that one Chinese Division, just South of CHAUM-NI (see Sketch 4), was still holding the British 29th Brigade at bay. This Chinese Division was backed up by another Chinese Division in the TWIN TUNNELS area. About two Chinese Divisions were astride the road at KOKSU-RI and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were making their first contact with this force. The sound of the British and the 1st Cavalry Division artillery could be heard to the South. Higher headquarters had designated a safety or "No fire" line about 1,500 yards South of CHIPYONG-NI. The Artillery of the units located to the South were forbidden to fire North of this line without specific permission of higher headquarters. This prevented the friendly artillery to the South from firing into the CHIPYONG-NI defenders. The Company F commander and his platoon leaders were ordered to reconnoiter the areas of Company E and Company G, so, that in an

emergency at night, one or two platoons of Company F could be moved into either sector. By afternoon most of the Chinese snipers had been eliminated. During the afternoon, Company E completed some work on the near-side of the double-apron barbed wire fence in its sector. Foxholes and emplacements that had been damaged during the night's attacks were repaired, more ammunition brought up and fresh AP mines, trip flares and booby-traps set out in front of the Battalion's MLR. Around noon, the front line companies sent out small patrols a few hundred yards in front of the MLR to count enemy dead.

Enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to fall sporadically into the Battalion sector throughout the day. One "lucky" 120mm mortar shell landed right in Company E's OP at 1000 hour, 14 February 1951, killing all 4 men manning the OP at that time. At 1430 hour, 14 February 1951, the 1st Platoon of Company E observed approximately a company of Chinese crossing the CHIPYONG-NI--NOEAN-NI ROAD (see Sketches 1 and 4) from West to East about 700 yards South of the MLR. Tank, 60- and 80mm Mortar and small-arms fire were immediately placed on this enemy group, killing about one-half of them. The remainder, badly disorganized, fled to the shelter of the draws on the West side of HILL 159. Groups of enemy were seen throughout the day on the distant ridges and noses of HILLS 397, 129 and 583. All groups were taken under fire by either artillery, mortar or recoilless rifle fire and dispersed.

Battalion ordered Company G to send a strong patrol to MASAN. At 1400 hour, 14 February 1951, two squads of the 2d Platoon of Company G, led by the Platoon Leader, departed from McGEE. Over-watched by the 1st and 3d Platoons, machineguns, recoilless rifles and artillery Forward Observers, the patrol entered MASAN without interference from the enemy. Here 12 Chinese soldiers, 7 of them badly wounded, were captured without a struggle. Two male civilians, who looked like Chinese, were also found and made prisoners. Many empty Chinese mortar shell cartons were found. It appeared that a very large body of Chinese had been in the village on the previous night. Pieces of cardboard with luminous numbers painted on them were picked up and brought in. These placards were evidently tied to the back of the leading man in each Chinese unit and served as a beacon for the Chinese that followed him in column; a simple but very efficient way of keeping direction and unity at night. The Chinese had also scattered hundreds of "Surrender Leaflets" on the ground as they withdrew, hoping that our patrols would pick them up. They had evidently been mimeographed that day as they contained the words "Now you are besieged". The patrol returned with its 14 prisoners at 1630 hour without further incident. The surrender leaflets were good for a laugh from the soldiers who read them. A verbatim copy follows:

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that they could have 4.2 mortar concentrations only in the case of extreme emergency. The 2d Battalion's ammunition supply was unusually good, because the Battalion always carried one extra 2½-ton truck load of ammunition in addition to the two 2½-ton truck loads prescribed by T/O&E. Since the 2d Battalion had not been engaged in the Battle of TWIN TUNNELS (see "Patrolling at TWIN TUNNELS"), it still had three full truck loads of ammunition. The Battalion had about 800 rounds of assorted 81mm mortar and 750 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition on hand. A shortage of illuminating shells existed as there were only ten 81mm and twenty-five 60mm rounds in the Battalion. The 3d Battalion, which had been heavily engaged at TWIN TUNNELS, was down to 250 rounds of assorted 81mm mortar ammunition and was very short on small-arms. The Division Ammunition Dump was so many miles to the rear that the 23d Infantry had been unable to get a resupply prior to being surrounded. Upon request of the 3d Battalion Commander the 2d Battalion Commander gave the 3d Battalion 150 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition and several thousand rounds of small-arms ammunition.

During the afternoon the Battalion P&A Platoon installed three gasoline mines, called "Fougasse". They were constructed by filling an empty 55-gallon gasoline drum about two-thirds full of waste oil and one-third full of gasoline. The drum was buried in the ground at an angle with only its top showing. The drum was slanted towards the direction of the enemy, and a TNT charge was placed under the bottom of the drum before it was buried. All drums were wired so that the TNT charge could be detonated by a trip wire near the drum or from a MLR foxhole. When detonated the drum would explode, shooting burning gas and oil at the enemy. The diameter of the circular burning area in front of each detonated drum was about 40 yards. It had the same effect as a small Napalm bomb. It was a simple but deadly instrument. The tunnel in front of Company E was booby-trapped and mined and a gasoline mine placed near the North entrance pointing South along the railroad track towards the South entrance. Another gasoline mine was placed in front of the center foxholes of Company G on MCGEE HILL, and a third mine in the center of the 2d Platoon of Company G's MLR in the rice paddy (see Sketches 8 and 9).

The 2d Battalion had only two flame-throwers that were operational. One had been given to Company F and the other to Company E. Both companies had placed them in their right (West) platoon areas. Since neither of these areas had been attacked on the night of 13-14 February, the flame-throwers had not been used. With the installation of the gasoline mines there was now some type of fire-throwing weapon in each company area across the entire Battalion front.

Enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the drop area during the entire day, thus hampering the work of retrieving the dropped supplies and ammunition greatly. The drops were so well made that only three parachutes landed outside of the perimeter. Two of these were only 100 yards in front of (South) Company G and both were brought in by patrols sent out after them. The third chute, containing water cans, dropped about 400 yards South of the MLR of Company G; its cans were destroyed by U. S. machinegun fire. The temperature was still around zero Fahrenheit at night and the foxholes were very uncomfortable. Almost every French soldier had appropriated one of the multi-colored parachutes and had made himself a small tent on the reverse side of SCHMITT HILL,

HEATH RIDGE and the railroad embankment. The rear of the French area looked like a gypsy or circus camp ablaze with color. The 2d Battalion P&A Platoon used some of the red and yellow parachutes to make additional air-display panels. These panels which were used to mark our vehicles and front lines during air-strikes were always in short supply.

The Chinese snipers around the perimeter would shoot at every "flying box-car" as it came in low to make its drop. One particularly persistent Chinese Burp-gunner was behind a small rise just to the South of Company F's 2d Platoon area. His "burrrip" could be heard distinctly every time a plane came in low. U. S. mortar concentrations finally discouraged most of the snipers but not this individual who continued sniping until dark. Fortunately, none of the planes were hit. Two hospital helicopters flew in through the sniper fire in the afternoon and evacuated some of the badly wounded. However, each plane could only take two litter cases. They were able to make only one trip before dark.

The Army Commander, a very brave man, flew in through the sniper fire in a helicopter, and told the 23d Infantry if they held that night he would send in all available air power the next day. He also promised that the 1st Cavalry Division would break through to the perimeter the next day. The fires of Corps Artillery units to the South were coordinated for firing around the 23d Infantry perimeter for the coming night. A "Fire-fly" plane dropping large flares, would circle the perimeter all night long. This boosted the already high morale of the 23d Infantry. The standard remark among the men following the previous night's victory was, "Let the Chinks come on, we'll clobber the hell out of them again!"

Flushed with their previous victories, the veteran combat infantrymen confidently awaited the coming night's assaults. In the afternoon the 2d Battalion Commander toured the front-line to inspect and check the preparations for the coming night's battles. The infantrymen proudly showed him the dead Chinese in front of their individual foxholes. He stopped to chat with one of his favorite fighting men, who was the Sergeant in charge of the Company H Heavy Machinegun Section located in Company E's 3d Platoon area. This Sergeant was always "losing" his helmet and the Battalion Commander was always supplying him with another one from a small supply that the Battalion Commander carried in the back of his jeep just for this occasion. It was a standing joke between the two. The Sergeant was an ex-Allstate tackle at BOY'S TOWN, NEBRASKA. While he was at BOY'S TOWN he had also acted as "Police Commissioner" and he described KOREA as a "long beat, tough neighborhood". He was a fighting fool who loved nothing better than to "clobber gooks" with his heavy machinegun. He had once asked the Battalion Commander for a silver Lieutenant Colonel's leaf for a souvenir. The Battalion Commander had only two leaves with him in KOREA and was reluctant to part with one of them. The Heavy Machinegun Section had not been in action on the previous night and the Sergeant was very crestfallen when he had to report to the Battalion Commander that he had bagged "no gooks" on the previous night. To cheer him up the Battalion Commander told him that he would give him the silver leaf if the Sergeant got "15 gooks tonight".

Additional artillery and mortar concentrations were registered in prior to dark. As darkness fell all braced themselves for the coming attacks, which like death and taxes were sure to come. Latest reports by liaison planes just prior to darkness disclosed that the rescue troops were making slow progress. The 29th British Brigade had still not captured CHAUM-NI and the 1st Cavalry Division was fighting savagely for KOKSU-RI.

THE SECOND NIGHT OF THE SEIGE
(see Sketches 8 and 9)

At 1730 hour, 14 February 1951, Company G spotted enemy movement on HILL 397 Southeast of MASAN. As night closed in artillery and Company G's 60mm mortars were placed on this enemy group, dispersing it. It was another dark night without a moon or stars. The Chinese threw in three fresh Divisions, plus the remnants of the two Divisions, which had been badly cut up on the previous night, plus some elements from at least three of the four Divisions that were opposing the 29th British Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division.

At 1900 hour, 14 February 1951, the 3d Platoon of Company G reported hearing bugle calls coming from HILL 397 and MASAN. Listening posts came in and reported a heavy concentration of enemy in MASAN and on the slopes of HILL 397. Company G then came under intense enemy mortar and machinegun fire and some SP fire. At 1930 hour, the Chinese, estimated to be at least a reinforced rifle company, attacked in the usual manner, shrieking wave following shrieking wave. The main effort was again, as on the previous night, directed at the limiting point between the 1st and 3d Platoons. "Fire-fly" was notified and started to drop flares over the Company G sector; he continued to drop flares around the perimeter throughout the night. The Company G infantrymen and machineguns calmly shot down each wave as it approached. After 20 minutes of this slaughter the remnants of this force retired. This first assault had screened the movement of a larger force, estimated to be a reinforced regiment, into assaulting positions. The enemy mortar fire had destroyed the wires to the gasoline mine and the defenders were unable to detonate it.

At 2000 hour, 14 February 1951, Company K received mortar fire and soon the entire perimeter was under an intense artillery and mortar barrage. At 2030 hour, Company C reported sounds of enemy digging in to the front, probably digging in their mortar base plates. The Regimental CP, Regimental Aid Station and nearby areas were really under an intense shelling. Enemy shells came in at the rate of ten to fifteen per minute. This was the worst artillery shelling that the 23d Infantry had ever experienced in the KOREAN war to that date. The Chinese were also using the captured 105- and 155mm Howitzers against the perimeter. The 105mm shells exploded but the 155 shells landed with a dull thud and didn't detonate. Examination by the artillerymen of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion disclosed that the Chinese had failed to unscrew the plugs in the bottoms of the 155mm shells and to insert fuses. This was a break for the 23d Infantry! The 3d Battalion was also soon hotly engaged.

At 2100 hour an estimated Battalion of Chinese launched an attack against the 3d Platoon of Company E under cover of a heavy small-arms, mortar and machinegun barrage. The attack was spear-headed by a Special Assault Company. All members of this Assault Company were armed with the Czech copy of the British Bren Gun. They were well equipped, carried pole-charges and bangalore torpedoes and were plentifully supplied with ammunition. They came North down the draw just West of NO MAN'S HILL. The listening post on NO MAN'S HILL heard them coming and withdrew. The Special Assault Company sent one Chinese soldier to a position near NO MAN'S HILL. Here he opened fire hoping that the defenders of the MLR


would return the fire thus disclosing their positions and the positions of their automatic weapons. The veterans of Company E disregarded the fire of the Chinese soldier; they were too well versed in the enemy's tricks. The BOY'S TOWN machinegun Sergeant told his section, "Not yet boys" and they held their fire. The Chinese then crept up to the double-apron barbed wire fence, inserted a bangalore torpedoe and set it off. Following the explosion, the BOY'S TOWN machinegun Sergeant still said, "not yet boys" and the machineguns remained silent. The Chinese assault company sprang up and rushed through the gap in the wire in a column. The BOY'S TOWN machinegun Sergeant tersely commanded, "Let 'em have it!" Both machineguns opened up just as the leading Chinese soldier emerged from the gap. All the Company E riflemen started to fire as well as the 50 calibre machineguns of the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section. Groans and shrieks of pain rent the air. In the morning 16 dead Chinese were found in the gap in the wire and 86 more in a column from the gap in the wire South up the draw. Everyone of them was armed with a Bren Gun. Scratch one Special Assault Company from Uncle Joe's muster rolls! Two days later the BOY'S TOWN machinegun Sergeant collected his silver leaf from the Battalion Commander.

Although the Chinese were hitting some of the same spots that they had hit on the previous night they were also hitting some new spots. The whole perimeter was soon aflame with combat. The enemy artillery and mortar shelling continued unabated. A Chinese mortar shell again hit the 2d Battalion Aid Station but did not cause any casualties. About 55 shells landed within a 150 yard radius of the 2d Battalion CP throughout the night but again no direct hits were made. The Chinese had certainly located all installations very accurately from their OPs during the day. By 2200 hour, 14 February, Companies A and C were both fiercely engaged as well as all four of the French companies. One wounded French soldier with his arm in a sling sneaked out of the Regimental Aid Station and returned to his company. When a group of Chinese threatened to penetrate the MLR of his company at one point, he led a group of French soldiers in a counter-attack which drove back the Chinese group. Armed only with a pistol in his one good hand, still in his stocking feet and with a red scarf tied around his head, he managed to personally kill four Chinese. The French soldiers were also fighting fools and worthy companions of the tough 23d Infantrymen. A strong mutual bond, forged in many a savage battle, linked them together. On one occasion when the French Battalion Commander was at the 2d Division CP, he was asked to drink a toast to the 2d Infantry Division. His reply was, "To hell with the 2d Infantry Division, I'll drink a toast to my regiment, the 23d Infantry!" Throughout the night U. S. and French troops, who had captured Chinese bugles during the previous night's fighting, blew them whenever the Chinese bugles were blown. This caused some confusion among the ranks of the attacking Chinese.

Meanwhile, in Company G's sector the second assault was launched at 2000 hour, about five minutes after the first assault had ended. This was a savage, general assault all along the SCHMITT, MCGEE and CURTIS HILLS MLR. The main effort was everywhere. This assault continued all night long and increased in intensity with each succeeding wave. Hordes of Chinese came up the slopes. The first wave was cut down in the light of illuminating flares about 250 yards South of the MLR, which was under an intense enemy mortar and machinegun barrage. The

Sketch # 8
C. E. Area - Night 14-15 Feb.

Sketch # 8
Cc: E Area - Night 14-15 Feb.



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second wave gained ten yards before it was mowed down. The next wave gained another ten yards. This was Chinese "human sea" tactics at its bloodiest, and it continued unabated, increasing in intensity for the next five hours. FPL fires ripped into the waves but they still came on. U. S. Artillery and mortars were firing continuously during the next three hours. The waves went right through the belt of AP mines, booby-traps and trip flares, taking terrific casualties. Human life is cheap to the Chinese. Many, many Chinese mortars of all calibers in and around MASAN smothered the 1st and 3d Platoon areas, as well as HEATH RIDGE and RAMSBURG BOWL. Batteries of enemy machineguns on the spurs of HILL 397 Northeast of MASAN laid down a hail of lead on McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. This was the enemy main effort against the perimeter.

At 2200 hour, 14 February 1951, the Chinese in front of Company E's 3d Platoon tried another assault in waves. As usual the assault was preceded by an intense mortar and machinegun preparation. Small groups made diversionary efforts against the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company E but never did assault them. At 2230 hour the Fougasse, gasoline mine, in the railroad tunnel went off with a bang. Flame spurted from both ends of the long tunnel. The flash lit up all the surrounding terrain. In the morning the remains of 14 Chinese bodies, burned beyond any resemblance to human beings, were found in the tunnel. A Chinese patrol had tried to sneak through the tunnel again and had set off the Fougasse. The Chinese made no further attempts to come through the tunnel for the remainder of the night.

At 2220 hour, a reinforced platoon came down the nose of HILL 397 in front of Company F's 2d Platoon on TYRELL HILL. The 2d Platoon of Company F and the Light Machinegun Section of Company H, attached to Company F, opened up on them when the enemy reached the wire, killing 17 and wounding most of the remainder. This put an abrupt end to this assault which was the only launched against Company F during the entire night.

The main Chinese attack at 2200 hour came down the draw just West of NO MAN'S HILL directly towards Company E's 3d Platoon. The Chinese waves hit the wire. Company H's 2d Section of Heavy Machineguns on NANCE HILL and the light machinegun of Company F's 2d Platoon switched to their FPLs which were along the wire. The 1st Section of 75mm Recoilless Rifles on NANCE HILL, manning their 50 calibre machineguns, were also firing along the wire from their primary positions near the MLR. The leading Chinese of each wave recklessly threw their bodies over the wire in an attempt to make human bridges, but their sacrifice of life was in vain. Wave after wave suffered the same fate. They just could not get through the bands of machinegun fire. The wire was covered with hanging Chinese bodies. After 30 minutes of this slaughter the Chinese broke and beat a hasty retreat into the darkness. The 3d Platoon of Company E tried to use its flame-thrower during this assault but something had gone wrong with the firing mechanism and the flame-thrower was useless for the remainder of the night.

At 2330 hour, 14 February 1951, the Chinese in front of Company E's 3d Platoon assaulted again with the same results. Wave after wave was piled up on the South side of the wire. None of the Chinese attempted to use the gap which had been blown in the wire, probably because it was choked with dead bodies and also because the Chinese knew our machineguns were sited right down the gap. However, the Chinese had

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evidently intended to blow other gaps in the wire as four dead Chinese soldiers, armed with bangalore torpedoes, were found in front of the wire the next morning. They had been killed before they could reach the wire. Many of the dead Chinese also carried pole-charges. The three Heavy Machinegun Sections of Company H expended 14,000 rounds of ammunition during this night. The 1st Section of 75mm Recoilless Rifles on NANCE HILL expended 15 boxes of 50 calibre ammunition during this same period.

Now let us turn to Company G. Each succeeding wave, stronger than the preceding one, was being thrown at Company G at about ten minute intervals. The waves were continuous lines extending over the entire area in front of SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS and overlapped the road slightly into the left part of the French 1st Company's Sector. Each wave gained about ten yards. Company G men were being killed and wounded by the intense machinegun and mortar fire, creating gaps in the line of foxholes on the MLR. The infantrymen fought like demons! They could see each wave in the light of illuminating flares coming closer and closer and knew that eventually certain death awaited them, but they never faltered. They remained at their guns, shooting grimly until the bitter end! The Company G Commanding Officer scraped together a few men from his already depleted Company Headquarters and Weapons Platoon and sent them up to the 3d Platoon to fill the empty foxholes. All of them were killed or wounded by the enemy machinegun and mortar fire before they could reach the foxholes. The pressure was terrific but still the Company G infantrymen stayed at their posts!

The Battalion 81mm mortars and all three rifle company 60mm mortar sections were firing continuously in front of Company G and Company E, although they themselves were under intense enemy mortar counter-battery fire. Regiment allowed the Heavy Mortar Company to expend some of their limited ammunition in front of Company G. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion and its attached battery of the 503d Field Artillery were plastering the slopes of HILL 397. Corps Artillery, miles to the South, was shooting concentrations all around the perimeter. B-29s were carrying on night bombing a few miles to the North, but still the attacks around the perimeter continued unabated. At 2400 hour, 14 February 1951, all attacks around the perimeter, except the main effort against Company G, came to a temporary halt but flared anew again at 0130 hour, 15 February 1951, with Companies A and K under very fierce attacks.

Another Chinese assault was launched against Company E's 3d Platoon at 0130 hour, 15 February 1951, by the suicidal enemy. Using the same tactics as before they again came on in shrieking wave after shrieking wave, and again the results were the same -- more dead bodies on and South of the wire. The FPL fires were, as the Infantry School teaches, a curtain of fire through which the assaulting Chinese just could not advance. After about 30 minutes there were practically no Chinese left; the remnants dragged off the dead and wounded, which were not under our machinegun muzzles, and retreated. This was the fourth and last assault on Company E's 3d Platoon. Mortar and sniper fire continued throughout the night. The Chinese had sacrificed at least a reinforced Battalion in front of Companies E and F.

The attack against Company G was increasing in intensity. It had continued for five hours and the Chinese waves were almost at the MLR which now had many gaps in it. Still the remaining riflemen fought like men possessed! At 0115 hour, 15 February 1951, special Chinese assault

groups reached the foxholes on the Western nose of McGEH HILL (see Sketch 9). Placing their pole-charges, consisting of 6 blocks of TNT tied to a long pole, on top of the overhead cover of the foxholes and emplacements they blew them in, killing what few Company G men were left alive. They paid a terrible price as each foxhole had from 6 to 9 dead bodies in a circle around it. The Company G combat infantrymen had fought to the bitter end! The MLR was breached at the limiting point between the 1st and 3d Platoons. Overwhelming numbers had triumphed over the gallant defenders! Battalion was informed.

Three times the Commanding Officer of Company G tried unsuccessfully to form a counterattacking force from the negro artillerymen of Battery B. Battery B of the 503d Field Artillery had white officers. The Commanding Officer of Company G would round up a force of 15 or 20 negroes from their foxholes along the 503d Field Artillery perimeter, and start up the hill towards the gap occupied by the Chinese. Each time his force would "melt away" in the darkness, and he would find himself accompanied only by the two or three negroes nearest to him. After the third attempt, he gave up in disgust. These negro artillerymen just didn't want to be converted into Combat Infantrymen. However, the majority of the negroes of this Battery performed very well under fire (see pages 39 and 40 below). The 37th Field Artillery Battalion had an Artillery captain stationed with Battery B of the 503d Field Artillery as a Liaison Officer. This Liaison Officer, an unusually brave man, helped the Commanding Officer of Company G round up the negro artillerymen. After the Commanding Officer of Company G had left in disgust, the Artillery Liaison Officer succeeded in rounding up ten negroes and leading them to the 1st Platoon area where they once again set up a 50 calibre machinegun with a five-man negro crew in the emplacement that the 503d Field Artillery personnel had used on the previous night. An old veteran negro sergeant was placed in command of the "machinegun squad". The other five negroes were assigned to empty foxholes in the vicinity of the "machinegun squad". Then the Artillery Liaison Officer by himself scouted along SCHMITT HILL to the West and ran into a group of Chinese. He killed two before he was wounded by a Chinese grenade. He then retreated to the 503d Field Artillery perimeter. Other elements of Company G were still under savage attack and could do nothing to eliminate the breach. The Battalion Commander ordered a rifle squad of Company F's support platoon to the Company G area. The squad arrived at 0200 hour, 15 February 1951, and led by the Platoon Sergeant of Company G's 3d Platoon, attempted to counter-attack the breach. By this time the Chinese had built up the force in the breach to such strength that in ten minutes of combat the entire Company F squad was killed or wounded. The Chinese now moved machineguns into the breach, enfilading the 1st and 3d Platoon areas. The remaining men of Company G still fought like demons! At 0230 hour, a Chinese wave engulfed the light machinegun of the 3d Platoon on McGEH HILL, killing both the gunner and his assistant and capturing the light machinegun. The 3d Platoon Leader pulled out part of his left (East) squad from CURTIS HILL to fill in this gap. The Weapons Platoon Leader immediately moved up his 57mm Squad on FINN HILL to replace these riflemen that had been taken off of CURTIS HILL. However, these proved to be measures which just stemmed the tide temporarily. The Chinese frontal assault waves had reached all MLR foxholes and emplacements and savage, hand-to-hand combat was in progress. At the same time elements

of the Chinese force in the initial gap were attacking the 3d Platoon in the flank, pushing the remnants towards the crest of McGEE HILL. Other elements of this same Chinese force attacked the 1st Platoon in the flank, pushing its remnants towards the road. The negro 50 calibre "machinegun squad" fought gallantly to the last man! The left flank of the 3d Platoon was over-run. The 57mm Squad was thrown back, losing its rifle and half of its personnel, and CURTIS HILL was in the possession of the Chinese. The light machinegun of the 2d Platoon was then over-run and its crew killed, firing to the last. The Sergeant, squad leader of this light machinegun squad, crawled through the Chinese in the darkness, recovered the light machinegun and crawled back with it to FINN HILL. Here, with the help of some men from the 2d Platoon and the Weapons Platoon, he established a line and stopped all further attempts of the Chinese to advance in this direction. This Sergeant had been a Chaplain's Assistant at Division Headquarters but had asked for a transfer to a rifle company as he felt that he was not doing his share back at Division Headquarters.

At 0300 hour, 15 February 1951, the Platoon Leader of the 3d Platoon, a very brave man, found himself on the crest of McGEE HILL with four riflemen, all that was left of his platoon. Another Chinese wave was approaching. Realizing that he would be unable to repulse the wave, he and his four men withdrew towards RAMSBURG BOWL, firing at the Chinese wave as they retreated. Two of the four men were killed but the Chinese did not pursue. At 0310 hour, 15 February 1951, the Chinese had at last taken McGEE HILL. The Lieutenant and his two remaining men reached the Company G CP and Battalion was immediately notified.

The Battalion Commander immediately ordered the remainder of the support platoon, the 3d of Company F, to proceed to the Company G area. This Platoon arrived at POINT A (see Sketch 9) at 0330 hour, 15 February 1951. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Battalion Commander informed Regiment and requested reinforcements. At this same time the 3d Battalion was requesting reinforcements as at 0230 hour, 15 February 1951, the enemy had penetrated Company K and was fighting in its foxholes. The Regimental Commander was reluctant, and rightly so, to commit too much of his slender Reserve in the 2d Battalion area as the whole perimeter at that time was aflame and the entire area was still under a terrific artillery and mortar barrage. However, he did give the 2d Battalion a Platoon of the Ranger Company and one tank, and attached the two tanks and the Quad 50, at the minefield in the cut on SCHMITT HILL, to the 2d Battalion. At 0315 hour, the Battalion Commander dispatched the Assistant Battalion S3, a very courageous Lieutenant with much combat experience, to meet the Ranger Platoon and guide them to the Company G area. The Assistant Battalion S3 was then to take command of a composite force, consisting of the Ranger Platoon, the 3d Platoon of Company F, the three tanks, the Quad 50 and the remnants of Company G's 1st and 3d Platoons, as the Commanding Officer of Company G at that time was a very junior Lieutenant. As soon as organized this Composite Force was to launch a counter-attack and recapture McGEE and CURTIS HILLS.

The 1st Platoon was still holding the crest of SCHMITT HILL assisted by the fire of the 50 calibre machineguns of the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section. This Recoilless Rifle Section had fired 10 rounds of 75mm at

the Chinese in the initial gap between the 1st and 3d Platoons but had failed to dislodge them. It had expended 17 boxes of 50 calibre machine-gun ammunition during the night's attacks and was almost out of ammunition. One of its 50 calibre machineguns had just been knocked out by Chinese fire. The French 1st Company, across the road from Company G's 1st Platoon, was receiving much of the fire directed at the 1st Platoon from the Chinese machineguns on the crest of the higher McGEE HILL. The French Battalion reported to Regiment that this Company would have to withdraw to HEATH RIDGE unless the 2d Battalion could retake McGEE HILL. The 2d Battalion Commander requested the Regimental Commander to order the French Company to remain in place until the counter-attack could be launched, and the Regimental Commander agreed to do so. The two tanks and the Quad 50 at the minefield in the cut on SCHMITT HILL up to this time had been under Regimental control. One of the tanks and the Quad 50 withdrew North up the road a short distance and began to fire on McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. The 503d Field Artillery Battery B was kept informed of the situation by the Commanding Officer of Company G and when McGEE and CURTIS HILLS fell they manned a perimeter around their guns (see Sketch 7) in RAMSBURG BOWL. These were the bravest negroes the writer had seen during the first five campaigns in KOREA. The Chinese now set up machineguns and began to fire down into RAMSBURG BOWL. The 503d Field Artillery levelled their guns and fired 155mm Howitzer shells point-blank at McGEE and CURTIS HILLS, blasting the tops right off of the hills. This stopped the machine-gun fire and forced the Chinese to stay on the reverse (Southern) slopes of those hills.

At about 0340 hour, 15 February 1951, the 1st French Company, probably on orders of its Battalion Commander, pulled back to HEATH RIDGE. The two tanks and the Quad 50 pulled back with them to positions in the cut on HEATH RIDGE. This left the remnants of the 1st Platoon of Company G on SCHMITT HILL in a very precarious position. While the Chinese assaults on them had now ceased, they were still under heavy mortar and machinegun fire and were almost out of ammunition. The Platoon Leader had been wounded and the Platoon Sergeant now in command, had been out of communication with Company G for about an hour. He had 16 men from Company G left plus 4 men from the Company H 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section. The Platoon Sergeant left his second-in-command in charge and went back alone to the Company G CP. Here at 0400 hour, he met the Assistant Battalion S3 who had just arrived with the Ranger Platoon and the additional tank.

The Ranger Platoon Leader, when informed of the counter-attack plan, objected to being placed under the command of the Assistant Battalion S3, another Lieutenant. The Assistant Battalion S3 relayed this objection by telephone to the Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander immediately dispatched the Battalion S2, a Captain and former rifle company commander, to take command of the Composite Force and to "straighten out" the Ranger Lieutenant. The Battalion Commander then, by telephone, ordered the Assistant Battalion S3 to make all the necessary preparation and coordination for the counter-attack, pending the arrival of the Battalion S2.

The Assistant Battalion S3 went to the 1st Platoon positions with the 1st Platoon Sergeant, to see how much, if any, this force could assist the counter-attack by fire. He then had a conference with the Battery Commander of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, who assured him

that his men would remain in place. The Battery Commander also agreed to place some of his men to the West of the road to prevent any Chinese from outflanking RAMSBURG BOWL from that direction. He further promised to fire another point-blank barrage at the crests of McGEE and CURTIS HILLS as a preparation when the counter-attack (C/A) jumped off. Chinese mortar fire continued to fall in RAMSBURG BOWL, on HEATH RIDGE and behind (North of) HEATH RIDGE for the remainder of the night. The Assistant Battalion S3 then moved the 3 tanks South on the road within the 503d Field Artillery perimeter and had them prepare to fire on McGEE and CURTIS HILLS on order. He attempted to move the Quad 50 to POINT B (see Sketch 9), but it ran off the narrow jeep trail at POINT C, blocking the trail. The crew, except for one man, deserted the vehicle. The one stated that he had only been with the crew for two days and would attempt to fire the Quad 50 if the Assistant Battalion S3 desired him to do so. The Assistant Battalion S3 ordered him not to fire the weapons but to stay with the vehicle and guard it.

The Battalion S2 arrived at Company G CP at about 0420 hour, 15 February 1951, and assumed command of the Composite Force. The Assistant Battalion S3 assisted him in getting the Composite Force on the LD (see Sketch 9). The Commanding Officer of the Composite Group planned to attack with three elements abreast. The three elements, from West to East, were the Ranger Platoon, the 3d Platoon of Company F (less one squad) and a Company G group of 14 men, many of them wounded, who had been recruited from the remnants of the 1st and 3d Platoons and from the Weapons Platoon. The objective of the Ranger Platoon was McGEE HILL and the objective of the other two elements was CURTIS HILL. The LD was as shown on Sketch 9. The attack was preceded by a ten minute 60- and 81mm mortar barrage. The 503d Field Artillery Battery fired several volleys point-blank at the crests of McGEE and CURTIS HILLS as the Composite Force crossed the LD at 0450 hour, 15 February 1951.

At this time Companies A and C received a severe attack from the North. The machinegunner from Company D, who had done such gallant work the night before, continued to mow down wave after wave but was finally over-run and killed. He received the Distinguished Service Cross post-humously. The 3d Battalion Commander, upon being informed of the serious situation in the 2d Battalion's area, rescinded his request for reinforcements. He moved part of Company L to the Company K sector and the combined force, by savage fighting, finally succeeded in ejecting the Chinese from the Company K foxholes. Mortar and artillery fire was still falling at the rate of ten to fifteen rounds per minute throughout the town of CHIPYONG-NI. It appeared that the Chinese never would run out of ammunition; they had expended thousands of rounds during the two nights of combat. The hospital tents of the Regimental Aid Station were sand-bagged on the sides but had no overhead cover. A direct mortar hit inside of one of the tents would have killed scores of wounded.

During a lull in the fighting one of the French companies saw torches moving in front of them. The torches were carried by Chinese soldiers, evidently aidmen, who were leading big dogs which were harnessed to sleds. The wounded Chinese were loaded on these sleds. The French, always chivalrous, held their fire and allowed the Chinese to evacuate their wounded, which is more than the Chinese would have done had the positions been reversed.

The mortar ammunition supply was becoming very critical. The Heavy Mortar Company was down to 140 rounds of 4.2 ammunition. There were no rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition left in the Regiment. The 2d Battalion had only 200 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition left. The Battalion Commander issued an order that prohibited the firing of an 81mm mortar concentration without prior approval of the Battalion Commander or Battalion S3. At 0300 hour, 15 February 1951, a 120mm enemy mortar shell made a "lucky" direct hit in the emplacement of one of the 81mm mortars, wrecking the tube and killing two and badly wounding the other two men of the four man crew. At 0430 hour, 15 February 1951, the Regimental Commander called the Battalion Commander and told him that he was attaching the remainder of the Ranger Company to the 2d Battalion. The Battalion Commander sent an officer to meet the Ranger Company and direct them to the Company G area.

In Company G's area the Composite Force had no sooner left the LD than it was smothered with mortar fire and the fire of 3 machineguns that the Chinese had sneaked up over the crests of the hills. These machineguns had remained silent until the Composite Force advanced. Company G's 60mm mortar section was also hit so heavily by enemy, counter-battery, mortar fire that they had to withdraw from their positions in RAMSBURG BOWL. The Composite Force, taking heavy casualties, advanced grimly up the slopes of the two hills. The remnants of the 1st Platoon assisted by small-arms fire. Advancing into the faces of the three blazing machineguns ~~and~~ the infantrymen knocked them out, killing their crews with bayonets and seized the crests of both hills at 0530 hour, 15 February 1951, bayonetting Chinese like wild men. They had paid a terrible cost! Only a squad of Rangers was left on McGEE HILL and a squad of Company F on CURTIS HILL. All the rest of the Composite Force had been killed or wounded. The Ranger Lieutenant had been killed and among the wounded were the Composite Force Commanding Officer, who was the Battalion S2 and a very brave man, the Platoon Leader of the Company F Platoon and the Lieutenant who was the Commanding Officer of Company G and who was also a very courageous man. The Composite Force Commander had a very bad mortar fragment wound in his leg but he refused to be evacuated. He was carried to Company G's CP where he remained in command until the Battalion Commander arrived (see below). The Composite Force Commanding Officer was wounded when he was about one-half the way up to the crest of McGEE HILL. He quickly dressed his wound and tried to hobble up the hill, but was forced to sit down. In a few minutes the Company G Commander arrived; he had agreed to follow the Composite Force and gather up any stragglers that he might find. The Composite Force Commander relinquished the command of his force to the Company G Commander; he also gave the Company G Commander his radio. The Company G Commander slung the radio over his shoulder, and unwittingly over his slung carbine, and proceeded to the crest of McGEE HILL where the remnants of the Ranger Platoon were hotly engaged. Reaching the crest, he was shot in the chest by a Chinese soldier before he could untangle his carbine sling from the radio sling. Another soldier, badly wounded in one arm, dragged him down the hill by one leg past the ex-Composite Force Commander, who, upon recognizing the seriously wounded Company G Commander, immediately resumed command of the remnants of the Composite Force. The Composite Force Commander then hobbled back to the LD with his radio.

Just before the counterattack was launched, the Assistant Battalion S3 had gone to the three tanks, which were now within the 503d Field Artillery perimeter, and instructed them to fire only on orders from the Infantry Commanders. Shortly after the counterattack (C/A) jumped off, an enemy machinegun located on that portion of McGEE HILL formerly occupied by the 1st Platoon, began to fire into the flank of the advancing Ranger Platoon. One of the tank commanders believed this to be a friendly machinegun and assumed that the Ranger Platoon advancing up McGEE HILL was an enemy force. He opened fire with his 50 calibre machinegun for about 30 seconds and caused several casualties in the Ranger Platoon. The screaming Assistant Battalion S3 raced over to the tanks and had them cease fire for the remainder of the attack. One of the three Chinese machineguns was located in the saddle between CURTIS and FINN HILLS. It opened up enfilading fire shortly after the counterattack was launched and caused considerable casualties in the Company G remnants and the Company F Platoon before it was eliminated. So, shortly after the Composite Force jumped off, all its elements had suffered heavy casualties and were somewhat disorganized. It is a great tribute to these courageous infantrymen that they finally succeeded in reaching their objectives in spite of the heavy odds against them.

The Chinese reacted quickly to the counterattack. A deluge of mortar and machinegun fire descended upon the two handfuls of men, killing or wounding half of them. At 0550 hour, 15 February 1951, a Chinese Battalion swept up the slopes and overwhelmed them. One man was left out of the Ranger Platoon, who had not been killed or wounded, and four men out of the Company F Platoon. These five survivors reached the 503d Field Artillery Battery perimeter with the sad news. The Chinese now again assaulted the remnants of the 1st Platoon of Company G on SCHMITT HILL. Reduced to 9 riflemen and 4 men from the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section, this force, under the intrepid Platoon Sergeant, was forced to retire to the 503d Field Artillery Battery perimeter. The 75mm Recoilless Rifle men destroyed the remaining 50 calibre machinegun and one of the 75mm recoilless rifles with the two thermite grenades which they had in their possession. The other 75mm recoilless rifle had to be abandoned to the enemy. Upon reaching the 503d Field Artillery Battery perimeter the Platoon Sergeant of the 1st Platoon directed tank fire on the serviceable 75mm recoilless rifle, destroying it.

Regiment upon being informed of the results of the counterattack of the Composite Force, ordered the 2d Battalion Commander to attack again with the rest of the Ranger Company. The Battalion Commander informed Regiment that he believed that the Chinese force involved was at least a Regiment and that the Ranger Company could not hope to retake the hills, as the Ranger Company had been roughly handled several nights ago on its night raid and now had lost a platoon in the counterattack of the Composite Force. However, the Battalion Commander agreed to try it. Calling the Battalion S2 at the Company G CP at about 0605 hour, 15 February 1951, the Battalion Commander ordered him to prepare the Ranger Company and any other remnants that he could gather up for another counterattack, pending the Battalion Commander's arrival. The Battalion Commander then told the Battalion Executive Officer to assume command of the remainder of the 2d Battalion as he, the Battalion Commander, was leaving for the Company G area to take personal command of all units there and of the coming counterattack. Just as the Battalion Commander was leaving the Battalion CP with the Battalion S3, the Regimental Commander

called him on the telephone and told him that he was attaching Company B to the 2d Battalion and to hold the next counterattack until Company B arrived. Company B was on HILL 210 (see Sketch 1), backing up Company A, and it would take about two hours to assemble it and move it to Company G's area. Company B of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion was designated as the Regimental Reserve.

The Battalion Commander immediately called up the Battalion S2 at Company G's CP and told him of the change in the plans. The Battalion Commander then ordered the Battalion S2 to have the Rangers and other Company F and Company G elements form a perimeter around the Company G CP where all the wounded were now located. As soon as all the wounded had been evacuated, this perimeter and the 503d Field Artillery perimeter were to be abandoned and all personnel pulled back to HEATH RIDGE into the foxholes that had been previously prepared by the 1st Platoon. There they were to wait for daylight. The 503d Field Artillery Battery would not be abandoning its guns as the guns would still be under the muzzles of the rifles and machineguns on HEATH RIDGE. The Battalion Commander and the Battalion S3 then proceeded to HEATH RIDGE, arriving there at POINT A at about 0630 hour, 15 February 1951. The entire area was still under heavy mortar and sniper fire. The mortar fire continued to fall in this area throughout the entire day. The line on HEATH RIDGE was in the process of being occupied when the Battalion Commander arrived. The Battalion Commander ordered the wounded Battalion S2 to the rear.

The Assistant Battalion S3, shortly after the Chinese Battalion had recaptured CURTIS and McGEE HILLS from the Composite Force, went up to FINN HILL with a radio operator. Searching for wounded, the two worked their way towards CURTIS HILL. They found several walking wounded and directed them to the Company G CP. They then proceeded up CURTIS HILL but stopped when they saw many Chinese swarming over the crest of that hill. One Chinese soldier, about 20 yards away from them, was blowing a bugle. He saw the two U. S. soldiers but made no attempt to shoot his weapon at them. The two then withdrew and went back to the Company G CP in RAMSBURG BOWL. Then the Assistant Battalion S3 and the Platoon Leader of Company G's 3d Platoon went up towards McGEE HILL again searching for wounded. They found no wounded as they worked up close to the crest which was also swarming with Chinese soldiers. About 10 Chinese soldiers started down towards RAMSBURG BOWL (see Sketch 7). The two officers hastily withdrew and alerted the 503d Field Artillery Battery perimeter. Small-arms and machinegun fire from the perimeter drove the Chinese back. Shortly thereafter an infantryman from Company G, hunting for the body of his buddy, who had been killed on McGEE HILL, worked himself up to the crest of McGEE HILL. He was on the crest in the middle of the Chinese before they discovered him. He began firing and almost every Chinese soldier on the crest fired at him. Most of the Chinese bullets hit their own men. The Company G soldier miraculously escaped the hail of lead and escaped back to the 503d Field Artillery Battery perimeter!

When the Assistant Battalion S3 returned to Company G's CP he found that the Rangers, disobeying orders, had withdrawn all of their men from the CP perimeter to help evacuate some of their wounded who were in a 3/4-ton truck at POINT C. The truck could not get past the Quad 50 on the jeep trail. With the assistance of the walking wounded, the few unwounded men left in the perimeter around the Company G CP evacuated the

seriously wounded to the road where they were picked up by jeep ambulances. One of the tanks came over and pulled the Quad 50 out of the ditch.

The tank crew had been led to the Quad 50 by the 37th Field Artillery Battalion Artillery Liaison Officer, who had recovered from the shock of his grenade wound. A fighting fool, he now manned the four 50 calibre guns by himself. After failure of the counterattack, he secured the permission of the Composite Force Commander to fire; and he swept the crests of CURTIS, McGEE, and SCHMITT HILLS until dawn. He also covered by fire two successful attempts to evacuate groups of wounded at the base of SCHMITT and McGEE HILLS. At dawn he wiped out a Chinese gun crew which was in the act of sighting a captured 75mm recoilless rifle at him. What a fighting man! He should have joined an Infantry outfit!

With the removal of the Quad 50 from the jeep trail at POINT C, the 3/4-ton truck with the Ranger wounded was able to proceed to the rear down the jeep trail. The 503d Field Artillery perimeter and the small perimeter around the Company G CP were then abandoned and all personnel withdrew to the foxholes on HEATH RIDGE. The 2d Platoon of Company G, except for the assault on its light machinegun squad on the right (West) flank of the platoon, had not been hit. The 2d Platoon occupied its original foxholes in the rice paddy and its extreme right (West) flank was bent back to occupy the crest of FINN HILL. The Fougasse in front of the center of the 2d Platoon had not been detonated. Remnants of the rest of Company G were next to the 2d Platoon on HEATH RIDGE, then came the Ranger Company and the 503d Field Artillery men manned the rest of HEATH RIDGE to the road (see Sketch 9). Two of Company G's 60mm mortars had been placed back into action back of (North) HEATH RIDGE but they were almost out of ammunition. Company F was ordered to give them some 60mm mortar ammunition. Two of the tanks were a little in front of HEATH RIDGE on the road and one tank and the Quad 50 were at the Southern end of the cut on HEATH RIDGE. These were the dispositions as dawn broke.

The enemy had dented in the perimeter but had not ruptured it. The 1st and 3d Platoons of Company G and their attached 57mm squad and 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section from Company H, plus the 5 negro artillerymen and some small additions from Company G Company Headquarters and Weapons Platoon, totalled 97 men. At dawn only 5 of the Company G men and 2 of the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section from Company H were left. The rest had been killed or wounded. These two platoons and their attachments had put up the most savage and spectacular defense that any unit in KOREA has ever made! They had stopped a reinforced Chinese Regiment cold for five savage hours. They had actually fought to the last man! Their glory will live forever in the 23d Infantry!

As dawn broke the enemy around the perimeter, with the exception of the Chinese in Company G's area, broke contact and fled. At 0700 hour, 15 February 1951, the 3d Platoon of Company E saw a large Chinese force start to cross the draw in front of them (see Sketch 8) from West to East. All weapons within range fired on this group and caused many casualties. This firing split the large group into many small groups, and firing continued on these small groups for about 40 minutes, until they disappeared out of sight on HILL 397. Company E then sent out several small patrols to repair the wire and count the enemy dead on and near the wire.

Just before dawn, on 14 February 1951, an unfortunate event occurred. An enemy 120mm mortar shell hit in the Regimental CP right by the Regimental Commander's tent. The Regimental Commander, a very brave man who was

admired and respected by all of his officers and men, was wounded in the leg by a fragment; the Regimental S2 was mortally wounded by the same shell and died a few hours later. The Regimental Commander's wound was not too serious and he could have remained for the rest of the battle, but the X Corps Commander, who had other reasons, insisted on an immediate evacuation. The Regimental Commander objected for one full day saying, "I brought them (23d Infantry) in and I'll take them out", but the Corps Commander would not change his order. The Corps G3, a Lieutenant Colonel, had been flown into CHIPYONG-NI on the 14th in one of the hospital helicopters; he was to take command of the Regiment at the end of the CHIPYONG-NI action. At 1105 hour, 15 February 1951, the old Regimental Commander, still protesting, was flown out by hospital helicopter and the Corps G3 assumed command of the Regiment. However, he had no influence on the action in the 2d Battalion's sector which at that time was the only action going on and which was the last action of the siege of CHIPYONG-NI. The 2d Battalion Commander took 30 minutes out from directing the attack on McGEE and SCHMITT HILLS to bid the old Regimental Commander, "God speed". Just before stepping into the helicopter, the Regimental Commander inquired about the progress of the battle in the 2d Battalion area. The 2d Battalion Commander told a "white lie" and informed the old Regimental Commander that the Chinese penetration had been eliminated. If the Regimental Commander had known that the situation was still very critical, he never would have left and would probably have been court-martialed by the Corps Commander.

Captain Russel A. Gugeler in Chapter 9, "Chiphong-ni", of his superb volume "Combat Actions in Korea", describes additional acts of gallantry by individual members of the "Second-to-None" Battalion, 23d Infantry, during the second night of the siege.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE SIEGE

(see Sketch 10)

With dawn the U. S. accurate tank and small-arms fire forced the Chinese to retreat to the reverse (Southern) slopes of CURTIS, McGEE and SCHMITT HILLS. The Chinese had evidently reinforced the original reinforced regiment with additional troops before dawn, as Liaison Planes reported swarms of Chinese troops clinging to the reverse slopes of the three hills, in MASAN and on the Western slopes of HILL 397. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on these locations continuously for the next three hours. However, most of the fire was by the artillery as very few mortar concentrations could be fired because of the shortage of mortar ammunition. On the other hand the Chinese appeared to have plenty of mortars and plenty of ammunition for them. Chinese mortar fire fell at the rate of two or three rounds per minute on HEATH RIDGE and on the area North of HEATH RIDGE, between it and the railroad embankment, during the entire day. This mortar fire caused many casualties. At 0830 hour, 15 February 1951, a fourth tank joined the attached tank platoon, completing its organization, and another Quad 50 was attached to the Battalion. At 0845 hour, 15 February 1951, the negro artillerymen of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, under cover of machineguns, tanks and Quad 50s, withdrew their guns and recovered all of their equipment from RAMSBURG BOWL. Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, then went into

positions North of the railroad embankment and West of the road, behind the French Battalion sector (see Sketch 5). The Ranger Company manned that portion of the line on HEATH RIDGE that they had occupied. Company B had stopped for breakfast and did not arrive behind HEATH RIDGE until 0930 hour, 15 February 1951.

The Ranger Company Commander complained to some of the 2d Battalion officers that his unit had been misused, and that his unit was just for "hit and run" actions and was not capable of ordinary attack and defense like Infantry units. Unfortunately the 2d Battalion Commander did not hear of this until the next day, when the Ranger Company was no longer under his control, or he would have had a "heart to heart" talk with one Lieutenant Ranger Company Commander. This is the main trouble with prima-donna outfits like the Rangers. They don't want the dirty fighting, they just want the glamour. In this case, they weren't even capable of performing their speciality, night raids. The veteran Infantrymen of the 2d Battalion thought that their "hit and run" tactics consisted mostly of running. The Army is much better off without these special units. They only tend to lower the morale of the average Infantryman by getting special privileges and equipment without doing their share of the fighting.

The Army Commander had really kept his word. With first light the air was dark with fighter planes. Flights were circling in the air awaiting their turn to strike. Every high hill around the perimeter was hit again and again. This was the best air support that the 23d Infantry had ever had. A total of 131 sorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry throughout the day! Late in the morning "flying box-cars" again began dropping supplies and ammunition, and they continued dropping throughout the day. Enemy mortars had "zeroed in" the drop area and their fire caused many casualties among the supply personnel retrieving the dropped supplies and ammunition. Among the casualties were one killed and three wounded from the 2d Battalion Supply Section; one of the wounded was the S4 of the 2d Battalion. Counter-battery fire silenced most of the enemy mortars by 1300 hour, but an occasional round still came in during the entire afternoon. Most of the drops still contained artillery ammunition. Some stupid individual in the Army G4 must have had a phobia on artillery ammunition. The 23d Infantry now had more artillery ammunition than it could shoot up in a week, but still no mortar or small-arms ammunition. It was always hoped that the "next drop" would contain some of this critically short ammunition, but the "next drop" always contained some more artillery ammunition. Hospital helicopters continued to evacuate the badly wounded throughout the day. All low flying planes continued to receive Chinese sniper fire from points around and close in to the perimeter, but no planes were hit.

Early in the morning radio contact was made with the 5th Cavalry Regiment, the leading unit of the 1st Cavalry Division, to the South. Reports from Liaison Planes showed that the 1st Cavalry Division was still fighting savagely for KOKSU-RI. The Army Commander had issued orders to the 1st Cavalry Division that they must break through to the 23d Infantry on that day, 15 February 1951. The 29th British Brigade had only been able to advance a few hundred yards against strong resistance and it was still South of CHAUM-NI (see Sketch 4). At 1230 hour, 15 February 1951, a Liaison Plane reported that some elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were just South of KOKSU-RI, moving slowly.

The 2d Battalion Commander had established a temporary CP at an OP in the cut on HEATH RIDGE, where he remained throughout most of the remainder of the day. At 0945 hour, 15 February 1951, from the OP, which was under enemy mortar and sniper fire, the Battalion Commander issued a verbal attack order to the Commanding Officer of Company B. Because all of the Company Commanders of the 2d Battalion were combat veterans with great experience, it was SOP in the 2d Battalion to give them an objective but not to tell them how to take it. Sometimes the Battalion Commander would indicate a suggested plan of maneuver but he would never order the Company Commander to follow it. It was always assumed in the 2d Battalion that the Company Commander would make a coordinated, maximum effort with all the units at his disposal. In this order the Battalion Commander indicated, but did not order, that one plan of maneuver would be to send a force with the tanks down the road to attack TOTH HILL from the cut (from the West), and another force from FINN HILL to attack CURTIS HILL. Then both forces could converge on McGEE HILL. The Ranger Company, the Tank Platoon, and the two Quad 50s were all attached to Company B. Company G's two 60mm mortars, the rifle remnants of Company G on HEATH RIDGE, elements of the 2d Platoon of Company G on FINN HILL and Company H's 81mm mortar Platoon were to assist by fire. The Company H 81mm mortar observer, the 4.2 mortar observer and the Artillery Forward Observer, all three of whom had been attached to Company G, were now attached to Company B. No air was called for as they were busy on the surrounding hills and it was believed that the preparations by the Artillery and mortars were sufficient. The Battalion Commander erred in issuing his order to the Commanding Officer of Company B. He should have issued definite detailed orders to the Company B Commander and should not have assumed that he was as expert as the 2d Battalion rifle company commanders.

Preceded by a ten minute artillery and mortar preparation on SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS, Company B jumped off at 1015 hour, 15 February 1951, using as an LD the MLR on HEATH RIDGE. Instead of making a coordinated effort the Company B Commanding Officer attacked piece-meal. The tanks and Quad 50s were ordered to support by fire from their present positions along the road. The Ranger Company remained on HEATH RIDGE to assist by fire (see Sketch 10). One lone rifle platoon jumped off at 1015 hour to seize SCHMITT HILL from the cut. As they started to climb SCHMITT HILL they came under heavy enemy mortar fire. Advancing courageously, they reached the crest of SCHMITT HILL. As they attempted to go over the crest they were literally swept off the crest by a hail of hand grenades from hundreds of Chinese on the reverse (South) slope and a solid curtain of machinegun bullets from about 20 enemy machineguns, located on the reverse slope of SCHMITT HILL and on the slopes of HILL 397 Northeast of MASAN. These machineguns were defiladed from the fire of the 2d Battalion's MLR by the nose of HILL 397 which ran into CURTIS HILL. The valiant infantry made two more attempts to go over the crest but the results were the same. Dragging down their dead and wounded this platoon, the 1st, withdrew about halfway down the North slope of SCHMITT HILL and awaited further orders. The Company Commander of Company B, continuing his piece-meal tactics, now at about 1130 hour, 15 February 1951, launched another rifle platoon by itself at McGEE HILL. Cutting straight across RAMSBURG BOWL this platoon reached the base of McGEE HILL without opposition, as supporting tank and small-arms fire kept all the Chinese off of the crests of McGEE and CURTIS HILLS. As they started up the slope

they received heavy enemy mortar fire. Reaching the crest they also valiantly swept over the top only to be blasted back by the same leaden curtain which had hit the 1st Platoon on SCHMITT HILL. A second attempt succeeded in placing a handful of men in foxholes just over the crest in the same area that the Ranger Platoon had reached at 0530 hour, 15 February 1951. The Chinese now really laid down a devastating amount of small-arms, mortar and machinegun fire on this handful, killing or wounding most of them. After about ten minutes of this, the few survivors had to crawl back to the North slope of McGEE HILL where the rest of the platoon was located. This platoon now withdrew about half-way down the North slope of McGEE HILL and awaited further orders. Both platoons were now subjected to heavy enemy mortar fire.

The Company Commander of Company B, after a conference with the 2d Battalion Commander, now at last tried a partially coordinated attack. The two platoons on SCHMITT and McGEE HILLS at 1300 hour tried a simultaneous attack on both crests, but the results were the same. As the platoons crossed the crests they were met by the same hail of lead, that stopped them cold during the previous assaults, and had to withdraw to the North slopes of both crests. The 2d Battalion Commander saw that this was a useless slaughter, so he ordered both platoons to withdraw to the base of the two hills and requested air strikes from Regiment. At 1415 hour, 15 February 1951, the first air-strike hit, followed in rapid succession by three others. All of them were Napalm strikes followed by rocket and 50 calibre machinegun strafing. They were beautifully executed, hitting the hundreds of Chinese on the reverse (Southern) slopes of all three hills and in MASAN. One Napalm bomb hit on the North side of the crest of McGEE HILL and the Napalm started to roll down the hill towards the Company B platoon. However, it stopped before it reached them, much to the relief of all observers. The last strike finished at 1450 hour, 15 February 1951. The platoon at the base of McGEE HILL had suffered heavy casualties and it was replaced during the strikes by the third rifle platoon of Company B. At 1500 hour, 15 February 1951, the two rifle platoons at the base of McGEE and SCHMITT HILLS again tried to sweep over the two crests. Although the strikes had killed many, there were still hundreds of Chinese very much alive, and the two platoons were again thrown back from the two crests. After this attack the Battalion Commander ordered the Company B commander to have the two platoons evacuate their dead and wounded and withdraw to HEATH RIDGE. Assaults from this direction were useless.

The Battalion Commander now realized that the key to the solution was to get the attached platoon of tanks South on the CHIPYONG-NI--KANHYON ROAD (see Sketch 5) beyond SCHMITT HILL, where they could fire into the hundreds of Chinese that were on the reverse (Southern) slopes of SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS, in MASAN and on the Western slopes of HILL 397. However, the friendly minefield, which the 2d Battalion P&A Platoon had laid in the cut on SCHMITT HILL, prevented the tanks from going South down the road. The Battalion Commander ordered up a squad of the P&A Platoon. By radio, he ordered the Battalion S3, who was a former rifle company commander and a very courageous man and who at that time was with the tank platoon, to form a small task force (TASK FORCE S) with the tank platoon and the P&A Squad and to

proceed to the cut and remove the minefield; then TASK FORCE S was to have its tanks debouch to the South and shoot up the Chinese mentioned above. TASK FORCE S reached the cut without opposition at about 1530 hour, 15 February 1951. When the P&A Squad started to remove the mines in the minefield they came under heavy small-arms fire from Chinese riflemen, clinging to the reverse (Southern) slope of SCHMITT HILL. The two leading tanks opened up on these Chinese riflemen. At this time 4 or 5 Chinese, armed with U. S. 2.36-inch bazookas, "popped out" of their foxholes in the rice paddy just South of SCHMITT HILL and started to shoot at the two tanks (see Sketch 10). The first few bazooka rounds did no damage but the tanks had to withdraw for fear that the bazooka men would become more accurate and hit a vital spot. TASK FORCE S withdrew to the North a short distance and its Commanding Officer, the Battalion S3, reported to the Battalion Commander by radio.

The situation evidently called for more rifle protection for the tanks. The Battalion Commander informed the Battalion S3 that he was attaching the entire Ranger Company to TASK FORCE S and ordered him to make another attempt to remove the minefield. The Ranger Company was ordered off of HEATH RIDGE where they had been sitting all day long; they complied with the order very reluctantly and joined TASK FORCE S.

Meanwhile to the South, the 1st Cavalry Division, complying with the Army Commander's order to break through to the 23d Infantry that day, had formed TASK FORCE CROMBEZ. TASK FORCE CROMBEZ consisted of 22 tanks from various units in the 1st Cavalry Division and one company of 165 riflemen from the 5th Cavalry Regiment. It also had a few 2½-ton trucks attached to it. The mission of TASK FORCE CROMBEZ was to rush North up the KOKSU-RI--CHIPYONG-NI ROAD, with sirens screaming and guns firing in all directions, in an attempt to reach the 23d Infantry perimeter before dark. The tigers painted on the fronts of all the tanks gave them a very ferocious appearance. The rifle company was to ride the tanks. Why, nobody knows! Probably someone had read somewhere that Infantry must always accompany tanks. In this dash they were unnecessary as the tanks never stopped to allow the infantry to dismount and fight. The infantry only furnished live targets for the Chinese riflemen. With sirens blaring, TASK FORCE CROMBEZ headed North through KOKSU-RI, shooting up the Chinese, swarming on the hills on both sides of the road, and nimbly side-stepping dynamite charges thrown on the road by Chinese soldiers from nearby foxholes. As could have been anticipated, the poor infantrymen were shot off of the tanks like clay pigeons. The Infantry Battalion Commander of the rifle company that was riding on the tanks, who was a very brave man, accompanied the 2½-ton trucks, which were at the tail of the column and which picked up the dead and wounded infantrymen as they fell off of the tanks. He and all of the truck-loads of dead and wounded infantrymen were captured by the Chinese.

The Ranger Company proceeded to a point about 100 yards North of the cut on SCHMITT HILL where TASK FORCE S was waiting. Company B, the remnants of Company G and the two Quad 50s kept up a continuous barrage on the crests of CURTIS, McGEHE and SCHMITT HILLS in order to keep the Chinese on the reverse slopes. Our artillery and mortars continued to fire on MASAN and the slopes of HILL 397. The enemy replied by intensifying the mortar fire that he had been placing on the

area all day long. TASK FORCE S, with the Rangers deployed around the 4 tanks, advanced to the cut again and reached it at about 1610 hour without opposition. The P&A Squad started to remove the mines and again came under the fire of the Chinese riflemen. The leading tanks smothered the Chinese riflemen with machinegun fire and once again the Chinese bazooka men "popped out" of their foxholes and began to fire on the tanks. The Rangers, who were supposed to knock out these bazooka men with rifle fire at the first outburst of Chinese rifle fire had run for cover behind (West of) the tanks and in the ditch on the West side of the road. 2d Battalion officers, among them the Commander of TASK FORCE S and the Platoon Leader of the tank platoon, fiercely "kicked them out" of the ditch and from behind the tanks, and forced them to take the Chinese bazooka men under fire so as to at least disrupt their accurate aim. The tank platoon leader, another very brave officer, then went to his leading tank and began firing his pistol at one of the Chinese bazooka men, when a rifle bullet hit him in the heel. The rifle fire of the Rangers and the P&A Squad killed most of the Chinese bazooka men and forced the remainder to "pop back down" and stay in their foxholes. The expert P&A Squad, under cover of the tank machineguns, removed the mines in about ten minutes. The 4 tanks by themselves now raced about 150 yards South on the road and began firing their cannons and machineguns rapidly at the hundreds of Chinese now clearly seen on the reverse slopes of CURTIS, McGEE and SCHMITT HILLS, in MASAN and on the Western slopes of HILL 397. The Chinese started to run East and then South up the slopes towards the crest of HILL 397. They formed a long strung out column of about 900 and everybody within range started to shoot at them.

At this psychological moment, about 1630 hour, 15 February 1951, TASK FORCE CHOMBEZ, shooting up a storm to either side, appeared in KANHYON. About 250 Chinese were fleeing wildly before them. Two tanks from TASK FORCE S were immediately dispatched South to meet them and in a few minutes the 250 fleeing Chinese were slaughtered in the rice paddies between the two TASK FORCES. This incident seemed to panic all of the Chinese around the entire perimeter. They had withstood terrific artillery and air bombardment throughout the entire day, but now the appearance of the tiger tanks, throwing lead in all directions, was too much for the superstitious Chinese. "Strange are the ways of the heathen Chinese!"

Thousands of Chinese on all the close and distant hills could now be seen running in long files away from the perimeter. Every available rifleman and weapon on and inside the perimeter began firing and there were more targets than weapons. Two Chinese Armies were in complete panic! The Chinese ran like terror-stricken deer and stumbled over their own dead and wounded in their wild desire to get away from the perimeter. HILLS 397, 583, 281, 345, 348, 506, and 159 (see Sketch 1) were swarming with frightened Chinese, whose only thought was to get as far away from the perimeter as possible. At 1700 hour, 15 February 1951, Company E again trapped a large group of fleeing Chinese in the draw South of its 3d Platoon area and killed most of them by fire. Air, artillery, tanks, and AA vehicles had a field day hitting the more distant targets. The riflemen, machineguns,

recoilless rifles, and mortars hit the closein targets. The column of about 900 Chinese, which had fled before the tanks of TASK FORCE SAGAR, was literally cut to ribbons before it reached the crest of HILL 397. The din was terrific with all weapons firing. It was like shooting ducks on a pond. Thousands of Chinese were killed during this one "mad hour" of firing.

Shortly after 1630 hour, 15 February 1951, the Ranger Company moved forward and occupied SCHMITT HILL without any opposition. Company B then moved forward and occupied McGEE and CURTIS HILLS without having a shot fired at them. The Chinese were too busy fleeing.

TASK FORCE CROMBEZ joined TASK FORCE S and assisted in shooting at the 900 Chinese fleeing South in panic up the slopes of HILL 397 towards its crest. TASK FORCE CROMBEZ then approached the perimeter with the Task Force Commander in the open turret of the leading "tiger" tank. He wore a colored bandana around his throat; he was an old Cavalryman. The column stopped briefly just south of the mine field where the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion was located. The Task Force Crombez Commander and the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion were old friends. The Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion shouted above the roar of the tank engines: "You are a sight for sore eyes! God, but we're glad to see you!" They had fought a furious and savage battle to reach the perimeter. This was truly a thrilling and historic rescue operation! May God bless old Cavalrymen like the Commander of TASK FORCE CROMBEZ!

Chapter 10, "Task Force Crombez", of that outstanding volume, "Combat Actions in Korea", by Captain Russell A. Gugeler, gives a detailed account of the terrific battle that TASK FORCE CROMBEZ waged to reach the Chipyeong-ni perimeter.

TASK FORCE CROMBEZ entered the jubilant perimeter at 1715 hour, 15 February 1951. TASK FORCE CROMBEZ' two leading tanks had been set on fire by accurate Chinese 2.36-inch bazooka rounds, and one-half of the rifle company had been shot off of the tanks. Out of the remaining half of the rifle company, only 25 men were left who were not wounded. The Task Force Commander was glad to get into the perimeter and had no intentions of returning that day. The 23d Infantry wounded had been loaded into trucks and ambulances in the belief that TASK FORCE CROMBEZ would take them out to the South immediately. The wounded were unloaded and placed back in the tents of the Regimental Aid Station. The Task Force had not brought any ammunition for the 23d Infantry and its own ammunition was about two-thirds expended. However, there is no doubt that the appearance of TASK FORCE CROMBEZ at the right psychological moment had panicked the entire Chinese force and, as was found out the next day, had lifted the Siege of CHIPYONG-NI!

When the shooting died down, the 23d Infantry soberly found out that it was almost out of ammunition. The Regimental Heavy Mortar Company had about 40 rounds. The 2d Battalion had 18 rounds of 81mm mortar and 21 rounds (7 rounds in each rifle company) of 60mm mortar ammunition. Hand grenades were down to two per frontline foxhole and, after searching glove compartments and trailer beds, each frontline rifleman had two clips (16 rounds) of rifle ammunition. Men in rear areas had only one clip of ammunition per weapon. BARs were down to

two clips (40 rounds) and all machineguns had only two boxes (500 rounds) of ammunition. The other three Battalions were in about the same shape as the 2d Battalion. Regiment had screamed for small-arms and mortar ammunition all day long but the airdrops still continued to disgorge artillery ammunition. The situation was serious! If the Chinese attacked on that night, 15-16 February 1951, as savagely as they did the night before, most of the 23d Infantry would die in savage, hand-to-hand fighting. The 20 remaining tanks of TASK FORCE CROMBEZ were split up into 4 groups of 5 tanks each. One of these groups went to each one of the four Battalions. These tanks were placed at the bottom of the slopes of the hills in each area on the outskirts of the town of CHIPYONG-NI, ready to sweep the tops of the hills with fire when the Chinese had broken through the MLR. A night airdrop at 2340 hours, 15 February 1951, finally dropped some mortar and small-arms ammunition but this was just a "drop in the bucket". The 2d Battalion's proportionate share of this drop consisted of 30 rounds of 60mm shell and 4 cases of small-arms, which would last about two minutes in a savage fight.

At 1730 hour the 2d Battalion Commander recommended to the new Regimental Commander that the line be pulled back to HEATH RIDGE for the night. The recommendation was accepted. The Ranger Company reverted to Regimental Control, but Company B, the tank platoon and the two Quad 50s remained attached to the 2d Battalion. At 1800 hour, 15 February 1951, the Battalion Commander ordered Company B to pull back to HEATH RIDGE. The 2d Platoon of Company G remained in the rice paddy but Company B took over the crest of FINN HILL from them. The 2d Platoon of Company B had been attached to Company F at 1600 hour, 15 February 1951, by the Battalion Commander and it remained attached to Company F during the night of 15-16 February 1951. The remnants of Company G (less the 2d Platoon) were pulled back to HITCHINGS HILL (see Sketch 6) and designated the Battalion Reserve. Two of the tanks were placed in the cut on HEATH RIDGE. The other two tanks and the two Quad 50s were placed to the North along the road between HEATH RIDGE and the railroad embankment, so that they could fire to the East over the heads of the 2d Platoon of Company G in the rice paddy. All units were in their new positions by dark.

After dark enemy flares appeared all around the perimeter and enemy digging could be heard to the North, East and West. The tired infantrymen of the 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team braced themselves for another night of horror that, because of the shortage of ammunition, was sure to bring death to most of them. To the great surprise and immense relief of everyone not a single shot or mortar round came into the perimeter during the entire night. The Chinese were still too busy fleeing from the perimeter. This ended the siege of CHIPYONG-NI!

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

Shortly after daybreak, 16 February 1951, Company B was ordered to reoccupy CURTIS, MCGEE and SCHMITT HILLS which they did without any opposition. The 1st French Company moved South and occupied their old line abreast of Company B. Company B was ordered to send a platoon patrol into MASAN and Company E was ordered to send a platoon patrol

part of the way to the crest of HILL 397. Both patrols accomplished their missions without finding anything but dead Chinese and there were hundreds of these. The Company E patrol could observe no Chinese on the crest of HILL 397. Liaison planes reported that the main Chinese forces were still fleeing madly to the North and were being hit by our fighter planes. Small patrols from all companies went forward to count enemy dead. Company G (less the 2d Platoon) went back to SCHMITT, McGEE, and CURTIS HILLS to recover its dead.

Hospital helicopters continued the evacuation of the badly wounded throughout the day. TASK FORCE CROMBEZ departed at 1600 hour, 16 February 1951, escorting about 20 ambulances and 2½-ton trucks, loaded with the 23d Infantry wounded; it reached the advance elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, now North of KOKSU-RI, without incident. A small amount of mortar and small-arms ammunition was air-dropped to the 23d Infantry during the day, but it still wasn't enough to withstand a savage attack. Someone had certainly blundered on this score. The mistake could have led to a massacre if the Chinese had continued their attacks. The only enemy seen all day was a group in front of Company E's 3d Platoon, early in the morning; they had evidently become lost the night before and had not withdrawn in the right direction. The 2d heavy machinegun section expended 600 rounds and the 1st Recoilless Rifle Section expended 17 rounds of 75mm HE and two boxes of 50 calibre machinegun ammunition at them, killing many of this enemy group. This was the last action around the perimeter.

The night of 16-17 February 1951 again passed quietly. The Battalion Commander secured permission from Regiment to send a company patrol to the crest of HILL 397. Company F was ordered to perform the mission and departed from the perimeter at daybreak, 17 February 1951. It reached the crest of HILL 397, leap-frogging its two rifle platoons through each other, at 0850 hour without encountering any enemy. No Chinese could be seen in any direction. Liaison Planes coordinated Company F's advance with the advance of the leading elements of the 1st Cavalry Division so that the two forces wouldn't fire into each other. Company F remained on the crest of HILL 397 until 1515 hour, 17 February 1951. At 1000 hour, Company F observed a group of five Chinese soldiers moving North towards the village of SOKPUL (see Sketch 1). Fire from a 57mm Recoilless Rifle was placed on this group but the results could not be observed. At 1035 hour four more Chinese were observed going into the same village. An officer led patrol of seven was dispatched to the village. As the patrol approached the village a group of nine Chinese was observed moving West out of the village. The Company F patrol fired at them and all nine Chinese hit the ground. Seven of them got up and ran towards HILL 319 (see Sketch 1) pursued by the fire of the patrol. The patrol then entered and searched the village of SOKPUL, finding eight rifles and many hand grenades in a hay stack. The patrol broke the rifles and set the hay stack on fire exploding the hand grenades. On their return to the crest of HILL 397 the patrol sighted three Chinese moving on HILL 319 but they were out of range. At 1515 hour, Company B of the 5th Cavalry Regiment arrived on the crest of HILL 397 from the South and relieved Company F. Company F then returned to the perimeter arriving at

about 1615 hour, 17 February 1951.

The night of the 17-18 February 1951, again passed quietly. On the morning of 18 February 1951 elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment arrived on the hills to the South of the 2d Battalion hills. The 5th Cavalry had decided not to occupy the perimeter but to just hold the high hills to the South of CHIPYONG-NI. At 1330 hour, 18 February 1951, the 23d Infantry with the 2d Battalion leading, departed on trucks from CHIPYONG-NI to assembly areas South of WONJU. This officially closed the "Siege of CHIPYONG-NI". The Chinese had taken the bait but the bait was too tough to digest!

SUMMARY

During the First Day, Second Night and Second Day of the Siege the 2d Battalion had suffered the following casualties:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>WOUNDED</u>	<u>MISSING</u>
Hq Co, 2d Battalion	1	4	0
Company E	5	9	0
Company F	11	21	2
Company G	23	42	29
Company H	5	8	2
2d Battalion Medical Section	0	4	0
	<u>45</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>33</u>

Adding the First Night's casualties to these brings the total casualties in the Battalion to:

52	killed
119	wounded
33	missing
<u>204</u>	

The large number of missing was due to a gruesome Chinese trick of removing our dead bodies and burying them with their own dead. A Company G patrol on 16 February 1951, searching for their own dead saw a Chinese grave near MASAN. Uncovering the grave they found it to contain two dead Chinese soldiers. As the soil under the two bodies also appeared freshly turned they continued to dig and uncovered the body of a dead Company G soldier. The Chinese had removed his body from McGEE HILL and buried it under two of their own dead. Since the ravines and gullies around MASAN and the rest of the perimeter were dotted with hundreds of fresh Chinese graves it was a matter of impossibility to open all of them. Some of them undoubtedly contained the bodies of Company G soldiers who are still carried "missing in action".

SCHMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS were macabre sights. Hundreds of dead Chinese littered the slopes. Some had been cooked to a crisp by Napalm. Some were without heads. Some had been horribly torn apart by direct hits from rockets or artillery shells. The writer will always remember one body whose head had completely disappeared; nothing remained on the neck stump except the lower jawbone and its

row of teeth. Lines of dead Chinese started at the bottom of the hills about 250 yards away from the MLR and every ten yards up the slope to the crests of the hills had another line of dead Chinese. Every Company G foxhole had from 6 to 9 dead Chinese in a circle around it. The Chinese had taken terrific losses! The scene was a testimonial to the super-human, heroic and gallant defense of the Company G combat infantrymen! The writer himself personally counted 526 dead bodies on MCGEE HILL. Patrols sent out to count the dead, reported 493 bodies on SCHMITT HILL and 362 bodies on CURTIS HILL. This made a total of 1,381 in front of Company G alone! There were hundreds of fresh graves in front of the perimeter and each grave contained at least two dead bodies. Time did not permit opening the graves or even counting them as there were so many of them in all the little ravines and gullies. Company F counted 27 dead Chinese in front of it and Company E 359 dead bodies hanging on the wire and in front of (South of) the wire in the 3d Platoon's area. This brought the total count of dead bodies to 1,767. Adding this to the 420 killed on the First Night of the Siege brings the grand total to 2,187. The other Battalions counted almost 4,000 in front of them. So the bodies actually counted around the perimeter totalled roughly 6,000. It must be remembered that these were just the bodies close to the MLR of the perimeter. No attempt was made to search the ravines and gullies or to go up to the distant crests where the artillery and air-strikes had been hitting for several days. Also as previously stated no attempt could be made to count the hundreds of fresh graves. A very conservative estimate is that 15,000 Chinese died around the flaming perimeter during the siege. This meant that about 45,000 were wounded. The Fourth Chinese Field Army, therefore, had approximately 60,000 casualties at CHIPYONG-NI. Small wonder that the Red High Command beheaded the Chinese General in command of the group of Chinese Divisions at CHIPYONG-NI for his failure. Some months later a booklet, which pointed out the tactical errors made by the Chinese units at CHIPYONG-NI, was captured from the enemy. The Chinese will never forget CHIPYONG-NI!

The following Chinese Divisions made the assaults on the perimeter: the 118th, 119th and 120th Divisions of the 40th Army and the 126th and 127th Divisions of the 42d Army. Prisoners were taken from all of these Divisions as well as prisoners from the following additional Divisions: the 116th, 121st and 207th. The 23d Infantry had held off five full divisions and elements of three others at CHIPYONG-NI! There were a minimum of nine Chinese Divisions in the CHIPYONG-NI area engaging the 23d Infantry, 1st Cavalry Division and the 29th British Brigade. There were a minimum of 6 Chinese Divisions in the WONJU area. The 2d Infantry Division, without employing fully its 9th Infantry Regiment, had fought a minimum of 15 Chinese Divisions and possibly even 18 or 21 Chinese Divisions to a standstill. It must be remembered that although a U. S. Division has more strength than a Chinese Division it has less actual Infantry strength than a Chinese Division, and it is strictly an infantry war at night. The 2d Infantry Division had brought the Chinese February 1951 offensive in Central KOREA to a screaming halt. A newspaper account read, "The Eighth Army announced that on one day the 2d Infantry Division **** inflicted 51% of all enemy casualties. The Eighth Army also claimed a record one-day bag of

10,993 Communists killed or wounded and 365 captured on 14 February. As for the Air Force, it set up a single day's record of 1,027 sorties on 15 February." The 2d Infantry Division had by itself stopped the Fourth Chinese Field Army and avenged KUNU-RI (see "The KUNU-RI Withdrawal").

Newsmen compared the "Siege of CHIPYONG-NI" to "Custer's Last Stand" and the "Alamo". General Ridgway was so impressed by the Chinese dead on McGEE HILL and the fighting spirit of the 23d Infantry that he told reporters in the presence of the writer, "When you see this (the dead Chinese) and the esprit de corps of the 23d Infantry--well, I'll tell you there's nothing finer in this world!" At a later news conference in his Headquarters, General Ridgway "credited 'magnificent performance' by the Franco-American garrison at CHIPYONG-NI with the decisive role in breaking the back of the Chinese offensive. 'At the time the attack was launched it seemed that it could have been sustained a long time. But we checked it two or three days ago. The attack against the CHIPYONG-NI salient was very bitterly pressed. It ceased at 5:30 PM three nights ago when the 5th Cavalry column broke through.-----You should have seen that area around CHIPYONG-NI, Chinese dead were lying all over the place. That was a magnificent performance by the U. S. 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team and the French Battalion!' "

Chinese tactics during the "Siege of CHIPYONG-NI" included the following:

1. The extensive use of artillery and mortars in the conventional U. S. manner; each assault was preceded by a very heavy artillery and mortar preparation.
2. The use of Special Assault Companies to breach specific points of the MLR; the personnel of these units were hand-picked, physically large men who were well equipped and well supplied with hand grenades and ammunition and the majority of whom were armed with the Czech copy of the British Bren Gun (similar to our BAR).
3. The extensive use of concussion-type, plastic hand grenades which were not too effective for producing casualties.
4. The use of Bangalore Torpedoes for blowing gaps in the U. S. wire.
5. The use of pole-charges for blowing in foxholes and emplacements and for use against U. S. tanks.
6. The use of 2.36-inch bazookas against the U. S. tanks; when these hit a vulnerable spot they would set a U. S. tank on fire.
7. The use of luminous paint on square cardboard placards which were tied to the backs of the leading men in each column; these appeared to be very effective for leading units into positions in the darkness.

and also as a psychological warfare measure.

9. The use of "Human Sea" tactics which consisted of throwing wave after wave of soldiers for hours at one position even though they took terrific losses. They also attempted to use human bodies as bridges across our wire.

10. The use of surrender leaflets containing the usual "down with Capitalism" propaganda; these were sometimes printed very rapidly which leads to the assumption that the Chinese Army carried portable mimeograph machines with them.

11. The rapid massing of the fire of many machineguns and mortars on one terrain feature.

South of WONJU the 23d Infantry Regiment received the farewell message of its beloved, old, Regimental Commander, who had commanded the 23d Infantry Regiment so gallantly since its first battle North of TAEJU in August of 1950. The officers and men knew that they would never have another commander like him. The message was as follows:

"SUBJECT: Farewell Message

TO : Regimental Staff
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion
Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion
Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion
Commanding Officer, French Battalion
Commanding Officer, 37th FA Battalion
Commanding Officer, Battery B, 82d AW Battalion
Commanding Officer, Battery B, 503d FA Battalion
Commanding Officer, Company B, 2d Engr C Battalion
Commanding Officer, Separate Unit Companies
Officers and Soldiers of 23d RCT

"It is with deep disappointment and sincere regret that during your recent crisis at CHIPYONG-NI I was ordered evacuated. While my wound was slight the Corps Commander wished me evacuated for other reasons. Although I protested, I was finally ordered out.

"Officers and men, I want to say to you that there is no grander fighting regiment in all the world than the 23d RCT. Your determination, courage and ability was demonstrated magnificently during the recent action at CHIPYONG-NI. I hated leaving without seeing the fight through to its successful conclusion.

"I want you to know that any personal success that I might attain as a result of our campaign in Korea is only a minute reflection of your gallant actions and outstanding courage.

"To each of you I wish continued success in battle, personal achievement, and good health and safety.

"I salute each of you and wish that I could shake every hand of the men who have so valiantly served (NOTE: 23d Infantry Regiment Motto,

"We Serve")."

(Signed) Paul L Freeman, Jr
Colonel, Infantry

As noted above the Motto of the 23d Infantry was "We Serve" and the telephone code name of the 23d Infantry Regiment throughout the KOREAN WAR was, appropriately enough, "INSPIRE".

The 23d Infantry Regiment was recommended for and received the U. S. Presidential Unit Citation for the "Seige of CHIPYONG-NI". Extract of General Order 49, dated 11 July 1951, follows:

EXTRACT

"The 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division and following attached units:

French Battalion, United Nations Forces
37th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How.)
Battery B; 82d AA AW Battalion (SP)
Battery B; 503d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How.)
Company B, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion
2d Clearing Platoon, Clearing Company, 2d Medical Battalion
1st Ranger Company

are cited for extraordinary heroism in combat near CHIPYONG-NI, KOREA, during the period 13 February through 15 February 1951. These units, comprising a Regimental Combat Team, were disposed in a defensive perimeter around CHIPYONG-NI with the hazardous mission of holding this important communications center and denying the enemy its extensive road net. On 13 February hordes of Chinese troops launched many determined attacks from every quarter, strongly supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Prearranged fire with artillery, tanks and mortars hurled back these fanatical attacks until the morning of 14 February when the enemy separated the 23d Regimental Combat Team from supporting units to the South, entirely surrounded it and made resupply possible only by air drop. Because of the encircling force, estimated to be five Chinese divisions, the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter rapidly developed into a "stand or die" defense. Fierce hand-to-hand combat engaged the two forces on the evening of the second day of the seige and only one company remained in reserve. With ammunition stocks running low, this one company was committed on 15 February and waves of attacking Chinese were again stemmed. Shortly after noon of 15 February radio contact was reestablished with a relief force, and friendly tanks broke through the enemy encirclement and forced his withdrawal. The dogged determination, gallantry and indomitable esprit displayed by the 23d Regimental Combat Team, when completely surrounded and cut off; the destruction of attacking Chinese hordes which enabled the United Nations Forces to maintain their front and resume the offensive; and the steadfast and stubborn refusal

to allow a fanatical and numerically superior force to dislodge them, are in keeping with the finest traditions of the United States Army and reflect great credit on all members of the units who participated in this historical combat action."

The following is an extract from the Congressional Record containing the 22 May 1952 address of General Matthew B. Ridgway to a joint session of the United States Congress.

* * *

"I wish I could pay proper tribute to the magnificent conduct of United Nations troops throughout these operations. It is difficult to single out any one unit or the forces of any one nation, but to illustrate, I shall speak briefly of the Twenty-third United States Infantry Regiment, Colonel Paul L. Freeman, Commanding, with the French Battalion and the normal components of artillery, engineer and medical personnel from the United States Second Infantry Division. These troops in early February of 1951 sustaining (sic) two of the severest attacks experienced during the entire Korean campaign. Twice isolated far in advance of the general battle line, twice completely surrounded in near zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese infantry. They were finally relieved by an armored column from the United States First Cavalry Division in as daring and dramatic an operation as the war provided.

"I personally visited these magnificent men during both operations and personally directed the attack of the relieving armored column which finally broke through and contributed to the utter and final rout of the enemy forces. I want to record here my conviction that these American fighting men with their French comrades-in-arms measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops America or France has produced throughout their national existence."

* * *

F I N I S

TAB F

CHIPYOUNG-YI
by
Lt. Robert Curtis

When the 23rd Regimental Combat Team pulled into the Chipyoung-ni perimeter I was a lieutenant serving on the 2nd Battalion staff of LTC. James Edwards. LTC. Edwards had figured that several lieutenants whom he had given battle field commissions had served their time on the front line and brought us back to the battalion staff for training. I was used as an assistant S-3 and S-2 helping out our experienced staff in any way that I could. LTC. Edwards also assigned missions to me.

On 13 and 14 February the entire 23rd RCT perimeter was surrounded and under heavy probing attacks by the Chinese. George Company in the 2nd battalion area had been particularly hard hit on the night of the 13th but had held. After this all of the battalion units were confident that they could hold until promised help could break the 23rd out of the Chipyoung-ni perimeter.

During the evening of 14 February all hell broke loose along the entire 23rd RCT perimeter. Again particularly hard against the George Company sector which was on the southern rim of the 23rd RCT perimeter. The French forces were on the right of George Company and Fox Company was on their left. Because of the extensive ground that had to be protected there was no tight physical tie in with either the French or Fox Company and gaps were covered by machine guns, mines, wire, mortar and artillery fires. As the evening and early morning hours wore on the Chinese kept constant pressure on the entire 2nd battalion sector and again constant determined probing attacks against George Company seeking weak spots and automatic weapons positions.

At about 0230 on 15 February, I was told to report to LTC. Edwards. I knew from radio and phone transmissions that all hell had broken loose in the George Company area and that the company had lost most of their perimeter positions. LTC. Edwards directed me to go down the main street through town and meet a ranger platoon, take them to the George Company commander, 1Lt. Heath, for use as part of a counterattack force to recover the lost George Company positions and then to return to the battalion CP as fast as I could.

As I walked down the road, I could hear enemy and friendly fire from all sides of the RCT perimeter and could see tracers criss crossing the night sky. Frequently the whole area was eerily illuminated by enemy or friendly flares. I could hear the platoon of rangers coming up the road long before I could see them and I could tell that they were extremely perturbed about something.

On joining the Rangers, I explained to their company commander, who had accompanied the platoon, my mission and that George Company had been over run and their mission was to attack as soon as possible with all forces available in the George Company area in order to retake the lost positions before the Chinese could reinforce them. After the attack they were to remain on position as part of the perimeter defense. The Rangers already knew about

the attack mission. There was more agitation on the part of the Ranger leaders. They explained to me that they could attack and retake the lost position but they were not equipped to defend for any length of time once the objective was taken. I explained to the Ranger Commander that there were no available reserve forces to relieve them on the objective but that he could work out a relief in the daylight hours with Colonel Freeman. This heated discussion continued all the way to the George Company command post. As we were approaching the George Company area heavy fire ceased on the southern perimeter and only occasional rifle came into the area.

On arriving at the CP, I found the situation was desperate. There had been extremely high casualties to include an entire squad from Fox Company that had been attached to George Company. Many of the key leaders were wounded and there was much confusion in the area. Lt. Heath was trying to complete a company reorganization and preparation for a counterattack. He briefed me on the situation and said he felt that some of the positions in the 2nd platoon area near Fox Company were still in place in the rice paddy and holding. A platoon, minus the lost squad had arrived from Fox Company and had been integrated into George Company. This was the last of the battalion reserve. After a discussion with Lt. Heath, it was decided that since we had a composite force in the area and we were having trouble with the Rangers, it would be better if I, as a staff officer, took charge of the attack and defense until George Company could be reorganized and then he would take over. He knew that I knew all of his non commissioned officers and that they would follow me. Lt. Heath offered to help in any way that he could to include leading the attack up the hill.

All of the George Company and Fox Company leaders and their men were ready and willing to attack. At that time, we had three 60 mm mortars, three tanks and light machine gun fires to support the attack, plus the possibility of a quad .50 caliber weapon that was sitting at an angle on a near by trail but was inoperable in that position. I couldn't find the 81 mm mortar observer and the company had lost contact with the 4.2 mortar fire direction center. The crew assigned to the quad 50 had left the area but I knew the tankers would know how to fire the weapon. I was told we had some artillery men forward of the CP but that they were guarding their howitzers and I did not count on their assistance in the attack because I didn't know how effective they would be as infantry, especially under the conditions that we were in.

I informed the Ranger Company Commander and his platoon leader that he would attack on the right flank guiding on the cut in the road and tying in to George Company on the left. During a heated discussion with the Ranger Company Commander the question of rank came up and when the Ranger Company Commander found out that both he and his platoon leader outranked me he said that he couldn't take orders from me. He again pointed out that he was attached directly to Colonel Freeman and that he would take no orders

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except directly from Colonel Freeman. I informed him that since he was the senior commander on the ground he was welcome to take charge of all the forces in the area and lead the attack and that George Company and the platoon from Fox Company would follow his commands. I told him that I could put him in touch with Colonel Freeman but all it would get him was an ass chewing for delaying the attack. The Ranger company commander still insisted that he could attack and take his portion of the objective faster than the infantry but that he couldn't hold it with the weapons he had available to him. He said in no uncertain terms that his mission did not allow him to take charge of the counterattack.

Time was critical and the situation was growing desperate so I called Colonel Edwards and explained to him that the Rangers wanted a direct order from Colonel Freeman before they would attack and that they refused to attack under my command since he and his platoon leader outranked me. I told him I had taken command of the break through area and asked him to send a senior captain or a major to the area as soon as possible, either to take command, or to back up my orders. I coordinated with the commanders on the ground and explained that a senior staff officer was on his way and we would attack as soon as he got there.

I asked the commanders to continue the preparation for the attack. While the commanders were working with their men, I went to the area that a quad .50 caliber had slipped off a trail and was sitting at a bad angle to see if it could be used to support the attack and more importantly, the defense of the area. While checking the quad .50 over Captain John Ramsburg, the battalion S-2, came down the trail leading to the George Company CP. I said, "Christ John, am I ever glad to see you, I can't do a damn thing with the Ranger company commander." I explained the situation to him and asked him if I would lead the attack or if he would. He said that he would lead the attack but I should stay and assist him. I had worked with Captain Ramsburg in a similar situation on the Naktong River and we knew how the other was going to react in this situation. I determined that the quad .50 had only slid off the trail and was on an angle that made the weapon inoperable. I made a mental note to find a tank crew to pull the weapon into a better position and use it in the attack and defense.

Captain Ramsburg and I proceeded to the George Company CP where he called a commanders meeting and laid out his plan of attack. This still left the Rangers on the right flank of the attack. The Ranger company commander still didn't believe the defense of the area was a suitable mission for his men but Captain Ramsburg straightened him out with a few choice words that left little doubt of who was in command and what was going to take place. At no time did the Rangers object to the attack, only their defending the area with the weapons and personnel available to them and to the supporting fires we had available to help hold their positions.

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Ramsburg directed me to coordinate with what fire support weapons I could find in the area and to see if I couldn't find more men for the attack. He also directed me to send back to the rear and get three radios, one for each of his commanders. The only weapons for support were the three tanks on the road, the George Company 60mm mortars and three light machine guns. Captain Ramsburg wanted the machine guns positioned to give overhead fire and the 60mm mortars moved forward so he could issue commands directly to the gunners. I couldn't find the observer for the 81mm mortars or the 4.2 mortars and we were not in contact with the 4.2 fire direction center. The 75mm and 57mm recoilless weapons and the 3.5 rocket launchers were never used at night because of the flashback that could be seen for miles plus no night firing devices were available to pick up enemy targets and these weapons were not in the area. All personnel in the area manning support weapons not being fired were to be used in the attack. Ammunition for all weapons was extremely low. The 60mm mortars claimed that they could provide only limited preparatory fires and then nothing for the defense.

When I was on my way back from the tanks to join Captain Ramsburg in the attack I could hear him giving direct commands to the mortars moving their rounds exactly where he wanted them. Just then enemy mortar fire fell into the area near the mortars. The Rangers thought that this enemy fire was coming from the George Company mortars and were screaming to halt the mortar fire. Several Rangers and personnel from Fox Company were wounded including the platoon leader. This confusion delayed the attack. The Ranger Company Commander was screaming so loudly that Captain Ramsburg thought he would demoralize the entire attack. He raced over to the Ranger Company Commander and asked him to gather up all of his wounded and evacuate them. He wanted to get rid of the Ranger Company Commander as fast as he could.

By the time I rejoined Captain Ramsburg the attack was well under way and he was half way up the objective hill. I could tell the Rangers were making an aggressive and rapid advance in their sector from the firing and shouting that was rapidly moving up the slope of the hill in their area. I realized that they were going to be on the objective well before the rest of the attacking forces just as the ranger company commander told me they would be.

As I reached Captain Ramsburg, all hell broke loose along the entire attack line. The Chinese had held most of their fire until the attacking forces had reached the crest of the hill. This probably was because they had occupied the original George Company positions. I could hear the Rangers shouting that they had taken their objective and needed litter bearers, medics and more ammunition. Shortly after the Rangers hollered that they needed help or they couldn't hold any longer. As I started to talk with Captain Ramsburg either friendly (French) or enemy machine gun fire raked the Ranger area. To me it appeared that it came from just forward of where I knew the French positions were located but to the Rangers it appeared the firing was coming

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from the French lines. This firing consisted of several long bursts of greenish red tracer fire followed by short bursts of fire. The firing lasted only seconds but caused more casualties in the Ranger platoon and in addition caused more loss of morale because all of the Rangers were positive that this fire came from friendly guns. The machine gun firing that appeared to come from the French position caused the tanks on the road to think that the French were firing into Chinese on the hill and they opened fire into the Rangers thinking they were the enemy. Captain Ramsburg hollered at me to go back and stop the damn tanks from firing into the Rangers. I ran to the tanks as fast as I could, ordered them to cease firing and told them that we had taken the hill back and not to fire again unless given an order to fire. As I raced back to Captain Ramsburg, I passed many wounded men coming down the hill. The Rangers were still shouting that they had taken their objective and needed help now or they couldn't hold out any longer. Shouts for medics and stretchers could be heard all up and down the line. We had no medics and no men available to be stretcher bearers. Enemy and Friendly fire on the hill was still extremely heavy and at close, almost point blank range. It was still dark and I couldn't see what was happening on the objective but several of the walking wounded said they had been in hand to hand combat with the Chinese but that we had taken and held the hill.

When I reached Captain Ramsburg, he was sitting in the snow looking at his foot, only taking time to shout at riflemen coming down the hill to return to the fight. None could as they were all wounded. I asked Ramsburg if we had anyone left on the objective as I had seen so many wounded coming back down and he said that he thought we held the hill as he could hear the Rangers shouting on their objective. I asked Captain Ramsburg what had happened to his foot as I could see he was in great pain. He said that he had shot himself in the foot with his 45 caliber sub-machine gun. I looked at his weapon and it was on full automatic and I told Ramsburg that if he had fired at his foot with the weapon on automatic he would have blown his whole foot off. He recalled that just before he felt the pain in his foot there had been a flash in the snow just to his front and we concluded that he had been hit by grenade fragments. Captain Ramsburg said that Lieutenant Heath had come up the hill behind him, found him wounded and offered to go up the hill and take charge of the attack but seconds later someone had dragged him seriously wounded down the hill past him. I urged him to return to the CP area and try to restore order to the rear and see if we had enough men for another attack in case we lost the hill and I would go up and take charge.

I continued on up the hill and encountered only wounded men coming down, assisting more seriously wounded soldiers. As I continued almost to the top I suddenly realized that the shouting in the Ranger area no longer came from on top of the hill but from the bottom of the hill near where I could just make out the silhouettes of the 155 howitzers. Also little firing was occurring along the entire hill mass and I could hear only

Chinese commands and I realized that I might be the only American left in the objective area. Since I didn't carry a weapon or have any men to command I decided I better get my fanny out of their fast.

As I slid down the hill, I could hear and see enemy fire coming from the second platoon area which mean't that we had lost that area too. This left our left flank in severe danger as the Chinese now could stop Fox Company from extending right to help us out. This area bordered on the right flank of Fox Company and I thought they would be under full scale attack next. Suddenly almost all firing ceased except for unaimed small arms firing and this caused no further casualties. As I reached the CP area all firing had stopped and the whole area fell silent except for Chinese digging on the reverse slope of the hill, evidently improving the old George Company positions.

At the command post Captain Ramsburg was attempting to restore order with the handful of men left in the area. This was extremely difficult as most of the men in the area were wounded and those not wounded were suffering from battle fatigue and were slow to respond to orders. Captain Ramsburg ordered me to take over the defense and form a line along a hump of ground that afforded some slight protection from the enemy small arms fire. I found a squad leader and five men, the only ones not wounded or killed from the Fox company platoon and about eight men from George Company.

I didn't attempt to coordinate with the Rangers as Captain Ramsburg was in a heated discussion with the Ranger Company Commander about whether or not we could defend in that area. He wanted to withdraw to the rear. I knew the squad leader from Fox Company (my former company) and all of his men and knew that this small force would remain in position and at that moment was all of the force in the area that I could depend on except for the tankers on the road. I searched the rear area again for men to include mortarmen, radio operators, wire men and cooks, just anyone who could fight in the defense. I grabbed several slightly wounded and used them on the defense line that was forming in the snow along the ground behind what was no more than a hump running along the ground parallel to the Chinese.

After placing the defense into position, I felt that these couldn't be all of the unwounded men left in the area and that perhaps men were still up on the objective. We had started the attack with a least ninety men and I could account for only about twenty five counting the Rangers. I asked permission of Captain Ramsburg to take a radio operator up the hill and establish communications from the top of the hill if I could find a place that we were still holding. I also wanted to help or direct the wounded that might not have been able to get down the hill as there was no one left to do it.

There was a slight ridge leading into the left center of the George Company area. This ridge had deep snow on the far (east)

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T. Ryan

down the road into Chipyoung-ni. Captain Ramsburg was still in charge and was having a heated discussion with the Ranger Company Commander who had returned to the area after evacuating his wounded that had been hit early in the attack. This led to Captain Ramsburg directing the Ranger Company commander to take all of his men and leave the area. The Ranger didn't believe we could make a defense in that area and wanted to withdraw. Needless to say, I was disappointed as hell to see them go as they were extremely good combat men and we needed them for the defense.

While this was going on I thought I had better check the area where the Rangers had attacked to make sure that the Rangers took all of their men with them as I had found wounded men on the opposite flank. I was surprised on passing through the base of the hill to find able bodied artillerymen and officers still in place protecting their howitzers. They would defend them to the last man. I had been told that all of the artillerymen had fled the area when the counterattack failed. The senior officer explained that under no circumstances could they lose their howitzers. I briefly talked to the officers and asked them if they could help in the defense of the area and advised them to evacuate any wounded they had left in their positions. They told me that they had been fighting with George Company for the last three days on the hill and would do anything asked of them as long as we protected their howitzers. I asked them to reorganize into squads and I would be right back to place them in position in the ditch behind the tanks.

Still convinced that the Rangers could have men in the area I searched the lower slopes in the area the Rangers attacked working towards the cut in the road. I found no able bodied men or any wounded, only dead. On reaching the right flank where the three tanks were still in position, I coordinated with the tank commander and gave him a run down on the situation. He said that they would stay in position and would only withdraw on my order. I asked him if he could give me some men for the defense but he said that he couldn't spare a man. While at the tanks I checked the road bank again and decided that it gave the best protection for the soldiers in the area and would enable them to fire into the flanks of attacking Chinese. I would then have the quad 50 and the Fox Company squad for frontal fire into attacking Chinese. Not much of a defense against at least a Chinese rifle company. There would be no other support weapons as we were out of 60mm mortar ammunition plus I could not find the crews to fire the mortars. I could find neither the three light machine guns or their crews. We still had no contact with the 81mm mortars or the 4.2 mortar fire direction center.

From all of the digging on the hill, it was evident that the Chinese were not going to withdraw at dawn but were there to stay. I thought that they were long overdue on making probing efforts to their front. I kept asking myself why they didn't

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continue the attack after they had knocked George Company off their hill. On returning to the George Company CP I found Captain Ramsburg in much pain from his wounded foot. As I was talking to him I was watching the skyline trying to detect Chinese activity. As I was watching a bugler sounded a series of calls and about a squad of Chinese came over the top of the hill almost in the center of the former George Company area, started down the hill and then disappeared below the sky line. At this time the only time you could clearly detect enemy activity or movement was when they were on the skyline. Our defense opened fire on the Chinese. Once they moved off the skyline they disappeared into the darkness. I pointed out the enemy to Captain Ramsburg and shouted to all of the wounded men lying on the ground around the small CP shack to get the hell out of there now or they would never make it out as there were not enough men left to protect them. All of the men, including Captain Ramsburg, left and headed down the road into Chipyoung-ni. A burst of enemy machine gun fire aided their evacuation as all of the wounded men took off on a run including Captain Ramsburg who a few seconds earlier could not bear to put weight on his shattered foot. These men went down the road towards Chipyoung-ni and I never saw or heard from them again that night. When Captain Ramsburg left he shouted "Come on everyone, we are going back to establish a new defensive position." On hearing that several of the unwounded men, to include wire and radio operators, ran after him down the road and I couldn't stop them. I raced to the road to prevent further loss of riflemen. I had not had time to tell Captain Ramsburg that I had decided to defend the ground we were on.

As I turned to face the task of forming a better defensive line, I found that I had only a handful of men left from George Company and the squad leader and his five men from Fox Company. I estimated that we had about fifteen men plus the artillerymen to defend the area. We still had the quad 50 which represented a hell of a lot of firepower. The enemy had not fired an anti-tank weapon of any kind all night. I reported this to LTC Edwards and he promised help and ammunition as soon as he could get it to us. There had been no question in my mind that we had to defend in place against further penetration and above all to protect the 155's from capture or destruction. I found the squad leader from Fox Company and asked him to move all of the infantrymen left in the area into the far side of the road ditch and to extend the men south down the road towards the tanks as far as they could go and that the artillerymen would tie in with them and they would extend towards the Chinese. He said that he already had placed some men in the ditch. He asked me that if we were not going to make it that he would like to go back to Fox Company and go down with them. I promised him that he could go back to Fox Company as soon as we got help.

I knew where the French were and where their battalion CP was located but couldn't take the time to go to the CP and explain our situation to them. Besides I knew that the French would hold and that we could shift to the right and tie into them if we had

to. There would be no way we could reach the Fox Company positions. I had no radio contact with the French, Fox Company or with Captain Ramsburg's new defensive line if one had been established. Captain Ramsburg had taken all the radio and wiremen with him and hadn't established communications with me. I had no idea where he would attempt to establish a new defensive position or where he would get men to man it. I did have communication with both the battalion and RCT command posts through the tankers radios. The Fox Company squad leader disposed his men and all of the other men in the area along the ditch. The men were divided into two squads and a leader placed in charge of each squad.

Having done what I could in the rear area, I went to find the artillery officers. I found the officers at the gun positions but they had already moved their men into the ditch and all of the wounded men had been evacuated. The officers again pointed out to me the importance to them to save the howitzers. The artillerymen seemed to be alert and willing to stay to protect their guns. Morale seemed to be high when the artillerymen found out that the infantry would not withdraw from their howitzers. The defense line now ran very close to the cut in the hill and that placed the forward positions of the artillerymen in an extremely dangerous position as the Chinese could shift left on the hill above them and fire into their positions. Having a defense established I again coordinated with the tank commander, a sergeant, who said that under no circumstance would he withdraw his tanks without an order, that they were there to stay. I found all of the leaders in the area and established a command post directly behind the last tank. This provided us with protection from Chinese rifle fire. From this point all of the men in the defense could see the CP and know that officers were there in charge which was important at this time. Morale was unusually high considering the impossible situation we were in. No effort was made to enforce noise discipline and the men talked back and forth. Everyone knew the Chinese could hear and possibly see them from their hill top which actually was only just a few short yards away. For some unknown reason, we did not draw enemy fire. I had expected anti-tank fire on the artillery pieces and on the tanks. It was strange to know that a large force of Chinese were so close and yet were not firing or patrolling forward from their positions. The sound of digging in the frozen ground continued, all on the reverse slope. I made arrangements with the tank commander to send a crew to the quad 50 and to protect him with the squad from Fox company. The Chinese still were not making any effort to advance under the cover of darkness and I knew that when they saw what opposed them they would attack if they had anti-tank weapons. We knew that if help didn't come we would play hell trying to defend our positions along the ditch line and the 155's. While talking to the tank commander and artillery officers they asked what more they could do to help out. Half kidding I asked the artillery officers if a crew could turn a howitzer around and fire point blank at the Chinese positions only about 400 yards away. Without hesitation he assembled a crew of volunteers and minutes

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later the howitzer blasted and a split second later the round hit. Six or seven rounds were fired before enemy small arms fire forced the crew back into their defensive positions. The 155 rounds fired were white phosphorous which produced a flash of light and huge clouds of smoke that hung in the air and then drifted south over the Chinese positions. From where I was standing I knew that the rounds scared the hell out of the Chinese as they burst very close to their positions. Right after the artillery fire the lead tanker lowered his gun tube and bounced rounds down the valley towards the south. The rounds hit the frozen, icy road and reverberated down the valley. The echo off the surrounding hills made a terrifying sound. I thought the Chinese would think that we had brought up a new type weapon. After this demonstration of firepower the night grew silent.

The Chinese did not fire at our positions and since our ammunition was dangerously low, we could not fire without a definite target. The Chinese continued to dig and improve their positions, the original George Company positions. These were all on the reverse slope and out of sight from our location. Once in a while, shadows could be seen moving along the skyline, but this for only a fleeting moment. I thought the Chinese didn't know that they had penetrated our perimeter and thought they had pushed back our outpost line and their heaviest fighting was yet to come. Standing there I could think of a million reasons why they did not continue the attack.

At first light I saw a figure come over the hill to our rear directly behind the quad 50 and proceed to the weapon, mount it and commence firing at full automatic. I looked at the Chinese positions and could see no enemy activity and realized that our key weapon against any Chinese attack was being destroyed for no reason at all. I couldn't understand it. My first thought was to shoot the son of a bitch off the weapon. I jumped up on the closest tank and laid the machine gun on the quad 50 intending to scare the gunner off the weapon. I knew there was a chance I might kill or wound the gunner but I felt that gun would save the howitzers and many lives as well if the Chinese attacked. Just as I was about ready to fire, the gunner assigned to the weapon I was using pushed me aside and said that he could fire the weapon better than any officer and that if I would take full responsibility in case he hit the gunner, he would fire the gun. I agreed to this and while we were changing positions, I saw that by firing the quad 50 full automatic the barrels were red hot and were being burned out. They were glowing red in the darkness and seemed to be bending down. By the time the tanker laid the machine gun on the quad 50, the gunner jumped down and disappeared over the hill. At that time I did not know who the individual was and neither did the tankers or artillery officers. I found out later that the gunner was a Captain John Elledge, liaison officer from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion and he had played a very important role in the defense of the George Company area of the 13th and 14th. A sergeant and I raced back to the quad 50 to see if it was still operable but the NCO found that the barrels had been burned out. I had studied the objective

area all night and had seen no activity or weapons on the hill to warrant firing the quad 50. If they had anti tank weapons they would have fired on our tanks. I couldn't understand why the weapon was fired or why the gunner hadn't come to the CP to ask permission to fire it nor could I understand why the gunner ran back over the hill as he did not draw any fire. I found out later that Captain Ramsburg had given Captain Elledge permission to fire the weapon prior to his leaving the area. When I found out the condition of the weapon I was mad as hell, as I had just lost the most important weapon we had to use against a massed Chinese attack.

Back at the CP behind the tanks, all remained quiet and we drew no enemy fire. The Chinese made no effort to probe over the forward slope of the hill. It was eerie standing there in the darkness knowing that a large force of Chinese were just yards away from us. I kept expecting some type of enemy action at any minute and tension was getting high up and down the small defense line we had established. I thought maybe the Chinese were waiting for anti-tank weapons or even replacements before they would attack. When Captain Ramsburg left the area he had shouted to everyone to fall back to a new defense position and I kept expecting some communications from him, at least a wire line. LTC Edwards kept telling me to hold as help was on the way and would be there any minute. He didn't know if and where Ramsburg had established a new defensive position. He said he would check with the staff on this and get right back to me. I kept one eye on the road leading into Chipyoung-ni and one eye on the enemy on the hill. I know that we could form a better defense by dropping back to the higher hill to our rear but I also knew better than to ask permission to withdraw as I had been in two similar situations before and knew that neither Colonel Freeman or Edwards were going to allow me to give up any ground that would have to be retaken in daylight. Beside, we couldn't remove the howitzers and giving any ground to the Chinese might have allowed them to destroy or capture the guns. It was almost light and we braced for a Chinese assault but still nothing happened. It was almost like if you don't fire at me, I won't fire at you. I couldn't see any observation posts on our side of the hill and all digging had stopped. Now I could see down the road to the south and could see no enemy activity except Chinese moving northeast on Hill 397 way out to our left front. They did not appear to be moving directly into our area and it appeared to be only infantry. No tanks or anti-tank weapons were to be seen. The Chinese did not use the road and all movement was cross country. I couldn't see the French positions but I could see that no Chinese had dug in on the right of the road in the French area. I couldn't understand why they hadn't dug across the road as this would have given them flat fields of fire directly into the George Company rear area and our defensive positions. From what I could estimate the Chinese were heavily entrenched from the cut in the road east to in front of Fox Company. It was obvious that they were afraid of the tanks and had nothing to destroy them or the artillery with. All remained silent. I couldn't figure out what was happening and minutes seemed like

hours waiting for the Chinese to make their move.

Just as full light broke I could see a rifle company coming down the road, the help the LTC Edwards had promised. I was sure that this force would take over the defense of the area but when I contacted LTC Edwards for instructions he ordered to me direct the company commander of B company to attack at once, supported by whatever help we could give him. He said that he had been ordered to attack by Colonel Freeman. I explained the situation to the company commander. As we approached the flat land near the old George Company CP full daylight was available and looking up the hill one could see dead bodies, Chinese and American laying across the objective area. The company commander questioned the feasibility of making a daylight frontal attack on an enemy dug in and without proper preparatory fires. In my own mind I know that the attack couldn't succeed. I checked again with LTC Edwards who stated in no uncertain terms that Freeman wanted that hill back and he wanted it now. He said attack as soon as possible. He suggested that maybe if I would lead the attack the company would follow. I talked it over with the company commander and it was decided that since I was a staff officer and since the second battalion had lost the ground I should lead the attack. I kept telling myself, you were lucky to make it though the night but your not going to make it up that damn hill. I knew damn well that there was no chance of our taking the objective against dug in positions. We would be sitting ducks to the defenders firing down on us.

We had just started our deployment of platoons when I looked down the road and saw a jeep coming down the road at top speed. I recognized LTC Edwards and stopped the attack and went back to see him intending to ask for artillery and mortar preparatory fires to soften up the objective. For some unknown reason, we still were not drawing enemy fire but you now could see enemy activity on the hill, soldiers running back and forth probably moving more men into the dug in positions. LTC Edwards told me that the attack was off until after the air force came in and bombed, strafed and napalmed the Chinese positions. He said that the remaining men from the Ranger Company were on their way to assist B Company in the attack and that he and the battalion forward CP would direct the attack.

He then gave me a new assignment which was to help Captain John Emerson, our S-1, get into a troubled rifle company which needed a new company commander. This company was on the exact opposite side of the perimeter and was in another battalions area. I left the George Company area and proceeded down the road into town and picked up Captain Emerson. He gave me a run down on the situation and said the company was in a precarious position. As we started up the hill mass towards the companies position all hell broke loose. We received Chinese small arms fire from extremely close range from our left flank and from directly above us. This meant that some Chinese had penetrated the perimeter. We slid to the right and tried to advance up the hill again only to be met by more small arms fire at close range. It didn't take

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long to realize that if we didn't get our fannies out of there soon, we were going to be killed or captured. I had been captured once before and they beat the hell out of me before I escaped and I didn't want another douse of that. Captain Emerson was at least 6' 7" and it didn't seem that there was any cover or concealment that was good enough to hide his long frame. I felt sorry for him and was glad I was so small. We decided to try to get back to the battalion CP and report that the Chinese had infiltrated the perimeter and for them follow the trace of the RCT perimeter down to the company we were supposed to assist.

At the CP the S-3 checked with the battalion that needed officers and found out that the situation had been taken care of and that they would sweep their rear area and flush out the Chinese behind them. By this time, we could hear the air force pounding the Chinese positions in the George Company area. They came in so low over the CP you felt you could reach up and touch them. Tired to the point of exhaustion, I laid down for a nap as I knew LTC Edward would give me a new assignment when he came back to the CP.

About 1600 on the 15th, I was told to report to LTC Edwards. He told me that the George Company positions had been retaken by the Rangers and Company B after heavy bombing, napalming and strafing by the air force. He said the Chinese put up a hell of a fight but that a tank attack that got in their rear area demoralized them and broke their will to fight and they had withdrawn. He said our tanks had contacted the lead elements of Task Force Crombez and I was to take a jeep and go down the road south until I came in contact with the tank force and guide it back to a designated tank park until it could be decided if Task Force Crombez would go back that night or stay and reinforce our perimeter and return during daylight hours.

We had known about Task Force Crombez and knew they were on the way to break into us. I heard they were a tank column, at least two companies of infantry, some engineers, ammunition resupply vehicles, empty trucks to remove the wounded and about 20 ambulances for the more severely wounded men. We knew that the task force was having a hell of a hard fight trying to reach us. I went down the road south past the George Company positions until I met the task force. When I met them, I was surprised as there only appeared to be about 12 tanks and no resupply vehicles. I could only see about 20 rifle men on the tanks and most of them appeared to be wounded and in bad shape.

I talked to the lead tank commander and explained my mission to him and found out from him that the Chinese resistance was so heavy the they couldn't bring our ammunition and vehicles to evacuate the wounded. He said it had been pure hell all the way in. I received permission to ride on the lead tank because I had to guide them in to a tank park so they could reorganize. On the tank were two wounded men and a sergeant from Company L, 5th Calvary Regiment, the rifle company that had the rode the tanks. They were very upset and kept swearing at the tankers and kept

saying that all of the tank officers should be shot or boiled in oil. I asked the sergeant where the rest of the riflemen from their company were and they claimed that they had left with their entire company but those I could see were all that were left and the rest were dead or captured or hiding in the hills. They kept swearing at the tankers and it was hard to get a story out of them.

The sergeant told me that his company of about 200 men was to ride the tanks and in case an enemy road block was encountered the riflemen were to dismount and eliminate the road block, remount and move on the the next road block. A group of engineers were to remove any land mines encountered. When the first road block was encountered the infantry dismounted as planned and attempted to eliminate the roadblock. There was heavy fighting. When the tankers saw that they could move ahead they took off at a high rate of speed and some of the infantry could not reach them or could not mount the fast moving tanks. At the second road block the same thing happened. The sergeant told me that his battalion commander was not supposed to go with the task force but as the task force was moving out, he changed his mind and mounted a tank. He wanted to go with his men. The last time the sergeant saw his battalion commander, he was in hand to hand combat with at least six Chinese soldiers. He claimed that all the way in it was like going through a shooting gallery with the Chinese shooting riflemen off the tanks. I had worked with our tanks in similiar situations and knew that they would never leave infantrymen so it was hard to believe the sergeants story but the other men backed him up. They said that just before they got to us they came through an area with hills close to the road on both sides and that the fire came down on them like hail.

When we got into the Chipyoung-ni perimeter I took the tank column to the designated tank park. It was dark by the time all of the tanks moved into position. I was talking to a tank commander when instinct told me to hit the ground and I pushed the tanker down with me. Just as we hit the ground boxes of ammunition started bouncing off the tanks. If we hadn't hit the ground, we would have been hit by the boxes. We had parked the tanks on the edge of the perimeter drop zone and the drop planes were a little off their target in the darkness. As I walked back to the battalion CP it was dark, a few flakes of snow were falling even though you could see stars shining in the sky. All the way back I kept thinking, thank God this one is over and that I was damn glad that I was not a rifleman riding the tanks on Task Force Crombez. By the time I reached the CP it had started to snow and there was no firing going on anywhere on the entire 23 RCT perimeter. The silence was eerie after the noise of the last few days. Snow fell all night.

The next morning I went to the tank park to watch Task Force Crombez leave but Colonel Crombez wanted to wait a few hours to see if the weather would improve as it was still snowing and visability was extremely limited. Father Frank, our battalion

chaplain, an Irish missionary who had a Catholic Church and school which was destroyed by the North Koreans, was with me and asked me to take him on a visit to all the front line troops. Escorting Father Frank was an assigned job of mine.

We were near the George Company positions and decided to start there. As we reached the top of the hill you could see that snow had covered the scarred hill where the hand to hand fighting had taken place but dead Chinese bodies, some burned to a crisp and charred black from the napalm, still lay exposed all across the forward and reverse slope of the hill. The Chinese had improved all of the George Company positions. Men in position told me that after they took back the hill they would find a dead Chinese in the hole and an American under him and then often would find another dead Chinese with an American soldier on the bottom of the position. Going down the battalion perimeter, on the left of Fox Company, we came to a machine gun position manned by Sergeant O'Shell, Company H (heavy weapons). He asked me to help him get a dead enemy body count as he couldn't get anyone to go forward of the line with him. Looking out from Sergeant O'Shell's position I saw that the forward slope of hill ran down into a draw that lead into his position and gave the enemy an excellent avenue of approach.

This draw had been mined and wired at a point where the draw was narrowest and was well within reach of friendly small arms fire. I could see at least fifteen dead Chinese lying in the snow from where I was standing. Walking out to the wire, I could see that there was a depression on the far side of the wire and from the wire down the draw there appeared to be at least a platoon of enemy dead. We made a quick count of at least thirty more dead Chinese. The enemy had discovered that the draw led into the perimeter and had stubbornly made repeated attacks in large numbers in the same area, the draw. Sergeant O'Shell's assistant gunner had been wounded early in the evening as well as the men occupying the positions on his left and right and had been evacuated. Sergeant O'Shell realized that the Chinese attacked in only one area and kept his machine gun laid on the draw all night in spite of extremely heavy enemy fire. It was a good thing that Colonel Edwards had ordered ammunition stockpiled on positions when the perimeter was established as there was no way to resupply him.

When I got back to the CP they told me that Colonel Crombez had just left with our wounded loaded in about seven 2 1/2 ton trucks and nineteen ambulances. The battle for Chipyoung-ni was over and for the first time in Korea the Chinese had been defeated by American soldiers.

TAB G

ALLIED COOPERATION IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTLE:
THE FRENCH BATTALION AT CHIPYONG-NI, KOREA,
FEBRUARY, 1951

A Research Paper
Presented to
Dr. L. L. Sims
Department of Strategy

In Partial Fulfillment
of Graduation Requirements
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

by
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"There is only one thing worse than having allies - that's not having allies."¹

The joint efforts of the French Battalion and the 23d Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in a perimeter defense at Chipyeong-ni, Korea in February 1951 demonstrated effective allied cooperation in a combined arms battle. However, the molding of these two forces into a highly effective fighting team did not happen by chance nor did it occur overnight. A brief background study and a review of the battle offers many insights into what enabled these allies to break the back of an attack by four Chinese divisions.

The French activated the Korea bound battalion on 16 September 1950. The battalion, composed solely of volunteers, had a full complement of 39 officers, 172 NCO's, and 806 enlisted men in addition to a replacement unit of 10 officers, 40 NCO's, and 350 enlisted men. A small unit of 20 officers and 130 other men remained in France for the support of the battalion. The proportion of active and reserve forces were as follows: officers, half and half; NCO's, 70 per cent active, 30 per cent reserve; and enlisted men, 10 per cent active, 90 per cent reserve. The battalion trained intensively for several weeks at a specifically designed camp and embarked on ship 25 October 1950 for Pusan, Korea.²

The French disembarked on 29 November 1950 and processed immediately into the United Nations Replacement Center (UNRC) at Taegu. They were equipped with U.S. Army materiel, and the battalion was organized under approximately the same TO&E as a

U.S. Army battalion.³ A three week training schedule was prepared. However, orders from Eighth United States Army Korea reduced this to ten days because of the suddenly adverse tactical situation.⁴ This did not present a significant problem though.

The troops were well trained and had considerable knowledge of most U.S. weapons before they arrived. They were proud of their efficiency, discipline, and military bearing and seemed to be the best trained of any unit received at UNRC.

Language was a bigger problem than anticipated because the French had only a few interpreters while almost no members of the UNRC could speak French. This problem was overcome by having the UNRC personnel teach the French instructors with the help of interpreters followed by the French instructors giving the training to their troops. Overall, the French unit was considered adequately trained in all weapons other than the 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles when they departed the UNRC on 10 December 1950.⁶

The French were attached to the 2d U.S. Infantry Division and subsequently attached to the 23d RCT on 13 December 1950.⁷ At that time the 23d RCT was reorganizing and reequipping after a withdrawal from North Korea following the Chinese Communists Forces invasion in November 1950. This gave the French additional time for emphasis on weapons training, small unit defense problems, squad tactics, maintenance of personal equipment, and inspections.⁸

On 21 December, the French Battalion moved with the 23d RCT to the vicinity of Chungju. The mission was to man blocking

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positions in the sector. The regiment was ordered on 29 December to move to the Wonju area to occupy defensive positions north of that town and to prepare to fight a delaying action south along the Wonju-Chunju and Wonju-Chipo-Ri-Chungju axis. On 30 December the Regiment moved from Wonju to Hoengsong. On 31 December the French participated in an operation to eliminate an enemy road block north of Hoengsong. This marked the French Battalion's baptism in combat.⁹

During the period 2-15 January 1951, the French Battalion and 23d RCT conducted clearing operations and occupied various defensive positions to secure Wonju and the surrounding area. They received on 15 January the mission to patrol the Wonju-Chunju road and area west to the Han River. The French sent out daily patrols until 25 January but reported no significant enemy contact. Slack time during this period was used for additional unit training and weapons firing. On 25 January the 23d RCT moved north to set up patrol bases. The 2d Battalion and French Battalion located in the vicinity of Mungmang-Ni. Again, no significant contacts were made.¹⁰

On 30 January the 23d RCT was given the mission of seeking out and destroying the enemy in the Twin Tunnels area. The French Battalion and the 3d Battalion attacked on 31 January to accomplish this mission. The attacking elements encountered stiff enemy resistance but reached their objectives and set up a perimeter defense by nightfall.¹¹ Two enemy regiments repeatedly attacked the perimeter on 1 February. The French Battalion received the brunt of the attacks and was engaged

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in hand to hand fighting. The French counterattacked with bayonets and drove the enemy back. For their heroic actions the French Battalion was awarded the Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation.¹²

The French Battalion and the 23d RCT proceeded on 3 February to the small town of Chipyeong-ni and set up a perimeter defense. The regimental commander placed his companies on lower ground, inside a ring of hills, to form a tight perimeter approximately two kilometers in diameter.¹³ The French Battalion commander placed all three of his rifle companies on the front line to cover the assigned sector which stretched from the southern part of Hill 100 to the northern area of Yongmal. This covered approximately one and a half kilometers on the western plain of Chipyeong-ni with most of the sector crossing a series of frozen rice paddies. Elements of the French Heavy Weapons Company were also placed on line.¹⁴

The French dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars and emplaced anti-personnel mines. One section of the regimental Heavy Mortar Company was assigned to fire in support of the French. Artillery was registered on all probable avenues of enemy approach, and all units established good communication lines to include radio, telephone, and messenger. Extra supplies and ammunition were stocked. Time was sufficient to coordinate the infantry, armor, artillery, and air support into an effective combined arms team.¹⁵

Daily patrols were sent in all directions to the high

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ground surrounding Chipyeong-ni. On 4 February the French captured a prisoner who identified his unit as the 125th Chinese Communist Division and said that his division was moving to the west of Chipyeong-ni. Small groups of enemy were observed by various patrols throughout the area. The French reported on 6 February that Hill 282 was occupied by the enemy.

From 10-13 February all patrols reported major enemy buildups in the area. The French saw lights on Hill 245 at 2114 hours, 13 February. At 2207 hours Company C received automatic weapons fire and four rounds of mortar fire. The siege of Chipyeong-ni had begun.¹⁶

The Chinese launched a company size attack at 0100 hours, 14 February at the juncture of the 1st and French Battalions. The attack came without warning and was opened by a barrage of hand grenades followed by an intense volley of small arms and automatic weapons fire. The attack failed. An hour later the enemy attacked again but in the center of the French Battalion's position. Since many of their men were on flat ground, the French took casualties from the enemy mortar fire. The French used four tanks and their own 60-mm mortars to repel the attack.

Probing attacks continued throughout the night all around the perimeter. Torches were seen and buglers heard in each sector prior to the attacks. At 0535 hours the main supply route was cut; the enemy had encircled the regiment. The Chinese attacked the 1st French Company at 0708 hours. Enemy

company size forces attempted several times to penetrate the perimeter. The French counterattacked from their front lines at 0845 hours and captured a Chinese officer and fourteen other POW's. The disrupted Chinese broke physical contact on the entire perimeter.¹⁷ The French preceded their counterattacks with the warning of loud noises emitted from a hand cranked siren.¹⁸

Throughout the day of 14 February short patrols were sent out from the perimeter. The French trapped fifty Chinese on the northeast slope of Hill 248 but were ordered back within the perimeter.¹⁹ Twenty four C-119's air dropped supplies and ammo to the Regiment during the afternoon. Air strikes were directed to the north of Chipyeong-ni.²⁰

The first enemy action in the evening occurred at 2030 hours when Company K received a mortar barrage. At the same time as an attack in the 2d Battalion area, the enemy brought the regimental command post under heavy fire from self-propelled guns, mortars, and small arms. This continued for over an hour and the impact spread to include the French Battalion area. Fighting increased around the perimeter until the 2d and 3d Battalions were engaged in close combat.²¹

A short lull occurred, but at 0130 hours, 15 February fighting resumed as Company K stopped two attacks. Pressure mounted against Company G on the south and southwest. At 0315 hours the overwhelming number of enemy forced Company G back with heavy losses. A composite force of Rangers, one platoon of Company F and the remainder of Company G was ordered to

counterattack to regain the lost ground. Meanwhile, several other attacks were repulsed around the perimeter.

The French fired their 81-mm mortars extensively to insure they held their positions next to the sector vacated by Company G. At 0425 hours, the French had no 60-mm mortar rounds and only 200 81-mm mortar rounds left. The French stopped another enemy attack at 0520 hours and also spotted and destroyed an enemy mortar position at the same time.²²

The counterattack to regain Company G positions failed at 0800 hours with heavy losses to friendly troops. Company B was then ordered to retake the lost ground to secure the perimeter. Company B was unsuccessful in their counterattacks until 1400 hours when air strikes and napalm drops routed the enemy from his positions. At 1605 hours the French sighted enemy digging on the western slope of Hill 391. Artillery fire was called to disrupt the enemy's actions.²³ Air drops in the afternoon resupplied the depleted stocks of ammunition.²⁴

During the day's activity, a radio contact was established with the 5th Cavalry Regiment which was approaching Chipyeong-ni from the southwest. By 1630 hours Company B, now secure in its position, could see the leading elements of the 5th Cavalry Task Force. At 1645 hours the French notified the remainder of the perimeter forces that hundreds of Chinese were fleeing from west to east toward Hill 391. The fleeing enemy was fired on with all available small arms, machine guns, artillery, and tank fire. At 1700 hours the Regimental

commander ordered all units to hold their fire as ammunition stocks were dangerously low. The relieving tank task force entered the perimeter at 1715 hours. No enemy contact was made during the night and the crisis of Chipyeong-ni had definitely passed by the morning of 16 February.²⁵

Analysis

This battle illustrates the combined efforts of allies to stop a numerically superior force. The French were volunteer soldiers, well trained and combat experienced from campaigns in Indochina and Africa. The issuance and use of U.S. Army clothing, weapons and ammunition, and all supplies minimized the logistical problems normally associated with allied forces. Slack time in December 1950 and January 1951 allowed the French to be trained in U.S. Army doctrine and tactics. It also gave the French the opportunity to become acclimatized to the harsh Korean winter and to become familiar with the type of terrain on which they would fight. Time was also used to form a close working relationship with the 23d RCT who were in a period of reorganizing, reequipping, and training.

The reorganization of the French Battalion under a U.S. TO&E further facilitated their integration into the 23d RCT. Introduction to combat was gradual and consisted primarily of patrolling and area security missions. Experience gained by the French and the 3d Battalions of the 23d RCT at the Twin Tunnels defensive perimeter enabled many of their combat lessons learned to be used by the whole 23d RCT at Chipyeong-ni.

Defensive perimeter preparations were extensive at

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Chipyong-ni and all elements of the combined arms team were well coordinated on the defensive plan. The French and Americans fought as a team throughout the battle. Finally, the valiant, daring actions of the French and their coolness in the heat of battle earned the lasting respect of their American ally. MG Robert N. Young, 2d Infantry Division Commanding General described it well when he stated:

The 23d Infantry regards the French as "blood brothers" and has the highest opinion of French esprit and gallantry.... We want the association to continue indefinitely; on every count they (the French) are "number 1".²⁵

FOOTNOTES

¹Statement by Field Marshall Sir William Slim during Kermit Roosevelt Lecture ("Higher Command in War") at USAACGSC, 8 April 1952.

²The War History Compilation Committee, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. III (Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 1974), pp. 192-193.

³Major William J. Fox, History of the Korean War: Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations (Japan: Far East Command, 1952), page 200.

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., pp. 24-26.

⁷"Letter, 2d Infantry Division, 12 Dec 1950," Command Report for 1-31 Dec 1950, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #45, item #20).

⁸"Operations Report," ibid., p. 10.

⁹Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹⁰"Operations Report," Command Report for 1-31 Jan 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #45, item #20), pp. 11-12.

¹¹"Operations Report," Command Report for 1-28 February 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #133, item #215), p. 27.

¹²Lt. Clark C. Munroe, The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-51 (Tokyo: Tappan Printing Co., LTD, 1951), pp. 221-222.

¹³"Narrative History," Command Report for 1-28 February 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #133, item #215), p. 2.

¹⁴The War History Compilation Committee, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"After Action Report, Intelligence Annex," Command Report for 1-28 February 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #133, item #215), pp. 1-2.


¹⁷"S3 Journal, 14 Feb 1951," ibid., pp. 1-5.

¹⁸Statement by COL H.E. Chapman, personal interview, April, 1976.

¹⁹"S3 Journal, 14 Feb 1951," Command Report for 1-28 Feb 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #133, item #215), entry 138.

- 20 "After Action Report, "Air Action Support," *ibid.*, p. 1.
- 21 "S3 Journal, 14 Feb 1951," *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 22 "S3 Journal, 15 Feb 1951," Command Report for 1-28 Feb 1951, 23d Infantry Regiment (CGSC Microfilm Box #133, item #215), pp. 1-2.
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.
- 24 "After Action Report, Air Action Support," *ibid.*, p. 2.
- 25 "S3 Journal, 15 Feb 1951," *op. cit.*, p. 5.

FRENCH BATTALION OFFENSIVE 1 JAN-30 MAR 1951




Situation Map 7

Taken from The War History Compilation Committee, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. III (Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 1974) p. 599. 210.

BATTLES OF TWIN TUNNELS & CHIPYONG-NI

31 JAN - 18 FEB 1951






Situation Map 8


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
BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI

12-16 FEB 1951

LEGEND

-  DAYLIGHT POSITIONS
-  ROAD BLOCKS
-  UNLAW ATTACKS





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
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TAB H

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

RUSSELL A. GUGELER



9


Task Force Crombez

★ While the 23d Regimental Combat Team, surrounded by Chinese Communists at Chipyeong-ni, braced itself for the second night of the siege, a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division set out on a sort of rescue mission: to drive through enemy lines, join the encircled unit and give it all possible assistance. Specifically, it was to open the road for supply vehicles and ambulances.¹

On 14 February 1951, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was in corps reserve when the commanding general of U.S. IX Corps (Maj.Gen. Bryant E. Moore) alerted it for possible action. It was midafternoon when he first telephoned the regimental commander (Col. Marcel G. Crombez) warning him to make plans for an attack along the road running from Yaju to Koksung-ni and then northeast into Chipyeong-ni—a road distance of fifteen miles.² Another force, attacking along the better and more direct road to Chipyeong-ni, had been unable to make fast enough progress because of heavily entrenched enemy forces along its route.

Immediately relaying the warning order to subordinate units, Colonel Crombez organized a task force.³

In addition to the three organic infantry battalions of the 5th Cavalry, he included a medical company, a company of combat engineers, two battalions of field artillery of which one was equipped with self-propelled howitzers, two platoons of medium tanks, and an attached company of medium tanks.⁴ The last named—Company D, 6th Tank Battalion—was not a part of the 1st Cavalry Division, but happened to be located closer than any other available tank company. General Moore attached Company D



to the 5th Cavalry and ordered it to get under way within thirty minutes to join that unit. Company D was on the road twenty-eight minutes later. At 1700 that afternoon, the corps commander again called.⁵

"You'll have to move out tonight," he told Colonel Crombez, "and I know you'll do it." ⁶

In the darkness, trucks and vehicles formed a column along the narrow, rutted road, snow covered and patched with ice. Moving under black-out conditions and in enemy territory, all units except the two artillery battalions crossed the Han River and advanced approximately half of the distance to Chipyeong-ni. About midnight the regimental column halted at a destroyed bridge where units formed defensive perimeters while combat engineers rebuilt the structure.⁷

At daylight on 15 February, the 1st Battalion jumped off again—this time on foot. Its mission was to seize a terrain feature on the right which dominated the road for several miles to the north. When the battalion was engaged after moving a hundred or two hundred yards, Colonel Crombez sent the 2d Battalion to attack north on the left side of the road. Within an hour or two a full-scale regimental attack was in progress. Two artillery battalions supported the action, lifting their fire only for air strikes. Chinese resistance was firm. Observers in airplanes reported large enemy forces north of the attacking battalions.⁸

The advance lagged throughout the morning. Sensing that the enemy offered too much opposition for the infantry battalions to be able to reach Chipyeong-ni by evening, Colonel Crombez decided that only an armored task force would be able to penetrate the enemy-held territory.⁹ With corps and division headquarters pressing for progress, Colonel Crombez separated the tanks—a total of twenty-three—from his regimental column, and organized an armored task force. The tanks came from Company D, 6th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion. He also ordered a company of infantrymen to accompany the tanks in order to protect them from fanatic enemy troops who might attempt to knock out the tanks at close range. This task fell to Company L, 5th Cavalry Regiment.¹⁰ In addition, four combat engineer soldiers were ordered to go along to lift any antitank mines that might be discovered. The engineers and the infantrymen were to ride on top of the tanks.¹¹

While the tanks maneuvered into position, Colonel Crombez reconnoitered the road to Chipyeong-ni by helicopter. It was a secondary road even by Korean standards: narrow, with mountain slopes on the left side and flat rice paddies on the right, except at a deep roadcut a mile south of Chipyeong-ni where, for a short distance, steep cliffs walled both sides of the road.

Meanwhile, the Company L commander (Capt. John C. Barrett) and the commander of Company D, 6th Tank Battalion (Capt. Johnnie M. Hiers), worked out the plans at company level. The two officers agreed

that when the tanks stopped, the troopers would dismount, deploy on both sides of the road, and protect the tanks and the engineers who might be lifting mines. When the tank column was ready to proceed, Captain Hiers would inform the tankers by radio; the tankers, in turn, would signal the troopers to remount.¹²

The M46 tanks of the 6th Tank Battalion were placed to lead the 70th Tank Battalion's M4A3 tanks because the M46s mounted 90mm guns, could turn completely around in place (an important consideration in the mountainous terrain traversed by a single and narrow road), and had better armor protection than the M4A3 tanks, which mounted only 76mm guns.¹³

Original plans called for a separate column of supply trucks and ambulances to follow the tanks. Colonel Crombez, however, doubted if such a column could get through. He decided to proceed with only the armored vehicles. When the road was clear and suitable for wheeled traffic, he would radio instructions to the supply vehicles and ambulances. By radio he informed the commanding officer of the 23d RCT that he was coming, but without the supply trains.

"Come on," the commander of the encircled force answered; "trains or no trains."¹⁴

Just before the task force left, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (Lt.Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Jr.) arranged for a 2½-ton truck to follow the rear of the tank column and pick up any wounded men from Company L. The Company L commander (Captain Barrett) issued instructions that any troopers who became separated from the tank column were to make their way back to friendly lines if possible, or wait near the road, utilizing the best available defensive positions, until the tanks returned from Chipyeong-ni later in the day.¹⁵

About 1500 Captain Barrett mounted his company on the tanks in the center of the column, leaving four tanks at each end of the column bare. The four engineer soldiers rode on the second tank in the column. Thus, 15 tanks carried 160 Company L infantrymen.¹⁶ The infantry platoon leaders selected one man on each tank to fire the caliber .50 machine gun mounted on its deck. Captain Barrett rode on the sixth tank in line, along with ten enlisted men and Colonel Treacy who, at the last minute, decided to accompany the task force.¹⁷

Planes strafed and bombed enemy positions along the route of march before the armored column took off. The two infantry battalions maintained strong pressure to keep the Chinese occupied and to prevent them from drawing off any strength to throw against the task force. With Colonel Crombez riding in the fifth tank, the mile-long column got under way at 1545 on 15 February.¹⁸ Liaison planes circled overhead, maintaining contact with the advancing tanks.¹⁹

The task force, with fifty-yard intervals between tanks, proceeded about two miles—until the lead tank approached the village of Koksuri.

All of a sudden, enemy mortar shells began exploding near the tanks, and enemy riflemen and machine gunners opened fire on the troopers exposed on the decks. Just then the lead tank stopped at a bridge bypass on the south edge of Koksuri, and the entire column came to a halt.²⁰ The tankers turned their guns toward Chinese whom they could see clearly on nearby hills and opened fire with their machine guns and cannons. Several troopers, wounded by the first bursts of enemy fire, fell or were knocked from the tanks. Others left the tanks, not so much to protect them as to take cover themselves.²¹ Colonel Crombez directed the tank fire.

"We're killing hundreds of them!" he shouted over the intertank communications.

After a few minutes, however, feeling that the success of the task force depended upon the ability of the tanks to keep moving, Colonel Crombez directed them to continue.²²

Without warning, the tanks moved forward. The troopers raced after the moving tanks but, in the scramble, thirty or more men, including two officers of Company L, were left behind. The truck following the tanks picked up three wounded men who had been left lying near the road. This truck, however, was drawing so much enemy fire that other wounded men preferred to stay where they were. After both officers in the group were wounded by mortar fire, MSgt. Lloyd L. Jones organized the stranded men and led them back toward their own lines.²³

There was another halt just after the column passed through Koksuri, and again the infantrymen deployed. Against the intense enemy fire the tankers and infantrymen fired furiously to hold the enemy soldiers at some distance. For the second time, the tanks began moving without notifying the infantrymen, and again many Company L men were unable to remount. Some troopers were deployed 50 or 75 yards from the road and the tanks were going too fast to remount by the time the men got back to the road.²⁴ Less than seventy men were left on the tanks when Task Force Crombez moved out after the second halt.²⁵ Another large group of men was left to seek cover or to attempt to rejoin friendly units south of Koksuri. Several men from this group, including the commander of the 3d Battalion (Colonel Treacy) are known to have become prisoners of the Chinese.²⁶

Captain Barrett was unable to remount the tank upon which he had been riding, but he did manage to climb on the fifth or sixth tank behind it.

During the next three or three and a half miles there were several brief halts and almost continuous enemy fire directed against the column whether it was halted or moving. Several times, in the face of heavy enemy fire, tank commanders inquired if they should slow down or stop long enough to shell and silence the Chinese guns. Although enemy fire was causing many casualties among the troopers who remained on the tanks, Colonel Crombez, speaking in a calm and cool voice over the radio network, each time directed the column to continue forward.²⁷

Task Force Crombez, in turn, maintained a volume of rifle, machine-gun, and cannon fire that, throughout the six-mile attack, could be heard by members of the infantry battalions still in position at the task force point of departure. Much of this fire was directed only against the bordering hills, but there were also definite targets at which to aim—enemy machine guns, bazooka teams, and individual Chinese carrying pole or satchel charges. Even though it was difficult to aim from moving tanks, the remaining troopers kept firing—at Chinese soldiers who several times were within fifty yards of the road. On one occasion Captain Barrett shot and killed three enemy soldiers who, trotting across a rice field toward the tanks, were carrying a bangalore torpedo.²⁸

Because of the intense enemy fire on the road, Colonel Crombez decided that wheeled traffic would be unable to get through. When he had gone about two thirds of the way to Chipyeong-ni, he radioed back instructions to hold up the supply trucks and ambulances and await further orders.²⁹

The Chinese made an all-out effort to halt Task Force Crombez when the leading tanks entered the deep roadcut south of Chipyeong-ni. For a distance of about 150 yards the road passed between steep embankments that were between 30 and 50 feet high. And on each side of the road at that point were dominating hills, the one on the right (east) side of the road being Hill 397 from which the Chinese had launched several of their attacks against the Chipyeong-ni perimeter. There was a sudden flare-up of enemy fire as the point tank (commanded by Lt. Lawrence L. DeSchweinitz) approached the cut. Mortar rounds exploded on and near the road. SFC James Maxwell (in the second tank) spotted an enemy soldier carrying a bazooka along the top of the embankment at the roadcut. He immediately radioed a warning to Lieutenant DeSchweinitz, but before he got the call through a bazooka round struck the point tank, hitting the top of the turret and wounding DeSchweinitz, the gunner (Cpl. Donald P. Harrell), and the loader (Pvt. Joseph Galard). The tank continued but without communication since the explosion also destroyed its radio.³⁰

The four members of the engineer mine-detector team rode on the next tank in line (Sergeant Maxwell's). They clung to the tank as it entered the zone of intense enemy fire. An antitank rocket or pole charge exploded on each side of Maxwell's tank as it entered the pass and one of the engineers was shot from the deck, but the vehicle continued, as did the next tank in the column.³¹

Captain Hiers (tank company commander) rode in the fourth tank that entered the road cut. Striking the turret, a bazooka round penetrated the armor and exploded the ammunition in the ready racks inside. The tank started to burn. The men in the fighting compartment, including Captain Hiers, were killed. Although severely burned, the driver of the tank (Cpl. John A. Calhoun) gunned the engine and drove through the cut and off

the road, thus permitting the remainder of the column to advance.³² It was later learned that this tank was destroyed by an American 3.5-inch bazooka which had fallen into enemy hands.³³

With the enemy located at the top of the cliffs directly overlooking the task force column and throwing satchel charges and firing rockets down at the tanks, close teamwork among the tankers became particularly necessary for mutual protection. As each of the remaining tanks rammed through the cut, crews from the tanks that followed and those already beyond the danger area fired a heavy blast at the embankments on both sides of the road. This cut down enemy activity during the minute or less required for each tank to run the cut. The enemy fire did, however, thin out the infantrymen riding on the tanks and, at the tail of the task force, flattened a tire on the 2½-ton truck that had been gathering up the wounded infantrymen who had either fallen or been knocked from the tanks. The driver had been hit near Koksuri as he was putting a wounded infantryman on the truck. Another wounded man (SFC George A. Krizan) drove after that and, although he was wounded a second time, continued driving until the truck was disabled at the roadcut. A few of the wounded men managed to get to one of the last tanks in the column, which carried them on into Chipyeong-ni. The others, surrounded by the enemy, became missing in action.³⁴

Meanwhile, within the perimeter of the 23d RCT at Chipyeong-ni, the 2d Battalion was fighting off stubborn and persistent enemy attempts to overrun the sector shared by Company G, 23d Infantry, and Battery A, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, on the south rim of the perimeter. Late in the afternoon of 15 February, after twenty hours of uninterrupted fighting, the battalion commander managed to send four tanks a short distance down the road leading south beyond the regimental defense perimeter with the mission of getting behind the Chinese and firing into their exposed flank and rear. Ten or fifteen minutes of firing by the four tanks appeared to have suddenly disrupted the Chinese organization. Enemy soldiers began running.

Just at that moment, tanks of Task Force Crombez appeared from the south. Sergeant Maxwell, in the second tank, saw the four tanks on the road ahead and was just about to open fire when he recognized them as friendly. The leading tanks stopped. For about a minute everyone waited, then Sergeant Maxwell dismounted and walked forward to make contact with the 23d Infantry's tanks. He asked them to withdraw and allow Task Force Crombez to get through.³⁵

By this time the Chinese were in the process of abandoning their positions south of Chipyeong-ni and many were attempting to escape. Enemy opposition dwindled. With enemy soldiers moving in the open, targets were plentiful for a short time and Colonel Crombez halted his force long enough to take the Chinese under fire.³⁶

At 1700 Task Force Crombez entered the Chipyeong-ni perimeter. It had required an hour and fifteen minutes for the tanks to break through a little more than six miles of enemy territory. Even though there were neither supply trucks nor ambulances with the column, and although the task force itself was low on ammunition, infantrymen were cheered by the sight of reinforcements.

Of 160 Company L infantrymen plus the 4 engineers who had started out riding the tank decks, only 23 remained. Of these, 13 were wounded, of whom 1 died of wounds that evening. Some members of that company already had returned to join the remainder of the 3d Battalion near the point of departure; a few wounded men lay scattered along the road between Koksū-ri and Chipyeong-ni. While crossing the six miles of drab and barren country between those two villages, Company L lost about 70 men—nearly half of its strength. Twelve men were dead, 19 were missing in action, and about 40 were wounded.²⁷

With only an hour of daylight remaining, Colonel Crombez had to choose between returning at once to his regiment, or spending the night at Chipyeong-ni. Any enemy opposition encountered on a return trip that evening would probably delay into darkness the contact with friendly forces, and unprotected tanks operating in the darkness, he reasoned, could be ambushed easily by enemy groups.²⁸

On the other hand, the 23d RCT was dangerously low on small-caliber ammunition, airdrops that day having contained only artillery shells.²⁹ Task Force Crombez had fired most of its ammunition during the action. Officers inside the perimeter wondered if there were enough small-arms ammunition to beat off another Chinese attack.

There was another reason for returning. Seriously wounded infantrymen within the perimeter urgently needed to be evacuated. It was also probable that men from Company L who had been wounded or stranded during the attack by Task Force Crombez were waiting near the road, according to their instructions, hoping to be picked up again as the tanks made the return trip. However, weighing the two risks, Colonel Crombez chose to stay. He arranged to station his tanks around the perimeter to strengthen the defense, but no attack came. Except for a few flares that appeared over enemy territory, the night passed quietly. Toward morning it began to snow.

At 0900, 16 February, the scheduled time for return to the regiment, Colonel Crombez informed his assembled force that the return trip would be postponed because the snow, reducing visibility at times to less than a hundred yards, prevented air cover. It was 1100 before the weather cleared and the task force was reassembled. This time Colonel Crombez stated that only volunteers from the infantrymen and the engineer mine-detecting crew would ride on the tanks. None volunteered. Instead, an artillery liaison plane hovered over the column as it moved south. The observer in the plane

had instructions to adjust proximity-fuzed shells directly on the column if the enemy attempted to destroy any of the tanks. On the return trip not a single enemy was seen, nor a shot fired.⁴⁰

Immediately upon his return Colonel Crombez ordered the assembled supply train to proceed to Chipyeong-ni. Escorted by tanks, twenty-eight 2½-ton trucks and nineteen ambulances pulled out in the middle of the afternoon. For his part, Captain Barrett (the Company L commander), having returned with the task force because he wanted to find out what had happened to the rest of his company, set out in a jeep to retrace the route and search for wounded men who might still be lying along the road. He found four whom he turned over to the evacuation train at Chipyeong-ni. The ambulances and seven 2½-ton trucks, all loaded with wounded men from the 23d Regimental Combat Team, left Chipyeong-ni that evening. The siege was ended.⁴¹

★ DISCUSSION

The few details in the narrative concerning the situation before the departure of Task Force Crombez do not permit sound criticism. However, it does appear that either the enemy was underestimated or friendly capabilities for attacking were overestimated. It hardly seems likely that foot soldiers fighting a determined enemy in the rough terrain of Korea could be expected to advance fifteen miles to Chipyeong-ni in one day.

Simplicity is a virtue applied to military operations. It means that units and individuals have but a limited number of clearly defined moves to make or jobs to do. It is not confined to brevity in orders; sometimes the simplest maneuver is simple only when detailed orders are issued to all participants. Simplicity of execution usually results from comprehensive and careful planning, which is frequently time-consuming and not simple. But the complexities of planning are relatively unimportant. It is for simplicity of execution that commanders must strive. The mission assigned Task Force Crombez was simple to state but difficult to execute. Task Force Crombez accomplished its mission but it paid an extremely high price. The cost can be attributed to inadequate planning and a subsequent lack of coordination.

Plans must be based on intelligence of the enemy, an evaluation of the terrain, and a knowledge of one's own capabilities. Hindsight clearly indicates that in this instance not one soldier should have ridden on top of the tanks. Friendly artillery and the tanks with their own machine guns could have provided adequate close-in protection for the armored column. No engineers were necessary to remove mines.

Coordination is neither accidental nor automatic. It comes with training, experience, and planning. When trained and experienced troops fail to coordinate their efforts, the failure must be attributed to a lack of planning. Complete lack of artillery support contributed to the difficulties of

Task Force Crombez. Coordination between the artillery commanders supporting the 5th Cavalry and the 23d Infantry could have provided artillery support over the entire distance—from the point of departure to Chipyeong-ni. The absence of coordination between the tanks and their riders is outstanding. Communication failures on two different occasions further point up deficiency in planning and coordination.

★ NOTES

1. 5th Cavalry Regiment: S3 report, 15 February 1951.
2. The narrative of this action is based upon a series of interviews made and recorded in March 1951 by Capt. Martin Blumenson with officers and men of Task Force Crombez. They were submitted as part of Eighth Army: command report, section V (After Action Interviews: Task Force Crombez). In this narrative, reference to the interviews will be made by referring to separate interviews as statements by the person under interview.
3. Statement of Col. Marcel G. Crombez.
4. 5th Cavalry Regiment: command report, 14 February 1951.
5. Statement of Lt.Col. George B. Pickett.
6. Crombez, *op. cit.*
7. Statement of Major Robert A. Humphrey.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Crombez, *op. cit.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. Statement of Capt. John C. Barrett; statement of Major Charles J. Parziale.
13. Crombez, *op. cit.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Barrett, *op. cit.*
16. Statement of CWO C. L. Umberger, who was unit administrative officer of Company L, 5th Cavalry.
17. Barrett, *op. cit.*
18. Parziale, *op. cit.*
19. Crombez, *op. cit.*
20. Statement of MSgt. Jessie O. Giddens.
21. Statement of MSgt. Lloyd L. Jones.

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22. Crombez, *op. cit.*
23. Jones, *op. cit.*; statement of SFC George W. Miller.
24. Barrett, *op. cit.*
25. This estimate is based upon Barrett, *op. cit.*, which appears to be the most accurate in this instance.
26. 5th Cavalry Regiment: command report (comments by regimental commander), 15 February 1951.
27. Humphrey, *op. cit.*
28. Barrett, *op. cit.*
29. Crombez, *op. cit.*
30. Statement of SFC James Maxwell.
31. Crombez, *op. cit.*
32. *Ibid.*; statement of Lt. William R. Bierwirth.
33. Pickett, *op. cit.*
34. Crombez, *op. cit.*; statement of Cpl. Wayne O. Kemp.
35. Maxwell, *op. cit.*
36. Crombez, *op. cit.*
37. *Ibid.*; Barrett, *op. cit.* See Company L, 5th Cavalry: morning reports, 13 to 25 February 1951.
38. Crombez, *op. cit.*
39. X Corps: command report (inclosures: 23d RCT Defense, Chipyong-ni).
40. Crombez, *op. cit.*
41. Barrett, *op. cit.*; statement of Capt. Keith M. Stewart.

TAB I

Chinese Communist Forces

*Hq XIX Army Group
CCF Korea
29 March 1951*



CCF

*A Collection of
Combat Experience*

IV CRITIQUE OF TACTICS EMPLOYED IN THE FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE
ENEMY AT CHIPYONG-NI
(From EUSAK PIR No. 377)

This is the fourth of a series of six inclosures extracted from a captured enemy booklet entitled "A Collection of Combat Experience". The booklet was issued by Hq, XIX Army Group, 29 March 1951, and translated by ATIS, 25 June 1951.

The 117th CCF Division, 39th CCF Army, in cooperation with other CCF troops was assigned the mission of annihilating the main UN rear force stationed in the areas north of HOENGSONG (DS1049). The 115th and 116th Division, 39th CCF Army, were further commanded to cut off other enemy forces stationed at CHIPYONG-NI (CS8048) in order to prevent the enemy from escaping and to intercept enemy reinforcements.

On the morning of 2 February 1951, the CCF forces pushed forward to the line linking TANSONG-NI (CS8839), SINCHANG-RI (CS9145), SANGMURAN-NI (CS9450) and HAMURAN-NI (CS9449). At this point they were temporarily stalemated by a part of the 3d LIEN TUI*, the US 2nd Division. On the same night, the 116th Division pushed west from SINCHANG-NI to TANSONG-NI and then continued in the direction of CHUAM-NI (CS8239), along highways and via mountainous areas to the south, to cut off the retreat of the enemy forces in the CHIPYONG-NI area so that they could not escape south to YOUNG. It was also the mission of the 116th Division to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the YO River.

The main force of the 115th Division (343rd and 344th Regiments) pushed forward from SOKKONG-NI (CS8943) along railroads northward to MANGMI-RI (CS8144) and KUDUN (CS8443). The 345th Regiment as the reserve force of the army - (in two characters illegible) was thrown out in a security line extending northeast in the direction of MUNMAK.

At dawn on the 14th of February 1951, the 116th Division, pushing forward to CHUAM-NI, annihilated two companies of the US 23rd Regiment. The 115th Division also arrived at KUDUN without encountering any forces en route. On the same night the 115th Division commenced an enveloping maneuver, pushing forward toward the enemy forces in CHIPYONG-NI, and surrounded the area in cooperation with the 119th Division, 126th Division and a regiment belonging to the 125th Division. The US forces (French battalion, artillery battalion and a Tank TA TUI* amounting to more than six thousand in strength) were surrounded on a narrow strip of high ground one or two miles to the west of PONGMI SAN (CS8048) north of CHIPYONG-NI.

On the 15th of February 1951, the situation was at a standstill with no advances being made by either side. At dawn of the 16th, a command was received, ordering our forces to carry out an urgent interception operation. The following is a summary of the experiences and lessons derived from the battle and the various stages of its progress.

A. Progress of battle.

1. Attack: The attack commenced at 141700 February 1951; the attacking troops successively advanced in the direction of CHIPYONG-NI. At 142310 the 2nd Battalion, 343rd Regiment, encountered and immediately engaged the enemy at KANHYON (CS7946). On receiving this information, the Regiment immediately dispatched five companies to occupy the hilltop to the south of MASAN. The main force of the 3rd Battalion was dispatched to push on along MISAN. The five companies took only 40 minutes to occupy KANHYON. Nearly a hundred enemy were killed and five captured as the enemy were forced to the streets of KANHYON; however, due to the 3rd Battalion's loss of direction, timely contact with the 2nd Battalion was not established, preventing the latter from following up its victory.

When contact was established with the 3d Battalion, it was after 150300. At that time information was received from the interrogation of prisoners that the enemy forces were highly concentrated and had constructed strong field works, so it seemed impossible to achieve victory before daybreak. This information was reported to the Division, whereupon the regiment was ordered to defend MASAN and wait for the attack to be continued on the night of the 15th.

The first battalion of the 344th Regiment, 115th Division, arrived at its line of departure, from which two unsuccessful attacks had already been launched by the 356th Regiment, 119th Division, at 141900. The 1st Battalion started to attack at 142400, but our fire power was not adequately organized because of the enemy's superior fire power and the open terrain. For this reason we failed each of the three times we attacked, with our troops suffering heavy casualties.

On 140400 the 3d Battalion moved to the mountain areas on the east, on the command of the Regiment facing the enemy. At 142100 the 3d Battalion arrived at its line of departure. At that time the 377th Regiment had launched three attacks on a small hilltop 300 meters to the southeast of the railroad station, but was unsuccessful, losing more than half of its forces. The 3d Battalion was more successful. Starting to attack at 150100, it occupied the first hilltop within 40 minutes, taking the second and third hilltops in succession. It was 150430 February 1951 before any further progress into the enemy areas was made. The Regiment gave an order to cease attacking, reconstructed the field works immediately, and hold the occupied positions firmly in preparation for continuing the attack on the night of the 15th.

2. ~~Defense:~~ On the 15th, the 349th Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion to hold the three peaks of MASAN. The 4th and 5th Companies of the 1st Battalion held fast, and the 6th Company was held in reserve. Several enemy counterattacks launched after our troops ceased to attack, were repulsed. After daybreak, our troops, because of the surrounding terrain and overconcentration, suffered heavy casualties from enemy air and artillery attacks. However, because of our timely troop adjustments, and the determination of the 1st Battalion, which had beaten back sixteen enemy counterattacks while collecting ammunition (TN Sic), the enemy failed to take our positions.

At 1600 more than 20 enemy tanks coming to reinforce CHIPYONG-NI from the direction of KOKSU-RI, surprised us; by being almost at the door of the Regimental CP before they were discovered, seriously threatening the flanks and rear of the 2d Battalion. The Regiment immediately ordered the displacement of the 2d Battalion to the positions occupied by the 3d Battalion. The tanks coming up to charge our rear and flanks were subjected to cross fire between our 1st and 2d Battalions laying in ambush, which completely annihilated a company of enemy infantry coming up on the tanks. Twenty others, from the battalion commander down, were captured. We also destroyed four tanks and one motor vehicle.

The 3d Battalion of the 344th Regiment, after occupying three hilltops situated south-east of the railway station, was prevented by daybreak from making any further exploitation of its success and ordered its 9th Company to hold the occupied positions. The company in turn ordered one of its platoons to hold the positions, with one heavy machine gun, while the main force of the company took cover at the base of the hill. The enemy launched four counterattacks with small units (platoons) between 0800 hours and 1300 hours, supported by mortar fire. Each of these attacks failing, the enemy again attacked after 1300 hours with air support strafing, bombing and dropping gasoline cans (TN Sic). With the positions in flames, the troops still remained firm, beating back another two enemy counterattacks. At 1500 hours, enemy tanks arrived; the company, after suffering heavy losses, was unable to cope with this new situation. The

entire battalion moved to concentrate at positions surrounding SINDAE (CS 8146) below MANCMI-SAN (CS8046).

On the 15th, the 115th Division intended to continue the attack at night, but received orders from the 39th UCF Army in the afternoon, ordering it to continue the attack on the night of the 16th, in cooperation with the 40th Army, and to make other troop adjustments. Further orders were given to the 117th Division to take over the defense of the areas surrounding CHUAN-NI (CS8339) and the 116th Division to advance to the south of KOKSU-RI (CS7742) to intercept enemy reinforcements coming from the south. The entire 42nd Army was distributed around IHO-RI, north of MUNMAK to intercept enemy reinforcements coming from WONJU.

The 115th Division made the following adjustments:

The 343d Regiment was ordered to KWANGZANG (CS7945) and areas to the south. The 344th Regiment was to assume command of SINDAE, MANCMI-SAN (CS8046) and the areas south of MANCMI-SAN, with its main force remaining at SOKPUL (CS8045). The 345th Regiment was ordered to MUCHON (CS3243) and mountain areas to the east with the Division CP remaining at KUDUN.

The various regiments distributed their forces as follows: The 343d Regiment ordered one platoon of its 1st Battalion to MASAN (CS7947); the main positions of the Regiment were the ones then occupied by its 1st and 3d Battalions. The 344th Regiment dispatched the 1st Company of its 1st Battalion to hold the enemy, its 2nd Battalion to the mountain areas west of CHOWANG-NI (CS8345), the 3d Battalion to SINDAE (CS8146), with its main force remaining at MANCMI-SAN, and the regimental CP at SOKPUL.

3. Disengagement: At 160330 February 1951, the 115th Division received a coded order from (the illegible) ordering immediate displacement. However, due to confused condition of the troops, having fought for 24 hours without rest, the many casualties, and obscurity of the situation, it was not possible to carry out the displacements immediately upon receiving the order. However, considering the coming day-break, and fearing envelopment by the enemy if and when the other friendly units withdrew, it was decided to order the various regiments to carry out the displacement.

The 343d Regiment proceeded to KOSONG (CS8548), the 344th Regiment to MAEWOL-LI (CS8744), the 345th Regiment to HAP-SONG (CS9349), and the Division CP to CHOYON (CS8944). The various units arrived at their respective positions at 1100 hours on the 16th, though with a certain amount of confusion.

B. Critique.

1. In the conduct of the entire campaign, or the battle command, we have underestimated the enemy. In view of their past characteristics in battle, we expected the enemy to flee at CHIPYONG-NI, after the enemy at HOENGSONG was annihilated.

2. Unfamiliarity with the situation. We thought the enemy had merely field works when they had organized key points of defense and other such defense work as bunkers, wire entanglements et cetera, with tanks acting as mobile fortresses. We not only did not organize, coordinate, and have the attacking units under a centralized command, but even two regiments of the same division failed to coordinate their movements, resulting in a "You fight, I rest" attitude.

3. Owing to insufficient time, and underestimation of the enemy, the mobile attacks generally lacked "attack the strong" preparations, hence violating the principle of the "Four quick, one slow" tactical technique. Officers did not survey the terrain in detail and famil-

larize themselves according to the principle of mobile warfare, but instead, engaged the enemy hastily without adequate preparation.

4. We did not organize and employ artillery fire, and the artillery units lagged behind. Infantry weapons too, were not exploited to their full capacity. For instance, the 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, launched three successive attacks on a small hilltop at the south of the railway station, and each of the three attacks failed in turn because of lack of fire support.

5. On the night when we failed to destroy the enemy and retreated, the withdrawal of our main force was not adequately executed. The enemy was close, facing us on the other hill, and our troops were closely concentrated; hence, though our losses were negligible on that night, yet we suffered greater losses on the following day. For instance the positions on MASAN (CS7247) could accommodate only one company at most, yet the entire 2d Battalion, 343d Regiment, was ordered to defend that hill where each enemy shell inflicted several casualties. We have been taught a lesson at the expense of bloodshed.

6. When carrying out an approach movement, if time allows, construct as many field works as possible while the troops advance. Besides the many advantages to be gained from these field works in offense or defense, they will also help to decrease the number of casualties suffered by reinforcements as they are being brought up from the rear.

7. Officers of the middle and lower ranks were unable to take advantage of opportunities, assume initiative and coordinate their movements at the right moment. They failed to take advantage of opportunities which the enemy could have been completely annihilated. For instance, when the 2d Battalion, 343d Regiment, was attacking MASAN, enemy troops were discovered to be moving at the base of the mountain in disorderly formation but did not attack the enemy. In another instance, the 3d Battalion of the 343d Regiment lost its bearings, resulting in lack of cooperation. The 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, did not complete its mission to attack the enemy. The 3d Battalion of the 344th Regiment did not exploit its success and continue the attack after it had occupied the hilltops on the front; instead it waited for the enemy, without launching an attack which could have inflicted heavier casualties upon the enemy.

8. Inaccuracy of combat reports: During the course of the battle, the 343d Regiment sent in a report stating that it had entered CHIPYONG-NI and was organizing attacks to be launched against PONGMI-SAN, while actually it had not even crossed the railroad. Then again, the 344th Regiment falsely reported completion of the first stage, preventing the higher command from making the proper decision.

9. Interrupted and delayed communication: Divisions were unable to send timely situation reports to armies, and armies could not inform divisions of their intentions, thereby greatly affecting the control of the battle. For instance, an order to intercept the enemy at 1800 hours of the 15th was received by the division at 0330 hours on the 16th. The result was that troop displacements were carried out in haste.

10. Inexperience of divisions in carrying out interception: Troop displacements were carried out too hastily, affecting the morale of the troops. They were not aware that the primary intention of enemy reinforcements was to rescue their troops surrounded at CHIPYONG-NI, and that without knowing the intention of our displacements the enemy did not dare attack immediately.

2 Inclosures


Inclosure #1 Overlay CHIPYONG-NI

Inclosure #2 Overlay CHIPYONG NI 10,000

BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI

14-16 Feb 51

The following overlays were prepared by the G-2 Section, EUSAK, to give a clearer picture of the disposition and movement of CCF units in the attack.



OVERLAY: KOREA: 1:250,000
AMS 552

CS20
DS00

BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI

HAGOSONG 6

~~KOSONG-NI~~

PACIFIC-SAN

SECRET

MA SAN

KANHYON

MANGET 5.1

SINDAE

SO:CGI

D KIANGYANG

CHOMANG-NI

3 ¹¹ CCF 343

$$\begin{array}{r} 11 \\ 2 \overline{) 22} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} 343 \\ 2 \overline{) 686} \end{array}$$

O. MUCHON

KUDUN CCF 115

 **KOKSU-RI**

~~CS40~~

CS82

XX

CHUALI-NI

TCF 116

OVERLAY
KOREA 1:50,000
AMS L751

TAB J

Oral History Transcripts

The USFK/EUSA History Office has conducted over 50 hours of taped oral history interviews with veterans of Chipyong-ni. Oral history interviews with individuals who participated in the defense of the southern perimeter include the following:

NAME	UNIT	CONTRIBUTION
McGee, Paul J.	George Company	Platoon leader 1/G
Kotite, Richard	Baker Company	Platoon leader in counterattack to regain George Company positions lost to the Chinese
Pratt, Sherman	Baker Company	Company commander who led counter attack
Curtis, Robert	Fox Company	Helped organize defense after the Chinese had penetrated the perimeter
Bererd, Serge	French Battalion	Served in French Battalion S-2 section
Chiles, John C.	Regimental Commander	Relieved Paul Freeman
Walker, Ansil	Dog Company	Provided mortar support to G company
Group Interview	Heavy Weapons Company	Includes an FO assigned to G Company

For additional information contact HQ USFK/EUSA Attn: SJS-Command Historian, APO San Francisco 96301, telephone 723-5213.

TAB K

FIRE SUPPORT

- RESPONSIBILITIES - BEGIN WITH COMMANDERS. LAY OUT TARGETS. CALL FOR FIRE ON TARGETS.
- FIRE SUPPORT PLANS
- MANEUVERING ARTILLERY - KEEP FORWARD OR OUT OF FIRE.
- COMMUNICATION
- MORTARS
- ATTACK HELICOPTERS DIFFICULT TO USE; MUST PLAN HOW TO USE; MUST BE ON TASK FORCE CMD NET.
- AIR FORCE AIR - KEEP INFORMED OF ENEMY ON GROUND.

AIR DEFENSE

- EARLY WARNING
- ADA POSITIONING
- ATTACHED OR SUPPORTING

NBC

- WARNING -
 - NBC 1 REPORTS, REPEAT PERIODICALLY.
- ATTACHMENTS -
 - KEEP PERSONNEL INFORMED WHO ARE ATTACHED.
- UNMASKING -
 - MUST BE MADE AT BATTALION LEVEL (DECISION).
- TRAINING VS DISCIPLINE

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- TIME FOR MANAGEMENT -
 - INTENT (COMMANDERS), REHEARSALS, DETAILS.
- NAVIGATION -
 - TO CONTROL MANEUVER AND FIRES.
- REPORTING/FRAGOs
- COMMAND
- TOC/2NC
 - (TWO NET CAPABILITY)

SAFETY FIRST

COMBAT SYSTEMS

⓪ CHECK ⓪

- INTELLIGENCE
- MANEUVER
- FIRE SUPPORT
- AIR DEFENSE
- NBC
- MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY
- COMBAT SUPPORT
- COMMAND AND CONTROL

MOBILITY/ COUNTERMOBILITY

- BYPASSES/OR BREACHING - MARK BYPASSES; GET SECURITY IN POSITION WHEN BREACHING.
- OBSTACLE PLANNING - KEY ELEMENT IN SURPRISING THE ENEMY WHEN ATTACKING/OR TO TEMPORARILY HOLD AN ENEMY FORCE.
- CONTROL OF BARRIER MATERIALS.
- MINE FIELD MARKING AND RECORDING.
- BULLDOZER - KEEP SUPPLY OF FUEL.

COMBAT SUPPORT

- INTEGRATED PLANNING PROCESS - S4 MUST BE INFORMED.
- MEDICAL TREATMENT/EVACUATION - SELF AID, BUDDY AID, MEDICS MUST HAVE PLAN.
- DISTRIBUTED MAINTENANCE EFFORT - DISTRIBUTED THRU BATTALION, COMPANY. MUST MIGRATE TO BRIGADE AREA.
- REPORTING - USED FOR COMMAND CONTROL.

INTELLIGENCE

- IPB - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION BATTLEFIELD.
- RECONNAISSANCE - KEY TO A GOOD, SUCCESSFUL ATTACK. COULD USE RADIO ACTIVITY.
- INTELL UPDATE - SCOUT MUST BE VERY PRECISE IN UPDATE.
- COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE - HAVE A PLAN TO DETECT ENEMY AND TANK TO KILL IT. DON'T LET FRIENDLY FORCES WANDER IN THIS TYPE OF MISSION.

MANEUVER

- OFFENSE -
 - PLANNING
 - MASS AND TEMPO
 - OVERWATCH BASE OF FIRE
 - DISMOUNTED INFANTRY - KEY TO UNLOCK ENEMY AT NIGHT - USE MINIMUM FIRE, AS NECESSARY.
- DEFENSE -
 - PLANNING SEQUENCE - LOOK WHERE TO KILL ENEMY, WHERE TO HOLD THEM.
 - DEPTH VS MASS - DEPTH - PLATOON/SQUADS AND DEFENSIVE MANEUVER.
 - WEAPONS POSITIONS AND CONTROL - TIGHTEN UP CONTROL.
 - USE OF INFANTRY - CONSTRUCT OBSTACLES, GUARD WEAPONS; NOT ENOUGH INFANTRY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR TANKS.

TAB L


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SHEET KOREA

장수 1.3 KM.

87 1.3 KM. 35' 75

YANGPYEONG YEONG YANGPYEONG
양평역 1.0 KM. 양평 0.5 KM.

WITBEOMSIL 204 4/14/80





여주 YEOJU

SEOWEONMAL
서원말 1.3 KM.

GWANGTAN RI
광탄리 1.8 KM.

GWANGTAN RI
광탄리 0.8 KM.

YONGD
용두리

76

77

78

79

380


81

82 40'

83

84

85





판 수 3-KAMC 계열번호 L752 도엽번호 32201
EDITION SERIES SHEET

URI 12 KM. 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 127°48'

YONGDU RI Hwangjeong 7.4 KM. 황정 10 KM. 45'

37°30'





범례 LEGEND

고속도로

- 4차선고속도로
- 2차선고속도로

도로

- 어떠한 기후에서라도 통행가능
- 포장된 표면 4.8미터(16피드) 또는 그이상의 폭
- 포장안된 표면 4.8미터(16피드) 또는 그이상의 폭
- 포장된 표면 2.4-4.8미터(8-16피드)의 폭
- 포장안된 표면 2.4-4.8미터(8-16피드)의 폭
- 뛰거나 건조한 기후에만 통행가능
- 포장안된 표면 4.8미터(16피드) 이상의 폭
- 포장안된 표면 2.4-4.8미터(8-16피드)의 폭
- 우.마차길 1.5-2.4미터(5-8피드)의 폭
- 소로 1.5미터(5피드) 이하의 폭
- 고속도로 번호
- 국도, 지방도 도로번호

교량

- 철교, 콘크리트교, 목교

철도

- 표준궤간 1.44미터(4'8 1/2")의 폭
- 단선 및 역
- 복선

별기징

- 돌담, 흙제방
- 고압선
- 삼각점, 수준점
- 지점의높이: 조사완료, 미조사
- 학교, 교회
- 변전소, 양수장
- 여울목, 나루
- 절, 사당, 묘지
- 삼림 또는 총림, 잡목숲
- 과수원, 포도원
- 논

SUPERHIGHWAY

- 4 Lanes superhighway
- 2 Lanes superhighway

ROADS

- All weather
- hard surface, 4.8m.(16feet) or more wide
- loose surface, 4.8m.(16feet) or more wide
- hard surface, 2.4 to 4.8m.(8 to 16 feet) wide
- loose surface, 2.4 to 4.8m.(8 to 16 feet) wide
- Fair or dry weather, loose surface, over 4.8m.(16 feet) wide
- Fair or dry weather, loose surface, 2.4 to 4.8m.(8 to 16 feet) wide
- Cart track 1.5 to 2.4m. (5 to 8 feet) wide
- Footpath, trail less than 1.5m.(5 feet) wide
- Superhighway route marker
- National, local route marker

BRIDGES


- Steel, Concrete, Wood

RAILROADS

- Normal gauge, 1.44m.(4'8 1/2") wide
- Single track with station
- Double track


Heliport

- Masonry wall, Levee
- Power transmission line
- Horizontal control point, Bench mark in meters
- Spot elevation in meters; Checked, Unchecked
- School, Church
- Transformer station, Water pumping station
- Ford, Ferry
- Temple, Shrine, Cemetery
- Woods or brushwood, Scrub
- Orchard, Vineyard
- Rice paddies




도로번호는 대통령령 제10247호 및 건설부령에 의거 81년6월1일에 개정된 번호를 적용하였음.
ROUTE NUMBERS ARE BASED ON THE ROUTE NUMBER CHANGED JUNE 1981, BY THE MOC.

도엽번호 3220 I SHEET
계열번호 L752 SERIES
판 수 3-KAMC EDITION



축척 Scale 1:50,000



제작기관 ——— 대한민국 육군지도창
 등고선 간격 ——— 20미터 보조 등고선은 10미터
 투영법 ——— 횡단 "마케이터" 식 투영
 수직기준면 ——— 해면 평균수위
 수평기준점 ——— "도포"를 기준했음
 좌표 ——— "벡셀" 지구 52구역의 1,000미터 만국횡단 "마케이터" 좌표
 책임편집사 ——— 군무기사 이차봉
 신빙년도 ——— 현지정찰 1982년
 인쇄기관 ——— 대한민국 육군지도창 11 / 82

PREPARED BY ——— REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY MAPPING CENTER
 CONTOUR INTERVAL — 20 METERS WITH 10 METER SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS
 PROJECTION ——— TRANSVERSE MERCATOR
 VERTICAL DATUM ——— MEAN SEA LEVEL
 HORIZONTAL DATUM ——— TŌKYŌ DATUM
 GRID ——— 1,000 METER UTM, ZONE 52 BESSEL SPHEROID
 RELIABILITY DATE ——— FIELD CHECKED 1982
 PRINTED BY ——— REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY MAPPING CENTER 11 / 82

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
1980 도자각
 G-M ANGLE
 6 1/2° (120 밀)
 MILS

자북방위각을 도북방위각으로
 변경하려면 G-M각을 감하라


TO CONVERT A
 MAGNETIC AZIMUTH
 TO A GRID AZIMUTH
 SUBTRACT G-M ANGLE


도북방위각을 자북방위각으로
 변경하려면 G-M각을 가하라

TO CONVERT A
 GRID AZIMUTH TO A
 MAGNETIC AZIMUTH
 ADD G-M ANGLE



도자각
 0° 49' (15 밀)
 도엽의 중앙에서
 GRID CONVERGENCE
 0° 49' (15 MILS)
 FOR CENTER OF SHEET






어 해 GLOSSARY


암	temple	Am
봉	mountain	Bong
천	river	Cheon
단	shrine	Dang
도	primary administrative division	Do
동상	bronze statue	Dongsang
읍	tertiary administrative division	Eub
강	river	Gang
고개	mountain pass	Cogae
굴	tunnel	Gul
교	bridge	Gyo
향교	confucian shrine	Hyang-gyo
재	mountain pass	Jae
칸트리	golf course	Kanteurikulleob
리	settlement	Ri
루	Pavilion	Ru
사	temple	Sa
사당	shrine	Sadang
산	mountain	San
섬	island	Seom
선	railroad	Seon
서원	confucian shrine	Seoweon
왕릉	tomb	Wangreung
역	railroad station	Yeo

고도지침표 ELEVATION GUIDE



높은지대	High
중간지대	Medium
낮은지대	Low

경계표 BOUNDARIES



개략의경계선 BOUNDARIES APPROXIMATE

도 (Nampo, Bugdo)	
시, 군	Si, Gun
읍, 면	Eub, Myeon
A. 강령군	A. Gyeonggi Do
1. 양평군	1. Yangpyeong Gun
a. 양평읍	a. Yangpyeong Eub
b. 용문면	b. Yongmun Myeon
c. 강상면	c. Gangsang Myeon
d. 개군면	d. Gaegun Myeon
e. 단월면	e. Danweol Myeon
f. 지제면	f. Jije Myeon
g. 양동면	g. Yangdong Myeon
2. 여주군	2. Yeosu Gun
h. 여주읍	h. Yeosu Eub
i. 금사면	i. Geumsa Myeon
k. 흥천면	k. Heungcheon Myeon
m. 대신면	m. Daesin Myeon
n. 북내면	n. Bugnae Myeon
p. 능서면	p. Neungseo Myeon
q. 가남면	q. Ganam Myeon
r. 강천면	r. Gangcheon Myeon
3. 이천군	3. Icheon Gun

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s. 맥사면	s. Baegsa Myeon
t. 부발면	t. Bubal Myeon
4. 횡성군	4. Hoengseong Gun
u. 서원면	u. Seoweon Myeon
5. 원성군	5. Wonseong Gun
v. 지장면	v. Jijeong Myeon
w. 문막면	w. Munmag Myeon
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